MEMCAL 


IN  MBMORIAM 
A.K.    CRAWFORD. 


.  D, 


THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 


HALL,  STUTTGART,  April  5,  1880. 

We  hereby  authorize  the  Rev.  Dr.  G.  A.  Zimmermann  to  translate 
into  English  the  book  entitled : 

Die  Dancin'schen  Theorien  und  ihre  Stellung  zur  Philo- 
sophie^  Religion  und  Moral,  von  Rudolf  Schmid. 

We  declare  that  we  know  of  no  other  translation  of  the  said 
book,  and  that  Dr.  Zimmermann's  translation  will  be  the  only  one 
authorized  by  us  for  the  United  States,  as  well  as  for  the  British 
Empire  and  its  Dominions. 

(The  Author)          RUDOLF  SCHMID. 
(The  Publisher)       PAUL  MOSER. 


THE 


THEORIES  OF  DARWIN 


AND   THEIR   RELATION   TO 


PHILOSOPHY,  RELIGION.  AND  'MORALITY. 


BY  EUDOLF  jgHMID, 

President  of  the  Theological  Seminarjfat  Schonthal,  Wurtcmberg. 


TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  GERMAN, 

BY  G.    A.   ZIMMERMANN,  Pn.D. 

WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 

THE  DUKE  OF  ARGYLL. 


/<§ 

CHICAGO  : 
JANSEN,    McCLURG,    &   COMPANY. 

1883. 


COPYRIGHT 

BY  JANSBN,  MCCLTJBG  &  Co. 
A.D.  1882. 


B,   B.   DONNELLEY   A   SONS,  PRINTERS. 


AUTHOR'S   PREFACE. 


The  movement  which  received  its  impulse  as  well  as  its 
name  from  Darwin,  seems  to  have  recently  passed  its  dis- 
tinctest  phase;  but  the  more  prominent  points  of  opposition, 
religious,  ethical,  and  scientific,  which  have  been  revealed 
through  it,  remain  as  sharply  contrasted  as  before.  The 
author  of  this  book  desires,  in  the  first  place,  to  be  of  ser- 
vice to  such  readers  as  feel  the  need  of  setting  themselves 
right  upon  these  questions,  which  touch  the  highest  interests 
of  mankind,  but  who  lack  time  and  opportunity  to  investigate 
independently  a  realm  in  which  so  many  and  so  heterogene- 
ous sciences  come  into  mutual  contact.  The  illogical  and 
confused  manner  in  which  some  noisy  leaders  confound 
these  sciences  and  their  problems  and  consequences,  renders 
it  still  more  difficult  to  arrive  at  a  satisfactory  result ;  and 
thus  perhaps  many  readers  will  look  with  interest  upon  an 
investigation  designed  to  simplify  the  different  problems 
and  the  Jifferent  attempts  at  their  solution,  and  to  treat 
them  not  jnly  in  their  relations  to  each  other,  but  also  sep- 
arately. But  with  this  primary  object,  the  author  combines 
another:  o  render  a  service  to  some  among  the  many  who 
perceive  the  harmony  between  their  scientific  conviction 
and  their  religious  need  threatened  or  shaken  by  the  results 
of  science,  and  who  are  unwilling  to  lose  this  harmony,  or, 
having  lost  it,  desire  to  regain  it.  Those  voices  are  indeed 
becoming  louder,  and  more  generally  and  willingly  heard, 
which  proclaim  an  irreconcilability  between  faith  and  know] . 


edge,  between  the  religious  and  the  scientific  views  of  the 
world ;  which  declare  that  peace  between  the  two  can  only 
be  had  at  the  price  either  of  permitting  the  religious  im- 
pulses of  the  heart  to  be  stifled  in  favor  of  science,  of 
satisfying  the  religious  need  of  the  mind  with  a  nourishment 
which  in  the  light  of  science  proves  to  be  an  illusion,  or,  as 
sceptics  in  theory  and  eclectics  in  practice,  of  renouncing 
with  resignation  a  logical  connection  and  foundation  to  their 
former  view  of  the  world.  The  most  striking  proof  of  the 
extent  to  which  these  voices  are  heard,  is  the  fact  that  it  has 
been  possible  for  a  one-sided  pessimism  to  become  the  fash- 
ionable system  of  philosophy  in  a  Christian  nation.  The 
most  effective  means  for  opposing  such  discordant  voices, 
and  for  making  amends  for  the  disagreements  which  they 
have  occasioned,  undoubtedly  consists  in  the  actual  proof  of 
the  contrary  of  their  theories,  in  the  clear  presentation  of  a 
standpoint  from  which  not  only  the  most  unrestricted  free~ 
dom  of  investigation  and  the  most  unreserved  acknowledg- 
•ment  of  its  results  shall  be  in  perfect  harmony  with  the 
undiminished  care  of  our  entire  religious  possession,  but  in 
which  this  peace  is  preserved  and  forever  established  by 
the  very  fact  that  one  function  of  the  mind  directly  requires 
the  other,  one  possession  directly  guarantees  the  other. 
This  is  the  standpoint  of  the  author,  and  from  it  he  has 
endeavored  to  treat  all  the  questions  which  are  to  be  taken 
into  consideration.  Should  he,  by  his  exposition  of  this 
standpoint,  succeed  in  helping  even  a  few  readers  in  reach- 
ing the  conviction  of  the  actual  harmony  between  the  scien- 
tific, religious,  and  ethical  acquisitions  of  mankind,  or  in 
confirming  them  anew  in  such  conviction,  he  would  find 
himself  amply  rewarded  for  this  first  extended  venture  before 
the  public. 

R.  S. 


AUTHOR'S    PREFACE    TO   AMERICAN    EDITION. 


Six  years  have  elapsed  since  I  wrote  the  book  which  is 
now  going  forth  in  English  dress.  The  great  leader  of  the 
theories  in  question  has  passed  away ;  the  waves  of  thought 
he  set  in  motion  are  assuming  smoother  shape ;  and  I  can 
only  add  to  what  I  have  already  written,  that  not  only  have 
I  had  no  occasion  to  retract  any  of  the  statements  or  views 
laid  down  in  the  book,  but  I  perceive  the  religious  as  well 
as  the  scientific  world  growing  more  and  more  into  accord 
with  the  views  I  have  maintained,  and  which  were  at  first 
so  vehemently  opposed. 

I  owe  so  much  to  the  literary  men  of  the  English  tongue 
on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  that  I  shall  be  glad  if,  through 
the  devoted  labors  of  the  translator,  I  am  enabled  to  pay 
them  a  tribute  of  gratitude  by  aiding  them  in  clearing  the 
way  for  thought  in  these  much  disputed  fields,  or  in  re- 
conciling in  their  minds  the  conflict  between  faith  and 
science. 

R.  S. 

SCHONTHAL,  WURTEMBERG,  September^  1882. 


INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION, 
BY  THE   DUKE  OF  ARGYLL. 


It  is  well  known  that  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  on  the  Origin 
of  Species  has  been  accepted  in  Germany  more  widely,  with 
more  absolute  faith,  and  with  more  vehement  enthusiasm, 
than  in  the  country  of  its  birth.  In  Germany,  more  con- 
spicuously than  elsewhere,  it  has  itself  become  the  subject 
of  developments  as  strange  and  as  aberrant  as  any  which 
it  assumes  in  the  history  of  Organic  Life.  The  most 
extravagant  conclusions  have  been  drawn  from  it — invading 
every  branch  of  human  thought,  in  Science,  in  Philosophy, 
and  in  Religion.  These  conclusions  have  been  preached, 
too,  with  a  dogmatism  as  angry  and  as  intolerant  as  any  of 
the  old  theologies.  It  is  the  fate  of  every  idea  which  is 
new  and  fruitful,  that  it  is  ridden  to  the  death  by  excited 
novices.  We  can  not  be  surprised  if  this  fate  has  overtaken 
the  idea  that  all  existing  animal  forms  have  had  their  an- 
cestry in  other  forms  which  exist  no  longer,  and  have  been 
derived  from  these  by  ordinary  generation  through  count- 
less stages  of  descent.  Although  this  is  an  idea  which, 
whether  true  or  not,  is  entirely  subordinate  to  the  larger 
idea  of  creation,  it  usurps  in  many  minds  the  character  of  a 
substitute.  This  is  natural  enough.  The  theory,  or  at  least 
the  language,  of  Evolutionists,  puts  forward  a  visible  order 
of  phenomena  as  a  complete  and  all-sufficient  account  of  its 
own  origin  and  cause.  However  unsatisfactory  this  may  be 
to  the  higher  faculties  of  the  mind,  it  is  eminently  satisfac- 


6  INTRODUCTION. 

tory  to  those  other  faculties  which  are  lower  in  the  scale. 
It  dismisses  as  needless,  or  it  postpones  indefinitely,  all 
thought  of  the  agencies  which  are  ultimate  and  unseen. 
Just  as  in  the  physical  world,  some  trivial  object  which  is 
very  near  us  may  shut  out  the  whole  of  a  wide  horizon,  so 
in  the  intellectual  world,  some  coarse  mechanical  conception 
may  shut  out  all  the  kingdom  of  Nature  and  the  glory  of  it. 

Two  great  subjects  of  investigation  lie  before  us.  The 
first  is  to  ascertain  how  far  the  Theory  of  Evolution  repre- 
sents an  universal  fact,  or  only  one  very  partial  and  frag- 
mentary aspect  of  a  great  variety  of  facts  connected  with 
the  origin  and  development  of  Organic  Life.  The  second 
and  by  far  the  most  important  inquiry,  is  to  estimate  aright, 
or  as  nearly  as  we  can,  the  relative  place  and  importance  of 
these  facts  in  the  Philosophy  of  Nature. 

Subjects  of  investigation  so  rich  and  manifold  as  these 
may  well  attract  all  the  most  varied  gifts  of  the  human 
mind.  This  they  have  already  done,  and  there  is  every 
indication  that  they  will  continue  to  do  so  for  generations 
yet  to  be.  Already  an  immense  literature  is  devoted  to 
them;  and  every  fresh  effort  of  observation  and  of  reason- 
ing seems  to  open  out  new  and  fruitful  avenues  of  thought. 
The  work  which  is  here  introduced  to  the  English  reader 
contains  an  excellent  review  of  this  literature,  so  far  as  it  is 
represented  in  the  English  and  German  languages.  Know- 
ing the  author  personally,  as  I  hava  done  for  many  years,  I 
recognize  with  pleasure  in  his  work  all  the  carefulness  of 
inquiry,  and  all  the  conscientiousness  of  reasoning,  which 
belong  to  a  singularly  candid  and  patient  mind. 

ARGYLL. 

INVERARY  CASTLE,  SCOTLAND, 
September,  1882. 


NOTE   BY  THE   TRANSLATOR. 


The  consideration  which  this  work  has  received  from  the 
leaders  of  religious  and  philosophic  thought  in  Germany, 
and,  indeed,  wherever  it  has  been  read  in  its  original  form, 
has  led  the  translator  to  believe  that  an  English  version  of 
it  would  be  acceptable.  Especially  in  America,  where 
religious  problems  and  religious  thought  are  so  intimately 
connected  with  the  processes,  of  scientific  and  philosophic 
investigation,  and  where  the  agitation  of  these  problems  is 
so  peculiarly  active  and  violent,  it  has  seemed  that  a  work 
marked  by  so  much  scholarship,  profundity,  and  compre- 
hensiveness and  originality  of  treatment,  must  serve  an 
important  purpose  to  the  cause  of  religious  no  less  than  of 
scientific  truth.  It  may  be  explained  here,  that  the  author 
resided  for  some  years  in  the  family  of  the  Duke  of  Argyll, 
and  there  breathed,  to  a  certain  extent,  the  scientific  air  of 
Darwinism  in  its  very  origin ;  and  thus  his  familiarity  with 
all  the  results  of  modern  scientific  research,  added  to  his 
theological  and  philosophical  acquirements,  enable  him,  with 
a  most  admirable  blending  of  the  spirit  of  fairness  and  tol- 
eration with  logical  severity  of  treatment,  to  bring  these 
different  domains  into  their  proper  relation  with  each  other 
and  to  establish  between  them  that  essential  harmony  in 
which  consists  the  solution  of  these  most  profound  and 
vital  problems  of  man's  welfare. 

Of  the  translation  it  may  properly  be  said  that,  while  the 
aim  has  been  to  give  the  work  the  clearest  possible  form 
consistent  with  that  strict  fidelity  to  the  original  which  is 

7 


NOTE    BY   THE    TRANSLATOR. 

especially  demanded  by  the  character  of  its  material,  the 
translator  has  not  hoped  to  make  the  work  altogether  "easy" 
reading.  Peculiarities  of  the  author's  style  have  been,  it  is 
believed,  largely  preserved ;  and  occasional  difficulties  of 
apprehension  are  no  doubt  to  be  expected,  both  from  the 
method  of  treatment  and  from  the  profound  and  abstruse 
character  of  the  topics  treated.  The  translator  will  be  well 
satisfied  if  it  shall  be  found  that  he  has  succeeded  in  per- 
forming his  task  without  adding  unduly  to  the  seeming 
obscurities  of  certain  passages — obscurities  which,  however, 
will  no  doubt  vanish  before  that  degree  of  mental  applica- 
tion without  which  such  works  may  not  be  read  at  all  intel- 
ligibly. 

Acknowledgments  are  properly  due  and  are  gladly  ren- 
dered to  George  C.  Dawson,  Esq.,  of  Chicago,  and  to  Mr. 
Francis  F.  Browne,  editor  of  The  Dial,  for  valuable  assist- 
ance in  revising  and  perfecting  this  version. 

G.  A.  Z. 

CHICAGO,  October,  1882. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION, 17 

PART  FIRST ': 
THE  DARWINIAN  THEORIES. 

BOOK     I. 

THE  PURELY   SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES. 
The  Scientific  Problem,      -  23 

CHAPTER    I. 
RISE  OF  THE  DARWINIAN  THEORIES. 

§1.    Direct  Predecessors,    -        -  ...        30 

§2.     Indirect  Preparations,    -  33 

CHAPTER    II. 

HISTORY  OF  THE  DARWINIAN  THEORIES. 

§1.     Darwin,       -  38 

§2.    The  Followers  of  Darwin.— Ernst  Hackel,  -  45 

§3.    Modifications  of  the  Theory.— Moriz  Wagner     Wigand,  52 

CHAPTER     III. 
PRESENT  STATE  OF  THE  DARWINIAN  THEORIES. 

§1.     The  Theory  of  Descent,                                                       -  61 
§2.     The  Theory  of  Evolution.  —  Archaeology,  Ethnography, 

Philology, 77 

.  §3.    The  Theory  of  Selection, 100 


10  CONTENTS. 


BOOK      II. 

THE  PHILOSOPHIC   COMPLETIONS  AND  CONSE- 
QUENCES OF  THE   DARWINIAN  THEORIES. 

The  Philosophic  Problems,  108 

CHAPTER    I. 

THE   NATURO-PHILOSOPHIC    SUPPLEMENTS   OP   THE    DARWINIAN 
THEORIES. 

§1.     The  Origin  of  Self -Consciousness  and  of  Free  Moral  Self- 

Determination,  115 

$2.    The  Origin  of  Sensation  and  of  Consciousness,  -  127 

§3.     The  Origin  of  Life,  132 
§4.    The  Elements  of  the  World ;  the  Theory  of  Atoms,  and 

the  Mechanical  View  of  the  World,  140 


CHAPTER     II. 

METAPHYSICAL  CONCLUSIONS  DRAWN  FROM  THE  DARWINIAN 
THEORIES. 

§1.     Elimination  of  the  Idea  of  Design  in  the  World.— Mo- 
nism,        -  158 


CONTENTS.  11 

PART  SECOND: 

THE   POSITION   OF    THE   DARWINIAN 

THEORIES   IN  REFERENCE    TO 

RELIGION  AND  MORALITY. 

BOOK    I. 

HISTORICAL   AND    CRITICAL. 
Plan  of  Treatment, 185 

A.    THE  DARWINIAN  THEORIES  AND  RELIGION. 
CHAPTER    I. 

9 

MORE  OB  LESS  NEGATIVE  POSITION  IN  REFERENCE  TO  RELIGION. 

§1.  Extreme  Negation:  L.  Biichner  and  Consistent  Mate- 
rialism, -  188 

£2.  Replacement  of  Religion  Through  a  Religious  Worship 

of  the  Universe.— Strauss.  Oskar  Schmidt.  Hackel.  190 

§3.  Pious  Renunciation  of  the  Knowability  of  God.— Wil- 

helm  Bleek.  Albert  Lange.  Herbert  Spencer.  -  -  193 

§4.  Spinoza  and  Hegel  in  the  Garb  of  Darwin. — Carneri, 

Ed.  von  Hartmann,  ...  -  203 

§5.  Reecho  of  Negation  on  the  Side  of  the  Christian  View  of 

the  World, 206 

CHAPTER     II. 

REFORM  OF  RELIGION,  OR  AT  LEAST  OF   THE    SCIENCE  OF  RE- 
LIGION, THROUGH  DARWINISM. 

§1.    Heinrich  Lang.     Friedrich  Vischer.     Gustav  Jager.        -      210 

CHAPTER    III. 
PEACE  BETWEEN  RELIGION  AND  DARWINISM. 

§1.  Darwin.  Wallace.  Owen.  Asa  Gray.  Mivart.  Me- 
Cosh.  Anderson.  K.  E.  von  Baer.  Alexander  Braun. 
Braubach,  and  others, -  217 


12  CONTENTS. 

B.     THE  DAB  WINIAN  THEORIES  AND  MORALITY. 
Preliminary  View, 228 

CHAPTER    IV. 

ANTAGONISM  BETWEEN  DARWINISM  AND  MORALITY. 
§1.     Objections  to  Darwinism  from  an  Ethical  Standpoint,      -      230 

CHAPTER     V. 
REFORM  OF  MORALITY  THROUGH  DARWINISM. 

§1.     The  Materialists  and  Monists.     Darwin  and  the  English 

Utilitarians.     Gustav  Jager.  233 

CHAPTER    VI. 

NEUTRALITY  AND  PEACE  BETWEEN   DARWINISM  AND  MORALITY. 
$1.    Mivart.     Alexander  Braun,  and  others,  -      245 

BOOK     II. 
ANALYTICAL. 

Preliminary  View,      ...  249 

A.     THE  DARWINIAN  THEORIES  AND  RELIGION. 

CHAPTER    I. 

THE  DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND   THE  THEISTIC  VIEW  OF  THE 

WORLD. 

a.     Tlw  Position  of  Purely  Scientific  Darwinism  in  Reference  to 
Theism. 

§1.     Scientific  Investigation  and  Theism.— The  Idea  of  Crea- 
tion,  252 


CONTENTS.  13 

§2.    The  Descent  Theory  and  Theism,  ....          259 

§3.     The  Evolution  Theory  and  Theism,  ....      263 

§4.     The  Selection  Theory  and  Theism,        ....          270 
b.     The  Darwinistic  Philosophemes  in  their  Position  Regard- 
ing Theism. 
§5.     The  Naturo-Philosophic  Supplements  of  Darwinism  and 

Theism, -      273 

§6.    Elimination  of  the  Idea  of  Design,  or  its  Acknowledg- 
ment and  Theism, 284 

CHAPTER    II. 
THE  DARWINIAN  THEORIES  AND  POSITIVE  CHRISTIANITY. 

§1.    The  Creation  of  the  World,  -      290 

§2.     The  Creation  of  Man,    • 

§3.    The  Primitive  Condition  of  Man. — Paradise,  the  Fall  of 

Man,  and  Primitive  History, 321 

§4.     Providence,  Hearing  of  Prayer,  and  Miracles,        -        -          345 
§5.    The  Redeemer  and  the  Redemption,   the  Kingdom  of 

God,  and  the  Receiving  of  Salvation,  -       -       -      373 

§6.    Eschatology, 375 


B.    THE  DARWINIAN  THEORIES  AND  MORALITY. 

CHAPTER     III. 
DARWINISM  AND  MORAL  PRINCIPLES. 

§1.     Darwinistic  Naturalism  and  Moral  Principles,         -        -      379 
§2.    Scientific  Darwinism  and  Moral  Principles,   ...         386 

CHAPTER    IV. 
DARWINISM  AND  MORAL  LIFE. 

§1.    Darwinistic  Naturalism  and  Moral  Life,  391 

§2.    Scientific  Naturalism  and  Moral  Life,    ....          396 


CONCLUSION, 


AUTHORS  CITED. 


Agassiz,  Louis,  35,  37,  50,  320. 

Anderson,  225. 

Anonymus,   ' '  the  Unconscious, " 

etc.,  128,129,  131,  134,  159. 
Anonymus,  "Vestiges, "  etc. ,  33. 
Argyll,  Duke  of,  50,  91,  92,  135, 

172,  202,  288. 
Ausland,  159,  240,  281. 
Baer,  Karl  Ernst  von,  36,  54,  56, 

71,  74,  81,  83,  106,  132,  149, 

160,177,  226,  259,  281,  288,  320. 
Barrande,  54. 

Baumgartner,  Heinrich,  57,  176. 
Blanchard,  Emil,  54,  106. 
Bleek,  Wilhelm,  17,  96,  97,  194, 

197,  234,  236. 
Boerhave,  36. 
Braubach,  226. 
Braun,  Alexander,  55,  176,  226, 

246,  397. 

Braun,  Julius,  17. 
Buch,  Leopold  von,  52. 
Buckle,  17. 
Buchner,  Ludwig,  42,  118,  141, 

158,  188,  205,  219,  233,  396. 
Buffon,  31. 
Oarneri,  203,  238. 
Cams,  36. 
Christy,  90. 
Condillac,  96. 
Cotta,  Bernhard  von,  51. 
Curtius,  96. 

Cuvier,  31,  32,  34,  37,  320. 
Darwin,  17,  18,  25,  27,  38,  118, 

171,  177,  217,  240,  320,  389. 
Descartes,  127. 
Dillman,  295,  301. 
Dohrn,  84. 
DuBois-Reymond,  Emil,  124, 125, 

127,  130,  134,  149. 


Ebrard,  159,  209. 

Ecker,  56. 

Escher,  von  der  Linth,  54. 

Farnir,  96. 

Fechner,   Gustav  Theodor,    135, 

146. 
Fichte,  Immanuel  Hermann,  142, 

175. 

Fraas,  Oskar,  55,  90. 
Frohschammer,  175. 
Gegenbaur,  56. 
Geiger,  Lazar,  17,  96. 
Geoffroy,  St.  Hilaire  Etienne,  32, 

34. 

Gerhard,  197.     v 
Giebel,  54. 
Goppert,  54. 
Gothe,  33,  34,  35,  320. 
Gray,  Asa,  222. 
Grusebach,  55. 
Grimm,  Jacob,  17,  95. 
Hackel,  35,  42,  43,  45,    75,  78, 

106,  123,  130,  133,   149,  159, 

160,  166,  170,   204,  219,  234, 

237,  281,  395. 
Hartmann,  Eduard  von.  56,  60, 

106,  131,   142,  168,  176,  191, 

205,  334,  376. 
Heer.  Oswald,  56,  176. 
Hegel,  126,  136,  204. 
Helmholtz,  136,  159. 
Heyse,  96. 
Hilgendorf,  82. 
His,  Wilhelm,  56,  81,  106. 
Huber,  175. 

Humboldt,  Wilhelm  von,  17,  95. 
Huxley,  Thomas,  42,  50, 177,  198, 

222,  279. 

Jager,  Gustav,  51,  124,  214,  243. 
Jellinghaus,  94. 


AUTHORS   CITED. 


15 


Kant,  195,  282. 
Keim,  18,  337. 
Kolliker,  56,  81,  176. 
Kostlin,  Julius,  175,  187. 
Kostlin,  Otto,  149. 
Kowalewsky,  A.,  42. 
Kowalewsky,  W.,  83. 
Kurz,  Johann  Heinrich,  306. 
Lamarck,  27,  30,  31,  33,  320. 
Lang,  Heinrich,  197,  210. 
Lange,    Friedrich    Albert,    112, 

168,  173,  176,  194,  196. 
Lartet,  96. 
Leibnitz,  127,  217. 
Leidy,  83. 
Lessing,  405,  407. 
Linnaeus,  30. 
Livingstone,  93. 
Lotze,  142,  145,  149. 
Lubbock,  Sir  John,  18,  91,  93, 242. 
Lyell,  Sir  Charles,  18,  36,  55,  89, 

90,  222. 

Madler,  177,  252. 
Malthus,  39. 
Marsh,  83. 
Martenseu,  187. 
Mayer,  Robert  von,  37,  129,  149, 

155. 

McCosh,  224. 
Mill,  John  Stuart,  242. 
Mivart,  55,  106,  223,  245. 
Moleschott,  42. 
Miiller,  Fritz,  79. 
Miiller,  Max,  18,  96,  98. 
Murchison,  Sir  Roderick,  54. 
Nageli,  56. 

Nitzsch,  Karl  Immanuel,  361. 
Noire",  Ludwig,  281. 
Oken,  34,  320. 
Owen,  Richard,  35,  56,  164,  176, 

221,  223,  320. 
Peschel,  Oskar,  279. 
Pfaff,  54. 

Pfleiderer,  Otto,  187. 
Planck,  Carl  Ch.,  105,  110. 
Preyer,  136,  146,  153. 
Rathke,  Heinrich,  81. 
Reichenbach,  42. 
Renan,  18. 


Rdville,  Albert,  334. 

Ritschl,  364. 

Riitimeyer,  56,  83. 

Sandberger,  55,  82. 

Schaaffhausen,  56,  85,  177. 

Schelling,  109. 

Schiller,  180. 

Schleicher,  17,  96. 

Schleiden,  42,  51. 

Schleiermacher,  190. 

Schmidt,  Oskar,  33,  34,  51,  75, 

124,  159,  164,  191,  234. 
Schopenhauer,  128,  190. 
Schrader,  Eberhard,  345. 
Seidlitz,  51,  159,  238. 
Semper,  Karl,  84,  131. 
Snell,  Karl,  42,  262. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  128,  139,  194, 

242,  279. 
Spinoza,  204. 
Stael,  Madame  de,  234. 
Steffens,  109. 
Steinthal,  17,  96. 
Strauss,  David  Friedrich,  18, 112, 

125,  128,  159,  163,  174,   175, 
190,  213,  234,  337,  376,  394. 

Swammerdam,  36. 

Tait,  138. 

Thomson,  Sir  William,  138. 

Triimpelmann,  209. 

Tiibingen  School,  18. 

Tylor,  91. 

Ulrici,  142,  144,  149,  175,  235. 

Virchow,  56,  85. 

Vischer,  Friedrich,  175,  176,  213, 

264 

Vogt,  Karl,  42,  56. 
Volkmann,  A.  W.,  56, 105,  177. 
Wagner,  Moriz,  52,  56. 
Wallace,  Alfred  Russell,  37,  101, 

177,  221,  262. 
Wedgewood,  96. 
Weismann,  56. 
Wigand,  Albert,   26,  52,  56,  57, 

106,  135,  149,  170,  226. 
Wuudt,  142. 
Wttrtemberger,  82. 
Zittel,  56. 
Zollner,  128,  129,  131,  138,  139. 


THE  THEOEIES  OF  DARWIN, 


AND   THEIR   RELATION   TO 


PHILOSOPHY,   RELIGION,    AND    MORALITY. 


INTRODUCTION. 

WITH  the  appearance  of  Darwin's  "Origin  of  Spe- 
cies," on  the  24th  of  November,  1859,  a  new  impulse 
began  in  the  intellectual  movement  of  our  generation. 
It  is  true,  the  whole  theory  advocated  and  inaugurated 
by  Darwin  is,  in  the  first  place,  only  one  of  the  many 
links  in  the  long  chain  of  phenomena  in  the  realm  of 
the  intellectual  development  of  our  century,  all  of  which 
have  the  same  character,  and  give  their  stamp  to  the 
entire  mental  work  of  the  last  decades.  This  stamp 
corisists  in  the  tendency  of  science,  which  has  nearly 
become  universal,  not  only  to  consider  all  phenomena, 
both  of  the  physical  and  the  mental  life,  in  connection 
with  their  preceding  conditions  in  space  and  time,  but 
to  trace  them  back  more  or  less  exclusively  to  these 
conditions,  and  to  explain  them  exclusively  by  means  of 
the  same.  What  a  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt,  and,  still 
more,  a  Jacob  Grimm,  prepared  the  way  for  in  the  realm 
of  philology,  a  Lazar  Geiger  and  a  Steinthal,  and  (under 
direct  influence  of  Darwin)  a  Schleicher  and  a  Wilhelm 
Bleek  further  developed ;  what  Julius  Braun  did  in  the 
realm  of  the  history  of  art ;  what  a  Buckle  and  a  Sir 

2  (17) 


18  THE    THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

John  Lubbock  triect  to  do  in  the  realm  of  the  history  of 
civilization;  what  a  Max  Miiller  did  in  the  realm  of  the 
history  of  religion;  what  the  Tubingen  School  began 
and  its  disciples  carried  out  in  the  realm  of  the  exegesis 
of  the  Bible;  what  a  Strauss  and  a  Renan,  and  in  a  cer- 
tain sense  also  a  Keim,  did  in  the  realm  of  christology; 
what,  finally — without  being  so  closely  connected  with 
individual  names  —  was  also  done  in  the  realm  of  the 
world's  history :  this,  Darwin  did  in  the  realm  of  the 
history  of  the  organic  kingdoms,  seconded  by  the  geo- 
logical principles  of  Sir  Charles  Lyell  and  by  the  inves- 
tigations in  biology  and  comparative  anatomy  of  a 
number  of  scientists.  From  this  point  of  view,  the 
movement  which  was  inaugurated  by  Darwin  seems  to 
us  but  the  reflex  of  the  universal  spirit  of  the  present 
time  upon  a  particular  realm  ;  namely,  that  of  natural 
science.  But  since,  soon  after  the  appearance  of  the 
before-mentioned  work  and  long  before  the  publication 
of  Darwin's  "  Descent  of  Man,"  man  also  was  included 
in  the  consequences  of  the  evolution  theory,  and  his 
existence  was  explained  as  a  wrholly  natural  development 
out  of  lower  animal  forms;  since  Darwin  himself  unre- 
servedly adopted  this  theory  of  the  descent  of  man  from 
the  animal  world  as  an  entirely  natural  consequence  of 
his  doctrine  of  the  origin  of  species,  the  evolution 
question  has  gone  far  beyond  the  proportionately  narrow 
and  limited  bounds  of  natural  philosophy  and  of  merely 
theoretical  scientific  interest  —  has  surpassed  in  interest 
all  the  before-mentioned  investigations,  however  lively 
this  interest  was  and  is  to-day,  and  has  stirred  up  the 
minds  of  all  most  thoroughly,  not  only  in  their  scientific 
but  also  in  their  religious  and  ethical  depths,  some  in 


INTRODUCTION.  19 

acknowledgment  and  admiration,  others  in  aversion  and 
repugnance,  and  only  a  few  in  sober  and  unprejudiced 
judgment.  While  some  see  in  Darwinism  the  flambeau 
which  now  lights  mankind  to  entirely  new  paths  of  truth, 
and  also  to  spiritual  and  moral  perfection,  others  see  in 
it  only  an  unproved  hypothesis,  threatening  to  become 
the  torch  which  might  change  the  noblest  and  greatest 
acquirements  of  the  culture  of  past  centuries  into  a  heap 
of  ashes;  while  some  date  from  it  a  new  period  of  cul- 
ture, others  see  in  it  a  deep  descent  of  the  present  from 
the  scientific,  religious,  and  moral  height  which  mankind 
has  ascended. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  has  become  'an  impossi- 
bility for  religion  and  the  moral  interest  as  guardians 
of  the  highest  and  most  sacred  acquisitions  of  mankind, 
,and  still  more  for  theology  and  ethics  as  the  scientific 
representations  of  religion  and  morality,  to  remain  idle 
spectators.  It  would  certainly  be  more  agreeable  to 
them,  and  more  profitable,  if  they  could  delay  their 
judgment  until  the  question  became  better  cleared  up. 
For  .the  whole  question  presented  by  Darwin  has  not  yet 
passed  beyond  the  stage  of  problems  and  attempts  at 
solution  ;  and  there  is  always  something  unsatisfactory 
in  being  compelled  to  deal  with  theories  which  in  their 
fundamentals  are  still  hypotheses.  But  since  all  tenden- 
cies of  the  present  which  are  hostile  to  Christianity  and 
to  the  theistic  view  of  the  world,  from  the  most  extreme 
materialism  up  to  the  most  sublime  monism  (as  panthe- 
ism and  materialism  of  to-day  have  begun  to  call  them- 
selves), seemingly  with  the  confidence  of  complete  vic- 
tory, take  possession  of  Darwinism  as  the  solid  ground 
from  which  they  hope  to  destroy  all  and  every  belief 


20  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

connected  with  faith  in  a  living  creator  and  master  of 
the  world,  it  has  also  become  impossible  for  those  to 
whom  the  religious  and  ethical  acquisitions  of  mankind 
are  a  sacred  sanctuary  to  take  any  longer  a  reserved  and 
expectant  position.  Silence  now  would  be  looked  upon 
only  as  an  inglorious  retreat ;  and  thus  nothing  remains 
but  openly  to  face  the  question  :  What  position  must 
religion  and  morality  take  in  reference  to  the  Darwinian 
theories  ? 

In  order  to  treat  of  the  question  with  that  objectivity 
which  it  requires,  we  have  to  begin  with  a  synopsis  of 
the  theories  themselves.  In  this  representation  we  have 
to  discriminate  strictly  between  the  merely  scientific 
theories  and  the  nature-philosophical  and  metaphysical 
supplements  and  conclusions  which  have  been  brought 
into  connection  with  them.  For  precisely  in  the  mixing 
of  the  most  different  problems  wrhich  are  to  be  con- 
sidered here,  lies  the  main  cause  of  the  confused  and 
superficial  judgment  which  is  so  often  heard  upon  these 
questions. 


PART  I. 

THE  THEOKIES  OF  DAEWLN". 


(21) 


BOOK    I. 

THE    PURELY   SCIENTIFIC   THEORIES. 


THE    SCIENTIFIC    PROBLEM. 

The  interesting  problem  which  underlies  Mr.  Dar- 
win's theories  is  the  answer  to  the  question  :  How  did 
the  different  species  of  organic  beings  on  the  earth  origi- 
nate f  We  find  ourselves  in  the  midst  of  an  endless 
variety  of  organic  beings,  animals  and  plants  ;  we  see 
ourselves,  so  far  as  regards  the  entire  physical  part  of 
our  being,  in  relationship  with  this  organic  world  — 
especially  with  the  organization  and  physical  functions 
of  the  animal  body.  The  organic  individuals  come  and 
go.  They  originate  by  being  begotten  by  and  born  of 
individuals  of  the  same  kind,  or  they  spring  up  through 
the  formation  of  germs  and  buds  ;  and  they  produce  in 
the  same  way  new  individuals,  that  resemble  them  in 
all  essential  characteristics.  Like  always  begets  like,  so 
far  as  our  observations  go.  But  not  only  the  indi- 
viduals, but  even  the  species  to  which  they  belong,  must 
have  originated  at  some  definite  period  of  time — and, 
indeed,  as  geology  tells  us,  not  all  at  once,  but  in  a  long 
series,  which  stretched  through  immeasurable  epochs  of 
the  earth's  history.  Thus  we  come  face  to  face  with  the 
question,  already  put,  which  we  can  now  formulate  more 

(23) 


24:  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

precisely  :  How  did  the  first  individuals  of  each  organic 
species  come  into  existence  f 

No  human  being  ever  has  observed,  nor  ever  could 
observe,  the  origination  of  a  new  species,  because  man, 
as  it  seems,  did  not  appear  on  the  earth  until  all  the 
other  organisms  were  in  existence.  For  this  reason, 
the  scientists  for  a  long  time  thought  it  unprofitable  to 
occupy  themselves  with  this  question  ;  and  even  in  our 
time  a  great  many  of  them  declare  the  question  to  be 
absolutely  insolvable,  and  every  attempt  at  answering  it 
to  be  an  unjustifiable  use  of  hypotheses.  But  the  impulse 
toward  investigation  admits  of  no  limitation  so  long  as 

O  £? 

there  is  any  probability  of  extending  its  field  of  action. 
Especially  in  the  province  of  nature,  so  many  things  which 
could  not  be  discovered  by  mere  observation  have  been 
traced  indirectly,  and  so  many  important  and  established 
facts  have  been  added  to  our  stores  of  knowledge, 

o    " 

by  first  starting  from  hypothetical  premises,  that  man 
has  again  and  again  endeavored  to  approximate  an 
answer  to  the  question  of  the  origin  of  species  by  taking 
the  indirect  course  of  hypothesis  and  induction,  when- 
ever the  direct  way  of  observation  did  not  lead  to  any 
result.  Religion  of  course  gives  a  solution  to  the  prob- 
lem by  stating  that  the  species  have  been  originated  by 
the  creative  act  of  God.  It  is  wrong  to  say  that  this 
solution  is  opposed  to  the  above-mentioned  impulse 
toward  investigation  ;  for  this  solution  suffices  for  reli- 
gion, whether  a  natural  progress  in  the  origination  of 
species  be  established  or  not.  For,  to  the  believer  in 
religion,  the  whole  universe,  with  all  its  objective  phe- 
nomena and  growth,  is  the  work  of  God  as  well  as  the 
individuals  of  the  already  existing  species  ;  and  a 


THE    SCIENTIFIC   PROBLEM.  25 

closer  acquaintance  with  the  manner  of  their  origin  is 
not  only  no  disturbance  to  his  ground  of  belief,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  an  addition  to  his  knowledge  of  the  method 
of  God's  action.  In  every  man  of  sound  mind,  the 
religious  faith  is  not  antagonistic  or  even  indifferent  to 
the  scientific  impulse  toward  investigation,  but  stands 
upon  a  most  intimate  footing  with  it.  Hence  the  human 
intellect  again  and  again  makes  the  attempt  to  find 
an  answer  to  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  species  in  a 
scientific  way,  and  each  endeavor  of  this  kind  necessa- 
rily ends  with  the  dilemma  that  either  the  first  individ-  ( 
uals  of  a  species,  no  matter  whether  it  be  the  highest  or 
the  lowest,  have  been  evolved  out  of  inorganic  matter, 
or  they  originated  by  descent  from  the  most  closely 
related  species  of  their  predecessors.  The  denial  of  the 
first  part  of  our  dilemma,  and  the  affirmation  of  the 
second,  is  the  "Theory  of  Descent." 

But  this  theory  of  descent  leads  us  at  once  into 
another  dilemma.  If  the  species  originated  by  descent 
from  the  most  closely  related  lower  species,  and  under 
certain  circumstances  also  from  species  of  the  same 
rank,  and  even  by  degeneration  from  the  next  higher,  it 
must  have  occurred  in  one  of  two  ways  :  either  by  leaps 
—called  by  naturalists  "metamorphosis  of  germs  "  or 
"heterogenetic  conception" — or  by  a  succession  of  imper- 
ceptibly small  alterations  of  the  individuals  from  genera- 
tion to  generation.  Each  of  these  changes  would  have 
been  no  greater  than  the  differences  we  observe  to-day 
between  the  individuals  of  the  very  same  species,  but 
became  in  the  course  of  time  so  massed  and  strengthened 

O 

in   one  direction  that  new  species  have  been  evolved. 
This  hypothesis  is  called  the  "  Theory  of  Development, " 


26  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

or  "Evolution."  We  retain  this  name,  although  well 
aware  of  the  fact  that  the  authors  do  not  agree  in  their 
use  of  the  term  "evolution."  Professor  Wigand,  who 
adopts  only  the  theory  of  a  descent  from  one  primordial 
cell  to  another,  and  who  positively  rejects  the  idea  of  a 
progress  from  one  fully  developed  species  to  another, 
claims  among  other  things  that  one  value  of  his  own 
theory  is  that  he  secures  for  the  idea  of  evolution  its  full 
meaning.  The  expression  still  has  a  meaning  for  those 
who  reject  the  real  descent  of  the  species  or  their  prim- 
ordial germs  one  from  another,  and  acknowledge  only 
the  ideal  bond  of  a  common  plan  in  their  successive 
manifestations.  But  as  soon  as  we  examine  more  closely 
the  literal  and  logical  meaning  of  the  word,  we  shall  find 
it  of  most  weight  when  we  understand  by  it  the  before- 
mentioned  gradual  evolution  in  opposition  to  the  theory 
of  progress  by  leaps  or  new  creations.  Moreover,  it  is 
well  known  that  long  before  this  no  other  term  than 
evolution  was  used  to  designate  the  growth  of  a  single 
organic  individual  from  the  primordial  cell  and  egg  to 
its  fully  developed  form  and  vital  function.  Besides,  we 
find  ourselves  also  in  harmony  with  most  of  the  authors, 
so  far  as  they  have  distinct  conceptions  of  the  different 
scientific  problems,  if  we  use  the  term  "theory  of  evo- 
lution "  for  the  gradual  development  of  one  species  from 
another,  in  opposition  to  the  hypothesis  of  a  metamor- 
phosis of  germs,  or  even  of  a  genealogy  of  primordial 
cells. 

But  each  evolution  theory  leads  again  to  new  the- 
ories, as  soon  as  it  has  to  be  proved  in  a  scientific 
way.  For  it  can  claim  a  scientific  worth  only  when  sus- 
tained by  earnest  attempts  to  find  and  prove  the  produc- 


THE   SCIENTIFIC   PROBLEM.  27 

tive  power,  agencies  and  laws  of  such  an  evolution  of 
species.  Those  attempts  can  be  made  in  various  ways. 
As  a  philosophical  question,  many  attempts  at  solu- 
tion have  been  made,  both  in  ancient  and  modern  times; 
but  being  mainly  in  the  realm  of  metaphysics,  they  do 
not  come  within  the  limits  of  our  scientific  essay.  As  a 
question  for  investigators  of  natural  phenomena,  only 
two  attempts  of  sufficient  importance  to  be  mentioned 
have  been  made.  The  first  one  was  made  by  Lamarck, 
who,  taking  the  really  different  ideas  of  descent  and 
evolution  as  one,  made  use  of  the  hypothesis  of  trans- 
mutation; thus  becoming  the  pioneer  of  Darwinism. 
The  other  attempt  was  made  by  Darwin  in  his  theory  of 
natural  selection,  or  struggle  for  existence,  and  is  called 
the  c '  Theory  of  Selection. " 

In  defining  our  problem,  therefore,  we  find  ourselves 
under  the  influence  of  a  scientific  law  of  development. 
The  simple  problem  which  we  started  from  has  devel- 
oped into  a  trinity  of  problems  and  attempts  at  solution. 
The  simple  question  of  the  origin  of  species  led  us  into 
the  dilemma  of  a  generatio  cequivoca^  or  a  descent;  the 
hypothesis  of  a  descent  led  to  the  dilemma  of  a  hetero- 
genetic  conception,  or  an  evolution  ;  and  the  hypothe- 
sis of  an  evolution  rendered  necessary  the  attempt  at 
explaining  this  evolution,  and  showed  Darwin's  method 
of  explaining  it  by  his  selection  theory.  It  will  be  well 
for  the  reader  to  keep  distinctly  in  mind  the  difference 
between  these  problems  and  theories,  in  following  our 
investigations,  even  if  we  cannot  arrange  our  historical 
sketch  according  to  the  natural  principle  of  division 
arising  from  these  differences. 

For  it  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  question  itself,  that 


28  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

these  theories,  in  their  historical  progress,  did  not  ap- 
pear singly,  but  together.  Those  who  inclined  to  the 
theory  of  a  descent  of  species  could  claim  for  it  the 
attention  of  scientific  investigators  only  after  having  also 
made  the  attempt  at  conceiving  this  descent  in  *  a  con- 
crete way,  and  according  to  certain  analogies  of  obser- 
vation. .  The  only  analogy  of  the  kind  appeared  in  the 
sphere  of  individual  development  and  individual  differ- 
ences on  the  one  hand,  and  in  that  of  closely  related 
characters  of  allied  species  on  the  other;  and  thus  led 
of  itself  to  the  evolution  theory.  As  soon  as  the  natural- 
ists thought  they  had  found  the  causes  of  such  an  evo- 
lution of  the-  species,  they  naturally  placed  these  causes 
in  the  foreground  of  their  demonstrations,  and  erected 
upon  them  the  structure  of  their  entire  theory;  thus 
treating  descent,  evolution  and  selection  as  one  single 
and  indissolubly  connected  theory.  But  this  manner  of 
treating  the  question  had  also  its  dangers,  which  have 
already  caused  a  great  deal  of  confusion  and  misunder- 
standing, as  well  as  much  unprofitable  controversy. 
Often  friends  and  enemies  of  the  theories  placed  that 
which  was  in  favor  of  the  theory  of  descent  to  the  credit 
of  the  evolution  or  selection  theory;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  which  seemed  opposed  to  the  selection  theory 
Was  often  held  to  be  a  weakening  of  the  evolution  and 
descent  theory;  and  this  was  done,  not  only  by  ama- 
teurs, but  often  enough  by  the  highest  authorities  also. 
In  reality,  however,  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  the  idea 
of  a  descent  may  prove  correct,  and  possibly  the  idea 
of  an  evolution  of  the  species  will  have  to  be  replaced 
by  that  of  a  heterogenetic  generation,  or  by  the  theory 
that  certain  groups  in  the  organic  system  are  originated 


THE   SCIENTIFIC   PROBLEM.  29 

by  heterogcnetic  generation,  and  others  by  evolution  ; 
and  so  the  evolution  theory  must  share  with  the  theory 
of  heterogenetic  generation,  or  of  a  metamorphosis  of 
germs.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  conceivable  that  even 
where  the  evolution  theory  is  confirmed,  the  evolution 
can  be  accounted  for  wholly  or  partly  by  other  rea- 
sons than  those  derived  from  the  selection  theory.  And 
even  this  result  of  present  investigations  is  not  incon- 
ceivable :  that  the  reasons  for  and  against  the  different 
theories  will  be  found  to  balance  one  another  to  such  a 
degree  that  they  will  sooner  or  later  lead  science,  in  an- 
swering the  question  of  the  origin  of  species,  to  the  old 
confession  of  Socrates — "  Ignoramus" 

We'shall,  therefore,  have  to  arrange  our  historical 
sketch  according  to  the  historical  order  of  the  appear- 
ance of  the  theories,  and  treat  the  problems  more  or  less 
as  an  undivided  whole.  But  we  shall  keep  in  mind, 
during  our  historical  sketch,  not  only  the  logical  separ- 
ation of  the  problems  in  question,  in  order  not  to  'lose 
clearness  of  judgment,  but  we  shall  also  at  the  end  of  our 
review,  if  we  consider  the  present  condition  of  the  pro- 
blems, have  to  examine  the  same  once  more  in  detail, 
so  far  as  regards  the  above  mentioned  separation. 


30  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 


CHAPTER  I. 

RISE    OF    THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES. 

§  1.     Direct  Predecessors. — Lamarck. 

The  first  man  who  gave  direct  expression  to  the  idea 
of  a  successive  generation  of  the  species  through  trans- 
mutation, and  who  attempted  to  folio  \v  it  up  in  a  scien- 
tific way,  was  the  French  naturalist  and  philosopher, 
Jean  Lamarck,  born  1744.  In  the  year  1801,  and  sub- 
sequently, he  published  his  views,  first  in  smaller  essays 
and  afterward  more  in  detail  in  his  "  Philosophie  Zool- 
oyique"  which  appeared  in  1809,  and  in  the  first  volume 
of  his  "  Ilistoire  Naturelle  des  Animaux  sans  Vertebres," 
published  in  1815.  In  these  works  Lamarck  upholds 
fully  the  descent  and  evolution  theory,  and  maintains 
that  the  simplest  organisms  are  generated  through  a 
generatio  spontanea,  which  is  still  taking  place;  but  that 
all  the  more  developed  organisms,  including  man,  are 
descended  through  a  gradual  change  from  other  species. 
With  this  theory,  he  put  himself  in  direct  and  con- 
scious opposition  to  the  old  doctrine  of  the  immutabil- 
ity of  species  and  their  characteristics,  which  had  been 
ably  maintained  by  Linnaeus,  and  also  made  some  at- 
tempts at  explanation  which  approach  very  nearly  the 
selection  theory.  A  change  in  the  physical  conditions 
of  life,  especially  the  force  of  habit  in  the  use  or  disuse 
of  the  organs,  the  inheritance  of  physical  and  psychical 


RISE    OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.  31 

qualities  thus  attained,  and  the  extension  of  the  process 
of  transmutation  into  extraordinarily  long  periods  of 
time  with  very  slight  changes,  are  also,  in  his  view,  the 
probable  causes  of  the  variation  and  development  of  the 
species.  He  only  lacks  the  idea  of  a  natural  selection 
in  the  struggle  for  existence,  and  the  comparison  of  the 
processes  in  nature  with  the  methodical  selection  of  man 
in  the  breeding  of  domestic  animals  and  plants,  to  iden- 
tify his  views  with  those  of  Darwin. 

At  first,  Lamarck  met  only  with  violent  opposition; 
but  after  a  little  while  his  views  ceased  to  attract  atten- 
tion. The  time  had  not  yet  come  to  make  such  an 
attempt  at  observing  nature  from  the  standpoint  of  evo- 
lution. The  sciences  which  favor  such  a  mode  of 
observation,  and  even  demand  it — such  as  comparative 
anatomy  and  physiology  and  the  history  of  the  devel- 
opment of  the  different  plants  and  animals — were  only  in 
their  infancy,  or  were — like  palaeontology  and  the  com- 
parative geography  of  plants  and  animals — not  yet  in 
existence.  The  influence  of  Linnaeus,  whose  views  diamet- 
rically opposed  those  of  Lamarck,  predominated  over 
all  the  investigations  of  natural  science  ;  Buffon,  who 
favored  the  ideas  of  Lamarck,  and  loved  to  trace  a  unity 
in  natural  phenomena,  was  too  instable  in  his  investi- 
gations and  views  to  arrive  at  a  comprehensive  principle; 
and  even  the  eminent  naturalist,  Cuvier,  of  Montpellier. 
showed  in  his  observation  of  nature  a  predilection  for 
analysis  rather  than  synthesis,  and  although  his  compre- 
hensive mind  inclined  to  generalize  and  explain,  he  placed 
himself  in  decided  opposition  to  a  theory  which  was 
founded  only  on  a  few  decisive  facts. 

This  last  mentioned  deficiency  seems  to  have  been 


32  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

the  main  cause  of  Lamarck's  views  soon  being  lost  sight 
of.  They  nowhere  found  a  support  in  facts;  the  force 
of  habit  played  in  them  an  exaggerated  and  unnatural 
role;  the  different  illustrations  of  them  —  such  as  the 
long  neck  of  the  giraffe  explained  by  the  permanent  and 
inherited  habit  of  browsing  on  the  branches  of  high  trees, 
or  the  web  on  the  toes  of  frogs,  swimming-birds,  etc.,  ex- 
plained by  the  habit  of  swimming — were  talked  about 
and  laughed  at  more  as  curiosities  than  as  worthy  of 
serious  consideration. 

Only  twice  after  this  did  the  question  put  by  La- 
marck attract  wider  attention  from  the  learned  world. 
The  first  time  was  when,  in  1830,  the  bitter  contest 
arose  at  the  Academy  of  Paris,  between  Cuvier  and 
Etienne  Geoffrey  St.  Hilaire,  the  father  of  Isidor 
G.  St.  Hilaire.  Geoffroy  St.  Hilaire  had  views  sim- 
ilar to  Lamarck's,  but  reached  them  from  quite  a 
different  standpoint — from  the  observation  of  the 
analogy  and  homology  of  the  organs  ;  and  account- 
ed for  the  variation  of  species,  not  by  the  use  or  disuse 
of  the  organs,  but  on  the  one  hand  by  the  common  orig- 
inal type  of  the  organs,  and  on  the  other  by  the  varied 
influence  of  the  surroundings — the  monde  ambiant.  La- 
marck himself  seems  not  to  have  been  mentioned  in  this 
contest.  The  controversy  turned  much* more  on  the 
question  whether  in  observing  nature  we  can  proceed 
by  synthesis  and  find  in  the  analogies  of  the  organisms 
the  principles  for  explaining  the  real  connection  between 
the  different  organic  forms,  or  whether  the  analytical 
process  is  the  only  correct  one,  and  the  synthetical 
should  be  discarded.  The  solution  of  it  will  probably 
be,  that  the  one  process  must  be  supplemented  by  the 


RISE    OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES. 

other,  as  Goethe  has  already  shown  in  his  account  of 
this  controversy;  but  at  that  time  it  was  decided  in  favor 
of  the  analytical  principle,  and  the  question  was  for  the 
time  dropped.  It  came  up  for  a  second  time,  but 
created  little  excitement,  in  1844,  when  an  anonymous 
work,  "Vestiges  of  the  Natural  History  of  Creation," 
directed  the  attention  and  the  interest  of  scientists  again 
to  Lamarck  and  his  doctrine.  But  this  interest  also 
soon  came  to  an  end,  until  through  Darwin's  first  publi- 
cation the  half-forgotten  man  again  suddenly  attained 
great  honor. 

Those  who  wish  to  form  a  closer  acquaintance  with 
the  different  advocates  of  the  evolution  theory  before 
Darwin's  appearance,  will  find  them  carefully  arranged 
in  the  historical  sketch  which  Darwin  gives  in  the  intro- 
duction to  his  work  on  "  The  Origin  of  Species  "  ;  and 
the  most  important  extracts  of  Lamarck's  4 '  Philosophie 
-Zoologique"  are  to  be  found  in  Oscar  Schmidt's  "  Descent 
and  Darwinism."* 

§  2.     Indirect  Preparations. 

While  thus  the  ideas  of  Lamarck  gradually  fell  into 
partial  oblivion,  yet  contemporaneous  with  and  follow- 
ing them  arose  several  other  series  of  thoughts,  views, 
and  investigations,  which,  although  they  only  indirectly 
prepared  for  the  revival  of  the  evolution  theory,  yet 
exercised  a  deeper  and  more  lasting  influence  on  the 
minds  of  scientists.  We  refer  to  the  ideas  in  regard  to 
natural  phenomena  held  during  the  first  decades  of  our 
century  ;  further,  to  the  principles  of  comparative  anat- 
omy which,  up  to  the  present  time,  partly  dependent 

*"The  International  Scientific  Series."    No.  xm. 
3 


<U  THK    THEORIES    OF    DARWIN. 

and  partly  independent  of  natural  philosophy,  have 
l>oen  expressed,  valued,  and  admired  as  leading  thoughts; 
and,  lastly,  to  the  empiric  results  of  comparative  ana- 
tomical and  biological  investigations  in  palaeontology  and 
geology,  as  attained  by  the  help  of  those  very  princi- 
ples. And  even  physics  and  astronomy  had  to.  coop- 
erate in  preparing  the  way  for  the  idea  of  evolution. 

The  philosophical  ideas  referred  to,  together  with 
the  points  of  view  and  results  of  comparative  anatomy, 
led  more  and  more  decisively  to  the  idea  of  an  original 
for  in,  or  type,  which  retains  its  identity  in  all  the  modi- 
fications of  form  in  plants  and  animals;  and  of  &  ground* 
plan,  which  is  realized  in  the  systems  of  the  plant  and 
animal  world  in  higher  and  higher  differentiations  and  in 
more  and  more  developed  modifications,  diverging  farther 
and  farther  from  the  prototype  until  it  reaches  its  highest 
form,  still  reducible  to  the  prototypes,  in  the  most  highly 
organized  dicotyledons  in  plants,  and  in  the  animal 
world  in  the  mammalia,  and  lastly  in  man. 

Men  like  Cuvier  and  Geoffroy  St.  Hilaire,  who  oth- 
erwise stand  diametrically  opposed  to  each  other,  unite 
in  these  and  kindred  ideas.  The  naturalist  Oken  attains 
the  same  result,  tinged  with  the  views  of  Schelling;  the 
poet  Goethe,  from  an  intuitive  knowledge  of  nature, 
arrived  at  the  same  conclusion.  The  former,  during  a  jour- 
ney in  the  Hartz  Mountains,  at  the  sight  of  a  bleached 
deer's  skull,  and  the  latter,  upon  picking  up  a  sheep's  skull 
in  the  Jewish  cemetery  at  Venice,  were  struck  by  the 
same  thought :  the  skull  is  only  a  modified  verte- 
bra. Oken  founded  upon  this  idea  and  kindred  analogies 
his  profound  philosophy  of  the  system  of  animals 
and  plants  which  comes  very  near  to  the  evolution  the- 


RISE    OF   THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES.  35 

ory,  and  in  his  cosmogony  traces  all  organisms  to  a  pro- 
toplasm in  such  a  way  as  to  bring  him  in  this  respect 
also  very  near  to  Darwinism.  Goethe,  in  his  metamor- 
phosis of  plants,  develops  ideas  in  which,  in  all  serious- 
ness, he  makes  a  concrete  application  of  his  thought  of 
a  prototype  to  the  leaf  of  a  plant ;  and  proved  for  zool- 
ogy the  fruitfulness  of  his  idea  of  a  type  by  his  well 
known  discovery  of  the  mid-jaw  bone  in  man.  Although 
Oscar  Schmidt  seems  to  be  decidedly  right  in  supposing, 
in  opposition  to  Ernst  Hackel,  that  Goethe  did  not 
intend  to  have  his  idea  of  unity  and  development 
taken  in  a  real  but  in  an  ideal  sense,  and  hence  could 
not  be  called  a  direct  representative  of  the  evolution 
theory,  still  he  is  all  the  more  decidedly  a  predecessor 
of  that  theory  in  directing  attention  to  the  unity  in  plan 
and  metamorphosis  of  plants  and  animals.  Louis  Agas- 
siz,  who,  on  the  other  hand,  continued  up  to  his  death 
in  opposition  to  the  entire  doctrine  of  descent,  made  the 
idea  of  types  the  principle  of  his  whole  classification, 
and  said:  "Man  is  the  purpose  toward  which  the 
whole  animal  creation  tends  from  the  first  appearance  of 
the  first  paleozoic  fish."  Richard  Chven,  who  rejected 
the  selection  theory  and  favored  that  of  descent,  pub- 
lished, long  before  Darwin's  appearance,  some  most 
interesting  results  of  his  anatomical  and  palaeontological 
investigations  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  prototype 
and  its  modifications.  "Man,  from  the  beginning  of 

,        '  O  O 

organisms,  was  ideally  present  upon  the  earth,"  is  a 
sentence  which  we  quote  from  Owen's  works. 

In  short,  this  ideal  momentum  in  the  observation  of 
the  organic  kingdoms  is  not  only  the  most  beautiful 
blossom  and  the  ripest  fruit  of  the  union  between  labo- 


36  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

rious  and  comprehensive  detailed  investigations  and  a 
generalizing  philosophic  penetration,  but  it  was  also  a 
very  efficient  preparation  of  the  mind  for  the  evolution 
problem,  so  far  as  the  summing  up  of  the  orpin  isms 
under  a  type  and  plan  is  only  the  ideal  reverse  of  its 
realistic  reduction  to  a  common  pedigree. 

We  have  yet  to  add  the  investigations  in  regard  to 
the  history  of  evolution  of  the  single  organisms,  as  well 
as  those  in  comparative  anatomy,  which  in  former  cen- 
turies were  begun  by  scientists  like  Swammerdam  and 
Boerhave  and  carried  more  nearly  to  completion  by  K. 
E.  von  Baer,  Carus,  and  others.  In  reducing  all  the 
tissues  of  plants  and  animals  to  one  cell,  and  tracing 
back  also  their  individual  developments  to  the  first 
differentiation  of  the  simplest  cell,  they  followed  out  the 
unity  of  the  plan  of  the  organic  kingdoms — which  hith- 
erto had  been  maintained  only  ideally  and  proclaimed  as 
a  philosophic  postulate  —  farther  and  deeper  into  the 
sphere  of  empiric  reality.  We  must  mention,  moreover, 
the  great  palaeontological  discoveries  which,  from  the 
first  foraminifera  of  the  Cambrian  formations  up  to  the 
historical  period  of  man,  showed  a  great  progressive 
scale  in  the  .appearance  of  the  organisms  and  a  very  wide 
relationship  between  this  scale  and  the  natural  systems 
of  botany  and  zoology  ;  and,  finally,  the  principles  of 
geology,  which,  under  the  leadership  of  Sir  Charles 
Lyell,  starting  from  the  idea  of  an  identity  of  the  powers 
which  were  active  in  former  times  with  those  of  the 
present,  attempted  to  explain  the  most  violent  of  the 
changes  in  the  earth's  crust  in  former  times  by  causes 
active  to-day.  This  often  explains  prodigious  effects — 
such  as  the  elevation  and  settling  of  entire  mountains 


RISE    OF   THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES.  37 

and  continents — by  the  constant  and  repeated  action  of 
the  slightest  causes  and  most  gradual  steps  ;  it  opens 
the  perspective  into  vast  epochs  of  long  and  numerous 
geological  periods;  and  sometimes,  where  scientists  like 
Cuvier  and  Agassiz  have  supposed  the  most  complete 
cataclysms  and  the  most  universal  revolutions  of  the 
globe,  there  prove  to  have  been  only  gradual  changes 
with  revolutions  very  partially  and  locally  limited. 

Finally,  if  we  take  into  consideration  the  grand  dis- 
coveries which  strikingly  illustrate  the  connection  in  ex- 
tent and  quality  between  the  universe  and  all  its  agencies 
and  powers — such  as  Robert  von  Mayer's  discovery  of 
the  conservation  of  force  and  of  the  mechanical  equiva- 
lent of  heat,  or  the  spectrum  analysis  and  the  informa- 
tion which  it  gives  us  by  ever-increasing  evidences  of  the 
identity  of  the  cosmic  and  telluric  substances — we  may 
venture  to" say  that  the  scientific  and  intellectual  ground 
was  well  prepared  for  a  theory  which  takes  the  origin 
of  organisms  into  this  common  relationship  of  the  essen- 
tial unity  and  development  of  the  universe. 

Only  one  thing  more  remained  to  complete  the 
hypothesis  offered  by  Lamarck,  of  the  fact  of  a  develop- 
ment of  species  by  a  new  and  more  satisfactory  answer 
to  the  question  as  to  the  manner  of  their  development. 
The  task  of  answering  in  a  more  comprehensive  and 
scientific  way  the  question  as  to  the  manner  of  develop- 
ment has  been  undertaken  by  Darwin  in  his  selection 
theory.  Alfred  Russell  Wallace,  who  arrived  at  the 
same  results  contemporaneously  with  and  independently 
of  Darwin,  has,  with  praiseworthy  modesty,  renounced 
his  claim  to  priority  of  the  discovery,  as  Darwin  had 
been  longer  engaged  in  working  out  his  theories  and 
had  begun  to  collect  materials  for  proof. 


38  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 


CHAPTER    II. 

HISTORY   OF  THE   DARWINIAN  THEORIES. 
£   1.     Darwin. 

In  order  to  explain  the  development  of  higher  spe- 
cies from  dower  ones  in  a  natural  way,  Darwin  starts 
from  two  facts.  The  first  fact  is,  that  all  individuals  of 
the  same  species  show,  besides  their  specific  similarity, 
individual  differences:  a  fact  which  we  call  the  law  of 
individual  variability.  The  other  fact  is,  that  each  indi- 
vidual inclines  to  transmit  to  his  offspring  all  his  quali- 
ties— not  only  the  characteristics  of  the  species,  but  also 
those  of  the  individual  :  a  fact  which  we  call  the  law  of 
heredity. 

To  show  how  the  whole  basis  of  explanation  of  the 
evolution  of  one  species  from  another  is  given  in  these 
two  facts,  Darwin  calls  attention  to  the  rules  according 
to  which  the  often  extraordinarily  great  varieties  of 
domestic  animals  and  cultivated  plants  are  obtained  and 
preserved  ;  namely,  the  rules  of  artificial  breeding.  The 
breeder  simply  selects  from  a  species  those  individuals 
having  such  individual  qualities  as  he  wishes  to  preserve 
and  to  increase,  and  refrains  from  breeding  those  indi- 
viduals which  do  not  possess  the  characteristics  he  wants 
or  which  possess  them  only  in  a  small  degree.  He 
continues  the  same  process  with  the  next  generation; 
and  by  the  constant  and  effectual  agency  of  the  two 


HISTORY    OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.  3!.) 

before-mentioned  laws,  he  will,  after  the  lapse  of  a  few 
generations,  have  breeded  a  variety  in  which  the  char- 
acteristics originally  belonging  only  to  a  single  individ- 
ual have  become  common  and  permanent. 

It  is  now  important  to  consider  whether  nature,  in 
natural  selection  (whence  the  name  u  Selection  Theory") 
does  not  act  unconsciously  according  to  the  same  rules, 
and  attain  the  same  results,  as  man  with  his  artificial 
and  intentional  selection  ;  and,  furthermore,  whether  she 
does  not  reach  results  which,  according  to  that  principle 
of  natural  selection,  finally  explain  the  origin  of  all, 
even  of  the  highest  and  most  complicated  organisms, 
from  one  single  original  form  or  a  few  original  and 
simplest  forms.  •  Darwin  finds  these  questions  answered 
in  the  affirmative;  and  arrives  at  this  answer  through 
the  following  conclusions. 

The  English  political  economist  Makhus  (1760-1834), 
in  his  "  Essay  on  the  Principles  of  Population,"  estab- 
lished a  law  in  regard  to  the  growth  of  the  human  race, 
which  may  be  applied  just  as  well  to  all  the  species  of 
the  entire  organic  world:  that  population  tends  to  increase 
in  a  geometrical  ratio,  although  the  conditions  of  life  for 
the  individual  remain  the  same  or  at  most  increase  in 
.an  arithmetical  ratio.  The  consequence  is  that  if  the 
species  is  to  be  preserved  and  the  individuals  of  future 
generations  are  to  continue  to  find  sufficient  food  and 
other  means  for  sustaining  life,  a  great  many  individ- 
uals of  each  generation  must  perish  very  early,  and 
even  as  germ  and  seed,  and  only  a  minority  will  lie 
preserved  and  reproduced.  This  exuberant  prodigality 
of  life-germs,  of  which  proportionately  only  a  few  are 
preserved  and  reproduced,  takes  place  in  the  plant  and 


40  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

animal  world  in  a  very  marked  degree.  There  a  con- 
tinual druggie  for  existence  prevails;  cadi  individual  has 
to  get  access  to  his  conditions  of  life  by  wresting  them 
from  a  whole  series  of  other  individuals  of  his  own  or 
other  species;  and  now  the  question  arises:  which  indi- 
viduals will  survive  in  this  struggle?  which  will  more 
probably  be  preserved  and  procreate  offspring  ?  Evi- 
dently, the  answer  is,  those  individuals  which  possess 
individual  characteristics  more  favorable  to  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  individual  than  those  possessed  by  other 
individuals.  These  individual  characteristics  are  trans- 
mitted to  the  next  generation.  In  this  there  will  be 
again  individuals  that  have  in  a  still  higher  degree  the 
characteristics  thus  transmitted  and  favorable  for  the 
preservation  of  the  individual,  or  that  add  to  these  favor- 
able characteristics  new  characteristics  favorable  in  an- 
other direction  to  the  survival  of  the  individual  in  the 
struggle  for  existence.  While  these  individuals,  with 
more  probability  than  the  others,  are  thus  preserved 
and  reproduced,  they  transmit  to  their  offspring  not 
only  the  old  favorable  characteristics  increased,  but  also 
those  newly  added.  Among  the  favorable  individual 
qualities,  Darwin  reckons  the  divergence  of  character, 
the  perfection  of  organization,  and  the  law  of  correla- 
tion;  the  latter,  however,  can  not  be  explained  by 
natural  selection,  since  according  to  this  law  a  variation 
in  an  organ  brings  about  a  corresponding  variation  in 
entirely  different  organs  (e.  g.,  cats  with  white  fur  and 
blue  eyes  are  also  deaf). 

This  is  natural  selection  hy  means  of  the  survival  of 
the  fittest  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Changes  in  the 
conditions  and  surroundings  of  life,  and  more  or  less 


HISTORY   OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.  41 

perfect  adaptation  of  the  organisms  to  the  new  condi- 
tions of  form,  color,  food  and  habit,  are  the  main  causes 
of  those  individual  variations,  the  accumulation  of 
which  through  many  generations  produces  so  great  ef- 
fects. If  we  only  have  behind  us  periods  long  enough 
to  permit  us  to  imagine  each  step  in  the  development 
as  an  extremely  small  and  hardly  appreciable  one,  nat- 
ural selection  offers  us  not  the  exclusive  but  the  main 
means  of  explaining  the  evolution  of  the  whole  animal 
and  plant  world  out  of  one  or  a  few  simple  organized 
original  forms. 

This  is  the  outline  of  the  selection  theory,  as 
given  by  Darwin  in  1859,  and  still  retained  in  all  its 
essentials.  It  is  true,  in  his  work  on  the  origin  of  man 
he  added  as  supplemental  the  sexual  to  the  common  nat- 
ural selection,  and  made  it  of  special  importance  for  the 
presentation  of  the  beautiful  in  nature  —  for  the  produc- 
tion of  beautiful  forms,  colors,  and  tones,  and  for  the 
development  of  power  and  intelligence.  And  in  the 
same  work  he  said  that  there  are  many  circumstances  of 
structure  which  seem  to  be  neither  beneficial  nor  detri- 
mental to  the  individual,  and  that  to  have  overlooked 
this  fact  was  one  of  his  greatest  mistakes  in  his  former 
publications.  But  for  the  rest,  he  maintains  the  selec- 
tion theory  unchanged,  with  the  single  modification 
that  it  explains,  if  not  the  whole  development  of  the 
species  through  descent,  at  least  that  which  is  of  most 
importance  in  it. 

That  it  was  only  one  step  in  the  course  of  reasoning 
to  extend  the  selection  theory  to  the  descent  of  man, 
was  seen  by  many  as  soon  as  Darwin's  work  on  the  ori- 
gin of  species  was  published  and  began  to  attract  at- 


THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

tention;  although  not  a  syllable  upon  this  question  was 
presented  in  this  work.  Various  persons  manifested 
their  presentiment  or  perception  according  to  their  point 
of  view — partly  by  the  most  violent  opposition  to  the 
new  doctrine,  partly  by  scientific  development  or  modi- 
fication of  their  anthropogenic  views,  partly  also  by 
revelling  in  imagination  in  the  consequences  hostile  to 
religious  faith  which  they  thought  could  be  drawn  from 
this  doctrine.  AVe  remind  the  reader  of  the  itinerant 
lectures  of  Karl  Vogt  about  the  ape-pedigree  of  man, 
and  of  the  echo  they  found  by  assent  or  dissent  in  press 
and  public;  also  of  Huxley  in  England,  Karl  Snell, 
Schleiden,  Reichenbach,  and  others;  of  the  materialists, 
L.  Buchner  and  Moleschott,  and  of  the  publications  of 
Ernst  Ha'ckel.  Finally,  Darwin  himself  made  us  fully 
certain  of  the  importance  which  from  the  beginning  he 
had  attributed  to  his  theory,  by  publishing,  his  work  on 
the  ''Descent  of  Man,"  in  the  year  1870. 

In  this  work  he  explained  the  descent  of  man  fully 
from  the  before-named  principles  of  the  descent,  evolu- 
tion, and  selection  theories,  of  which  we  have  given  all 
the  essentials  in  the  foregoing  presentation.  He  carefully 
enumerates  everything  in  the  structure  of  the  human 
body  that  reminds  us  of  our  relationship  with  the  animals 
—especially  those  embryonic  phenomena  and  rudimen- 
tary organs  in  man  which  are  still  to  be  found  in  use 
and  in  a  more  developed  state  in  different  animal  species, 
and  which  led  him  to  imagine  our  ancestors  now  with  a 
tail,  then  with  sharp  ears,  now  living  in  the  water, 
then  being  hermaphrodites.  He  reviews  the  spiritual 
qualities  of  man,  and  finds  for  them  all  analogous  qual- 
ities in  the  animal  world.  He  finds  in  his  work  on 


HISTORY   OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.  ±3 

"Expression  of  the  Emotions  in  Man  and  Animals," 
published  in  1872,  new  confirmation  of  the  genealogical 
relationship  of  both.  He  looks  over  the  whole  course 
of  the  zoloogical  system  and  of  palreontological  dis- 
coveries, and  searches  for  the  points  where  the  branches 
and  twigs  of  the  animal  pedigree  of  man  must  have 
diverged.  To  begin  with  the  lowest  branches,  he  thinks 
the  most  important  divergence  took  place  where  the 
series  of  vertebrates  may  have  been  developed  out  of 
the  invertebrates.  Here  he  adopts  the  investigations  of 
A.  Kowalewsky,  and  the  deductions  of  Hackel  founded 
upon  them,  concerning  the  larva  of  the  ascidiae,  a  genus 
of  marine  mollusca  of  the  order  tunicata,  and  sees  in 
a  cord,  to  be  found  in  this  larva,  most  decided  relation- 
ship to  the  spine  of  the  lancelet  fish  or  amphioxus,  the 
lowest  of  all  the  vertebrates,  it  being  yet  doubtful 
whether  it  belongs  at  all  to  the  vertebrates.  In  the 
transition  that  once  took  place  from  one  species  of  ascid- 
ian  larva  to  a  form  similar  to  the  lancelet  fish,  he  sees 
the  new  branch  diverging  in  the  series  of  vertebrates. 
Out  of  the  fish  he  concludes  that  the  amphibia  were 
developed,  and  out  of  those  the  reptilia,  out  of  one  of 
them  the  marsupialia,  and  from  them  the  lemurs  or  half- 
apes,  the  representatives  of  which  yet  live  in  Madagas- 
car and  the  southern  part  of  Asia.  From  these  there 
branched  off  on  the  one  side  the  plat}Trrhini,  or  apes 
with  a  .flat  nose,  on  the  new  continent ;  on  the  other, 
the  catarrhini,  or  apes  with  a  narrow  nose,  on  the  old. 
Among  the  ancestors  of  the  last,  he  searches  for  the 
common  progenitors,  from  which  again  two  branches 
started — on  the  one  hand  the  ignoble  branches  of  the 
catarrhine  species  of  apes,  always  remaining  lower  in 


44  THE   THEORIES    OF   DARWIN. 

development,  to  which  also  belong  the  anthropomor- 
phous apes,  like  the  oning  outang  and  gibbon  in  Asia, 
the  gorilla  and  chimpanzee  in  Africa ;  on  the  other 
hand,  that  branch  whioh  represents  the  ascent  of  animals 
to  man. 

The  refining  agencies  which  finally  raise  the  animal 
up  to  the  man  are  essentially  the  same  that  on  the  lowest 
scales  of  the  pedigree  have  caused  the  development  of 
the  lower  organisms  into  the  higher,  namely  :  favor- 
able individual  variations,  inheritance,  acclimatization, 
survival  of  the  fittest  in  the  struggle  for  existence,  nat- 
ural, and  especially,  sexual  selection.  These  are,  if  not 
the  exclusive,  still  the  main  agencies  which  finally  led 
the  primate  of  the  earthly  creation  upon  the  stage  and 
furnished  him  with  his  superior  faculties.  But  it  is  par- 
ticularly by  means  of  his  social  life,  and  of  the  forces 
which  determine,  transmit,  increase  and  ennoble  the 
various  impulses  and  instincts  promoting  it,  that  man 
has  become  what  he  is.  Through  the  need  and  faculty 
•of  reciprocal  help,  through  sexual  selection — which  of 
course  is  a  very  essential  factor  of  social  life  —  there 
originated  language,  and  reflection,  and  all  the  intel- 
lectual qualities;  and  through  these  again  originated 
the  moral  qualities,  which  are  most  important  in  consti- 
tuting the  specific  worth  of  man,  and  which  were  finally 
developed  into  self-consciousness  and  free  moral  respon- 
sibility. 

But  with  the  description  of  this  attempt  to  explain 
more  in  detail  these  specific  characteristics  of  man,  we 
leave  the  ground  of  pure  natural  science  and  enter  the 
region  of  philosophy,  in  which  we  have  to  take  up  the 


HISTORY   OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.  45 

question  again  (in  Book  II,  Ch.  I)  at  the  same  point 
where  we  here  leave  it. 

§  '2.     The  Followers  of  Darwin. — Ernst  Hackel. 

Darwin's  theory  soon  found  an  enthusiastic  corps  of 
followers — on  the  continent,  and  especially  in  Germany, 
almost  more  than  in  his  own  country.  The  outlook  into 
an  entirely  new  explanation  of  the  origin  of  man,  and 
the  probable  use  of  this  theory  for  attacks  upon  faith 
in  a  Creator  and  Master  of  the  world,  called  wide-spread 
attention  to  it ;  and  the  theory  opened  to  natural  science 
itself  entirely  new  impulses  and  paths,  and  promised 
the  solution  of  many  problems  before  which  it  had 
hitherto  been  compelled  to  stand  in  silence.  To  be  sure, 
it  threatened  likewise  to  allure  the  mind  from  the  slow 
but  sure  ways  of  solid  study  to  the  entertaining  but  in- 
secure and  aimless  paths  of  imagination  and  hypothesis. 

Among  all  the  German  followers  of  Darwin  who 
adopted  not  only  the  idea  of  an  origin  of  species  through 
descent  and  evolution,  but  also  the  explanation  of  evolu- 
tion by  natural  selection,  and  extended  it  so  as  to  make 
the  principle  of  selection  of  exclusive  value,  Ernst 
Hackel  occupies  the  most  prominent  rank. 

In  his  "General  Morphology,"  published  in  1866, 
and  in  his  "Natural  History  of  the  Creation,"  the  first 
edition  of  which  appeared  in  1868,  and  finally  in  his 
"Anthropogeny  "*  (why  he  does  not  say  Anthropogony, 
we  are  nowhere  informed),  1874,  this  scientist  brought  the 
new  theory,  which  had  been  presented  by  Darwin  in  an 
almost  bewildering  flood  of  details,  into  connection  and 
order,  and,  analyzing  the  powers  active  in  natural  selec- 
tion, combined  them  into  an  entire  system  of  laws.  He 
*" Evolution  of  Man." 


4:6  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

iit  once  drew  the  origin  of  man  also  into  the  course  of 
reasoning  on  the  new  theory,  and  sustained  the  theory 
•by  the  discovery  of  the  monera  and  other  low  organ- 
isms of  one  cell,  as  well  as  by  special  investigations  of 
the  calcareous  sponges.  For  these  labors,  he  was  re- 
warded by  the  warm  and  unreserved  acknowledgment 
which  Darwin  made  to  him  in  his  work  upon  the  origin 
of  man,  which  was  published  subsequently  to  the  ''Nat- 
ural History  of  the  Creation."  There  Darwin  says:  "If 
this  work  had  appeared  before  my  essay  had  been  writ- 
ten, I  should  probably  never  have  completed  it.  Almost 
all  the  conclusions  at  which  I  have  arrived,  I  find  con- 
firmed by  this  naturalist,  whose  knowledge  on  many 
points  is  much  fuller  than  mine."  Hackel's  labors 
rendered  still  greater  service  to  the  Darwinian  theory 
by  dividing  the  organic  world  into  three  kingdoms:  the 
protista  kingdom,  the  vegetable  kingdom,  and  the  ani- 
mal kingdom, — a  division  which  solves  in  a  most  simple 
way  the  difficulty  that  was  felt  more  and  more  of  secur- 
ing for  the  lowest  organisms  a  place  among  the  animals 
or  plants.  He  further  aided  the  theory  by  leaving  the 
choice  open  to  adopt  either  a  uniform  or  multiform  ped- 
igree of  the  organisms  and  their  kingdoms  and  classes, 
and  by  treating  each  class  under  both  points  of  view; 
and  finally,  by  fascinating  experiments  to  bring  before 
us  in  detail  the  hypothetical  pedigrees  of  all  classes  of 
organisms  from  the  protista  kingdom  up  to  man. 

We  will  try  to  reproduce  briefly  the  pedigree  which 
is  of  most  interest — the  hypothetical  pedigree  pf  man. 
Hackel  divides  it  into  twenty -two  stages,  eight  of  them 
belonging  to  the  series  of  the  invertebrates,  and  fourteen 
to  that  of  the  vertebrates.  On  this  ladder  of  twenty- 


HISTORY    OF   THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES.  47 

two  rounds,  he  leads  us  from  the  lowest  form  of  the 
living  being,  in  slight  and  mostly  plausible  transitions, 
continually  higher  and  higher,  up  to  man;  and  makes 
our  steps  easy  by  mentioning  at  each  stage,  on  the  one 
hand  the  corresponding  state  in  the  embryonic  develop- 
ment, on  the  other  4the  still  living  creature  through 
which,  in  his  opinion,  the  former  organisms  of  the  cor- 
responding round  of  the  ladder  are  still  represented, 
and  which  accordingly  has  been  a  creature  that  remained 
on  its  round,  while  other  members  of  its  family  have 
been  developed  up  to  man  and  to  many  other  genera 
and  species. 

He  begins  with  the  monera,  the  organisms  of  the 
lowest  form,  discovered  by  himself,  which  have  not  so 
much  as  the  organic  rank  of  a  cell,  but  are  only  corpus- 
cules  of  mucus,  without  kernel  or  external  covering, 
called  by  him  cytod,  and  arising  from  an  organic  car- 
bon formation.  The  lowest  and  most  formless  moneron 
is  the  bathybius,  discovered  by  Thomas  Huxley,  a  net- 
work of  recticular  mucus,  which  in  the  greatest  depths 
of  the  sea,  as  far  down  as  7,000  metres,  covers  stone, 
fragments  and  other  objects,  but  are  also  found  in  less 
depths,  in  the  Mediterranean  Sea,  for  instance.  From 
the  moneron  he  proceeds  to  the  amoeba  —  a  simple 
cell,  with  a  kernel,  which  still  corresponds  to  the' 
egg  of  man  in  its  first  state.  The  third  stage 
is  formed  by  the  communities  of  amceboe  (synamcebee), 
corresponding  to  the  mulberry-yolk  in  the  first  de- 
velopment of  the  fecundated  egg,  and  to  some  still 
living  heaps  of  amoebae.  To  the  fourth  stage  he 
assigns  the  planrea,  corresponding  to  the  embryonic  de- 
velopment of  an  albumen  and  the  planula  or  ciliated 


4.s  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

larva.  When  these  ciliated  larva?  are  developed,  they 
contract  themselves  so  as  to  form  a  cavity;  and  this  fifth 
stage — especially  important  for  his  theory — he  calls 
gastrsea.  In  this  form,  he  says,  the  progaster  is  already 
developed,  and  its  wall  is  differentiated  for  the  first  time 
into  an  animal  or  dermal  layer.,  (ectoblast),  and  into 
a  vegetative  or  intestinal  layer  (hypoblast).  At  the 
sixth  stage,  there  branched  off  the  prothelmis,  or  worms, 
with  the  first  formations  of  a  nervous  system,  the  sim- 
plest organs  of  sense,  the  simplest  organs  for  secretion 
(kidneys)  and  generation  (sexual  organs),  represented 
to-day  by  the  -gliding  worms  or  turbellaria;  as  the 
seventh  stage,  the  soft  worms,  as  he  called  them  at  first 
—the  blood  worms,  or  crelomati,  as  he  describes  them 
in  his  uAnthropogeny  " — a  purely  hypothetical  stage, 
on  which  a  true  body-cavity  and  blood  were  formed;  the 
eighth  stage  are  the  chorda-animals  with  the  beginning 
of  a  spinal  rod,  corresponding  to  the  larva  of  the  ascid- 
ke.  At  the  ninth  stage,  called  the  skull-less  animals 
(acrania),  and  corresponding  to  the  still  living  lancelet, 
we  enter  the  series  of  the  vertebrates.  The  importance 
of  the  eighth  and  ninth  stages  for  the  theory,  we  have 
already  pointed  out  in  our  remarks  upon  Darwin,  p  43. 
The  tenth  stage  is  formed  by  those  low  fishes  in  which 
the  spinal  rod  is  differentiated  into  the  skull — and  the 
vertebral-column,  called  the  single-nostriled  animals 
(monorrhini),  and  represented  by  the  cyclostoma  of  to- 
day (hag  and  lampreys).  The  eleventh  stage  is  formed 
by  the  primaeval  fish  or  selachii  (sharks);  the  twelfth 
by  the  mud  fish,  of  which  there  still  live  the  protop- 
terus  in  Africa,  the  lepidosiren  in  the  tributaries  of  the 
Amazon,  and  the  ceratodus  in  the  swamps  of  Southern 


HISTORY   OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.  49 


Australia.  On  the  thirteenth  stage,  there  are  tho  oil 
amphibians  (sozobranchia),  proteus  and  axolotl;  on 
the  fourteenth,  the  tailed  amphibians  (sozura),  newt 
and  salamander;  on  the  fifteenth,  the  purely  hypo- 
thetical primaeval  amniota  or  protamnia  (amnion  is 
the  nanie  given  to  the  chorion  which  surrounds  the 
germ-water  and  embryo  of  the  three  higher  classes  of 
vertebrates)  on  the  sixteenth,  the  primary  mam- 
mals (promammalia),  to  which  the  present  monotremes 
(ornithorhynchus  and  echidna)  stand  nearest;  on  the 
seventeenth,  the  pouched  animals  or  marsupialia;  on  the 
eighteenth,  the  semi-apes  or  prosimiae  (loris  and  maki); 
on  the  nineteenth,  the  tailed  apes,  or  menocerca 
(nose-apes  and  slerider-apes,  or  semnopithecus);  on  the 
twentieth,  the  man-like  apes  (anthropoides)  or  tail-less 
catarrhini  (gorilla,  chimpanzee,  orang  outang  and 
gibbon).  And  now  we  come  to  twenty-one  —  ape-like 
men  or  speechless  primaeval  men  (alali)  —  of  whom  we 
are  reminded  to-day  by  the  deaf  and  dumb,  the  cretins 
and  the  microcephali;  and  number  twenty-two  is  homo 
sapiens,  the  man.  The  Australians  and  the  Papuans 
are  supposed  to  be  the  only  remaining  representatives 
of  his  first  stage-development.  In  like  manner,  Hackel 
also  gives  us  the  stem-branches  of  all  the  types,  classes 
and  orders  of  the  organisms,  and  forms  from  them  a 
very  acceptable  hypothetical  pedigree;  or  —  if  we  prefer 
to  suppose  a  polyphyletic  rather  than  a  monophyletic 
origin  of  species  —  hypothetical  pedigrees  of  the  whole 
organic  world. 

The   perspicuity   and    clearness  of  Hackel's  deduc- 
tions, the  extent  of  his  knowledge,  and  the  singleness 
of  his  aim,  to  which  he  makes  them  all  subservient,  lend 
4 


50  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

to  his  works  a  great  charm.  But  on  the  other  hand  we 
dare  not  conceal  that,  even  on  the  ground  of  explana- 
tions belonging  purely  to  natural  history,  the  character 
of  hypothesis  is  often  lost  in  that  of  arbitrariness  and 
of  the  undemonstrable.  Even  the  unlearned  in  natural 
science  often  enough  get  this  impression  when  read- 
ing his  works,  and  will  find  it  confirmed  by  scientists 
who  not  only  contradict  his  assertions  in  many  cases,  but 
disclose  plain  errors  in  his  drawings  —  errors,  indeed, 
exclusively  in  favor  of  the  unity-hypothesis  ;  and  in 
other  cases  they  show  that  drawings  which  are  given  as 
pictures  of  the  real,  represent  merely  hypothetical  opin- 
ions. There  is  especially  evident  in  his  works  an  ex- 
tremely strong  tendency  to  impress  on  his  hypotheses 
the  character  of  an  established  and  proved  fact,  by  giv- 
ing them  the  alluring  name  of  laws.  Entire  systems  of 
laws  of  the  selection  theory  are  produced,  and  all  imag- 
inable assertions  are  also  immediately  called  laws.  For 
example,  Huxley,  in  his  anatomical  investigations  of 
apes  and  men,  arrives  at  the  conclusion  that  the  differ- 
ences between  the  highest  and  the  lowest  apes  are  greater 
than  the  differences  between  the  highest  apes  and  man. 
This  purely  anatomical  comparison,  Hackel  calls  repeat- 
edly "Huxley's  Law."  We  are  well  aware  that  the 
idea  of  law  is  capable  of  great  extension  in  meaning, 
and  in  that  respect  we  can  refer  to  nothing  more  in- 
structive than  the  well-meditated  inquiry  upon  this  idea 
in  the  "  Reign  of  Law"  of  the  Duke  of  Argyll  (London, 
Strahan  &  Co.).  But  if  we  may  venture  to  call  purely 
anatomical  comparisons  of  this  nature  laws,  such  a  use 
of  language  destroys  all  logical  reasoning ;  and  this 
mistake  appears  again  in  Hackel's  philosophic  discus- 


HISTORY   OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.  51 

sions,  of  which  we  shall  have  to  speak  hereafter.  We 
shall  have  to  refer  also  hereafter  to  an  additional  embel- 
lishment, which  Hackel  thinks  himself  obliged  to  give 
to  his  works — namely,  that  he  makes  on  every  occasion 
the  strongest  attacks  upon  faith  in  a  personal  God,  a 
Creator  and  Lord  of  the  world  ;  that  he  traces  all  the 
motives  of  human  action  to  self-interest ;  that  he  denies 
the  liberty  of  man  and  the  moral  system  of  the  world  ; 
that  he  makes  consent  to  his  view  of  things  .the  criterion 
of  the  intellectual  development  of  a  man  ;  and  that  he 
thinks  to  render  a  service  to  civilization  by  such  a  view 
of  the  world  and  of  ethics. 

In  the  consequent  carrying  out  of  the  selection  prin- 
ciple as  the  satisfactory  key  in  explaining  the  origin  of 
all  species  and  also  of  man,  Hackel  is  indeed,  in 
spite  of  the  approval  of  his  works  by  the  British  master, 
more  Darwinian  than  Darwin  himself,  who  expressly 
refuses  to  give  exclusive  value  to  this  theory  of  expla- 
nation. Hence  there  are  among  scientists  only  a  few 
who  go  with  him  to  this  extent.  In  Germany,  aside 
from  the  materialists,  we  only  know  of  Seidlitz  and 
Oskar  Schmidt — who  in  the  thirteenth  volume  of  the  ' '  In- 
ternational Scientific  Series "  treats  of  "The  Theory  of 
Descent  and  Darwinism, "  and  advocates  not  only  the 
autocracy  of  the  selection  theory,  but  also  all  the  mon- 
istic and  atheistic  consequences  which  are  deduced  from 
it.  Perhaps  Gustav  Jager,  Schleiden,  Bernhard  Cotta 
— at  least  judging  from  their  earlier  publications — should 
be  mentioned  as  followers  of  the  pure  selection  theory  ; 
although  they  do  not  all  draw  from  it  the  before-men- 
tioned philosophic  consequences.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  number  of  those  is  very  great  who,  although  inspired 


52  THE   THEORIES    OF   DARWIN. 

by  Darwin  to  adopt  the  idea  of  an  origin  of  species 
through  descent  and  evolution,  yet  have  more  or  less 
modified,  laid  aside,  or  entirely  refused  the  very  doc- 
trine which  is  especially  new  in  Darwin's  theory  —  the 
selection  theory.  In  the  following  section  we  shall 
briefly  give  an  account  of  them. 

§  3.  Modifications  of  the  Theory — MorizWagner.    Wigand. 

One  of  the  most  prominent  objections  to  the  selection 
theory,  which  strikes  us  at  once  from  the  standpoint  of 
natural  history,  is  the  following:  The  varieties  of  a 
domesticated  species,  obtained  by  artificial  breeding,  are 
lost,  and  return  to  the  original  wild  form  of  the  species 
as  soon  as  they  are  crossed  long  enough  with  other  vari- 
eties or  are  left  to  themselves  and  to  the  crossing  with 
individuals  of  the  original  form  of  their  species;  and 
hence  we  can  not  see  how  individual  characteristics,  even 
if  favorable  to  the  individual,  will  not  be  lost  again  by 
the  crossing  which  is  inevitable  in  a  state  of  nature,  with 
such  individuals  as  do  not  possess  those  characteristics. 
Besides,  it  is  an  established  fact,  confirmed  by  all  our 
observations  stretching  over  thousands  of  years,  that 
the  characteristics  of  species  are  preserved  in  spite  of 
all  individual  modifications,  and  that  this  preservation  of 
the  characteristics  of  species  has  its  cause  essentially  in 
the  free  crossing  of  individuals. 

This  objection  induced  Moriz  Wagner  to  take  up 
again  an  idea  already  expressed  by  Leopold  von  Buch, 
and  to  complete  the  principle  of  a  selection  through  nat- 
ural breeding  by  another,  and  partly,  indeed,  to  sup- 
plant it  by  the  principle  of  isolation  ~by  migration. 
Isolated  individuals,  who,  from  any  reason  naturally  to 


HISTORY   OF   THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES.  53 

be  accounted  for,  leave  the  mass  of  their  fellows,  can 
from  the  very  consequence  of  this  isolation  transmit  to 
their  offspring  common  individual  characteristics  which 
are  not  destroyed  again  by  the  crossing  with  other  indi- 
viduals. They  will  especially  fix  and  transmit  these  in- 
dividual characteristics,  when  they  are  favorable  to  them 
for  the  conditions  of  existence  in  their  new  place  of  liv- 
ing, and  these  individual  characteristics  will  so  much 
the  more  be  increased  and  developed  in  a  direction 
favorable  to  the  subsistence  of  the  individuals  in  their 
new  place  of  living,  as  there  are  more  closely  connected 
with  this  isolation  variations  in  the  conditions  of  exist- 
ence, in  climate,  geographical  surroundings',  food,  and 
so  on.  He  very  attractively  applies  this  theory  also  to 
the  explanation  of  the  origin  of  man.  According  to  his 
opimon,  even  the  nearest  animal  progenitors  of  man 
were  isolated,  and  the  isolating  power  was  the  rise  of 
the  great  mountains  of  the  Old  World,  which  took  place 
previous  to  the  glacial  period.  One  pair,  or  perhaps 
a  few  pairs,  of  those  progenitors  were  driven  away  from 
the  luxurious  climate  of  the  torrid  zone  to  the  northern 
half  of  the  globe,  and  found  their  return  cut  off  by  gla- 
ciers and  high  mountains;  in  place  of  a  comfortable  life 
on  the  trees,  necessity  urged  them  to  gain  support  from 
conditions  less  favorable  to  existence,  and  necessity, 
this  mother  of  so  many  virtues  and  achievements,  finally 
made  man  what  he  is.  In  following  out  these  ideas, 
Moriz  Wagner  has  gradually  and  more  and  more  decid- 
edly given  up  the  selection  theory,  and  opposed  it  by 
sharp  criticisms. 

This  migration  or  isolation  theory  also  found  a  degree 
of   favor,    but    subordinate    in    its    nature.       For    it 


54  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

can  not  and  will  not  pretend  to  solve  the  main  prob- 
lems. It  only  tries  to  explain  how  the  individual  varia- 
tions, already  in  existence,  might  have  been  preserved 
and  perhaps  increased,  and  how  new  conditions  of  exist- 
ence could  have  roused  latent  powers;  but  not  how 
these  variations  and  these  powers  originated.  Just  as 
little  is  the  selection  theory  able  to  explain  this ; 
but  it  pretends  to  do  it,  and  hence  we  can  easily  com- 
prehend how  during  the  last  few  years  a  constantly  in- 
creasing number  of  voices,  and  more  important  ones, 
have  been  raised  against  the  selection  theory.  This 
opposition  came  not  only  from  those  who  —  like 
Agassiz,  Barrande,  Emil  Blanchard,  Escher  von  der 
Linth,  Goppert,  Giebel,  Sir  Roderick  Murchison,  Pfaff, 
and  others — directly  reject  each  and  every  idea  of  de- 
scent on  account  of  the  difficulty  in  defending  the  selec- 
tion theory;  or  who — like  Karl  Ernst  von  Baer,*  (the 

*It  was  only  when  the  manuscript  of  this  work  was  nearly  finished 
and  the  first  part  of  it  had  gone  to  the  press,  that  the  author  received 
the  second  part  of  K.  E.  von  Baer's  "  Sludten  cms  dem  Gebiete  der 
Naturwissenschaften"  (Studies  in  the  Realm  of  Natural  Sciences). 
It  contains  another  essay  on  teleology,  "  Ueber  Zielstrebigkeit  in  den 
organischen  Kffrpern  iiisbesondere,"  and  a  treatise  on  Darwin's  doc- 
trine, "  Ueber  Darwin's  Lehre"  which  Baer  had  promised  long  ago 
and  which  the  public  had  anxiously  awaited.  It  is  no  little  satisfac- 
tion to  find  that  I,  from  my  modest  premises,  reached  results  regard- 
ing the  nature  philosophical  problems  and  their  weight  in  the  reli- 
gious realm  which  so  fully  harmonize  with  the  views  of  this  first  au- 
thority in  the  realm  of  the  history  of  development.  I  shall  still  have 
occasion  here  and  there  to  avail  myself  of  a  study  of  this  latest  and 
most  important  publication  upon  the  question  of  Darwinism,  and 
shall  confine  myself  here  to  the  remark  that  von  Baer,  although  he 
rejects  the  selection  theory  and  the  superficial  treatment  of  the  princi- 
ple of  evolution  on  the  part  of  materialists,  is  by  no  means  disinclined 
to  the  idea  of  the  origin  of  species  through  descent,  whether  in  grad- 


HISTORY    OF    T1IK    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.  55 

pioneer  in  the  region  of  the  history  of  individual  devel- 
opment), like  Oskar  Fraas,  Griesebach,  Sandberger,  and 
others — generally  take  a  more  reserved  and  neutral  posi- 
tion, because  of  the  uncertainty  of  the  facts  and  the 
inaccessibility  of  the  problems;  but  it  comes  especially 
from  those  scientists  who  are  inclined  to  adopt  an  origin 
of  species  through  descent  and  even  through  develop- 
ment, yet  refuse  to  explain  it  by  the  selection  principle, 
and  look  for  the  essential  cause  of  the  develop- 
ment in  the  organisms  themselves,  without  claim- 
ing to  have  themselves  found  these  causes.  Among 
the  most  prominent  advocates  of  this  view,  we 
may  name  the  late  Sir  Charles  Lyell,  Mivart,  and  Rich- 

ual  development  or  in  leaps;  and  that  in  this  respect  he  could  no 
longer  be  counted  among  the  advocates  of  the  group  above  referred 
to,  but  among  those  which  we  mention  farther  on,  had  he  not  re- 
peatedly and  forcibly  confessed,  with  a  modesty  worthy  of  acknowl- 
edgment, his  total  ignorance  concerning  the  manner  in  which  certain 
forms  of  life,  especially  the  higher  ones,  originated.  The  origin  of 
higher  species  without  the  supposition  of  a  descent  is  to  him  unex- 
plaiuable,  because  the  individuals  of  these  species  are,  in  their  first 
development  of  life,  so  dependent  on  the  mother.  Furthermore,  he 
points  out  the  fact  that  in  early  periods  of  the  earth  the  organic  form- 
ing power  which  ruled,  must  have  been  a  higher  one  than  it  is  at  the 
present  time;  in  like  manner  as  the  first  period  in  the  embryonic  de- 
velopment of  individuals  is  to-day  the  most  productive.  This  higher 
power  of  organization,  he  says,  could  consist  in  a  higher  power  of 
changing  organisms  into  new  species,  as  well  as  in  a  higher  power  of 
producing  new  species  through  primitive  generation ;  or  it  could  con- 
sist in  both.  In  general,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  primi- 
tive generations  which  took  place  at  the  first  origination  of  life  on 
earth,  could  not  have  been  repeated  later  and  oftener.  The  nearer  a 
a  generation  was  to  these  individuals  originated  through  primitive  gen- 
eration, the  greater  was  undoubtedly  its  flexibility  and  changeable- 
ness;  the  farther,  the  greater  the  fixity  of  type. 


56  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

% 

ard  Owen,  in  England;  and  in  Germany,  Alexander 
Braun,  Ecker,  Gegenbaur,  Oswald  Heer,  W.  His, 
Niigeli,  Riitimeyer,  Schaaffhausen,  Virchow,  Karl  Vogt, 
A.  W.  Volkmann,  Weismann,  Zittel,  and  here  also  Mo- 
riz  Wagner,  and  among  the  philosophers,  Eduard  von 
Hartmann.  Many  of  these  men- are  but  little  aware  of 
the  difference  between  the  two  questions  :  whether,  on  the 
one  hand,  the  adoption  of  the  origin  of  species  through 
descent  does  not  of  itself  involve  the  idea  of  a  gradual 
development  of  one  species  from  another,  almost  unob- 
servable  in  its  single  steps ;  or,  on  the  other  hand, 
whether  a  descent  of  species  through  heterogenetic  gen- 
eration in  leaps  and  through  a  metamorphosis  of  the 
germs,  could  be  imagined.  They  consider  descent  and 
evolution  as  identical ;  and  this  identification  is  explain- 
able so  long  as  we  are  not  in  a  condition  to  come  nearer 
to  the  eventual  causes  of  the  supposed  variation  of 
species.  But  men  are  not  wanting  who  put  these  ques- 
tions clearly  and  plainly,  and  separate  them  distinctly 
from  one  another.  Among  them  we  may  mention  K.  E. 
von  Baer,  Ed.  von  Hartmann  and  Wigand;  of  the  latter 
we  will  have  occasion  to  speak  more  in  detail  hereafter. 
Among  them  we  find  also  scientists  who  answer  the 
question  in  the  sense  of  a  new-modeling  of  the  species, 
of  a  heterogenetic  generation,  and  of  a  metamorphosis 
of  germs.  To  this  class  belong  especially  Oswald  Heer — 
"  Urwelt  der  Schweitz  "  ("Antediluvian  World  in  Switz- 
erland "),  Zurich,  1865,  p.  590-604;  Kolliker—  "Ueber  die 
Darwin'sche  Schopfungstheorie,"  ("Darwin's  Theory 
of  Creation"),  Leipzig,  1864;  "Morphologic  und  Ent- 
wicklungeschichte  des  Pennatulidenstammcs  nebst  allge- 
meinen  Betrachtungen  zur  Descendenzlehre,"  ("Mor- 


HISTORY   OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.  57 

phology  and  History  of  the  Development  of  the  Stem  of 
the  Pennatulidae,  together  with  General  Remarks  on  the 
Descent  Theory"),  Frankfurt,  1872;  and  Heinrich  Baum- 
gartner  —  "Natur  mid  Gott"  ("Nature  and  God"), 
Leipzig,  Brockhaus,  1870.  Heer  has  introduced  into 
scientific  language  the  term  "new-modeling  of  the 
species,"  Kolliker  that  of  a  $•' heterogenetic  generation," 
and  Bauiugartner  that  of  a  "transmutation  of  the  types 
through  a  metamorphosis  of  germs. "  Baer  also  is  not 
averse  to  adopting  the  latter. 

The  botanist,  Albert  Wigand,  of  Marburg,  takes  a 
peculiar  position.  On  one  hand,  the  observation  of  the 
relationship  of  organic  beings  with  one  another  leads 
him  to  adopt  a  common  genealogy,  a  descent ;  on  the 
other,  the  objections  to  adopting  a  descent  of  the  species 
one  from  another  appear  to  him  insurmountable.  In  the 
first  place,  he  sees  all  the  species  everywhere  strictly 
limited — although  in  the  second  volume  of  his  work, 
which  appeared  after  the  preceding  lines  were  written, 
he  again  warns  against  a  one-sided  emphasizing  of  the 
invariability  of  species.  In  the  second  place,  he  sees  so 
clearly,  through  the  whole  organic  world,  the  differ- 
ences, nay,  the  contrasts,  of  the  species,  in  their  build- 
ing-plan, in  the  numbers  and  conditions  and  positions  of 
their  parts,  and  in  their  mode  of  development,  that  it 
appears  to  him  impossible  to  assume  in  the  perfected 
organism  a  production  of  germs  which  in  a  course  of 
generations,  by  a  process  even  as  gradual  as  possible, 
would  grow  into  such  an  entirely  new  phenomenon  as  a 
new,  even  closely  related,  species  would  be.  But  if  we 
adopt  the  theory  of  a  heterogenetic  generation,  we 
explain  by  it  the  variety  but  not  the  similarity  of  species  ; 


58  THE    THEORIES   OF   DAKWIN. 

for  a  heterogenetic  generation  would  in  the  new  species 
make  everything  different  from  the  old  one — a  conclu- 
sion, the  necessity  of  which  it  would  be  difficult  to  show. 
For  these  reasons,  he  refers  the  descent  of  the  organic 
beings,  not  to  the  series  of  the  species,  with  their  indi- 
viduals already  specified  and  defined,  but  to  the  series 
of  primordial  cells  living  free  in  the  water.  The  earli- 
est primordial  cells  represented  only  the  common  char- 
acter of  the  ivhole  organic  world,  and  out  of  them  the 
primordial  cells  of  the  animal  and  those  of  the  vegeta- 
ble kingdom  were  produced  by  dividing  the  cells;  so  that 
the  first  ones  embraced  only  the  general  and  primitive 
characteristics  of  the  whole  animal,  the  last  ones  those 
of  the  whole  vegetable  kingdom.  Out  of  these  primor- 
dial cells  of  the  two  kingdoms,  those  of  the  main  types 
proceeded — (for  instance,  the  primordial  cells  of  the  radi- 
ated animals,  the  vertebrates,  etc.,  the  gymnosperms, 
the  angiosperms,  etc.);  out  of  them  those  of  the  classes 
— (for  instance,  the  mammalia,  the  dicotyledons ) ; 
out  of  them  those  of  the  orders — (for  instance,  the  beasts 
of  prey,  rosiflorae) ;  out  of  them  those  of  the  families 
(canina,  rosaceaj);  out  of  them  those  of  the  (/cnus(c&ms, 
rosa);  and  out  of  them  those  of  the  species  (canis  lupus, 
rosa,  canina).  Only  when  the  primordial  cells  of  the 
species  had  been  produced,  were  they  developed  into 
finished  representatives  of  the  species;  and  when  once 
these  primordial  cells  of  the  species  had  been  developed 
into  finished  and  full-grown  individuals  of  the  species, 
their  transmission  took  place  in  the  manner  well  known 
to  us.  \Vigand  published  his  criticism  of  the  Darwinian 
Theories  in  his  larger  work,  "Der  Darwinismus  und  die 
Naturforschung  Newtons  und  Cuviers,"  (''Darwinism 


HISTORY   OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.  59 

and  the  Natural  Science  of  Newton  and  Cuvier"),  Braun- 
schweig, Vieweg,  Vol.  I,  1874,  Vol.  H.,^1876,  and  his 
own  attempt  at  explanation  in  a  smaller  book,  published 
at  the  same  place  in  1872:  "  Die  Genealogie  der  Urzel- 
leri  als  Losung  des  Descendenzproblems  oder  die  Ent- 
stehung  der  Arten  ohne  natiirliche  Zuchtwahl"  ("Gene- 
alogy of  the  Primordial  Cells  as  a  Solution  of  the 
Problem  of  Descent ;  or  the  Origin  of  Species  without 
Natural  Selection"). 

Whether  this  genealogy  of  the  primordial  cells  found 
any  followers,  we  do  not  know.  None  of  the  hypoth- 
eses thus  far  mentioned  are  so  very  far  from  having 
analogies  in  experience.  The  idea  of  a  first  develop- 
ment of  the  higher  organisms  out  of  their  specific  pri- 
mordial cell,  through  all  kinds  of  conditions  of  larvae 
up  to  the  finished  form,  demands  of  us  the  acceptance 
of  monstrous  improbabilities  —  (think,  for  example,  of 
the  first  men,  who,  originating  from  a  human  primor- 
dial cell,  grow  in  different  metamorphoses  of  larvae,  first 
in  the  water  and  then  on  the  land,  until  they  appear  as 
finished  men).  Moreover, 'the  hypothesis,  in  claiming 
that  a  heterogenetic  generation  of  one  species  from 
another  must  necessarily  nullify  all  similarity  between 
the  organism  of  the  child  and  that  of  the  mother,  is  so 
little  convincing,  and  shows  —  in  the  necessity  of  con- 
ceiving the  universal  type  of  organisms,  the  type  of 
kingdoms,  of  main  types,  of  classes,  of  orders,  of  fam- 
ilies, of  genera,  and  of  species,  as  but  individual  exist- 
ences which,  in  the  form  of  cells  and  before  the  existence 
of  the  developed  species,  partly  through  many  thous- 
ands of  years,  lead  a  real  empiric  and  concrete  life — • 
such  an  abstract  synthetical  construction  of  nature,  that 


60  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

we  are  not  astonished  that  the  theory  of  the  genealogy 
of  primordial  cells  stands  almost  alone.  On  the  other 
hand,  Wigand's  larger  critical  work  rendered  great  ser- 
vice in  clearing  up  the  problems.  It  is  true,  his  judg- 
ment appears  in  many  single  cases  not  at  all  convincing, 
since  he  often  enough  fights  his  adversaries  with 
sophisms  and  deduces  from  the  views  of  Darwin  and 
Hackel  conclusions  to  which  they  certainly  do  not  lead. 
But,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  his  work  is  full  of  real  con- 
vincing power,  and  with  the  breadth  of  its  philosophical 
view  and  with  the  sharpness  of  its  definitions,  as  well  as 
with  its  abundance  of  philosophic  and  especially  botan- 
ical teachings  and  their  ingenious  application,  it  is  direct- 
ly destructive  to  the  use  of  the  selection  theory  as  the 
principal  key  to  the  solution  of  the  problems.  Eduard 
von  Hartmann  describes  the  work  in  his  publication, 
"  Wahrheit  und  Irrthum  im  Darwinismus,"  ("  Truth  and 
Error  in  Darwinism"),  as  a  mile-stone  which  marks  the 
limits  where  Darwinism  as  such  passed  the  summit  of  its 
influence  in  Germany. 


PRESENT   STATE   OF   THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        61 


CHAPTER  m. 

PRESENT  STATE  OF  THE  DARWINIAN  THEORIES. 

g  1.     The  Theory  of  Descent. 

The  historical  retrospect  of  the  Darwinian  theories, 
from  their  purely  scientific  side,  leads  us  of  itself  to  a 
critical  review  of  their  present  state.  We  can  briefly 
indicate  in  advance  the  result  to  which  it  will  lead  us, 
viz. :  that  the  descent  theory  has  gained,  the  selection 
theory  has  lost  ground,  the  theory  of  development  oscil- 
lates between  both;  but  that  all  three  theories  have 
not  yet  passed  beyond  the  rank  of  hypotheses,  although 
they  have  very  unequal  hypothetical  value.  We  can 
best  arrange  our  review  by  beginning  with  that  theory 
which  is  the  most  common,  and  which  perhaps  may 
still  have  value  when  both  the  others  find  their  value 
diminished  or  lost :  the  theory  of  descent.  From  that 
we  proceed  to  the  theory  of  evolution,  and  from  this 
to  that  of  selection. 

The  theory  of  descent  is  indeed  at  first  sight  ex- 
ceedingly plausible,  and  will  probably  always  be  the 
directive  for  all  future  investigations  as  to  the  origin  of 
species.  The  organic  species  show,  besides  the  great 
variety  of  their  characteristics  and  the  unchangeable 
nature  of  these  characteristics,  many  other  qualities 
which  are  common  to  them;  and  these  common  charac- 
teristics are  precisely  those  which  are  most  essential. 


62  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

Moreover  the  higher  the  structure  of  the  organisms 
which  are  differentiated,  the  more  numerous  and  more 
valuable  will  become  the  evidences  of  similarity,  and 
the  greater  also  will  be  their  distance  from  the  inorganic 
and  from  the  lowest  organisms  of  their  class,  their  type, 
or  their  kingdom.  For  instance,  rose  and  apple-tree, 
elder  and  ash,  wolf  and  dog,  goat  and  sheep,  ape  and 
man,  are  not  only  a  great  deal  farther  removed  from  the 
mode  of  existence  of  inorganic  bodies  than  the  algae, 
the  monera,  and  other  low  organisms,  but  they  have 
also,  in  spite  of  the  great  interval  which  separates  them 
from  one  another  and  especially  which  separates  man 
from  every  animal,  much  more  numerous  and  important 
points  of  contact  than,  for  instance,  two  families  or  gen- 
era of  algffi  or  of  mosses,  of  polyps  or  of  infusoria,  have 
among  one  another.  Now  our  imagination  refuses  to 
accept  the  theory  that  the  Creator,  or  nature,  or  what- 
ever we  wish  to  call  the  principle  generating  the  species, 
in  producing  the  new  species,  laid  aside  all  those  points 
of  contact  which  are  continually  becoming  more  numer- 
ous and  more  important,  and  produced  instead,  by  ever 
widening  leaps,  the  new  and  higher  species  from  the 
inorganic,  which  lies  farther  and  farther  from  them.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  theory  appears  to  us  all  the  more 
plausible,  that  every  new  species  came  into  existence  on 
that  stage  which  is  the  most  nearly  related  to  it,  and 
which  was  already  in  existence.  If  we  add  further, 
that  the  two  old  maxims  of  the  natural  scientists, 
omne  vivum  ex  ovo  and  omne  ovum  ex  ovario,  have  not 
been  invalidated,  in  spite  of  all  the  searching  for  a  gen- 
eratio  ceqidvoca,  and  that,  even  if  the  origination  of  the 
lowest  organisms  out  of  the  inorganic  could  in  future  be 


PRESENT   STATE    OF   THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        63 

proved,  yet  the  truth  of  these  maxims  for  all  the  higher 
organized  individuals  is  established  as  a  fact  without 
exception.  Moreover,  if  we  take  into  consideration  the 
fact  that  we  can  not  at  all  imagine  either  the  origin  or 
the  first  development  of  a  higher  animal  or  a  human 
organism  without  the  protecting  integument  and  the 
nourishing  help  of  a  mother's  womb,  we  may  venture 
to  say  that  each  and  every  attempt  to  render  the  ori- 
gin of  the  first  individuals  of  the  higher  species  conceiv- 
able, leads  of  necessity  to  the  descent  theory.  We  have 
either  to  reject,  once  for  all,  such  an  attempt,  as  an  un- 
scientific playing  with  impossibilities,  or  to  accept  the 
idea  of  descent.  It  is  certainly  the  lasting  merit  of 
Darwin,  even  if  his  whole  structure  of  proofs  should  in 
the  course  of  time  show  itself  weak,  that  he  not  only 
had  the  courage  (as  others  had  before  him),  but  also 
inspired  scientists  with  the  courage  to  trace  the  idea  of 
a  descent  of  species  in  a  scientific  way. 

To  be  sure,  so  long  as  we  have  no  other  proof  of  the 
descent  theory  than  the  circumstance  that  we  can  imag- 
ine it,  it  will  continue  to  be  nothing  more  than  an  inge-. 
nious  hypothesis.  We  have,  therefore,  to  look  to  the 
realm  of  nature  for  more  direct  proofs;  and  we  are 
there  furnished  with  them.  They  are  presented  to 
us  by  geology  in  connection  with  the  botanical  and  zoo- 
logical systems,  by  geology  in  connection  with  vegetable 
and  animal  geography,  by  comparative  anatomy,  and 
by  the  history  of  the  embryonic  development  of  ani- 
mals. 

Geology  finds  in  the  strata  of  the  crust  of  the  globe 
a  large  number  of  extinct  plants  and  animals  of  extraor- 
dinary variety;  but  all  of  them,  however  much  they 


()i  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

may  differ  from  the  organisms  of  to-day,  are  completely 
in  harmony  with  the  botanical  and  zoological  systems  in 
which  we  divide  the  still  living  organisms.  Not  only 
have  by  far  the  most  of  the  now  extinct  genera  and 
species  their  family  and  stem-companions,  and  many 
even  their  genera  and  species  companions,  in  the  living 
world,  but  also  those  genera  whose  nearer  relations  are 
now  extinct — as,  for  instance,  the  elub-moss-trees,  the 
trilobites,  the  ammonites,  the  belemnites,  the  sauria, 
the  nummulites, — show  still  a  very  perceptible  relation- 
ship with  living  genera,  and  can  be  quite  accurately  in- 
cluded in  the  botanical  and  zoological  systems;  nay, 
they  even  fill  up  gaps  in  it.  The  anatomical,  mor- 
phological, and,  so  far  as  we  can  judge,  the  physio- 
logical and  biological  relationship  of  the  fossil  with  living 
organisms,  is  so  great  and  comprehensive  that  in  the 
present  state  of  science  a  systematic  botany  or  zoology, 
ttiat  should  only  treat  of  the  fossils  or  of  living  organ- 
isms alone,  would  be  imperfect.  But  the  relationship  of 
the  fossil  organisms  with  the  natural  systems  of  botany 
and  zoology  is  apparent  not  only  in  this  respect,  but 
also  in  the  fact  that  the  single  species  during  the  long 
periods  of  time  which  are  shown  by  geology  to  have 
elapsed,  came  into  existence  in  a  series,  which  again 
pretty  closely  corresponds  to  the  natural  system  of  the 
organic  kingdoms;  and  that  the  fossil  representatives  of 
all  classes  and  families,  the  nearer  they  come  to  the  pres- 
ent world,  appear  the  more  nearly  related  to  the  liv- 
ing organisms,  so  that  the  fauna  and  flora  of  the  ante- 
human  time  are  lost  in  those  of  the  human  period  by 
transitions  gliding  from  the  one  to  the  other.  For  in- 
stance, in  the  Miocene  formation  of  the  tertiary  epoch 


PRESENT   STATE    OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.        65 

we  find  thirty  per  cent,  of  species  still  living  to-day;  in 
the  Pliocene,  even  sixty  to  eighty  per  cent.,  and  toward 
its  end  even  about  ninety-six  per  cent,  of  species  which 
are  identical  with  those  now  living. 

A  brief  glance  may  still  more  closely  illustrate  this 
analogy  between  the  geological  series  and  the  organic 
systems.  Plants  and  animals  seem  to  have  appeared 
nearly  at  the  same  time,  and  at  first  in  the  form  of  the 
very  lowest  organisms.  The  earliest  plants  found  by 
geology  belong  also  to  the  lowest  stage  of  the  vegetable 
kingdom;  they  are  the  algae.  They  are  followed  again 
by  higher  cryptogamous  plants,  especially  ferns  and 
club-mosses.  Only  at  a  later  period  flowering  plants 
appear,  among  them  being  first  the  plants  with  naked 
seeds  standing  lower  in  the  system-,  as  the  cy cad-trees  and 
pine-forests;  later,  those  with  enclosed  seeds,  among 
them  being  again  first  the  monocotyledons,  last  the 
dicotyledons, —  all  of  them  precisely  corresponding  to 
the  botanical  system.  The  same  thing  is  true  in  the 
animal  kingdom.  If  the  eozoon  Canadense,  found  in 
the  laurentian  slate  of  the  Cambrian  formation  in  North 
America,  is  really  an  organism  and  not  an  inorganic 
form,  the  earliest  vestiges  of  animal  life  we  can  find  are 
the  rhizopodes  or  foraminifera;  and  these  organisms 
belong  to  the  lowest  stage  of  life — to  that  stage  which 
forms  a  kind  of  undeveloped  intermediate  member  be- 
tween the  vegetable  and  animal  kingdom,  HackeFs 
kingdom  of  the  protista.  The  next  oldest  animal  or- 
ganisms found  in  the  Cambrian  formation  are  the  zoo- 
phytes, and  immediately  above  them  the  mollusca  and 
the  Crustacea.  In  the  following  Silurian  period  we  find 
corals,  radita,  worms,  mollusca,  and  Crustacea,  i:i 
5 


(JO  THE    THEORIES    OF   DARWIN. 

great  number,  also  all  the  main-types  of  the  inverte- 
brates; and  in  the  highest  Silurian  strata  there  are  also  to 
be  found  representatives  of  the  lowest  class  of  verte- 
brates, of  fish,  but  still  of  very  low  organization 
and  little  differentiated.  That  the  five  main-types  of 
the  invertebrates  seem  to  have  appeared  quite  contem- 
poraneously, yet  that  the  zoophytes  realty  appeared  first, 
does  not  contradict  the  before-mentioned  law  of  a  pro- 
gress in  the  appearance  of  the  organisms  from  the  lower 
to  the  higher.  For  in  the  zoological  system  also  these 
main-types  of  the  invertebrates  do  not  stand  one  above 
the  other,  but  by  the  side  of  each  other:  at  most,  the 
radiata,  the  worms,  the  mollusca,  and  the  articulata, 
take  their  places  above  the  zoophytes.  Only  within 
the  main-types,  in  the  classes,  orders,  etc.,  do  differ- 
ences in  rank  take  effect;  and  even  here,  not  without 
exception.  What  difference  in  rank,  for  instance,  is 
there  between  an  oyster  and  a  cuttle-fish?  between  a 
cochineal  and  a  bee  or  ant  ?  and  yet  the  first  two  belong 
to  one  and  the  same  type — the  type  of  mollusca;  and 
the  last  three  to  one  and  the  same  class — the  class  of  in- 
sects. The  vertebrates  rank  decidedly  above  the 
invertebrates;  and  in  a  manner  wholly  corresponding 
to  this,  the  vertebrates  also  appear  after  the  in- 
vertebrates. Just  as  decidedly  as  to  their  rank,  the 
main  classes  of  the  vertebrates  do  not  stand  beside,  but 
above  one  another:  above  the  fish  stand  the  amphibia, 
above  them  the  reptiles,  next  the  birds,  and  above  them 
the  mammalia.  To  this  series  of  succession  also  the 
geological  facts  seem  to  correspond  pretty  closely;  only 
long  after  the  fish  do  the  first  amphibia  and  reptilia  ap- 
pear— although  it  can  not  yet  be  decided  which  of  these 


PRESENT   STATE    OF   THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        67 

two  classes  has  left  its  earliest  traces.  If  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  gigantic  foot-steps  in  the  colored  sand- 
stone of  North  America,  as  belonging  to  the  cursorial 
birds,  is  correct,  the  first  appearance  of  birds  falls  in 
the  time  between  the  reptilia  and  mammalia;  otherwise 
the  first  mammalia  would  have  appeared  before  the  first 
birds.  For  if  we  find  the  first  real  bones  of  birds  only 
in  the  Jura  and  in  the  Chalk-formation,  they  are  birds 
with  tail-spines  and  with  teeth  in  the  beak — hence  still 
related  to  the  reptilia  or  the  sauria.  The  first  traces  of 
mammalia  to  be  found  in  the  Upper  Keuper  formation, 
and  in  the  Jura,  belong  to  the  order  of  opossums  or 
marsupialia;  i.  e.,  to  that  order  which  (excepting  the 
echidna  and  the  ornithorhynchus  that,  as  so-called 
monotremeta,  stand  the  very  lowest  in  the  class  of  the 
mammalia,  but  are  very  scarce)  occupies  the  lowest 
stage  among  the  multitude  of  mammalia.  Only  after 
them  do  the  higher  orders  of  mammalia  appear;  and  last 
of  all  organisms,  man. 

If  we  follow  more  in  detail  the  appearance  of  the 
single  organisms,  some  remarkable  modifications  show 
themselves  in  the  course  of  their  appearance  and  growth. 
We  have  heretofore  mentioned  the  possibility  of  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  mammalia  before  the  bird.  Another 
fact  which  deserves  attention  is,  that  frequently  the  lowest 
representatives  of  a  class  or  an  order  do  not  at  first  appear 
where  the  highest  representatives  of  the  next  lower  class 
or  order  are  in  existence,  but  with  lower  representatives 
of  a  preceding  class  or  order,  viz. :  such  representatives 
of  the  same  as  are  still  less  differentiated  and  unite  in 
themselves  comparatively  still  more  generic  and  less 
specific  characteristics — as  for  instance,  the  lowest  and 


68  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

earliest  amphibia,  which  do  not  appear  at  the  same  time 
and  place  with  the  most  highly  organized  fishes,  but 
with  fishes  of  still  lower  organization.  Moreover  many 
groups  of  organisms  show  in  earlier  geological  periods 
a  richness  of  development  from  which  they  have  now 
fallen  far  away.  For  instance,  among  the  mammalia 
the  pachydermata,  among  the  reptilia  the  salamander 
and  newt,  among  the  articulata  the  cephalopoda,  are  at 
present  remarkably  reduced; — compare  with  the  legions 
of  ammonites  and  belemnites  of  the  secondary  period 
the  small  number  of  nautilus  and  cuttle-fish  of  the  seas 
at  the  present  clay.  A  similar  fortune  was  experienced 
by  the  ferns  and  club-mosses  which  formed  whole  forests 
in  the  carboniferous  period.  Other  groups  which  once 
played  a  great  rdle,  are  now  wholly  extinct;  for  instance, 
the  trilobites  of  the  primary,  the  sauria  of  the  second- 
ary, the  nummulites  of  the  tertiary  periods.  Now,  all 
these  modifications  of  geological  progress  would  entirely 
correspond  to  the  idea  of  a  pedigree  to  which  the  descent 
theory  traces  back  the  whole  abundance  of  forms  of 
organisms.  As  soon  as  we  seriously  accept  the  idea  of 
a  pedigree,  each  of  the  two  organic  kingdoms  would 
throughout  form  for  its  classes  and  species  not  only  one 
single  straight  line  of  descent,  but  a  tree,  the  branches 
of  which  are  again  ramified  in  a  manifold  way;  a  tree  on 
which  single  branches — as  perhaps  that  of  the  class  of 
birds — may  leave  the  main-stem  or  a  main-branch,  pos- 
sibly being  a  branch  destined  to  a  higher  development, 
and  on  that  account  held  back  in  the  process  of  develop- 
ment; a  tree,  finally,  on  which  also  branches  and  twigs 
can  wholly  or  partly  die  off,  as  those  of  the  extinct  or 
reduced  groups  of  organisms. 


PRESENT   STATE   OF   THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        69 

From  the  point  where  the  geological  formations  ap- 
proach the  present  time,  plant  and  animal  geography 
also  assists  geology  in  increasing  the  weight  of  the  rea- 
sons for  an  origin  of  organisms  through  descent.  With 
the  tertiary  period,  the  fauna  and  flora  of  the  globe, 
which  in  former  periods  had  a  nearly  uniform  character 
all  over  the  earth  and  showed  no  climatic  differences, 
begin  to  separate  according  to  climate,  zones,  and  great- 
er continents.  This  separation  becomes  distinctly  evi- 
dent in  the  middle  tertiary  formations,  the  Miocene,  and 
much  more  distinctly  in  the  higher  tertiary  formations, 
the  Pliocene.  The  animals,  especially  the  higher  verte- 
brates, of  the  Pliocene  formation  on  each  conti- 
nent or  each  larger  group  of  islands,  correspond  very 
closely  to  the  now  living  animals  of  the  same  geograph- 
ical limit,  with  the  exception  of  being,  generally  of  a 
much  larger  size.  The  Pliocene  animal  world  of  mam- 
malia of  the  three  old  continents,  for  instance,  corre- 
sponds exactly,  through  all  its  orders,  to  the  present 
fauna  of  Europe,  Asia  and  Africa;  and  that  on  an  aver- 
age it  was  built  up  more  stupendously  than  that  of 
to-day,  we  can  see  from  the  cave-bear  and  the  mammoth, 
South  America  is  the  home  of  a  peculiar  order  of 
mammalia — of  the  edentata,  to  which  belong  the  sloth, 
the  armadillo,  and  the  like.  All  its  predecessors  are  to  be 
found  also  in  the  Pliocene  strata  of  South  America,  and 
only  there;  and  mostly  in  gigantic,  but  otherwise  com- 
pletely related,  forms.  New  Zealand  has  no  indigenous 
mammalia,  but  in  their  place  great  cursorial  birds  with 
but  rudimentary  wings.  Exactly  the  same  thing  is  found 
by  geology  in  its  tertiary  and  post-tertiary  strata  :  no- 
where a  mammal,  but  gigantic  birds  with  rudimentary 


70  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

wings,  down  to  the  dinornis,  which  probably  died  out 
in  man's  time.  New  Holland  has  merely  marsupial  and 
son:e  monotrematous,  but  no  placental,  mammalia;  even 
its  tertiary  strata  give  no  placental  mammalia,  but  mar- 
supialia,  in  analogy  with  all  living  genera,  herbivorous, 
and  carnivorous.  Indeed,  the  analogy  goes  so  far  that 
the  same  line  which  through  the  Indian  Archipelago 
separates  the  present  Australian  animal  and  plant  world 
from  the  Asiatic,  forms  also  the  separating  line  for  the 
geological  zones  of  the  Pliocene  epoch.  All  these  are 
facts  which  render  quite  inevitable  the  idea  of  an  origin 
of  the  higher  organic  species" of  to-day  through  descent. 
But  still,  from  another  side,  animal  geography, 
though  it  does  not  yet  speak  for  a  common  pedigree  of  the 
whole  animal  world,  as  the  facts  just  mentioned  also  do 
not,  still  at  least  speaks  for  a  descent  of  related,  though 
at  present  separated,  genera  and  species  from  common 
forefathers.  The  continents  of  the  Old  and  New  World 
are  so  constructed  that  toward  the  North  Pole  they  ap- 
proach one  another  very  closely,  and  toward  the  South 
Pole  they  withdraw  from  one  another.  Without 
doubt  there  existed  in  the  North,  through  long  periods 
of  time,  a  land-connection  of  America  with  Asia  and 
with  Europe.  Now,  both  continents  have  their  more  or 
less  characteristic  animal  world,  and  these  characteris- 
tics are  distributed  over  the  two  halves  of  the  globe  in 
the  following  extremely  remarkable  way:  The  fauna  of 
the  Old  and  the  New  World,  in  those  groups  of  animal 
genera  which  live  only  in  the  warmer  or  tropic  zones 
or  only  south  of  the  equator,  and  have  no  associates 
of  genera  -  or  families  in  the  higher  North,  is  in  each 
hemisphere  entirely  characteristic,  and  differs  in  a 


PRESENT    STATE    OF   THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        71 

marked  way  from  the  fauna  of  the  other  half  of  the 
globe.  For  instance,  the  rhinoceros,  the  hippopotamus, 
the  giraffe,  the  antelope  with  undivided  horns,  the  hedge- 
hog, the  mole  proper,  are  only  inhabitants  of  the  Old 
World,  whence  also  the  horse  originally  came,  the 
striped  ones  in  Africa  and  the  non-striped  in  Asia  ;  on 
the  other  hand,  the  lemur,  the  ant-eater,  the  armadillo, 
and  others,  are  limited  to  South  America.  The  apes  of 
the  Old  World  have  five  molar  teeth  on  each  side  of  the 
jaw,  narrow  noses,  tails  usually  short  and  never  prehen- 
sile, and  fleshy  protuberances  for  sitting ;  the  apes 
of  the  New  World  have  six  molar  teeth,  flat  noses,  and 
long  prehensile  tails.  And  on  the  contrary,  where 
closely  related  species  are  found  on  both  parts  of  the 
globe,  they  belong  only  to  genera  of  which  single  spe- 
cies live  or  have  lived  in  the  far  North  ;  as,  for  instance, 
the  rein-deer,  still  common  to  the  Old  and  the  New 
World  in  this  very  North  which  once  formed  a  bridge 
between  the  two  halves  of  the  earth.  The  same  is  true 
in  regard  to  cattle,  the  deer,  the  cat,  the  dog,  the  hare. 
Similar  facts  can  also  be  shown  of  other  animal  classes. 
The  farther  the  different  species  of  these  genera  with- 
draw from  the  North  Pole,  the  greater  become  the  differ- 
ences between  the  species  on  the  one  half  of  the  globe 
and  the  analogous  species  of  the  other.  Compare  on 
this  point  K.  E.  von  Baer's  "  Studien  aus  dem  Gebiete 
der  Naturwissenchaften,  iiber  Darwin's  Lehre,"  ("  Studies 
from  the  Realm  of  Natural  Science  upon  Darwin's 
Teachings"),  p.  356  f.  If  we  add,  further,  tire  before 
mentioned  fact,  that  those  genera  which  are  exclusively 
peculiar  to  one  or  the  other  continent,  have  their  related 
predecessors  in  the  tertiary  strata  of  these  continents, 


72  THE   THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

the  hypothesis  of  a  separate  origin  for  each  single 
species,  without  genealogical  connection  with  the  anato- 
mically and  physiologically  related  species,  becomes 
neither  more  nor  less  than  a  scientific  impossibility. 

Moreover,  there  are  several  facts  of  comparative 
anatomy  which  have  long  been  the  joy  of  all  zoologists 
and  have  rewarded  the  toilsome  labors  of  detailed  inves- 
tigations by  a  delightful  view  over  the  whole  realm  of 
the  organic  world,  but  which  find  a  scientific  explanation 
only  in  the  descent  theory.  They  are  the  komology  of 
the  organs,  and  to  a  certain  degree  also  the  so-called 
rudimentary  organs.  By  homology  of  organs  we 
mean  the  fact  that  within  one  and  the  same  class-group 
of  organisms  all  the  organs,  and  especially  the  organs 
in  their  most  solid  constituents,  in  the  skeleton,  are  built 
after  one  and  the  same  fundamental  plan,  and  therefore  are 
even  in  their  most  widely  separated  modifications  varied 
after  this  one  and  the  same  plan.  This  is  especially 
true  of  the  vertebrae  and  the  limbs.  This  homology  goes 
so  far  within  one  class,  particularly  within  the  class  of 
mammalia,  that,  for  instance,  the  hands  and  feet  of  man^ 
the  hands  of  the  ape,  the  paws  of  the  beast  of  prey,  the 
hoof  of  the  horse  and  of  the  ox,  the  paws  of  the  mole, 
the  fins  of  the  seal  and  of  the  whale,  the  wing-mem- 
branes of  the  flying-squirrel,  correspond  to  one  another 
in  their  smallest  parts  and  ossicles,  and  can  all  be  regis- 
tered with  the  same  numbers  and  letters  ;  i.  <?.,  they  are 
homologous  to  one  another  even  to  the  minutest  detail. 
The  ideal  plan  and  connection  in  the  organisms,  disclosed 
by  these  facts,  and  long  ago  acknowledged  and  admired, 
receives  at  the  same  time  its  simple  material  basis 
through  the  acceptance  of  a  common  descent. 


PRESENT   STATE   OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.        73 

A  similar  relation  is  observed  in  rudimentary  organs. 

Many  of  them,  as  the  nipples  of  males,  point,  if  not 
to  a  common  descent  from  a  lower  form,  at  least  to  a 
common  plan  of  the  sexes.  But  when  the  embryo  of 
the  whale  still  has  its  teeth  in  the  jaw,  the  grown  up 
whale  its  hip-bones,  when  the  eye  of  man  still  has  its 
winking  membrane,  the  ear  and  many  portions  of  the 
the  skin  their  rudimentary  muscles  of  motion,  the  end 
of  the  vertebral  column  its  rudimentary  tail,  the  intes- 
tinal canal  its  blind  intestine  ;  when  sightless  animals, 
living  in  the  dark,  still  have  their  rudimentary  eyes, 
blind  worms  their  shoulder-blades  ;  when  in  like  manner 
the  plants,  especially  in  their  parts  of  fecundation,  show 
in  great  number  such  rudimentary  organs  as  are  entirely 
useless  for  the  functions  of  life,  but  which  are  never 
misleading  in  determining  their  relationship  with  other 
plants: — how  simply  are  all  these  facts  explained  by  the 
descent  theory,  how  not  at  all  without  it ! 

Finally,  if  we  now  mention  the  history  of  the  de- 
velopment of  animals,  we  shall  have  to  postpone  to  the 
next  section  the  consideration  of  the  most  essential  facts 
furnished  by  this  science  ;  for  the  individual  develop- 
ment of  animals  is  a  process  which  could  speak  not 
only  for  a  descent  of  the  species,  but  also  for  a  descent 
of  them  through  gradual  development.  But  where,  as 
in  the  present  section,  we  treat  the  descent  theory  apart 
from  the  evolution  theory,  we  have  also  to  think  of  the 
possibility  that  the  species  or  groups  of  species  are  not 
originated  through  gradual  development,  but  nevertheless 
do  originate  through  descent — namely,  in  leaps  through 
metamorphosis  of  germs  or  a  heterogenetic  generation  ; 
and  for  such  an  idea  we  find  confirmation  in  the  observa- 


74  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

tionof  the  history  of  development  of  animals,  which  we 
call  change  of  generation  or  metagenesis.  *  By  this  is  meant 
the  following  phenomenon  :  Certain  animals,  as  the 
salpa  and  doliolum  of  the  order  of  the  tunicata,  as  well 
as  certain  mites  and  many  tape-worms,  produce  off- 
spring which  are  wholly  dissimilar  to  the  mother 
stock.  These  offspring  have  the  capacity  of  reproduc- 
ing themselves — if  not  by  sexual  means,  as  at  the  first 
generation,  still  by  the  formation  of  sprouts ;  and  it  is 
only  the  animals  originated  by  the  second  generation 
(with  many  species,  even  those  by  the  third)  which  return 
again  to  the  form  of  the  first  generation.  The  plant-lice 
transmit  themselves  through  six,  seven,  even  ten  genera- 
tions by  means  of  sprouts,  until  a  generation  appears 
which  lays  eggs.  Now  it  is  indeed  trur  that  the  change 
of  generation  forms  a  circle  in  which  the  form  of  the 
last  generation  always  returns  to  that  of  the  first,  and 
therefore  leaves  the  species,  as  species,  wholly  unchanged. 
But  it  is  nevertheless  a  process  which  shows  that  the 
natural  law  of  an  identity  between  generator  and  pro- 
duct, observed  in  other  relations,  is  not  without  excep- 
tion ;  and  if  we  once  have  reason  to  suppose  that  the 
generation  of  new  species  took  place  in  past  periods  of 
the  globe,  but  has  ceased  in  the  present,  such  processes 
in  the  single  period  open  to  our  direct  observation— 
namely,  the  present  (in  which,  however,  according  to  our 
knowledge,  the  species  remain  constant) — are  neverthe- 

*  After  the  completion  of  this  manuscript,  the  author  found  that 
K.  E.  von  Baer,  in  his  treatise  upon  Darwin's  doctrine,  pays  especial 
attention  to  the  change  of  generation  and  also  to  the  metamorphosis 
of  plants  and  animals  in  exactly  the  same  sense  and  reaches  the  same 
conclusion. 


PRESENT   STATE    OF   THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        75 

less  hints  worthy  of  notice.  For  they  refer  us  to  ways 
in  which  in  those  former  times,  when  certainly  new 
species  did  originate,  this  formation  of  species  might 
possibly  have  taken  place. 

This  consideration  leads  us  to  treat  of  the  main  ob- 
jection raised  to  every  descent  theory:  namely,  that 
never  yet  has  the  origin  of  one  species  from  another 
been  observed,  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  all  species — so 
far  as  our  experience  goes,  stretching  over  thousands  of 
years — remain  constant.  We  will  give  no  weight  to  the 
fact  that  the  constancy  of  species  seems  by  no  means  to 
be  absolutely  without  exception ;  for  on  the  whole,  they 
certainly  remain  constant.  The  only  example  which 
goes  to  prove  such  an  evolution  of  species  as  taking 
place  to-day — viz  :  the  natural  history  of  sponges- 
seems  not  to  have  this  bearing.  The  transitions  of  form, 
proven  by  O.  Schmidt  in  the  siliceous  sponges  and  by 
Hackel  in  the  chalk-sponges,  seem  to  show,  not  the  gen- 
etic coming  forth  of  a  new  species  out  of  another,  and 
especially  not  the  evolution  of  a  higher  species  out  of  a 
lower,  but  rather  the  uncertainty  of  the  idea  of  species 
in  general  and  the  \vorthlessness  of  the  skeleton-forms, 
for  this  idea,  in  such  low  organizations  as  the  sponges. 
But  that  objection  already  loses  its  chief  force  from  the 
consideration  that  we  have  not  only  never  observed  the 
origin  of  one  species  from  another,  but  never  even  the 
origin  of  a  species  itself;  and  that  nevertheless  all  spe- 
cies have  successively  originated  in  time.  If  we,  there- 
fore, are  not  able  to  observe  directly  their  origination, 
we  have  a  right  to  make  all  possible  attempts  at 
approaching  the  knowledge  of  it  in  an  indirect  way. 
But  we  see  this  objection  invalidated  by  still  another 


76  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

fact.  From  all  observations,  it  seems  to  be  evident 
that  those  agencies  which  originated  the  species  in  gen- 
eral have  ceased  since  man  appeared.  Now  this  fact  is 
inconvenient  for  all  those  who,  on  metaphysical  grounds, 
reject  aim  and  purpose  in  the  world  and  accept  an  aim- 
less motion  in  the  universe,  a  circle  in  which  only  identi- 
cal powers  are  ever  active  to  all  eternity.  From  this 
standpoint,  the  scientists  cannot,  except  by  very  artificial 
hypotheses,  escape  the  conclusion  that,  if  new  species 
once  originated  through  descent,  new  species  ought  still 
to  originate  through  descent.  In  like  manner,  it  is  true, 
they  are  also  obliged  to  accept  the  other  conclusion  : 
that  if  new  species  once  originated  through  primitive 
generation,  new  species  ought  still  to  originate  through 
primitive  generation.  On  the  other  hand,  those  scien- 
tists who  recognize-  aims  in  the  world  for  which  the 
world  and  each  part  of  it  is  destined,  and  which  are  at- 
tained in  the  world  through  the  processes  of  coming  into 
existence,  have  to  expect  in  advance  that  the  organic 
kingdoms  are  also  planned  with  reference  to  those  aims. 
They  naturally  see  the  aim  of  the  origin  of  species  at- 
tained, where  in  the  organic  world  beings  appear  who 
combine  with  the  highest  physical  organization  a  self- 
conscious  and  responsible  spiritual  life,  and  who  are 
capable  of  conceiving  the  ideal,  even  the  idea  of  God. 
For,  with  the  appearance  of  these  beings,  there 
enter  upon  the  theatre  of  the  world  beings  who 
go  beyond  the  value  of  a  purely  physical  organism 
and  of  a  purely  somato-psychical  life,  and  in  like 
manner  represent  again  a  higher  order  of  beings; 
just  as  the  first  appearance  of  organic  lite  on 
earth  once  introduced  a  new  and  higher  stage  of  exist- 


PRESENT   STATE   OF  THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        77 

ence  in  contrast  to  the  inorganic  world.  Scientists  who 
take  this  standpoint  can  readily  adopt  the  fact  that  we 
do  not  now  observe  the  origination  of  new  species;  for 
it  is  in  full  harmony  with  their  metaphysical  doctrines, 
without  the  same  being  on  that  account  essentially  de- 
pendent upon  the  confirmation  or  rejection  of  the  hypoth- 
esis of  the  present  constancy  of  species.  With  this 
very  fact,  the  maxim  that  if  new  species  once  originated 
through  descent,  new  species  must  still  originate  through 
descent,  has  lost  for  them  its  truth,  and  therefore  its 
power  of  demonstration.  So  we  see  even  here,  while 
in  the  midst  of  the  discussion  of  a  purely  scientific  prob- 
lem, in  what  close  correlation  metaphysics  and  natural 
science  stand,  and  moreover  —  since  the  metaphysical 
view  is  most  closely  connected  with  the  religious  —  in 
what  close  relationship  religion  and  natural  science 
stand.  At  the  same  time  we  also  see  how  little  the 
metaphysical  interest,  and  much  more  how  little  the 
religious  interest,  has  reason  to  avoid  the  investigation 
of  facts  in  nature. 

§  4.  The  Theory  of  Evolution — Archaeology,  Ethnography, 
Philology. 

The  evolution  theory  teaches  that  the  species  have 
developed  themselves  one  from  another  in  gradual  trans- 
itions, each  of  which  was  as  small  as  the  individual  dif- 
ferences still  observed  to-day  among  the  individuals  of 
the  same  species.  It  is  not  without  support,  especially 
in  the  history  of  the  development  of  plants  and  animals. 

Each  organic  being  becomes  what  it  is  by  means  of 
organic  development.  Each  plant,  even  the  highest 
organized,  begins  in  its  seed-germ  with  a  simple  cell, 


78  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

and  is  differentiated  in  constant  development  up  to  the 
fully  perfected  individual.  Each  animal,  even  the  most 
highly  organized  (man  included),  begins  the  course  of 
its  existence  as  an  egg;  and  each  egg  has  no  greater 
value  of  form  than  that  of  a  single  cell.  This  egg-cell 
is  differentiated,  after  fecundation,  in  gradual  and  im- 
perceptible transitions,  farther  and  farther,  higher  and 
higher,  until  the  individual  has  reached  its  perfect  organ- 
ization. No  organ,  no  function  of  the  body,  no  power 
or  function  of  the  soul  or  of  the  mind,  appears  sud- 
denly, but  all  in  gradual  development.  Since  we  see  all 
individuals  thus  originating  by  means  of  gradual  devel- 
opment, the  possibility  lies  very  near  that  the  different 
organic  formations  of  all  the  organic  kingdoms  could 
also  have  been  originated  by  the  same  means. 

In  still  another  direction  does  the  history  of  the  de- 
velopment of  single  plants  and  animals  make  this  possi- 
bility plausible  to  us.  In  the  animal  world,  and  partly 
also  in  the  plant  world,  the  single  individuals  of  higher 
species  in  their  embryonic  development  pass  through 
states  of  development,  in  the  former  stages  of  which 
not  only  the  individuals  of  the  most  different  species 
look  confusingly  similar  to  one  another,  but  also  the 
embryos  in  their  organization  remind  us  of  the  perfected 
state  of  much  lower  classes  of  beings.  In  order  to  give 
a  clear  idea  of  the  first  mentioned  facts,  Hackel,  for 
instance,  in  his  "  Natural  History  of  Creation  "  and  in  his 
"  Anthropogeny,"  represents  by  engravings  the  embryos 
of  different  vertebrates  and  also  of  man;  representations 
which — although,  according  to  the  judgment  of  compe- 
tent scientists,  unfortunately  not  exact,  but  modi- 
fied, after  the  manner  of  stencil  plates,  in  favor  of 


PRESENT   STATE   OF   THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        79 

greater  similarity — yet  make  it  quite  clear  that  the  sim- 
ilarity of  the  different  embryos  must  be  very  great.  We 
see,  for  instance,  on  one  table  the  embryos  of  a  tish,  a 
salamander,  a  turtle,  a  fowl ;  on  a  second,  those  of  a 
pig,  an  ox,  a  rabbit,  a  man  ;  on  a  third,  those  of  a  turtle, 
a  fowl,  a  man  ;  and  we  find  the  similarity  really  great. 
Examples  of  the  second  fact — that  individuals  of  higher 
classes  or  orders  in  former  states  of  their  embryonic 
development  represent  an  organization  which  corre- 
sponds to  the  full-grown  individuals  of  the  lower  classes 
— are  :  the  tail  of  the  human  embryo,  the  gill-arches  of 
the  embryos  of  reptilia,  of  birds,  of  mammalia,  and  of 
man.  Now  Hackel  here  takes  up  again  an  idea  first 
suggested  by  Fritz  Miiller,  and  derives  from  these  obser- 
vations the  "biogehetic  maxim, "as  he  calls  it:  uThe 
history  of  the  germ  is  an  epitome  of  the  history  of 
the  descent ;  or,  in  other  words,  ontogeny  (the  history 
of  the  germs  or  the  individuals)  is  a  recapitulation  of 
phylogeny  (the  history  of  the  tribe);  or,  somewhat  more 
explicitly:  that  the  series  of  forms  through  which  the 
individual  organism  passes  during  its  progress  from  the 
egg-cell  to  its  fully  developed  state,  is  a  brief,  com- 
pressed reproduction  of  the  long  series  of  forms  through 
which  the  animal  ancestors  of  that  organism  (or  the 
ancestral  forms  of  its  species)  have  passed  from  the 
earliest  periods  of  so-called  organic  creation  down  to  the 
present  time. "  In  his  latest  publ  ication,  ' '  Ziele  und  Wege 
der  heutigen  Entwicklungsgeschichte,"  ("Aims  and 
Methods  of  the  Present  History  of  Evolution"),  he  admits 
into  the  formulation  of  his  biogenetic  maxim  also  the 
consideration  of  those  phenomena  in  the  ontogenetic 
development  which  are  no  recapitulation  of  the  history 


80  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

of  the  stein,  but  originated  by  adapting  the  embryo  to 
its  surroundings.  In  the  description  and  explanation  of 
this  theory,  he  uses  a  term  which  throws  upon  nature  a 
peculiar  reproach,  never  before  made,  namely  :  cenog- 
eny,  or  history  of  falsifications,  in  contrast  to  palingeny, 
or  history  of  abridgments.  This  amended  formula  now 
reads  :  The  development  of  germs  is  an  abridgment  of 
the  development  of  stems,  and  is  the  more  complete 
according  as  the  development  of  the  abridgment  is  con- 
tinued by  inheritance,  the  less  complete  according  as  the 
development  of  the  false  is  introduced  by  adaptation. 

Now,  we  ask  :  Is  this  biogenetic  maxim  correct  ?  and 
moreover,  from  the  fact  of  the  organic  individuals 
originating  through  development,  are  we  entitled  to 
draw  the  conclusion  that  even  the  species  must  have 
originated  through  development  ?  To  this  question  we 
can  no  longer  get  an  answer  from  the  life-processes  of 
living  organisms  ;  for  we  have  already  mentioned  the 
fact  that,  according  to  the  present  state  of  our  knowl- 
edge, we  can  no  longer  observe  the  origination  of  a  new 
species.  Moreover,  the  embryonic  states  of  develop- 
ment show  also,  in  all  their  similarity,  even  in  the  very 
first  stages,  and  with  especial  distinctness  in  these  first 
stages,  many  differences  between  the  single  species  ; 
and  this  is  true  especially  of  those  species  which,  accord- 
ing to  the  followers  of  this  so-called  biogenetic  maxim, 
should  lie  in  the  same  stem-line,— so  that  the  direct 
scientific  value  of  the  embryological  results  to  the  palae- 
ontological  investigation,  or  of  the  latter  to  the  former, 
is  so  far  very  slight.  Such  a  problem,  however,  as  the 
one  contained  in  that  biogenetic  maxim,  which  only 
gives  to  investigators  the  direction  in  which  possibly  an 


PRESENT    STATE    OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.        81 

interesting  and  profitable  path  can  be  opened,  does  not 
at  all  deserve  the  name  of  a  "law."  K.  E.  von  Baer, 
the  founder  of  the  whole  present  science  of  the  history  of 
development,  has  certainly  a  most  competent  judgment 
of  the  correctness  of  this  so-called  biogenetic  maxim ; 
and  he  convincingly  shows,  in  his  essay  on  "Darwin's 
Doctrine,"  that  the  embryos  never  represent  a  former 
animalic  form,  but  that  their  development  follows  the 
principle  of  representing  first  the  common  characteristics 
of  the  class,  then  those  of  the  order,  etc.,  until  finally 
the  individual  characteristics  appear  in  the  formation. 
Those  who  wish  more  information  about  embryology  can 
find  it  in  Heinrich  Rathke's  "  Entwicklungsgeschichte 
der  Wirbelthiere "  ("History  of  the  Development  of 
Vertebrates"),  edited  by  A.  Kolliker,  Leipzig,  Engel- 
mann,  1861;  and  those  who  wish  to  inform  themselves 
as  to  the  influence  of  the  ontogenetic  results  of  the  solu- 
tion of  the  phylogenetic  problems,  will  find,  besides  the 
before-mentioned  work  of  Wigand,  rich  and  clearly  elab- 
orated material  in  the  publication  of  Wilhelm  His— 
"  Unsere  Korperform  und  das  physiologische  Problem 
ihrer  Entstehung,  Briefe  an  einen  bef  retmdeten  Natur- 
forscher"  ("The  Form  of  our  Body  and  the  Phy- 
siological Problem  of  its  Origin  ;  Letters  to  an  Asso- 
ciate Scientist"),  Leipzig,  Vogel,  18T5.  The  latter 
writer,  although  he  advocates  the  descent  theory,  rejects 
the  hasty  assertions  of  Hackel  with  direct  and  convinc- 
ing arguments. 

Thus  embryology,  having  from  the  simple  fact  of  an 

origin  of  single  plants  and   animals  through  descent  at 

least  confirmed  the  idea  of  the  possibility  of  an  origin 

also  of  species  through  development,  forsakes  us  in  th  3 

6 


M>  THE    THEORIES    OF   DARWIN. 

inqury  as  to  the  reality  of  such  a  genealogy  of  develop- 
ment, and  refers  us  to  other  sciences. 

Such  a  science,  from  which  we  certainly  are  entitled 
to  expect  a  decided  answer,  is  geology.  For  if  the  evo- 
lution theory  is  right,  those  periods  of  the  history  of 
our  globe  in  which  new  species  originated — namely,  the 
periods  of  geology — must  show  us  also  ihefo?rms  of  transi- 
tion between  the  different  species.  And,  indeed,  geol- 
ogy gives  us  an  answer  ;  but  it  reads  contradictorily  : 
It  says  yes,  and  it  says  no. 

Geology  does  show  us  forms  of  transition,  and,  in- 
deed, most  frequently  in  the  lower  classes  of  animals. 
Who  that  has  once  studied  petrifactions,  does  not  know 
the  mass  of  forms  of  the  terebratulae,  the  belemnites, 
and  the  ammonites,  in  the  Jura  formation  ?  Wurtem- 
berger  has  brought  light  into  the  perplexing  division  of 
species  of  the  ammonites  by  simply  showing  their  tempo- 
rary and  systematic  transitions  into  one  an- 
other. In  the  fresh  water  chalk  formation  of  Stein- 
heim,  near  Heidenheim,  in  Wiirtemberg,  scientists  have 
found,  on  the  same  place,  in  an  uninterrupted  series  of 
strata,  the  snail  valvata  or  paludina  multiformis  in  all 
imaginable  transitions —  from  the  flat  winding,  showing 
the  form  of  a  chess-board,  up  to  the  sharp  form  of  a 
tower.  And  it  was  not,  as  Hilgendorf  thought,  in  a 
series  which  can  be  traced  in  the  strata  according  to  time, 
but,  as  Sandberger  says,  in  quite  a  varied  mixture,  yet 
in  all  imaginable  modifications.  But  even  among  the 
higher  and  the  highest  classes  of  animals,  we  can  trace 
the  transitions.  The  flying  sauria,  if  not  in  their  organs 
of  flying,  which  remind  us  more  of  the  bat,  at  least  in 
head,  neck,  and  toes,  are  closely  connected  with  the  birds 


PRESENT  STATE    OF   THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        83 

— the  oldest  birds  of" the  Jura  and  chalk  formations,  with 
their  tail-spines  similar  to  the  reptilia  and  their  teeth  in 
the  beak  to  the  sauria.  The  tertiary  formations  espe- 
cially show  the  primitive  history  of  many  vertebrates  in 
very  instructive  forms  of  transitions — which,  for  instance, 
Riitirneyer,  a  scientist  who  is  very  cautious  in  his  con- 
clusions, very  distinctly  traced  to  the  horse,  to  the  rum- 
inating animals,  and  lately  also  to  the  turtles.  Still  more 
in  detail,  W.  Kowalewsky  has  lately  shown  us  the  primi- 
tive history  of  the  horse,  and  Leidy  and  Marsh  have 
further  completed  it  by  the  addition  of  American  forms, 
the  former  having  at  the  same  time  described  the  forms 
which  have  led  to  the  tapir. 

But  to  such  facts  there  are,  on  the  other  hand,  expe- 
riences directly  contradictory.  Many  lower  and  higher 
forms  of  animals  and  plants  appear  in  the  geological 
strata,  so  far  as  they  have  been  explored,  in  a  wholly 
independent  way.  We  have  mentioned,  in  the  foregoing 
section,  that  the  main  types  of  the  invertebrates 
appear  somewhat  contemporaneously  and  without 
any  traceable  intermediate  form.  The  trilobites,  a 
quite  highly  organized  order  of  Crustacea,  appear  in  the 
strata  of  the  silurian  epoch  almost  suddenly,  in  very 
many  and  very  distinctly  marked  species.  The  uncer- 
tainty of  our  knowledge  shows  itself  most  clearly  when 
we  ask  for  the  geneologic  relationship  of  the  vertebrates. 
In  Chap.  II,  §  1  and  §  2  we  have  already  referred  to  the 
value  which  Darwin,  and  more  especially  Hackel,  lays  on 
the  relationship  of  the  larva  of  the  ascidia  to  the  lancelet 
fish.  Now  the  important  testimony  of  K.  E.  von  Baer, 
in  his  "Memoires  de  1'Acadlmie  de  St.  PStersbourg," 
Ser.  vii,  Vol.  19,  No.  2,  tells  us  that  the  nerve-ganglion 


84:  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

of  the  ascidia  lies  on  the  side  of  the  stomach,  and  on 
that  account  can  not  be  homologous  with  the  spine  of  the 
vertebrates,  but  that  the  cord  in  the  larva  of  the  ascidia 
is  nothing  more  than  a  support  for  the  tail  in  swimming, 
which  afterwards  disappears,  as  with  many  other  larvae. 
As  to  the  course  of  reasoning  in  reaching  these  geneal- 
ogical conclusions,  he  says:  "  The  hypothesis  is  indeed 
flexible.  According  to  common  reasoning,  that  which 
shows  itself  early  in  the  development  is  an  inheritance 
of  the  first  progenitors.  Therefore  the  ascidse  ought  to 
descend  from  the  vertebrates,  and  not  the  reverse.  But 
it  was  necessary  to  show  the  descent  of  the  vertebrates 
from  the  lower  forms.  In  order  to  respond  to  such  a 
necessity,  men  sometimes  reverse  their  conclusions. 
Although  favorably  disposed  to  the  doctrine  of  the  trans- 
mutation of  the  animalic  forms,  I  want  a  complete  proof 
before  I  can  believe  in  a  transformation  of  the  vertebrate 
type  into  that  of  the  mollusca."  Moreover,  the  zoolo- 
gists Semper  and  Dohrn  find  in  the  embryonic  develop- 
ment of  the  sharks,  the  scates,  and  other  cartilaginous 
fishes,  organs  which  would  bring  them  rather  into  a 
nearer  relationship  with  the  ringed  worms  than  with  the 
Crustacea.  When,  on  the  other  hand,  we  look  around 
in  palaeontology,  the  oldest  fossil  fishes  remind  us 
neither  of  the  Crustacea  nor  of  the  ringed  worms,  but  of 
the  crabs  :  a  class  of  animals  which  lies  entirely  outside 
of  Hackel's  stem-line  of  vertebrates.  Also  the  first  ap- 
pearance of  mammalia  does  not  show  transitions.  Thus 
far  we  have  not  found  in  the  geological  strata  any  vesti- 
ges of  the  half-apes,  which,  according  to  the  hypothesis 
of  the  evolutionists,  as  a  common  stem-line  for  the  lines 
of  ape  and  man  development,  once  played  such  an  im- 


PRESENT    STATE    OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.        85 

portant  rdle,  and  which  have  quite  numerous  represen- 
tatives. 

But  the  answer  which  geology  gives  to  our  questions 
as  to  the  probable  confirmation  of  the  evolution  theory, 
naturally  becomes  most  interesting  where  the  origin  of 
man  is  treated  of.  Our  attention  is,  therefore,  especially 
directed  to  the  most  recent  formations  of  the  globe  which 
show  us  the  oldest  remains  of  man.  The  most  instruc- 
tive are  those  parts  of  the  skeleton  which  allow  us  to 
draw  the  most  convincing  conclusions  as  to  the  degree 
of  mental  development  of  an  individual,  namely:  the 
parts  of  the  skull.  Although  human  bones  seem  to  have 
been  less  easily  preserved  than  those  of  animals,  and 
are,  comparatively  speaking,  very  scarce,  especially 
more  so  than  prehistoric  implements,  still  there  are  not 
wanting  such  remains,  which  go  back  far  beyond  histor- 
ical time.  The  oldest  known  skull  is  the  celebrated  one 
of  the  Neander  cave  near  Dusseldorf,  with  its  large 
vault  of  the  forehead,  and  its  low  height.  Although 
Virchow  finds  on  it  evidences  of  rachitis  in  youth  and 
of  gout  in  old  age,  as  well  as  of  injuries,  it  nevertheless 
can  not  have  been  changed  in  its  fundamental  form  by 
any  sickness,  even  according  to  Virchow.  This  very  skull 
now  indisputably  shows  a  still  lower  formation,  which, 
although  quite  essentially  different  from  the  type  of  the 
ape,  stands  nearer  to  it  than  is  the  case  with  the  skulls 
of  men  in  later  times.  Of  a  later  date,  and  of  a  corre- 
spondingly higher  form,  are  the  skull  of  Engis,  of  Cann- 
statt,  the  skulls  of  the  Belgian  caves  (especially  Chau- 
vaux),  of  France,  and  of  Gibraltar.  According  to  the 
weighty  authority  of  Schaaffhausen  (note  his  opening  ad- 
dress at  the  Wiesbaden  Congress  of  the  Anthropologi- 


86  THE    THEORIES    OF   DARWIN. 

cal  Society,  1873),  the  skulls  and  the  remaining  parts 
of  the  skeleton  show  more  indications  of  a  lower  forma- 
tion the  older  they  are.  He  especially  calls  attention  to 
a  certain  bone  of  the  roof  of  the  skull — the  Os  interpa- 
rietale  or  the  so-called  Os  Incce — which  has  only  recent- 
ly been  recognized  as  a  characteristic  of  a  lower  forma- 
tion of  skulls,  standing  nearer  to  that  of  animals.  As 
late  as  the  summer  of  1873,  two  human  skeletons  were 
found  at  Coblenz  in  a  volcanic  sand,  of  which  Schaaff- 
hausen  says  :  "  No  less  than  eight  anatomic  marks  of  a 
lower  formation,  which  probably  have  not  heretofore 
been  found  together,  indicate  the  great  age  of  these  re- 
mains." With  all  these  traces  of  a  difference  between 
the  former  and  the  present  state  of  the  physical  condi- 
tion of  man,  the  differences  between  the  type  of  man  and 
that  of  the  animal  are  still  great  enough  to  leave  wide 
open  the  possibility  of  the  origin  of  man  through  some 
other  means  than  that  of  gradual  development.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  more  or  less  in  favor  of  the  evolution 
idea,  that  so  far  such  old  remains  of  man  have  been 
found  in  places  which  certainly  can  not  have  been  the 
cradle  of  mankind,  and  that  those  parts  of  the  earth 
which  we  would  naturally  suppose  to  be  the  first  dwel- 
ling place  of  the  earliest  human  genera  have  been  little 
or  not  at  all  investigated.  And  also  the  hypothesis  of 
Hackel,  that  the  cradle  of  mankind  was  a  land  between 
Africa  and  Asia,  now  sunk  in  the  sea,  and  called  Lemu- 
ria,  can  be  neither  proved  nor  denied.  Such  vague 
possibilities  have  indeed  not  the  least  scientific  value. 

In  considering  these  contradictory  results  of  geologi- 
cal investigation,  we  dare  not  overlook  three  points : 
First,  our  knowledge  of  the  crust  of  the  globe  is  still 


PRESENT    STATE    OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.        87 

very  fragmentary,  and  does  not  yet  extend  over  the 
whole  globe.  Further,  it  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  case 
that  the  strata  in  mountain  formations  can  only  give 
a  very  incomplete  picture  of  the  whole  variety  of  the 
real  organic  life  which  may  have  populated  the  earth  and 
the  sea.  What  a  poor  picture  of  the  present  plant  and 
animal  life  would  be  offered,  for  instance,  by  the  soil  of 
our  continents,  the  slime,  sand,  and  pebbles  of  our  coasts 
and  of  the  bottoms  of  our  lakes  and  seas,  if  we  had  to 
construct  from  them  alone  the  fauna  and  flora  of  the 
present !  A  third,  but  purely  hypothetical,  considera- 
tion is  rendered  of  importance  particularly  by  Darwin 
and  Hackel  ;  namely,  that  the  forms  of  transition  with- 
out doubt  existed  for  a  shorter  period  than  those  forms 
whose  organization  has  established  itself  in  fully  devel- 
oped species. 

Thus  far  we  have  directed  our  attention  to  inquiring 
how  the  organic  individuals  were  originated — and  have 
throughout  observed  a  successive  development;  next,  we 
have  questioned  geology — and  here  also  have  observed  a 
progress  in  the  appearance  of  the  species,  but  have  re- 
ceived at  the  same  time  contradictory  answers  to  .the 
question  whether  this  progress  presents  itself  as  a  grad- 
ual development  of  one  species  from  another  or  as  a 
sudden  appearance.  So  the  reasons  for  and  against  the 
evolution  theory  almost  balance  one  another;  and  it  is 
not  improbable  that  the  hypothesis  of  an  origin  of  spe- 
cies through  development  will  have  to  share  its  authority 
with  the  hypothesis  of  a  descent  of  species  through  hete- 
rogenetic  generation,  as  well  as  with  the  hypothesis 
of  a  primitive  generation  of  lower  organisms,  still  repeat- 
ing itself  at  a  later  time.  Thus  for  the  origination  of 


88  THE    THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

groups  lying  nearer  together,  we  have  the  evolution  the- 
ory; for  the  other  groups,  and  especially  for  the  origi- 
nation of  types  where  no  transitions  to  other  types  can 
be  traced,  the  theory  of  the  heterogenetic  or  primitive 
generation  recommends  itself;  and  both  theories  thus 
far  are  of  a  purely  hypothetical  nature. 

But  there  is  still  a  third  realm,  which  is  just  as  open 
to  our  observation  as  the  history  of  the  development  of 
organisms  and  as  geology,  and  of  which  we  can  also  ask, 
whether  it  does  not  open  for  us  an  indirect  way  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  origin  of  species,  and  especially  of 
man — a  knowledge  which  we  can  no  longer  approach  in 
the  direct  way  of  observation.  This  realm  is  natural 
history  and  the  history  of  the  development  of  the  human 
race.  For  mankind  also  is  engaged  in  a  process  of  de- 
velopment, and  its  present  members  do  not  stand  on  the 
same  height.  Now  the  question  is,  to  what  beginning 
can  we  trace  backward  the  development  of  mankind, 
and  to  what  succeeding  stages  of  development  from  this 
present  condition?  And  do  we  find  in  these  earliest 
periods,  and  on  these  lowest  stages,  points  that  are  con- 
nected with  still  earlier  conditions  and  organizations, 
and  especially  points  which  could  genealogically  join 
together  mankind  and  the  animal  kingdom?  Three 
sciences,  still  young,  favorite  children  of  the  present 
generation,  participate  in  investigating  this  realm, 
namely,  archaeology,  comparative  ethnology,  and  com- 
parative philology. 

Archoeology  leads  us  back  to  far-off  times.  It  is  a 
fact  that,  chronologically  speaking,  man  lived  in  the 
glacial  period — according  to  French  scientists,  even  be- 
fore it;  and  that,  palseontologically  speaking,  man  and 


PRESENT   STATE    OF   THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES.        89 

mammoth  lived  at  the  same  time,  and,  according  to  a 
discovery  made  some  thirty  years  ago  at  Denise  in  Mid- 
dle France,  probably  even  man  and  another  older  and 
defunct  form  of  pachydermata,  the  elephas  meridion- 
alis,  in  North  America  man  and  the  mastodon.  The 
reader  may  compare  the  discoveries  regarding  the  age 
of  mankind,  as  they  are  described  most  recently  by  Sir 
Charles  Lyell  in  his  work  upon  this  subject,  in  the  pub- 
lications of  the  Anthropological  Congress  at  Brussels  in 
the  year  1873,  and  in  those  of  the  fourth  General  Assem- 
bly of  the  German  Society  for  Anthropology,  Ethnology 
and  Primitive  History,  at  Wiesbaden,  in  the  year  1873. 
Now,  to  be  sure,  from  the  oldest  human  tools  and 
utensils  that  are  found,  we  can  expect  still  less  than 
from  the  oldest  human  bones  that  they  will  throw  direct 
light  upon  the  answer  to  the  question  of  the  origin  of  man. 
For  where  man  not  only  uses  tools,  but  manufactures 
the  same  for  use,  a  wide  breach  already  exists  between 
man  and  animal.  Manufactured  articles,  therefore,  can 
only  throw  some  light  on  the  history  of  the  development 
of  the  already  existing  human  race.  And  even  this 
light  is  less  clear  than  we  perhaps  expected  in  view  of 
the  first  interesting  prehistorical  discoveries.  It  is  true, 
all  these  discoveries  show  us  an  ascent  from  the  simplest 
and  roughest  forms  to  the  more  perfect;  from  the  split 
but  unpolished  stone  to  the  polished,  and  from  stone  to 
bronze  and  iron.  But  a  progress  of  the  human  races  in 
manufacturing  and  using  articles,  from  the  simple  and 
rough  form  to  the  more  artificial,  lies  so  much  in  the 
nature  of  the  case,  and  is  so  taken  for  granted  with 
every  conception  of  the  origin  of  man,  even  with  that 
contradictory  to  Darwinism,  that  from  this  simplicity  of 


90  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

the  earliest  todls  we  can  not  at  all  conclude  that  there 
was  a  condition  of  mankind  lying  near  that  of  animals; 
and  especially  we  can  draw  only  general  and  uncertain 
conclusions  as  to  that  which  makes  man  man,  as  to  the 
spiritual  and  moral  qualities  of  those  prehistoric  men. 
Moreover,  in  discoveries  belonging  to  the  very  old- 
est, we  come  upon  drawings  and  engravings  from 
which  we  recognize  the  man  of  those  primitive  times  as 
a  creature  whose  life  was  not  entirely  taken  up  in  the 
animalic  struggle  for  existence,  but  was  already  adorned 
with  those  ideal  pursuits  and  enjoyments  which  we  are 
accustomed  to  ascribe  to  the  height  of  civilization.  Ex- 
amine, for  instance,  the  drawing  of  a  mammoth  on  a 
mammoth  tooth  of  Dordogne,  which  the  French  scien- 
tists Lartet  and  Christy  have  reprinted  in  their  Reliquiae 
Aquitanicse  (1868),  and  which  Sir  Charles  Lyeli  has 
copied  in  his  "Age  of  the  Human  Race."  How  much 
spirit  and  life  in  this  primitive  work  of  art !  Or  read 
what  Fraas,  in  the  "Journal  of  the  German  Society  for 
Anthropology,"  March,  1874,  reports  about  the  picture 
of  a  grazing  reindeer,  engraved  on  a  knife  handle  made 
of  the  horns  of  a  reindeer,  which  was  lately  found  in  the 
cave  of  Thayngennear  Schaffhausen,  and  which  surpasses 
in  beauty  all  rough  drawings  thus  far  found.  The  whole 
bearing  of  the  animal — the  muscles  of  the  legs  and  the 
head,  the  form  of  the  many -branched  antlers,  with  the 
wide-spread  eyes,  the  representation  of  the  hair  upon  the 
body  and  under-jaw  —  all  disclose  a  real  artist  among 
those  savages. 

This  is  also  to  be  taken  into  consideration  :  that 
those  men,  whose  traces  we  find,  could  possibly  have 
been  the  descendants  of  more  noble  predecessors,  driven 


PRESENT   STATE    OF   THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        91 

off  and  degenerated,  just  as  well  as  they  could  have  been 
representatives  of  the  whole  former  condition  of  culture 
of  mankind.  In  England,  where  the  questions  of  the 
first  condition  of  culture  of  mankind  are  very  warmly 
discussed,  the  Duke  of  Argyll  particularly,  in  his 
"Primeval  Man,"  advocates  these  views,  arid  very  forci- 
bly calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  thus  far  the  places  of 
the  discovery  of  the  earliest  traces  of  man  undoubtedly 
lie  very  far  from  the  original  home  of  the  human  race; 
while  Sir  John  Lubbock,  in  his  "Origin  of  Civilization'' 
and  in  his  ''Prehistoric  Times,"  and  also  Tylor  in  his 
"Beginning  of  Culture"  and  in  his  "Early  History  of 
Mankind,"  take  the  opposite  view  of  a  progress  of  man- 
kind from  the  most  uncultivated  beginnings. 

Archaeology,  as  a  whole,  seems  to  do  no  more  than 
admit  that  its  results  can  be  incorporated  into  the  theory 
of  an  origin  of  the  human  race  through  gradual  develop- 
ment, if  this  theory  can  be  shown  to  be  correct  in  some 
other  way,  and  that  its  results  can  just  as  well  be 
brought  into  harmony  with  a  contradictory  theory. 

Comparative  ethnology  gives  us  quite  a  similar  re- 
sult. It  is  true,  there  are  races  of  mankind  in  the  low- 
est grades  of  human  existence.  It  is  well  known  how 
Darwin,  in  his  voyage  on  board  the  "Beagle,"  got  one 
of  his  first  vivid  impressions  of  the  possibility  of  an  evo- 
lution of  man  from  the  animal  world,  by  seeing  the  in- 
habitants of  Tierra  del  Fuego;  and  it  is  remarkable  that 
the  arms,  tools,  and  furniture,  used  by  the  lowest  savages, 
are  very  similar  to  the  earliest  remains  of  civilized  races 
found  on  earth.  The  conclusion  lies  extremely  near, 
that  the  savages  simply  remained  in  earlier  stages  of 
human  culture;  and  an  ethnographic  picture  of  mankind 


92  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

at  present  would  in  a  similar  way  give  an  approximate- 
ly correct  view  of  its  former  development,  as  the  natural 
zoological  and  botanical  system  of  the  present  fauna 
and  flora  must  give  us  at  the  same  time  the  key  to  their 
pedigree;  supposing  the  Darwinian  theory  to  be  correct. 

If  it  were  so,  ethnology  would  be  an  altogether  inesti- 
mable help  for  the  exploration  of  the  descent  and  devel- 
opment of  the  human  race.  For  the  extremely  few  and 
rare  fossil  remains  of  man — which,  moreover,  do  not 
give  us  any  answer  to  the  most  important  questions  in 
regard  to  the  mental  and  moral  quality  of  the  primitive 
man — would  be  rendered  complete  by  living  examples 
of  the  kind,  which  remained  at  the  old  stages  of  develop- 
ment. 

But  much  is  still  wanting,  before  the  followers  of  an 
evolution  theory  dare  to  use  ethnology  directly  as  a 
primitive  history  of  the  development  of  mankind,  pre- 
pared and  preserved  for  them.  Especially  the  before- 
mentioned  objection  of  the  Duke  of  Argyll — that  the 
lowest  savages  of  our  time  can  just  as  well  be  depraved 
&s  be  men  who  remained  stationary  in  the  process  of  de- 
velopment— has  here  increased  weight.  Moreover,  even 
with  the  savages  of  to-day,  a  rude  state  of  their  tools 
and  a  low  condition  of  their  mental  and  moral  life  are 
not  so  nearly  parallel  as  to  allow  unrestricted  conclu- 
sions to  be  drawn.  Finally,  we  still  know  too  little 
about  the  state  of  culture  of  the  savages;  and  the  deeper 
and  higher  the  intellectual  and  ethical  possessions  of 
mankind  are,  the  presence  of  which  among  the  savages 
is  in  question,  the  more  uncertain  is  our  knowledge. 

This  is  especially  true  of  the  most  important  ques- 
tion in  this  connection — the  question  as  to  the  existence 


PRESENT    STATE    OF   THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        93 

or  absence  of  an  idea  of  God,  and  the  different  stages 
of  development  of  religious  ideas.  While  some  assume 
as  an  established  fact,  that  there  are  savage  tribes  with- 
out any  idea  of  God  or  any  religion,  and  even  give  the 
names  of  these  tribes,  especially  of  some  from  the  inte- 
rior of  South  America;  while  Sir  John  Lubbock  syste- 
matically enumerates  seven  stages  of  religious  develop- 
ment, from  atheism  to  the  connection  of  religious  with 
moral  conceptions,  and  lets  each  single  race  run 
through  these  stages  in  an  identical  series  until  it  either 
remains  on  one  of  the  seven  stages  or  arrives  at  the 
highest :  yet,  on  the  contrary,  other  equally  trustworthy 
scientists  assert  that  there  is  not  a  single  human  race 
without  some  idea  of  religion  and  of  a  God — indeed,  not  a 
single  race  without  a  monotheistic  presentiment — and 
that  all  heathenism,  down  to  its  most  degenerate  stages, 
consists  not  so  much  in  a  non-recognition  of  a  God  as  in 
ignoring  him.  They  call  especial  attention  to  the  diffi- 
culty of  getting  acquainted  with  the  ideas  of  a  savage 
tribe  without  living  with  it  through  many  years  and 
being  intimate  with  its  language  and  customs,  and  espe- 
cially without  enjoying  the  unrestricted  confidence 
of  the  tribe.  Mutual  misunderstandings,  a  suspicious 
reserve,  evasive  and  untrue  answers  to  questions,  are 
entirely  unavoidable  without  those  conditions.  At  any 
rate,  the  fact  deserves  attention,  that  those  who  have 
been  longest  and  most  active  among  savages,  and  who 
enjoyed  their  confidence  to  the  fullest  extent,  all  reached 
this  result:  they  found  them  not  only  not  without 
religion,  but  also  not  without  a  presentiment  of  the 
monotheistic  idea  of  God.  Livingstone,  for  instance, 
expressed  this  idea  decidedly  of  all  the  African  tribes 


94  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

with  which  he  became  acquainted ;  and  Jellinghaus 
gives  the  same  evidence  in  regard  to  the  Kols  in  South 
Asia. 

The  anatomic  results  of  ethnology  are  more  favor- 
able to  the  descent  theory,  although  they  too  lead  no 
farther  than  to  the  conclusion  that  the  skull-forms  of  the 
lowest  tribes  represent  a  lower  stage  of  formation  than 
those  of  the  higher,  and  that  these  lower  skull-forms  are 
relatively  nearer  to  the  ape-form  than  the  higher,  but 
that  they  are  still  separated  from  it  by  a  wide  interval. 

It  appears,  then,  that  even  ethnology  does  not  lead 
us  essentially  nearer  the  solution  of  the  question  than 
archaeology  and  geological  anthropology. 

The  relatively  strongest  support  to  the  evolution 
theory  is  given  by  comparative  philology  /  and  since 
language  is  the  most  important  and  most  decisive  of  all 
the  distinctive  characteristics  which  separate  man  and 
animal*,  this  science  deserves  especial  consideration. 

In  the  realm  of  the  natural  sciences,  the  enormous 
progress  of  palaeontology  on  the  one  hand  and  of  sys- 
tematic zoology  and  botany  on  the  other  took  place  step 
by  step  together,  and  thus  prepared  the  way  for  Dar- 
win's idea — which,  from  the  rich  material  of  analytical 
investigations,  only  tries  to  draw  the  simple  synthesis, 
and  to  show  at  the  same  time  in  the  zoological  and  botan- 
ical system  a  representation  of  the  zoological  and  botan- 
ical history  of  development.  In  quite  an  analogous  way, 
a  process  took  place  in  the  linguistic  realm  which  in 
independent  investigations  prepared  the  way  for  Dar- 
winism, and  now,  since  Darwin's  theory  has  sought 

*Compare  Max  Miiller,  "Lectures on  the  Science  of  Language," 
6th  ed.,  London,  1871,  vol.  I,  p.  403. 


PRESENT   STATE   OF   THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        95 

acknowledgment  in  the  realm  of  natural  history,  brings 
again  Darwin's  ideas  to  the  support  of  philology. 

Linguistic  and  ethnographic  investigations,  especially 
the  linguistic  works  of  the  missionaries,  long  ago  resulted 
in  gathering  rich  material  from  the  storehouse  of  the 
language  of  races  now  living,  and  the  latest  works  in 
the  realm  of  historical,  etymological,  and  comparative 
philology  had  traced  the  branches  and  twigs  of  the 
better  known  languages  to  stems  and  roots  lying  far 
back.  The  result  of  the  comparison  soon  became  the 
same  as  in  the  realm  of  the  organic  world  :  what  pre- 
sented itself  in  the  system  of  the  living  languages  as  a 
lower  form,  seemed  to  represent  itself  as  the  older  and 
more  original  form  also  in  the  history  of  languages. 
Therefore,  all  the  prominent  linguistic  investigators 
found  themselves  more  and  more  urged  to  accept  a  the- 
ory which  declares  language,  this  entirely  specific  char- 
acteristic of  man,  to  be  subject  to  the  same  laws  of 
development  from  the  simpler  and  most  simple  forms  as 
the  world  of  the  organic.  Long  ago  so  celebrated  a  man 
as  Jacob  Grimm, — "  Ueber  den  Ursprung  der  Sprache  " 
( '  'The  Origi  n  of  Language"),  Berlin,  Dummler — following 
the  footsteps  of  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt,  had  established 
a  theory,  according  to  which  language  is  "  not  created, 
but  produced  by  the  liberty  of  the  human  will;"  and  judg- 
ing from  many  of  his  Darwinistic  utterances  concerning 
the  origin  and  development  of  language,  he  had  traced 
its  development  in  such  a  way  as  to  arrive  at  the  conclu- 
sion that  artless  simplicity  in  the  unfolding  of  the  senses 
is  the  first  period  of  its  appearance. 

The  scientists  divide  all  the  languages  of  the  earth 
into  three  great  groups  :    first,  the  monosyllabic,  isolat- 


96  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

ing,  radical,  or  asynthetic  languages ;  second,  the 
agglutinant,  terminational,  or  polysynthetic  languages ; 
third,  the  inflectional  languages.  They  are  of  the  opinion 
that  even  the  languages  of  highest  rank — the  inflectional 
—very  probably  took  a  starting-point  from  the  asyntlict  ic 
languages,  and  a  course  of  development  through  the 
agglutinants,  and  that  in  like  manner  the  agglutinants 
have  behind  them  an  asynthetic  period.  Thus  they  trace 
all  the  languages  back  to  certain  roots,  which  are  more 
or  less  common  to  the  different  groups  of  languages. 

To  the  question  that  now  arises — How  did  these  roots 
originate  f — the  linguists  give  us  three  different  answers. 
The  onomatopoetic  theory,  called  by  Max  Miiller  the 
Wow  -  Wow  Theory,  traces  them  to  imitations  of  the 
sound  (W.  Bleek,  G.  Curtius,  Schleicher,  Wedgewood, 
Farrar);  the  interjectional  theory,  called  by  Max  Miiller 
the  Pooh -Pooh,  or  Pah -Pah  Theory,  traces  them  to 
expressions  of  the  senses  (Condillac)  ;  a  third  theory 
declares  the  roots  to  be  phonetic  types  (Max  Miiller, 
Lazar  Geiger,  Heyse,  Stein  thai);  while  it  is  still 
an  open  question,  whether  the  attempts  at  ex- 
planation of  these  types  must  here  come  to  a  stand- 
still for  the  present,  as  Max  Miiller  thinks,  or  whether, 
according  to  Lazar  Geiger,  we  can  trace  the  first  root- 
expressions  especially  to  impressions  of  light  and  color. 

The  reasons  from  which  Max  Miiller,  in  his  "Lec- 
tures on  the  Science  of  Languages  "  (Vol.  I. ,  Lect.  IX), 
rejects  the  first  two  theories  and  proves  the  third,  are 
quite  convincing.  Even  if,  in  a  purely  hypothetical 
way,  a  language  could  be  thought  of  in  abstracto,  the 
roots  of  which  only  consist  in  imitations  of  sounds 
or  interjections,  still  in  the  really  existing  languages. 


PRESENT   STATE    OF   THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        97 

so  far  as  we  can  trace  back  and  uncover  their  roots,  the 
roots  imitating  sounds  and  the  interjectional  roots 
form  only  a  small  and  entirely  isolated  minority,  which 
neither  shares  in,  nor  is  capable  of  development;  they 
stand  like  "dead  sticks  in  a  live  hedge."  By  far  the 
greater  number  of  roots,  and  all  which  are  capable  of 
development,  express  abstractions  from  visible  objects, 
conditions  and  activities,  and  therefore  presume  a  hu- 
man intelligence,  reflecting  with  self-consciousness, 
which  formed  and  used  the  roots. 

Now  Max  Miiller  sees,  back  of  this  period,  still  open 
to  science,  in  which  the  root-elements  of  the  human  lan- 
guages were  fixed,  a  long  period  of  exuberant  and  unhin- 
dered growth  of  the  elements  of  language,  in  which  the 
roots  were  separated  from  the  multitude  of  nascent 
tones  by  elimination  or  natural  selection  in  the  struggle 
for  existence.  In  this  realm,  which  is  no  longer  open 
to  investigation,  the  naturalistic  and  the  linguistic  friends 
of  the  evolution  theory  are  now  in  entire  accord.  Wil- 
helm  Bleek,  in  his  small,  but  very  noteworthy  essay, 
"  Ueber  den  Ursprung  der  Sprache  "  ("Origin  of 
Language"),  Weimar,  Bohlau,  1868,  p.  11,  uses 
this  ingenious  figure :  what  the  animal  world  pos- 
sesses analogous  to  language,  takes  about  the  same 
position  as,  in  the  art  of  printing,  the  block-print  does 
in  relation  to  printing  with  movable  types.  On  page 
12,  he  sees  in  the  communication  of  the  emotions  among 
animals  the  sources  from  which  under  favorable  condi- 
tions (in  consequence  of  which  the  separation  of  lan- 
guage into  articulated  parts  became  possible)  human 
language  might  have  originated.  This  idea,  which  is 
closely  joined  to  the  interjectional  theory,  Darwin  mee+  -, 
7 


98  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

with  a  related  idea,  depending  upon  the  onomatopoeti- 
cal  theory,  when  he  says,  in  his  "  Descent  of  Man": 
"  Since  monkeys  certainly  understand  much  that  is  said 
to  them  by  man,  and  when  wild,  utter  signal-cries  of 
danger  to  their  fellows,  may  not  some  unusually  wise 
ape-like  animal  have  imitated  the  growl  of  a  beast  of 
prey,  and  thus  told  his  fellow-monkeys  the  nature  of  the 
expected  danger  ?  This  would  have  been  a  first  step  in 
the  formation  of  language." 

But  philology,  from  the  point  where  it  goes  farther 
back  in  search  of  the  roots  of  language,  leaves  the  safe 
ground  of  knowledge  and  commits  itself  to  the  fluctuat- 
ing ocean  of  conjectures;  and  since  also  the  scientific 
evolution  theory  has  only  a  hypothetical  value,  the  sup- 
port of  a  hypothesis  in  the  one  science  by  a  hypothesis 
in  the  other  naturally  adds  no  weight  to  its  probability, 
either  for  the  one  or  the  other.  Besides,  we  must  not 
overlook  the  fact  that  the  Very  point  in  the  history  of 
the  development  of  languages  on  which  the  investi- 
gation, as  it  looks  backwards,  must  at  present  pause — 
namely,  the  existence  of  linguistic  roots — presumes  a 
faculty  of  abstraction  which  can  not  be  thought  of 
without  self-consciousness. 

Therefore  archaeology,  comparative  ethnography, 
and  comparative  philology,  show  us  quite  clearly 
a  development,  but  not  an  origin  of  mankind 
through  development.  Yet  they  do  show  an  already 
existing  development  of  mankind;  for  all  three  sciences 
lead  back  to  starting-points  where  mankind  already  ex- 
isted with  all  the  essential  attributes  of  mankind,  and 
leave  us  without  answer  to  our  questions  as  to  the  con- 
ditions lying  still  farther  back.  Their  results  we  can 


PRESENT   STATE   OF   THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES.        99 

without  difficulty  harmonize  with  a  theory  which  sup- 
poses mankind  to  have  originated  by  evolution,  provided 
such  a  theory  could  be  confirmed  from  another  side  ; 
but  they  agree  just  as  well  with  a  contrary  theory,  which 
excludes  the  origin  of  mankind  by  gradual  develop- 
ment. 

Taking,  thus,  everything  into  consideration,  we  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  evolution  theory,  like  the  de- 
scent theory,  is  so  far  only  a  hypothesis — and,  indeed, 
a  hypothesis  which  as  such  has  a  much  more  problemat- 
ical character  than  the  descent  theory.  For  while  in 
regard  to  the  latter  we  had  to  say  that  we  have  either 
this  explanation  or  none  of  the  origin  of  the  higher 
species,  with  the  evolution  theory  there  is  not  even  room 
for  this  alternative.  For  even  in  case  of  its  failure,  a 
descent  of  one  species  from  another  through  heterogene- 
tic  generation  is  certainly  very  possible.  Besides, 
it  is  not  only  possible,  but  even  probable,  that  both  the- 
ories— that  of  heterogenetic  generation  and  that  of  grad- 
ual development — may  have  to  share  with  one  another  in 
the  explanation  of  the  origin  of  species;  and  even  that, 
especially  for  the  lowest  species  and  for  the  beginnings 
of  the  main  types,  primitive  generation  also  has  its 
share  in  the  establishment  of  the  paternity. 

The  evolution  theory  could  only  pass  beyond  the 
rank  of  a  hypothesis,  if  we  should  succeed  in  showing 
the  impelling  forces  of  such  an  origin  of  species  through 
development.  Such  an  attempt  can  be  made  in  two 
ways  —  the  metaphysical  and  the  scientific -empirical. 
The  first,  the  metaphysical,  although  it  may  be  justified 
in  its  general  principles,  will  always,  from  the  point 
at  which  it  attempts  to  approach  the  concrete  questions  as 


100  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

to  the  origin  of  single  species,  expose  itself  to  the 
fate  of  being  a  priori  rejected  by  science  as  unjustified, 
and  of  being  a  posteriori  confuted  by  facts — a  fate  which 
it  has  richly  and  clearly  experienced  in  the  first  half 
of  our  century.  But  the  discussion  of  the  metaphysical 
way  does  not  belong  to  the  present  purely  scientific  part 
of  our  investigation;  it  will,  however,  be  shortly  taken 
up  again  in  Book  II.  The  other  way,  the  scientific- 
empirical,  will  have  to  be  looked  upon  as  correct 
when  it  can  show  the  impelling  forces  of  development 
in  such  powers  and  laws  as  are  either  still  active  to-day 
or  at  least  have  their  points  of  connection  in  powers  and 
laws  active  to-day.  Such  an  attempt  is  the  selection 
theory.  We  have  already  in  Chap.  II,  §  1  and  2, 
given  an  outline  of  this  theory,  and  have  only  yet  to 
discuss  its  present  state  of  tenability. 

§  3.     The  Theory  of  Selection. 

The  selection  theory  also  is  not  entirely  without  sup- 
port in  the  realm  of  observed  facts.  How  simply  it  ex- 
plains the  fixedness  of  the  differences  of  closely  related 
species  arising  from  their  geographical  and  climatical 
home!  how  simply  the  similarity  of  the  color  of  many 
animals  from  the  color  of  their  abode,  through  which 
they  have  protection  against  persecution!  how  simply 
the  so-called  mimicry — i.e.,  the  similarity  of  certain  spe- 
cies in  form  and  color  with  form  and  color  of  entirely 
different  species  in  the  midst  of  which  they  live,  a  simi- 
larity which  often  gives  them  protection  against  persecu- 
tion !  The  best  known  examples  of  this,  in  our  regions, 
are  the  spinning  caterpillars,  which  in  a  state  of  rest 
look  strikingly  like  a  twig  of  a  tree  or  a  shrub  on  which 


PRESENT   STATE    OF    THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES.      101 

they  live.  In  other  regions  there  is  a  multitude  of  the 
most  striking  freaks  of  nature  of  this  kind — for  instance, 
butterflies  and  other  insects,  which  at  rest  look  like  the 
leaves  of  plants  under  which  they  live;  butterflies  living 
among  other  butterflies  which,  by  an  offensive  odor,  are 
protected  against  persecution,  and  although  they  are 
themselves  a  favorite  food  for  birds,  carrying  the  form 
and  color  of  that  badly-smelling  family  of  butterflies. 
We  can  also  add  the  orchidese,  and  their  resemblance  to 
bees,  flies,  butterflies,  spiders,  etc.  A.  R.  Wallace  and 
Darwin  themselves  recur  often  to  these  striking  appear- 
ances. 

But  herewith  we  have  mentioned  nearly  every  sup- 
port which  the  selection  theory  has  on  the  ground 
of  observed  facts.  More  numerous  and  more  weighty 
are  the  objections  to  it.  First  of  all,  we  have  to  state 
that  the  selection  theory  no  longer  enjoys  that  protection 
which  the  descent  and  evolution  theories  can  justly  claim, 
against  the  main  objection,  mentioned  in  Chap.  Ill,  §1,  to 
all  the  ideas  of  descent,  development  and  selection.  That 
main  objection  is  the  permanence  of  species,  observed 
through  thousands  of  years  ;  and  the  defense  with  which 
the  descent  and  evolution  theories  successfully  weaken 
it,  is  the  statement  of  the  fact  that,  since  man  appeared, 
no  new  species  has  originated,  and  that  therefore 
the  principle  of  the  generation  of  species  seems  to 
have  come  to  a  stand-still.  Now  this  fact  is  no  longer  in 
favor  of  the  selection  theory,  but  directly  repugnant  to 
it.  For  the  selection  theory  expressly  declares  the  origin 
of  species  through  agencies  that  are  all  active  still,  and, 
therefore,  if  they  really  suffice  to  explain  the  origin  of 
species,  would  not  only  have  td  generate  new  species, 


102  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

but  also  to  develop  all  the  existing  species.  All  those 
circumstances  which,  according  to  the  selection  theory, 
have  led  to  change  of  species,  are  just  as  active  to-day 
as  they  are  supposed  to  have  been  from  the  beginning 
of  organic  life  ;  and  the  effect  which  we  observe  is 
not  change  but  permanence  of  species.  The  individ- 
uals still  have  individual  qualities  ;  they  still  have  the 
tendency  to  inherit,  in  addition  to  the  qualities  of  the 
species,  those  of  the  individual ;  the  individuals  still 
change  their  abode,  and  therewith  also  their  conditions 
of  life  ;  a  natural  selection  still  takes  place  in  the  strug- 
gle for  existence  ;  and  what  is  the  result?  From  an 
observation  stretching  over  thousands  of  years,  we  find 
nowhere  an  effect  of  natural  selection  going  farther  than 
alterations  in  growth  and  color  and  purely  external 
changes  in  form.  All  the  dispositions  of  organisms 
and  their  reciprocal  action  aim  not  at  increasing  the  indi- 
vidual differences,  but  at  reducing  them  to  the  average 
character  of  the  species.  When  the  species  change  their 
abode  or  their  conditions  of  life,  they  either  perish  or 
remain  constant ;  at  least,  with  the  exception  of  the 
slight  modifications  before  mentioned.  Even  those  alter- 
ations which  artificial  breeding  produces,  have  a  tendency 
to  return  to  the  original  species  :  as  soon  as  cultivated 
plants  and  domestic  animals  are  left  to  themselves,  they 
run  wild,  i.  e.,  they  reassume  their  original  qualities. 
Even  the  bastard-formations  either  cease  to  be  fertile, 
or,  remaining  fertile,  finally  return  to  one  or  the  other 
stem-form  of  the  originally  crossed  species.  Nor  can 
we  oppose  to  these  facts  the  consideration  that  the 
period  of  time  during  which  mankind  has  observed  the 
organisms  is  too  short.  For  the  permanence  of  very  many 


PRESENT   STATE   OF   THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES.      103 

species  can  be  traced  through  thousands  of  years,  and 
the  shortness  of  the  period  of  our  observations  is  amply 
counterbalanced  on  the  one  hand  by  the  multitude  of 
species  from  all  parts  of  the  organic  systems  which  come 
under  our  notice,  on  the  other  by  the  immense  altera- 
tions in  the  conditions  of  existence  to  which  man  submits 
plants  and  animals.  How  great,  for  instance,  are  the 
alterations  in  the  conditions  of  existence  wrhich  tropical 
plants  undergo  in  our  hot-houses  and  gardens  !  And  the 
only  alteration  they  show  is  that  they  are  stunted  and 
only  bear  blossoms  with  difficulty  and  fruits  with  still 
greater  difficulty.*  Now,  if  the  ever-active  selection 
principle  does  not  produce  in  thousands  of  years  even 
minimum  alterations  which  can  be  observed,  science  cer- 
tainly is  justified  in  doubting  for  the  present  the  asserted 
effect  of  that  principle. 

Thus  not  only  are  the  facts  directly  opposed  to  the 
autocracy  of  the  selection  principle ;  but  logic  is  also 
none  the  less  so.  For,  under  the  most  favorable  cir- 
cumstances, selection  would  only  explain  the  preserva- 
tion and  perhaps  also  the  increase  of  useful  qualities  and 
organs,  if  the  same  are  already  in  existence  and  have 
shown  themselves  useful  to  the  individual  ;  but  would 
not  explain  their  origination.  This  would  rather  most 
emphatically  be  left  to  chance.  According  to  the  strict 
selection  theory,  it  would  be  pure  chance  that  among  the 
thousands  and  thousands  of  individual  qualities  of  the 
individuals  of  a  species,  such  qualities  are  always  exist- 
ing as  offer  advantages  to  the  individual  in  his  struggle 
for  existence.  And  it  would  be  a  second  series  of 
chances,  which  from  generation  to  generation  would 
*  Compare  v.  Baer,  "  Studies,  etc  ,"  p.  204  ff. 


THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

have  to  coincide  with  the  first,  that  among  the  individ- 
ual qualities  advantageous  to  the  individual  and  making 
it  victorious  in  the  struggle  for  existence,  there  should  be 
found  always  just  those  qualities  which  develop  the  spe- 
cies and  raise  it  to  a  higher  rank  and  order  in  the  zoolog- 
ical and  botanical  systems.  Bat  the  total  of  improba- 
bilities which  would  have  to  be  overcome  continually  in 
this  theatre  of  chance,  would  in  the  course  of  genera- 
tions necessarily  amount  to  infinity.  Thus,  in  the  very 
beginning,  insuperable  doubts  arise  as  to  how  we  can 
explain  from  two  causes  the  world  of  organisms  which  is 
so  richly,  beautifully,  and  systematically  arranged.  The 
first  of  these  causes  is  the  inclination  to  individual  alter- 
ation, inherited  indeed  in  the  organisms,  but  in  itself 
absolutely  indifferent  for  the  systematical  idea  in  the 
framework  of  the  organic  systems  and  for  the  pro- 
gressive element  in  the  development.  The  other  is  the 
struggle  for  existence  and  natural  selection,  which 
approaches  the  organisms  purely  from  without 
like  individual  variability,  must  as  a  whole  appear  a 
necessity,  but  in  each  single  case  in  the  concrete  mix- 
ture of  coinciding  circumstances,  would  seem  a  work  of 
chance  for  the  individual  which  is  to  be  changed. 

Moreover,  it  is  a  demonstrable  impossibility  to 
explain  the  origin  of  just  those  organs  and  members 
in  the  structure  of  organisms  which  are  systematically 
the  most  significant  and  functionally  the  most  important, 
by  means  of  natural  selection.  It  is  true  that  many  of 
these  organs  and  members,  in  their  perfected  state,  offer 
to  the  organism  an  immense  advantage  over  lower  or- 
ganisms; but  if  they  had  been  originated  through  grad- 
ual development,  they  would  have  been  in  their  first 


PRESENT   STATE   OF   THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES.      105 

beginnings  and  earlier  stages  of  development  at  least 
quite  indifferent,  often  directly  obstructive  to  the  in- 
dividual in  its  struggle  for  existence,  and  therefore  would 
have  been  called  into  existence  and  developed  by  agen- 
cies which  had  an  effect  directly  counteracting  natural 
selection.  How  high,  for  instance,  stand  the  vertebrates 
above  the  invertebrates !  Yet  how  could  the  first 
deviation  from  the  gangl ionic  system  of  the  nerves  of  the 
invertebrates  to  the  cerebro- spinal  system  of  the  verte- 
brates have  occurred? — and,  especially,  how  could  the  first 
deposit  of  the  vertebral  column  have  procured  any  benefit 
to  the  individual  in  the  struggle  for  existence?  We 
quote  this  objection  from  Karl  Planck's  ' ;  Wahrheit 
und  Flachheitdes  Darwinismus,"  ("Truth  and  Platitude 
of  Darwinism"),  Nordlingen,  Beck,  1872. 

Still  more  striking  is  the  insufficiency  of  the  selec- 
tion theory  for  the  explanation  of  the  origin  of  the 
organs  of  motion  in  the  higher  classes  of  vertebrates.  A. 
W.  Volkmansays  of  it,  in  his  instructive  lecture,  "Zur 
Entwickelung  der  Organismen."  ("Development  of 
the  Organisms")  Halle,  Schmidt,  1875,  p.  3  ff: 
"Without  doubt,  animals  with  extremities  will 
come  from  animals  which  lacked  extremities.  Now 
if  the  metamorphosis  originated  in  the  course  of 
one  generation,  the  animals  with  extremities  would  have 
an  advantage  over  the  rest,  which  ought  to  show  itself 
in  the  natural  selection;  but  if  the  development  of  an 
extremity  needs  10,000  generations,  the  individual  in 
which  the  process  of  the  development  begins  produces 
ToTor  °f  the  extremity  and  the  advantage,  resulting 
therefrom  is  reduced  to  zero.  For  an  organ  can  only 
be  of  advantage  when  it  performs  its  functions;  and  on 


106  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

the  first  of  the  10,000  stages  of  development  the  extrem- 
ity can  not  perform  its  functions.  Just  think  of  the 
cetacea  !  Of  the  hind  extremity,  only  its  carrier,  the 
pelvis,  has  been  developed;  and  even  this  is  only  repre- 
sented by  the  two  hip-bones,  hanging  in  the  flesh.  As 
to  the  python,  the  hind  extremities  are  more  complete, 
but  they  lie  hidden  under  the  skin,  and  therefore  are  of 
no  use  for  local  movement.  Such  examples  show 
that  in  the  history  of  the  development  of  an  organ  thous- 
ands of  years  may  pass,  and  numerous  generations  may 
arise  and  disappear,  until  it  reaches  that  grade  of 
perfection  where  it  is  of  use  to  its  owner.  How  there- 
fore, can  we  look  upon  such  an  organ,  when  finally  it  is 
perfect,  as  a  product  of  selection  in  the  sense  of  Darwin?" 
We  find  the  scientific  objections  to  the  selection  the- 
ory collected  in  detail  in  the  before-mentioned  works  of 
Wigand,  Blanchard,  His,  von  Baer,  and  especially  in 
Mivart's  "Genesis  of  Species,"  (London,  MacMillan, 
1871);  and  it  is  a  praiseworthy  testimony  of  Darwin's 
love  of  truth,  that  lately  he  himself,  the  originator  of 
the  selection  theory,  willingly  admits  these  weak  points 
in  his  theory,*  while  Hackel  and  many  of  his  followers 

*  Darwin  says,  on  page  146,  Eng.  Ed.,  of  his  "Descent  of  Man": 
"In  the  earlier  editions  of  my  'Origin  of  Species,'  I  perhaps  attrib- 
uted too  much  to  the  action  of  natural  selection  or  the  survival  of 
the  fittest.  *  *  I  did  not  formerly  sufficiently  consider  the 
existence  of  structures  which,  as  far  as  we  can  at  present  judge, 
are  neither  beneficial  nor  injurious;  and  this  I  believe  to  be  one 
of  the  greatest  oversights  as  yet  detected  in  my  work.  *  *  An 
unexplained  residuum  of  change,  perhaps  a  large  one,  must  be  left  to 
the  assumed  uniform  action  of  those  unknown  agencies,  which  oc- 
casionally induce  strongly-marked  and  abrupt  deviations  of  struc- 
ture in  our  domestic  productions." 


PRESENT   STATE   OF   THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES.      JOT 

in  Germany  still  stoutly  reject  every  doubt  of  the  auto- 
cracy of  the  selection  principle. 

In  summing  up  all  we  have  said  thus  far  about  the 
theories  of  descent,  of  evolution,  and  of  selection,  we 
still  find  all  three  solutions  of  the  scientific  problems  to 
be  hypotheses,  but  hypotheses  of  very  different  value. 
The  idea  of  descent  has  the  most  scientific  ground;  it  will, 
as  a  permanent  presupposition,  govern  all  scientific  inves- 
tigations as  to  the  origin  of  species,  even  if  it  does  not 
exclude  the  idea  of  an  often-repeated  primitive  genera- 
tion of  organisms — especially  of  those  that  stand  still 
lower  in  development.  More  uncertain  and  less  compre- 
hensive is  the  position  of  the  evolution  theory;  in  all  like- 
lihood, the  idea  of  an  origin  through  development  will 
have  to  share  the  sovereignty  with  the  idea  of  origin  by 
leaps  through  metamorphosis  of  germs.  Still  more  un- 
favorable is  the  state  of  the  selection  theory.  It  possesses 
the  merit  of  having  started  the  whole  question  as  to  the 
origin  of  species;  it  may  explain  subordinary  develop- 
ments; natural  selection  may  have  cooperated  as  a  regu- 
lator in  the  whole  progress  and  the  whole  preservation 
of  organic  life.  Ed.vonHartmann,  in  his  essay,  "Truth 
and  Error  of  Darwinism,"  (Berlin,  Duncker,  1875),  on 
page  111,  compares  its  functions  with  those  of  the  bolt 
and  coupling  in  a  machine;  but  that  the  driving  princi- 
ple which  called  new  species  into  existence  lay  or  origi- 
nated in  the  organisms,  and  did  not  approach  them  from 
without,  seems  to  be  confirmed  more  and  more  decid- 
edly with  every  new  step  of  exact  investigation  as  well 
as  of  reflection. 


BOOK    II. 

THE  PHILOSOPHIC  SUPPLEMENTS  AND  CONSE 
QUENCES  OF  THE  DARWINIAN  THEORIES. 


THE  PHILOSOPHIC  PROBLEMS. 

Although,  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of 
the  task  before  us,  we  have  to  restrict  ourselves  to  giv- 
ing the  results  of  natural  science  only  in  their  general 
outlines,  still  we  believe  that  we  have  not  overlooked 
any  essential  result  which  is  of  importance  to  the  ques- 
tion of  the  origin  of  species  and  of  man.  We  have 
now  finished  our  scientific  review  ;  and  the  conclusion  to 
which  we  see  ourselves  brought  is  that  natural  science, 
in  its  investigation  of  the  origin  of  .species,  has  arrived 
at  nothing  but  problems  which  it  is  not  able  to  solve. 
There  is  a  very  great  probability  of  an  origin  of  species, 
at  least  of  the  higher  organized  species,  through  descent ; 
but  whether  through  descent  by  means  of  gradual  devel- 
opment or  of  metamorphosis  of  germs,  or  whether  with 
one  group  of  organisms  it  is  in  this  way,  with  another 
in  that,  is  not  yet  decided.  The  attempt  to  explain  their 
entire  origin  exclusively  by  the  selection  theory,  must 
be  regarded  as  a  failure;  all  indications  rather  show  that, 
supposing  the  descent  principle  correct,  the  deciding 
agencies  which  formed  new  species  did  not  approach  the 
old  species  out  of  which  the  new  ones  originated  from 

(108) 


THE   PHILOSOPHIC   PROBLEMS.  109 

without,  but  that  they  originated  or  were  already  in 
existence  within  them.  But  what  these  agencies  were, 
natural  science  is  at  present  unable  to  state  ;  and  not 
only  those  scientists  who  reject  every  idea  of  a  descent, 
but  also  those  who  are  favorable  to  the  ideas  of  descent 
and  of  evolution,  rejecting  only  the  selection  theory,  are 
at  one  in  silent  or  open  acknowledgment  of  this  limit 
of  our  knowledge,  be  it  permanent  or  temporary. 

But  now  the  question  arises:  does  the  search  after 
these  agencies  henceforth  remain  the  exclusive  task  of 
natural  science,  and  have  we  therefore  simply  to  wait  and 
see  whether  it  will  succeed  in  finding  them  ?  or  have  we 
to  look  for  the  answer  to  these  questions,  which  natural 
science  can  no  longer  give,  in  another  science — namely, 
philosophy  ?  The  first  question  we  will  have  to  answer 
in  the  affirmative,  the  second  in  the  negative.  It  is  cer- 
tainly understood  that  metaphysical  principles  must 
underlie  all  physical  appearances  ;  and  the  right  to  define 
these  principles,  so  far  as  they  can  be  known,  is  willingly 
conceded  to  philosophy  by  the  scientists,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  those  of  materialistic  and  naturalistic  tendencies. 
This  mutual  re-approaching  of  philosophy  and  natural 
science  is  one  of  the  most  gratifying,  and,  to  both,  most 
fruitful  evidences  of  the  intellectual  work  of  the  present 
generation.  But  these  metaphysical  principles  them- 
selves become  cognizable  only  when  the  physical  effects, 
whose  cause  they  are,  become  accessible  to  our  knowl- 
edge ;  and  every  attempt  to  find  them  a  priori,  or  only 
to  extend  them  a  priori,  will  always  fail  through  the 
opposition  of  empirical  facts  ;  or  even  if  this  attempt 
accommodates  itself  to  the  existing  state  of  knowledge 
at  a  given  time,  it  will  always  be  overcome  by  the  pro- 


110  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

gress  of  the  empirical  sciences.  In  the  most  favorable 
case,  it  can  claim  the  value  of  a  hypothesis  which  has  to 
be  put  to  the  proof,  whether  it  can  be  empirically  con- 
firmed and  whether  we  can  successfully  operate  with  it 
in  knowing  the  world  of  realities.  But  herewith  it 
leaves  the  realm  of  pure  philosophy,  and  makes  the 
question  of  its  right  to  exist  dependent  upon  the  decision 
of  natural  science. 

Since  the  decline  of  the  doctrines  of  nature  held  by 
Schelling,  Steffens,  and  Hegel,  there  has  come  to  our 
knowledge,  from  the  domain  of  philosophy,  but  one 
earnest  attempt  to  explain  the  origin  and  development 
of  organisms  down  to  the  concrete  differences  between 
single  types,  classes,  and  even  orders  and  families,  from 
one  single  metaphysical  principle;  and  this  attempt  has 
been  made  by  an  antagonist  of  the  descent  doctrine.  K. 
Ch.  Planck,  in  ' ;  Seele  und  Geist,  oder  Ursprung,  We- 
sen  und  Thatigkeitsform  der  physischen  und  geistigen 
Organisation  von  den  naturwissenschaftlichen  Grund- 
lagen  aus  allgemein  fasslich  entwickelt"  ("Soul  and 
Spirit,  or  Origin,  Nature,  and  Form  of  Activity  of  Phys- 
ical and  Intellectual  Organization,  Clearly  Developed 
from  a  Scientific  Basis"),  Leipzig,  Fues,  1871,  and  in 
"Wahrheit  und  Flachheit  des  Darwinismus  "  ("Truth 
and  Platitude  of  Darwinism"),  Nordlingen,  Beck,  1872, 
makes  the  ' '  inner  concentration  "  the  moving  principle 
of  the  whole  development  of  the  world.  He  thinks  that 
what  belongs  to  the  organism  and  to  the  soul  has  origi- 
nated and  developed  up  to  man  and  his  spiritual  nature 
thus :  that  the  creating  centrum  of  the  earth  pro- 
duces individual  centra  on  its  periphery,  which  tend 
more  and  more  to  bring  into  view  the  principle  of  cen- 


THE    PHILOSOPHIC   PROBLEMS.  Ill 

tralization,  in  its  contrast  to  the  purely  peripheral  form 
of  existence,  until  it  reaches  its  goal  irr  man,  with  his  cen- 
tralizing spirit.  We  have  no  reason  to  reject  the  idea  of  a 
principle  of  concentration  in  the  world  and  its  parts;  it 
is  confirmed  by  observation,  and  shows  itself  fruitful  in 
many  respects.  But  in  spite  of  the  many  ingenious  and 
often  suggestive  ideas  in  the  works  of  Planck,  we  have 
some  doubt  about  a  system  which  tries  to  explain  the 
whole  concrete  abundance  of  the  richness  of  formations 
and  life-forms  in  the  world,  rising  higher  and  higher  up 
to  spiritual  existence  and  moral  action,  from  the  single 
idea  of  concentration,  and  makes  this  principle  the  mys- 
tical and  mysteriously  acting  cause  of  a  whole  world  and 
its  contents.  We  doubt  at  the  outset  the  success  of  this 
argument.  We  have  especially  the  strongest  objections 
to  a  philosophical  system  which  submits  all  the  contend- 
ing physical  theories  of  the  present  to  the  measure  of 
that  concentration  principle,  and  from  these  purely  meta- 
physical reasons  takes  side  exclusively  with  the  one  or 
the  other  of  the  theories,  or  establishes  new  theories — 
from  the  theories  of  atoms  and  ether,  of  light  and  heat, 
down  to  geological  questions  as  to  whether  universal 
revolutions  of  vthe  world  or  a  continual  development 
took,  place.  The  solution  of  all  these  questions,  in  their 
full  extent,  we  do  not  attribute  to  philosophy,  but  to 
natural  science;  although  to  a  natural  science  which 
permits  philosophy  to  define  the  ideas  with  which  it 
operates  and  the  general  principles  to  which  it  comes. 
For  this  renunciation — which  philosophy,  however,  can 
not  at  all  escape — it  will  be  the  more  richly  rewarded  in 
this,  that  it  obtains  the  more  certainly  for  its  own  work 
sure  and  sifted  material.  But  all  attempts  which  can  not 


112  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

submit  to  this  renunciation,  give  only  an  apparent  right 
to  that  view  which  Albert  Lange,  in  his  "History  of 
Materialism,"  defends,  when  he  banishes  speculative 
philosophy  to  the  realm  ot  imagination. 

But  in  rejecting  philosophy  in  the  question  of  the 
causes  of  the  development  and  organization  of  the  or- 
ganic kingdoms,  we  did  not  reach  the  end  of  the  philo- 
sophic problems  with  which  we  are  confronted.  This 
whole  question  is  itself  only  a  segment  of  the  problems 
before  which  we  stand,  and  leads  of  necessity  to  other 
questions. 

Already  within  the  series  of  development  of  the  or- 
ganic world,  so  far  as  it  is  investigated  by  natural  sci- 
ence, we  have  found  and  named  a  point  (at  the  end  of 
§  1,  Chap.  II,  Book  I),  where  the  competency  of  pure 
natural  science  comes  to  an  end,  and  the  question  arises 
whether  another  source  of  knowledge — i.  e.,  even  phi- 
osophy — can  not  take  up  the  investigation  where  natu- 
ral science  completes  its  task.  This  point  was  the  origin 
of  self-consciousness  and  of  free  moral  self-determination; 
consequently,  the  origin  of  that  which  makes  man  man. 
Going  still  farther  back  on  the  temporal  and  ideal  scale 
of  organic  beings,  we  arrive  at  another  point,  which 
natural  science  no  longer  can  explain,  and  that  is  the 
origin  of  sensation  and  of  consciousness.  With  the  ap- 
pearance of  sensation  and  consciousness,  the  animal 
world  came  into  existence.  Moreover,  the  whole  scien- 
tific question  as  to  the  origin  and  development  of  species, 
so  far  as  we  have  hitherto  treated  it,  started  from  ini- 
tial points  where  the  organic  and  life  already  existed;  it, 
therefore,  leads  of  necessity  to  the  further  question  as  to 
the  origin  of  the  organic  and  of  life  itself.  D.  F.  Strauss, 


THE    PHILOSOPHIC    PROBLEMS.  113 

in  his  "Postscript  as  Preface,"  thus  clearly  and 
simply  characterizes  these  still  unfilled  blanks  in  the 
evolution  theory  :  ' '  There  are,  as  is  well  known,  three 
points  in  the  rising  development  of  nature,  to  which  the 
appearance  of  incomprehensibility  especially  adheres  (to 
speak  more  categorically:  which  have  not  been  explained 
thus  far  by  anybody).  The  three  questions  are:  How 
has  the  living  sprung  from  that  which  is  without  life  ? 
the  sentient  (and  conscious)  being  from  that  which  is 
without  sensation  ?  that  which  possesses  reason  (self-con- 
sciousness and  free  will)  from  that  which  is  without 
reason  ? — questions  equally  embarrassing  to  thought. " 
But  even  the  question  as  to  the  origin  of  the  organic  and 
of  life  can  not  be  discussed  without  an  investigation, 
leading  us  farther  back  to  the  question  as  to  the  elements 
of  the  world  in  general.  The  doctrine  of  atoms,  and  the 
mechanical  mew  of  the  world,  are  the  scientific  evidences 
of  the  efforts  in  this  direction. 

So  far  as  the  attempts  to  solve  these  four  questions 
start  from  the  results  of  natural  science  and,  from  this 
starting-point  of  the  known,  try  to  solve  the  unknown,  we 
will  have  to  assign  them  in  the  encyclopaedic  classifica- 
tion of  the  sciences,  to  that  department  of  philosophy 
which  treats  the  doctrines  of  nature;  and  since  our 
whole  investigation  starts  from  the  Darwinian  theories, 
and  only  tries  to  treat  of  what  is  properly  connected 
with  them,  the  attempts  to  solve  these  four  questions 
offer  themselves  as  the  naturo-philosophic  supplements  of 
the  Darwinian  theories. 

After  concluding  our  treatment  of  them,  we  shall 
have  to  speak  of  still  another  view,  which  presupposes 
all  these  attempts  at  solution  to  be  wholly  or  nearly  sue- 
8 


114  THE   THEORIES  OF   DARWIN. 

cessful,  and  draws  an  inference  from  them  which  no 
longer  belongs  to  the  realm  of  natural  science,  but  is  a 
purely  metaphysical  hypothesis;  it  is  the  abolition  of  the 
idea  of  design  in  nature.  In  connection  with  this,  finally, 
we  shall  have  to  discuss  the  name  which  this  view  has 
lately  assumed,  viz:  "Monism" 

Whatever  further  questions  may  arise,  belong  either 
to  the  special  subdivisions  of  natural  science  and  philos- 
ophy, or  to  theological  and  ethical  problems. 


THE   N AT  URO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.          115 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  NATURO-PHILOSOPHIC  SUPPLEMENTS  OF  THE  DAR- 
WINIAN THEORIES. 

§  1.     The  Origin  of  Self -Consciousness  and  of  Free  Moral 
Self -Determination . 

If  sensation,  and  its  most  developed  form,  conscious- 
ness, is  a  reflex  of  the  material  in  something  immaterial, 
which  feels  itself  a  unit  in  contrast  to  the  material,  and, 
where  sensation  rises  into  consciousness,  is  opposed  as  a 
unit  to  the  material — self-consciousness  again  is  the  re- 
flex of  this  sentient  and  conscious  subject  in  a  new  and 
still  higher  immaterial  unity;  and  this  again  makes  this 
sentient  and  conscious  subject,  together  with  the  sum  of 
its  feelings  and  ideas,  its  object,  changing  it  from  a  sen- 
tient and  conscious  subject  into  a  felt  and  presented 
object.  Therefore  it  is  clear,  and  will  be  the  result  of 
all  thought  upon  these  concepts,  that  as  with  sensation 
and  consciousness,  so  also  with  self-consciousness,  some- 
thing new  always  comes  into  existence — a  higher  cate- 
gory of  being,  different  from  the  merely  material.  The 
first  is  the  form  of  being  of  the  animal  world;  the  latter 
that  of  mankind. 

It  is  exactly  the  same  with  the  first  appearance  of  vol- 
untary movement,  and  again  with  that  of  free  moral 
self-determination.  The  reaction  of  the  sentient  subject 
upon  his  sensations  is  something  qualitatively  different 
from  the  purely  mechanical  and  physical  action  and  re- 


116  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

action  of  pure  matter;  although,  in  order  to  understand 
the  possibility  of  a  sensation  as  well  as  of  a  voluntary 
movement,  we  must  admit  that  the  physical  qualities  of 
matter  must  be  such  as  to  afford  a  basis  and  condition 
for  sentient  and  reacting  beings.  That  reaction  is  the 
reaction  of  something  immaterial  upon  the  material, 
even  if  it  is  entirely  caused  by  the  material  and  bound  to 
the  material.  Now,  with  free  moral  self-determina- 
tion a  new  subject  comes  into  existence  and  activity  in  the 
individual,  which  makes  that  subject,  reacting  upon  mere 
sensations  and  ideas,  its  object,  and,  as  a  new  immate- 
rial subjective  unity,  acts  determiningly  upon  that  sub- 
ject which  has  just  become  object.  This  new  subject, 
considered  from  the  side  of  its  receptivity,  we  call  self- 
consciousness;  from  the  side  of  its  spontaneity,  free 
moral  self-determination.  Whether  we  consider  this 
freedom  predetermined  or  not,  does  not  at  all  alter  the 
described  fact  and  the  qualitative  difference  between  the 
form  of  human  moral  agency  and  that  of  purely  animal 
spontaneity.  For  even  those  advocating  determination 
must  admit  that  the  morally  acting  subject  distinguishes 
itself  from  its  object,  and  does  not  take  its  motives  to 
action  from  the  material  and  from  the  instinctive  life 
which  is  bound  to  the  sensual  and  dependent  on  it. 

Now  it  is  true  that  all  these  circumstances  in  organ- 
ized individuals  which  serve  self-consciousness  and  free 
moral  self-determination  as  their  condition,  presupposi- 
tion, and  basis,  all  the  dispositions  of  the  soul  and  the 
manifestations  of  life  found  in  the  animal  world,  will 
be  worthy  of  the  closest  attention  even  on  this  account : 
because  they  form  the  basis,  the  condition,  and  (if  self- 
consciousness  and  freedom  are  once  present)  an  essential 


THE   NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.  117 

part  of  the  contents  and  object  of  self-consciousness  and 
moral  self-determination.  But  where  the  origin  of  man 
is  discussed,  the  central  point  of  the  investigation  is  no 
longer  the  enumeration  of  those  activities  of  the  soul 
of  man  whose  analogies  we  also  find  in  the  animal  world, 
but  rather  in  the  answer  to  the  question  as  to  how  that 
entirely  new  manifestation,  self-consciousness  and  moral 
self-determination,  came  into  existence  or  could  have 
originated.  This  question  is  the  more  decidedly  the 
central  point  of  the  investigation,  since  this  new  form, 
when  once  in  existence,  has  for  its  object  not  only  what 
already  appears  in  the  life  of  the  soul  of  animals,  but 
also  receives  a  new  object,  which  can  only  be  an  object 
of  self-consciousness  and  of  moral  self-determination, 
and  not  of  mere  consciousness  and  instinctive  life.  These 
new  objects  are  the  ideas  leading  up  to  the  conception 
of  God  and  moral  ideals. 

Now  this  very  question  as  to  the  origin  of  self-con- 
sciousness and  of  free  moral  self-determination  is  wholly 
misjudged  as  to  its  importance,  and  given  remarkably 
little  attention  by  those  evolutionists  who  are  well  versed 
in  the  realm  of  natural  science.  The  question  as  to  the 
origin  of  self-consciousness  is  either  entirely  ignored — 
as  if  self-consciousness  must  originate  wholly  by  itself, 
if  only  those  first  steps  of  an  intellectual  and  social 
life  which  the  animal  world  also  shows,  are  once  pres- 
sent  and  properly  developed  —  or  the  solution  is  put 
aside  with  the  most  superficial  analogies.  The  ques- 
tion regarding  free  moral  self-determination,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  either  likewise  ignored,  and  for  the  same 
reasons,  or  it  is  supposed  that  it  must  fail  of  itself,  if 


118  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

only  this  self-determination  is  explained  in  a  determin- 
istic way. 

It  is  true,  Darwin  devotes  several  chapters  of  his 
work,  "  Descent  of  Man,"  to  a  comparison  of  the  intel- 
lectual powers  of  man  with  those  of  animals,  and  these 
chapters  are  full  of  the  most  interesting  facts  and  com- 
parisons ;  but  although  his  work  comprises  two  volumes, 
he  devotes  to  the  origin  of  self-consciousness,  individual- 
ity, abstraction,  general  ideas,  etc.,  only  a  single  page, 
and  justifies  his  brief  treatment  with  the  assertion  that 
the  attempt  at  discussing  these  higher  faculties  is  useless, 
because  hardly  two  authors  agree  in  their  definitions  of 
these  terms.  What  he  says  about  self-consciousness  .is 
really  contained  in  two  sentences,  namely:  "But  how 
can  we  feel  sure  that  an  old  dog  with  an  excellent  mem- 
ory and  some  power  of  imagination,  as  shown  by  his 
dreams,  never  reflects  on  his  past  pleasures  or  pains  in 
the  chase  ?  This  would  be  a  form  of  self-conscious- 
ness." On  the  other  hand,  as  Biichner  has  remarked  in 
his  "Lectures  about  Darwin's  Theory":  "How 
little  can  the  hard-working  wife  of  a  degraded  Australian 
savage,  who  hardly  ever  uses  abstract  words,  and  can 
not  count  above  four,  how  little  can  such  a  woman  exert 
her  self-consciousness,  or  reflect  on  the  nature  of  her 
own  existence  ! "  And  in  Darwin's  resume  of  his  chapters 
on  the  intellectual  powers  of  man  and  animals,  he  says, 
on  page  126  :  "  If  it  could  be  proved  that  certain  high 
mental  powers,  such  as  the  formation  of  general  con- 
cepts, self-consciousness,  etc.,  were  absolutely  peculiar 
to  man,  which  seems  extremely  doubtful,  it  is  not  im- 
probable that  these  qualities  are  merely  the  incidental 
results  of  other  highly-advanced  intellectual  faculties: 


THE   NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.  119 

and  these  again  mainly  the  result  of  the  continued  use 
of  a  perfect  language." 

If  Darwin  is  thus  not  able  to  show  us  in  the  animal 
world  a  single  real  analogy  which  at  all  approaches  self- 
consciousness,  and,  in  order  to  supply  this  want,  must 
have  recourse  to  the  purely  hypothetical  possibility  that 
it  is  not  certain  whether  an  old  hunting-dog  does  not 
reflect  upon  the  past  joys  of  the  chase  ;  if  by  the  uncer- 
tainty of  the  expression  that  self-consciousness  might  be 
an.  "accompanying"  result  of  other  faculties,  he  never- 
theless gives  us  to  understand  that  he  can  not  find  the 

^ 

sufficient  cause  of  the  origin  of  self-consciousness  in 
those  other  faculties  ;  and,  finally,  if  he  closes  the  last 
mentioned  quotation  with  a  sentence  which  has  for  its 
premise  the  wholly  illogical  thought  that  language  might 
have  been  able  to  reach  "  a  high  state  of  development " 
before  the  origin  of  self-consciousness  and  without  its 
assistance  :  then,  indeed,  the  result  of  all  this  certainly 
is  that  he  has  given  no  adequate  consideration  to  the 
specific  nature  of  self-consciousness.  It  is  only  under 
this  supposition  that  it  is  possible  for  him  to  say :  "  Nev- 
ertheless, the  difference  in  mind  between  man  and  the 
higher  animals,  great  as  it  certainly  is,  is  one  of  degree 
and  not  of  quality. "  The  authors  may  possibly  not  agree 
in  the  definitions  of  the  idea  of  self-consciousness — we 
ourselves  perhaps  are  only  an  additional  example  in  con- 
firmation of  this  fact —  ;  but  whatever  the  definition  may 
be,  the  fact  itself  remains,  that  self-consciousness  does 
not  stand  as  one  of  the  intellectual  faculties  beside  the 
others  and  coordinate  with  them,  but,  as  an  entirely  new 
form  of  being,  introduces  a  qualitatively  new  and  val- 
uable factor  into  the  subject.  That  which  precedes  the 


120  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

origin  of  self-consciousness — the  purely  conscious  and 
not  yet  self-conscious  life  of  the  soul,  as  it  shows  itself 
with  higher  animals,  especially  with  mammals — may 
have  been  the  necessary  condition  and  requirement  for 
the  origin  of  self- consciousness.  It  certainly  has  been 
so  ;  and  from  this  point  of  view,  all  these  psychological 
studies  of  animals  and  psycho- physical  investigations 
which  are  a  favorite  object  of  modern  science,  have  a 
high  value  ;  but  what  has  been  called  into  existence  by 
'means  of  conditions  is  not  on  that  account  the  pro- 
duct of  those  conditions.  This  very  fact  is  one  of  the 
greatest  mistakes  of  most  of  the  modern  evolution  theo- 
ries :  that  very  often — and  especially  where  they  wish 
to  draw  metaphysical  conclusions  from  their  scientific 
results  or  hypotheses  —  they  confound  condition  and 
basis  with  cause. 

Now  it  appears  to  us  that,  in  quite  an  analogous  way, 
Darwin  overlooks  or  contests  the  fact  that  with  free 
moral  self-determination  something  specifically  new 
comes  into  existence.  He  certainly  discusses  the  origin 
of  the  moral  qualities  of  man  more  in  detail  than  he 
does  the  origin  of  his  intellectual  qualities.  He  derives 
them,  in  their  first  beginnings,  from  the  fixity,  trans- 
mission and  increase  of  the  social  impulses  and  instincts. 
These,  being  the  basis  of  the  whole  moral  development, 
and  leading  in  their  more  mature  form  to  love  and  to 
sympathy,  originated  by  natural  selection  ;  and  the  other 
moral  qualities,  such  as  moral  sense  and  conscience,  pro- 
gressed more  by  the  effect  of  custom,  by  the  power,  of 
reflection,  instruction,  and  religion,  than  by  nat- 
ural selection.  Higher  and  lower,  common  and  special, 
permanent  and  transitory  instincts  come  into  collision 


THE   NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.  121 

with  one  another.  The  dissatisfaction  of  man  when  any 
of  the  lower,  special,  and  transitory  instincts  have  over- 
come the  higher,  common  and  permanent,  and  the  reso- 
lution to  act  differently  for  the  future,  is  conscience. 
Darwin  considers  that  one  a  moral  being  who  is  capable 
of  comparing  with  one  another  his  past  and  future 
actions  and  motives,  of  approving  some  of  them  and  of 
disapproving  others;  and  the  fact  that  man  is  the  only 
creature  who  can  with  certainty  be  ranked  as  a  moral 
being  is,  according  to  Darwin,  the  greatest  of  all  differ- 
ences between  man  and  animals. 

Here,  again,  the  whole  central  point  of  the  investi- 
gation as  to  the  origin  of  man  does  not  lie  in  the  ques- 
tion of  the  origin  of  the  instincts  between  which  the 
moral  subject,  acting  in  moral  self-determination,  has  to 
choose.  For  it  is  clear  that  the  beginnings  of  these  in- 
stincts are  also  present  in  the  animal  world.  But  the 
main  question  is,  how  did  this  faculty  and  necessity  of 
choosing,  this  conscience  and  responsibility,  this  "  moral 
sense,"  as  Darwin  calls  it,  originate  ?  Now  to  this  ques- 
tion we  have  a  plain  answer  in  the  before-mentioned 
utterances  of  Darwin:  It  originated  not  as  &  product  of 
the  social  instincts — it  only  has  these  instincts  for  its 
preceding  condition,  object  and  instrument;  but  it  origi- 
nated as  a  product  of  other  agencies,  which  act  upon 
these  impulses  and  instincts,  operate  with  them,  choose 
between  them;  and  as  these  other  agencies  Darwin 
mentions  the  high  development  of  the  intellectual  pow- 
ers. That  this  is  his  opinion,  we  can  clearly  see  from 
an  expression  with  which  he  introduces  his  essay  on  the 
origin  of  "  moral  sense":  " The  following  proposition 
seems  to  me  in  a  high  degree  probable — namely,  that 


122  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

any  animal  whatever,  endowed  with  well-marked  social 
instincts,  would  inevitably  acquire  a  moral  sense  or  con- 
science, as  soon  as  its  intellectual  powers  had  become  as 
well,  or  nearly  as  well  developed,  as  in  man"  These  in- 
tellectual powers  which  moral  feeling  and  conscience 
require  at  their  birth,  are  certainly,  according  to  Darwin 
the  power  to  distinguish  oneself  as  subject  from  one's 
impulses  and  instincts,  and  to  choose  between  them;  i.e., 
self-consciousness.  We  shall  have  to  admit  fully  this 
intimate  connection  between  moral  self-determination 
and  self-consciousness;  but  we  must  admit,  at  the  same 
time,  that  moral  self-determination — this  new  form  of 
activity  in  which  moral  activity  distinguishes  itself  from 
all  merely  instinctive  activity — finds  its  sufficient  explana- 
tion in  the  previous  stage  of  the  animal  world  as  little  as 
self-consciousness;  and  that  moral  self-determination  has 
the  condition  and  presupposition,  but  not  the  cause,  of 
its  existence  in  that  which  is  also  found  in  the  previous 
stage  of  the  animal  world.  The  proof  that  the  origin  of 
moral  self-determination  finds  its  sufficient  explanation 
in  that  which  the  previous  stage  of  the  animal  world  also 
has,  would  appear  to  have  been  given  by  Darwin  only 
when  he  had  succeeded  in  explaining  the  origin  of  self- 
consciousness  from  animal  intelligence;  but  that  he  did 
not  succeed  in  it,  we  think  we  have  clearly  shown.  On 
the  other  hand,  we  willingly  admit  that  the  study  of  the 
social  and  all  other  instincts  and  impulses  which  are 
common  to  man  and  animals,  and  which  in  man  form 
the  object  and  instrument  of  his  moral  activity,  has  for 
us  the  highest  interest,  inasmuch  as  the  only  problem  is 
to  explain  the  conditions  and  prerequisites  of  moral  self- 
determination — or,  historically  speaking,  the  conditions 


THE   NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.          123 

and  prerequisites  of  the  origin  of  morally  acting  beings. 
Furthermore  we  have  to  say  here  also  that  condition  and 
prerequisite  are  not  identical  with  cause,  and  it  is  pre- 
cisely the  cause  of  moral  responsibility  and  of  the  origin 
of  such  morally  responsible  beings,  which  has  not  yet 
been  discovered  by  the  Darwinian  theory. 

The  followers  of  Darwin  enter  still  less  into  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  question  as  to  the  ©rigin  of  self-conscious- 
ness and  of  moral  self-determination.  Hackel — who,  in 
his  "  Natural  History  of  Creation  "  and  in  his  "  Anthro- 
pogeny,"  expounds  his  whole  evolution  theory  in  all  its 
antecedent  conditions  and  consequences — has,  indeed, 
much  to  say  of  the  different  faculties  of  the  soul  of  man 
and  animals.  He  trices  these  faculties  in  the  case  of  man 
down  to  the  lowest  state  of  the  most  degraded  races,  and 
in  the  case  of  animals  from  the  kermes  up  to  the  bee, 
from  the  lancelet-fish  to  the  dog,  ape,  elephant  and  horse; 
and  he  also  treats  of  the  so-called  a  priori  knowledge 
which  "  arose  only  by  long-enduring  transmission, 
by  inheritance  of  acquired  adaptations  of  the 
brain,  out  of  originally  empiric  or  experiential 
knowledge  a  posteriori"  (Vol.  II,  345).  But  we  look 
in  vain  in  his  works  for  a  treatment  of  the  question  as 
to  the  origin  of  the  Ego — of  self-consciousness.  No- 
where does  he  enter  into  the  analysis  of  the  psychologi- 
cal ideas;  he  only  compares  the  psychical  utterances  of 
different  creatures,  and  thinks  the  whole  problem  solved 
when  he  says:  "The  mental  differences  between  the 
most  stupid  placental  animals  (for  instance,  sloths  and 
armadillos)  and  the  most  intelligent  animals  of  the  same 
group  (for  instance  dogs  and  apes)  are,  at  any  rate, 
much  more  considerable  than  the  differences  in  the  in- 


124  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

tellectual  life  of  dogs,  apes,  and  men."  Or:  "If 
these  brutish  parasites  are  compared  with  the  men^ 
tally  active  and  sensitive  ants,  it  will  certainly  be  admit- 
ted that  the  psychical  differences  between  the  two 
are  much  greater  than  those  between  the  highest  and 
lowest  mammals  —  between  beaked  animals,  pouched 
animals  and  armadillos,  on  the  one  hand,  and  dogs,  apes, 
men,  on  the  other."  The  fact  that  in  the  human  indi- 
vidual consciousness  and  self-consciousness  are  gradually 
developed,  is  to  him  a  proof  that  in  the  organic  kingdom 
also  consciousness  and  self-consciousness  came  into  exis- 
tence gradually,  and,  indeed,  hand-in-hand  with  the 
development  of  the  nervous  system;  and  with  this  result 
he  thinks  that  he  has  relieved  himself  from  the  task  of 
showing  the  " how"  of  the  origin  of  self-consciousness. 
This  becomes  clearly  evident  from  a  remark  about  the 
origin  of  consciousness,  in  his  "Anthropogeny," 
where  he  says  that,  if  DuBois-Reymond  had  thought 
that  consciousness  is  developed,  he  would  no  longer  have 
held  its  origin  to  be  a  thing  beyond  the  limits  of  human 
capacity.  Hackel  likewise  seems  to  regard  the  question 
of  the  origin  of  moral  self-determination  as  solved  or 
rejected,  if  only  freedom  is  denied — which,  indeed,  is 
repeatedly  done  by  him. 

A  similar  defect  in  the  treatment  of  this  question  by 
evolutionists  we  find  in  the  works  of  Oscar  Schmidt, 
Gustav  Jager,  and  others.  Even  Emil  DuBois-Rey- 
mond,  who,  in  his  celebrated  and  eloquent  lecture  on 
"The  Limits  of  the  Knowledge  of  Nature,"  given  be- 
fore the  assembly  of  scientists  at  Leipzig,  1872,  asserts 
so  energetically  that  the  origin  of  sensation  and  con- 
sciousness is  inexplicable  (see  next  section),  seems  to 


THE   NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.  125 

take  the  origin  of  self-consciousness  for  granted,  and  as 
needing  no  further  explanation,  if  only  consciousness  is 
once  present. 

Since,  then,  the  scientists  leave  us  without  a  sufficient 
answer  to  the  question  respecting  the  origin  of  self-con- 
sciousness and  of  moral  self-determination,  we  shall  have 
to  turn  to  the  philosophers.  Here,  indeed,  we  find  rich 
definitions  and  genetic  analyses,  but  none  that  lead  us 
any  farther  than  to  the  information  that  consciousness  is 
the  necessary  condition  of  self  consciousness  ;  that  ani- 
mal instinct  is  the  necessary  antecedent  condition 
of  moral  self-determination.  Yet  in  the  works  of 
these  very  philosophers  who  are  inclined  to  a  mechanical 
and  "  monistic"  view  of  the  world,  we  find  that  they  di- 
rectly avoid  the  question  as  to  the  origin  of  self-conscious- 
ness and  of  moral  self-determination.  As  Soon  as  they 
are  led  near  it,  in  the  course  of  reasoning  in  their  works, 
they  suddenly  turn  aside  again  to  the  quite  different 
questions  of  the  connection  between  brain  and  soul,  be- 
tween physical  and  psychical,  external  and  internal  pro- 
cesses, etc.  Evidently  they  feel  that  with  this  question 
they  have  arrived  at  the  weak  point  of  their  system. 
That  here  is  a  weak  point,  we  clearly  see  in  the  case  of 
D.  F.  Strauss,  a  leading  advocate  of  modern  naturalism, 
and  the  greatest  philosophic  scholar  of  that  school.  It 
is  true,  in  his  "  Postscript  as  Preface,"  as  we  saw  before, 
he  mentions  the  origin  of  self-consciousness  as  one  of 
the  points  which  need  special  explanation ;  but  he  seems 
to  have  made  this  acknowledgment  more  with  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  that  DuBois  -  Reymond,  in  admitting 
the  origin  of  self-consciousness  to  be  explainable,  has  no 
longer  any  reason  to  contest  the  explicability  of  the 


126  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

origin  of  sensation  and  consciousness  ;  for  in  his  work 
on  "The  Old  Faith  and  the  New,"  he  did  not  enter  into 
that  question  at  all.  On  the  other  hand,  he  makes  in 
his  last-mentioned  work  a  remarkable  confession.  In 
answering  the  question — how  do  we  determine  our  rule 
of  life  ? — he  comes  to  speak  of  the  position  of  man  in 
nature,  traces  a  law  of  progress  in  nature,  and  says :  "  In 
this  cumulative  progression  of  life,  man  is  also  com- 
prised, and,  moreover,  in  such  wise  that  the  organic 
plasticity  of  our  planet  (provisionally,  say  some  natural- 
ists, but  that  we  may  fairly  leave  an  open  question)  cul- 
minates in  him.  As  nature  can  not  go  higher,  she  would 
go  inwards.  '  To  be  reflected  within  itself,'  was  a  very 
good  expression  of  Hegel's.  Nature  felt  herself  already 
in  the  animal,  but  she  wislied  to  know  herself  also." 
But  still  stronger  is  the  following  expression :  "In 
man,  nature  endeavored  not  merely  to  exalt,  but  to  tran- 
scend herself  .^  In  §1,  Chap.  II,  we  shall  have  to  speak 
of  this  important  acknowledgment  of  teleology  in 
nature,  which  such  an  antagonist  of  teleology  as  Strauss 
makes  in  the  above-quoted  remarks  about  a  progress  in 
nature  and  a  will  of  nature  ;  but  here  we  are  more 
interested  in  the  equally  remarkable  acknowledgment 
of  the  fact  that  man  can  not  be  explained  from  nature 
alone — that  he  is  something  which  transcends  nature. 
For  that  (according  to  Strauss)  nature,  in  originating 
man,  not  only  intended  to  transcend  herself,  but  really 
did  transcend  herself  and,  that  she  succeeded  in  her  in- 
tention, we  can  infer  from  the  moral  precept  which 
Strauss  gives  :  "Do  not  forget  for  a  moment,  that  thou 
art  human  ;  not  merely  a  natural  production. " 

The  result  of  our  investigation,  therefore,   is  that 


THE   NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.          127 

with  self-consciousness  and  free  moral  self-determination 
something  specifically  new  came  into  existence  which 
had  its  antecedent  condition  in  a  previous  state  of  exist- 
ence, but  has  not  yet  found  its  sufficient  explanation  in 
this  antecedent  state. 

§  2.    The  Origin  of  Sensation  and  of  Consciousness. 

The  limits  of  our  knowledge  show  themselves  still 
more  clearly  in  the  attempts  to  explain  the  origin  of  con- 
sciousness and  its  lowest  form  —  sensation.  Self -con- 
sciousness is  without  doubt  ideally  nearer  to  conscious- 
ness in  this,  that  both  are  an  immaterial  activity  ;  and 
yet  we  found  no  demonstrable  bridge  which  leads  from 
consciousness  to  self-consciousness.  Still  broader  is  the 
gulf  between  the  material  and  the  immaterial,  between 
the  unconscious  and  the  conscious, — or,  to  describe  the 
two  realms  with  names  which  bring  them  nearest  togeth- 
er, between  that  which  is  without  sensation  and  that 
which  has  sensation  :  a  gulf  to  bridge  which  philosophy 
also  has  vainly  exerted  its  utmost  efforts,  as  has  been 
well  known  since  the  ' '  supernatural  assistance "  of 
Descartes  and  the  " preestablished  harmony"  of  Leib- 
nitz. Wherein  lies  the  real  necessity  that  there  should 
be  sensation?  How  does  the  material  become  some- 
thing that  is  felt  ?  What  is  the  demonstrable  cause  (not 
the  condition,  but  the  cause)  of  a  sentient  subject  ?  To 
these  questions,  every  science  up  to  the  present  day  lacks 
an  answer.  As  is  well  known,  DuBois-Reymond,  in  his 
previously-mentioned  lecture  upon  ' '  The  Limits  of  our 
Knowledge  of  Nature,"  declares  the  origin  of  sensation 
and  of  consciousness  to  be  one  of  two  limits,  beyond 


128  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

which  we  have  not  only  to  say  "ignoramus," but  "ignor- 
dbimm" 

In  abstracto^  we  might  think  of  two  attempts  at 
bridging  over  this  gulf :  the  first  one  is  that  we  try  to 
transform  sensation  itself  into  something  material,  and 
the  other  is  that  we  attribute  sensation  also  to  that  which, 
according  to  our  observation,  seems  to  be  without  sen- 
sation ;  namely,  to  matter  and  its  elements,  the  atoms. 
Both  of  these  attempts  have  been  made — the  former  by 
D.  F.  Strauss  in  his  "The  Old  Faith  and  the  New,"  and 
by  the  English  philosopher,  Herbert  Spencer,  in  his 
"  First  Principles  of  Philosophy; "  the  latter,  first  pointed 
out  by  Schopenhauer,  was  taken  up  and  farther  devel- 
oped by  Zollner  in  his  work.  "Ueber  die  Natur  der 
Kometen"  ("  Nature  of  the  Comets  "),  Leipzig,  Engel- 
mann,  1872,  and  with  special  acutenessby  an  "Anonymus" 
in  the  work  :  "Das  Unbewusste  vom  Standpunkt  der 
Physiologic  und  Descendenztheorie"  ("  The  Unconscious 
from  the  Standpoint  of  Physiology  and  Descent  Theory"), 
Berlin,  Duncker,  1872. 

Strauss  says,  in  the  previously-mentioned  work: 
"If,  under  certain  conditions,  motion  is  trans- 
formed into  heat,  why  may  it  not,  under  other  conditions, 
be  transformed  into  sensation  ?  "  And  Herbert  Spencer 
says,  in  his  "  First  Principles  of  Philosophy,"  (page  217): 
"Various  classes  of  facts  thus  unite  -to  prove  that  the 
law  of  metamorphosis,  which  holds  among  the  physical 
forces,  holds  equally  between  them  and  the  mental 
forces.  Those  modes  of  the  unknowable  which  we  call 
motion,  heat,  light,  chemical  affinity,  etc.,  are  alike 
transformable  into  each  other,  and  into  those  modes  of 
the  unknowable  which  we  distinguish  as  sensation,  emo- 


THE   NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.          129 

tion,  thought  :  these,  in  their  turns,  being  directly  or 
indirectly  retransformable  into  the  original  shapes. " 

But  motion— even  the  finest  material  motion,  that  of 
ether,  (which,  in  consequence  of  the  very  important  dis- 
covery of  the  conservation  of  force  and  of  the  mechan- 
ical equivalent  of  heat,  made  by  Robert  von  Mayer,  at 
present  is  taken  to  be  heat) — is  so  decidedly  a  material 
process,  the  sensation  of  motion  is  so  decidedly  a  reflex 
of  the  material  in  something  immaterial,  that  the  assertion 
of  a  transformation  of  motion  into  sensation  seems  to  us 
only  to  change  the  point  of  view,  and  not  to  explain  the 
difference,  but  to  efface  it.  And  we  think  that  the  appeal 
of  Strauss  from  his  contemporaries,  who  do  not  under- 
stand him,  to  posterity,  who  would  understand  him  better 
and  esteem  him,  has  but  little  prospect  of  being  opera- 
tive. 

If  that  which  has  sensation  and  that  which  has  it  not, 
are  to  be  brought  genetically  near  one  another,  and  hence 
the  difference  between  the  two  at  the  point  where  the 
lowest  sentient  being  has  found  its  first  existence,  is  to  be 
made  void  or  at  least  bridged  over,  then  it  is  much  more 
reasonable,  and  also  in  the  line  of  Strauss's  solution,  to 
deny  the  difference  between  that  which  has  sensation 
and  that  which  has  it  not,  and  to  do  this  in  the  sense  in 
which  we  also  declare  that  to  be  sentient  which  we  have 
hitherto  been  accustomed  to  regard  as  without  sensation  ; 
and  we  should  likewise  attribute  sensation  to  the  orig- 
inal elements  of  the  world,  be  they  called  atoms  or 
whatever  one  may  wish.  This  is  done  by  Zollner  and  by 
the  before  mentioned  ' ' Anonymus. "  This  conclusion  is 
logical  ;  it  is  even  the  only  possible  conclusion,  if  we 
once  start  from  the  axiom  that  the  new,  which  com°:i 
9 


130  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

into  existence,  must  necessarily  be  explainable  from 
agencies  previously  active,  and  known  to  or  imagined  by 
us  through  abstractions  and  hypotheses.  Zollner  is  cer- 
tainly right  when,  in  his  work  which  appeared  before  the 
lecture  of  DnBois-Reymond,  he  puts  the  alternative, 
"  either  to  renounce  forever  the  conceivableness  of  the 
phenomena  of  sensation,  or  hypothetically  to  add  to 
the  common  qualities  of  matter  one  more,  which  places  the 
simplest  and  most  elementary  transactions  of  nature 
under  a  process  of  sensation,  legitimately  connected  with 
it ;  "  as  also  when  he  says  (page  327) :  "  We  may  regard 
the  intensity  of  these  sensations  (of  matter)  as  little  and 
unimportant  as  we  wish  ;  but  the  hypothesis  of  their 
existence  is,  according  to  my  conviction,  a  necessary 
condition,  in  order  to  comprehend  the  really  existing 
phenomena  of  sensation  in  nature."  Only  we  shall  do 
well  to  choose  the  first  alternative  for  the  present,  and, 
with  DuBois-Reymond,  answer  the  question  as  to  the 
explanation  of  the  origin  of  sensation  with  an  "ignora- 
mus" ;  indeed,  we  shall  take  a  surer  road  with  his 
"  ignordbimus "  than  by  a  plunge  into  that  bottomless 
ocean  of  hypotheses — in  spite  of  the  protest  of  Hackel, 
who  (Anthrop. ,  page  XXI)  sees  that  scientist  who  has  the 
courage  to  admit  the  limits  of  our  knowledge,  on  account 
of  this  "  ignordbimm",  walking  in  the  army  of  the 
"  black  International'1,  and  "marshalled  under  the  black 
flag  of  the  hierarchy,"  together  with  "  spiritual  servitude 
and  falsehood,  want  of  reason  and  barbarism,  supersti- 
tion and  retrogression",  and  fighting,  "spiritual  freedom 
and  truth,  reason  and  culture,  evolution  and  progress." 
For  a  solution  of  the  question  which  simply  denies 
all  sharply-marked  differences  in  the  world,  and  explains 


THE   NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.  131 

the  new,  which  comes  into  existence  with  sensation,  by 
the  assertion  that  this  new  element  is  not  new,  but  was 
already  present,  and  that  it  exists  everywhere,  only  we 
do  not  see  it  everywhere, — such  a  solution  seems  to  us 
not  to  be  the  true  way  to  interpret  the  problem  of  the 
sphinx.  Even  Ed.  von  Hartmann  seems  to  infringe  the 
impartiality  of  the  true  observer,  when,  in  his  "  Philos- 
ophy of  the  Unconscious,"  he  attributes  sensation  to 
plants.  But  when  Zollner  says  (p.  326):  "  All  the  labors 
of  natural  beings  [and,  as  the  connection  indicates,  of  all, 
even  of  inorganic  natural  beings]  are  determined  by 
like  and  dislike;"  and  when  "Anonymus"  attributes  sensa- 
tion to  all  atoms  and  to  all  complexities  composed  of 
them,  even  to  stone,  then  all  reasonable  conception  of 
natural  things  and  processes  certainly  vanishes  into  thin 
air. 

It  will  be  remembered,  however,  that  in  treating 
the  question  of  the  origin  of  self-consciousness,  although 
we  were  not  able  to  solve  the  problem,  nevertheless  we 
had  to  ascribe  high  value  to  the  investigation  of  all  psy- 
chical processes  on  the  low  stage  of  sensation  and  con- 
sciousness, since  they  show  us  not  the  cause,  but  the 
condition  and  basis,  of  self-consciousness.  Likewise,  in 
the  question  as  to  the  origin  of  sensation  and  of  con- 
sciousness, although  we  are  not  able  to  solve  it,  we  will 
willingly  admit  that  we  observe,  even  in  that  which  has 
no  sensation,  qualities  and  processes  which  furnish  the 
absolutely  necessary  condition  and  basis  for  sensation. 
For  the  same  reason,  we  will  also  admit  the  manifold  analo- 
gies of  sensation  which  we  observe  in  that  which  is  without 
sensation.  The  whole  system  of  symbols  in  nature  which 
fills  our  treasury  of  words  and  penetrates,  in  a  thousand- 


132  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

fold  way,  our  scientific  and  popular,  our  poetical  and 
prosaic  speech,  our  thoughts  and  feelings,  bears  witness  to 
the  fact  that  that  which  is  without  sensation  is  also  a  pre- 
paratory step  to  sensation,  and  feeling  both  active  and 
passive  springs  from  it.  However,  a  preparatory  step, 
as  such,  is  not  necessarily  the  cause  ;  and  the  fact  and 
the  acknowledgment  of  a  correlation  is  not  on  that 
account  an  explanation. 

§3.   The  Origin  of  Life. 

The  third  problem  to  be  solved  is  the  origin  of  life. 
As  is  well  known,  Darwin  himself  makes  no  attempt  at 
explaining  this  problem,  but  is  satisfied  with  the  idea 
that  life  was  infused  into  one  or  a  few  forms  by  the 
Creator  ("Origin  of  Species,1'  6  ed.,p.  429).  His  investiga- 
tions and  theories  only  begin  where  organic  life,  in  its 
first  and  lowest  forms,  is  already  in  existence. 

But  lately  there  have  been  made,  in  the  realm  of  the 
organic,  discoveries  of  beings  which  take  the  lowest  con- 
ceivable round  on  the  ladder  of  organisms,  and  which  in 
their  form  and  structure  are  so  simple  that  from  them  to 
the  inorganic  there  seems  to  be  but  a  short  step.  We 
can  no  longer  mention  as  belonging  to  the  bridges  which 
are  said  to  lead  from  the  organic  world  to  the  inorganic, 
the  often-named  batkybius,  discovered  by  Huxley,  and 
so  strongly  relied  upon  for  the  mechanical  explanation 
of  life — a  slimy  net-like  growth,  which  covers  the  rocks 
in  the  great  depths  of  the  ocean.  For  after  scientists 
like  K.  E.  von  Baer  and  others  had  already  declared  it 
probable  that  this  bathybius  is  only  a  precipitate  of 
organic  relics,  no  less  a  person  than  the  discoverer  of  the 
bathybius,  in  the  "  Annals  of  Natural  History,"  1875, 


THE    NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC    SUPPLEMENTS.  133 

and  in  the  "Quarterly  Journal  of  Microscopical  Science," 
1875,  has  suggested  that  the  whole  discovery 
is  but  gypsum,  which  was  precipitated  in  a  gelatinous 
condition.  Likewise  the  utterances  concerning  the  sim- 
plicity and  lack  of  structure  of  the  lowest  organisms, 
are  to  be  accepted  only  with  great  reservation  ;  for  most 
of  these  organisms  show  very  differently  and  very  dis- 
tinctly stamped  structures  ;  of  this  fact,  anyone  may 
easily  convince  himself,  who  has  had  the  opportunity  of 
observing  with  the  microscope  low  and  lowest  organ- 
isms, and  to  admire  their  striking  and  manifold  forms. 
Nevertheless,  there  are  monera  whose  structure  seems  to 
be  nothing  but  a  living  clod  without  kernel  and  cover, 
and  which  in  that  respect  represent  the  lowest  conceiv- 
able form  of  organic  being  and  life. 

Now,  relying  on  these  discoveries,  as  well  as  upon  the 
successful  demonstration,  by  inorganic  means,  of  organic 
acids  in  chemistry,  and  starting  from  the  supposition 
that  the  first  appearance  of  life  must  necessarily  be  ex- 
plained by  those  agencies  which  are  already  active  in  the 
inorganic  nature,  many  scientists  have  attempted  the  so- 
called  mechanical  explanation  of  life.  This, attempt  has 
been  made  most  logically  and  systematically  by  Hackel. 
He  says  that  organic  matter,  organic  form,  and  organic 
motion,  in  the  lowest  stages  of  the  organic,  which  are 
almost  the  only  ones  to  be  taken  into  consideration 
when  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  life  is  discussed,  con- 
tain nothing  at  all  which  does  not  also  pertain  to  the 
inorganic.  In  his  opinion,  organic  matter  is  an  albumin- 
ous carbon  combination,  of  which  we  have  to  presuppose 
that,  like  all  chemical  combinations,  under  certain  phys- 
ical and  chemical  conditions  it  Can  also  arise  in  the  realm 


134:  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

of  the  inorganic  in  a  purely  chemical  and  mechanical 
way.  Organic  form  which,  in  its  lowest  stages,  is  so 
simple,  like  the  moneron  and  the  ba thy  bins,  and  which 
stands  still  lower  than  a  cell,  is,  moreover,  something 
which  there  is  no  difficulty  in  explaining  from  inorganic 
matter.  Finally,  organic  motion  which  alone  is  the  last 
and  lowest  characteristic  of  the  organic  in  its  lowest 
stage — in  which  the  process  of  life  properly  consists,  and  in 
which,  therefore,  we  have  to  recognize  the  punctum 
saliens  of  the  whole  question — is  only  an  increase  and 
complication  of  the  merely  mechanical  motion  of  the 
inorganic,  likewise  explainable  by  mechanical  causes. 
This  view  Hackel  expounds  in  the  thirteenth  and  partly 
also  in  the  first  chapter  of  his  "  Natural  History  of  Cre- 
ation," and  explains  the  origin  of  the  first  and  most  sim- 
ple organic  individuals  either  through  what  he  calls 
autoyony  in  an  inorganic  fluid,  or  through  plasmogony 
in  an  organic  fluid — a  plasma  or  protoplasma.  In  fact, 
according  to  him,  the  only  correct  idea  is  that  all  matter 
is  provided  with  a  soul,  that  inorganic  and  organic 
nature  is  one,  that  all  natural  bodies  known  to  us  are 
equally  animated,  and  that  the  contrast  commonly  drawn 
between  the.  living  and  the  dead  world  does  not  exist. 
This  is  but  a  repetition,  in  a  more  rhetorical  way,  of  the 
same  idea  which  "Anonymus"  expressed  in  discussing  the 
question  as  to  the  origin  of  sensation. 

DuBois-Reymond — who,  in  his  lecture  at  Leipzig, 
pronounced  the  origin  of  sensation  and  of  consciousness 
a  problem  of  natural  science,  never  to  be  solved — is  also 
of  the  opinion  that  the  explanation  of  life  from  mere 
mechanism  of  atoms  is  very  probable,  and  only  a  ques- 
tion of  time.  It  is  well  known  that  the  experimental 


THE    NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC    SUPPLEMENTS.  135 

attempts  at  originating  the  organic  through  chemistry 
are  at  present  pursued  with  an  eagerness  that  can  have 
its  stimulus  only  in  the  hope  of  success. 

It  is  clear  that  the  main  point  of  the  question  does 
not  lie  in  organic  matter  or  in  organic  form,  but  in 
organic  motion,  for  even  the  specific  of  the  organic  form 
originates  only  first  through  organic  motion  of  life.  If, 
therefore,  life  is  to  be  explained  from  mechanical  causes, 
it  must  also  be  shown  that  the  merely  mechanical  motion 
of  inorganic  matter  produces  that  motion  which  we  know 
as  organic  motion,  and  how  it  produces  it.  The  idea  of 
"  increase  and  complication  of  the  inorganic,  merely 
mechanical  motion, "  with  which  Hackel  throws  a  bridge 
from  the  living  to  the  lifeless  or  from  the  organic  to  the 
inorganic,  does  not  yet  give  us  that  proof;  it  seems  rath- 
er to  be  one  of  those  pompous  phrases  with  which  people 
hide  their  ignorance  and  make  the  uncritical  multitude 
believe  that  the  explanation  is  found:  a  manipula- 
tion against  which,  among  others,  Wigand,  in  his  great 
work,  repeatedly  protests,  as  also  does  the  Duke  of  Ar- 
gyll in  his  lecture  on  "Anthropomorphism  in  Theology," 
having  especially  in  his  mind  the  deductions  of  Spencer. 
For  we  may  review  the  whole  known  series  of  mechan- 
ical motions  and  their  mechanical  causes,  and  imagine 
their  mechanical  increase  and  their  mechanical  complica- 
tion the  largest  possible;  and  still  the  life-motion  of  the 
organic  will  never  result  therefrom.  If  such  a  keen 
psychical  and  physiological  investigator  and  thinker,  and 
such  an  authority  in  the  realm  of  the  motions  of  atoms 
and  molecules,  as  Gustav  Theodor  Fechner — uEinige 
Ideen  zur  Schopfungs-  und  Entwicklungsgeschichte  der 
Organ  ismen"  ("Some  Ideas  about  the  History  of  the 


136  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

Creation  and  Development  of  Organisms"),  Leipzig, 
1873,  p.  1,  f. — can  find  the  whole  lasting  and  effectual 
difference  between  the  organic  and  inorganic  in  nothing 
else  than  in  the  way  and  manner  of  motion — namely, 
that  the  motion  of  the  organic  molecules  is  different 
from  that  of  the  inorganic  molecules — and  when  he 
traces  this  difference  with  mathematical  exactness,  then 
an  assertion  which  simply  denies  that  difference,  without 
attempting  to  show  the  identity  of  the  two  motions,  to 
say  nothing  of  proving  this  identity,  is  nothing  more 
than  a  clear  evidence  that  the  mechanical  theory  has  not 
yet  succeeded  in  explaining  the  origin  of  life,  and  that 
those  scientists  who  so  haughtily  look  down  upon  the 
abuse  of  "vital  power"  to  the  efficacy  of  which  their 
antagonists  began  to  resort  when  their  knowledge  came 
to  an  end,  make  exactly  the  same  abuse  with  their 
"mechanism"  That  organic  motion,  even  the  organic 
motion  of  molecules,  once  present,  comes  into  dependence 
on  the  well  known  laws  of  mechanism,  we  naturally  will 
not  deny  ;  any  more  than  that  the  human  body,  when 
serving  the  will  of  the  mind,  follows  in  its  motions  the 
laws  of  physiology  and  mechanism. 

Preyer  seems  to  make  a  mistake  similar  to  that  of  those 
who  efface  sensation  and  motion,  when,  in  an  essay  on  the 
hypothesis  of  the  origin  of  life,  in  the  "  Deutsche  Rund- 
schau,'' Vol.  I,  7,  he  even  effaces  the  difference  between 
life  and  sensation,  and  simply  identifies  life  and  motion. 
"  Self-motion,  called  life,  and  inorganic  movement  of 
bodies  by  agencies  outside  of  themselves,  are  but  quan- 
titatively, intensively,  or  gradually  different  forms  of 
motion  ;  not  in  their  innermost  being  different. 
Our  will  changes  many  kinds  of  motion  into  heat,  makes 


THE    NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC    SUPPLEMENTS.  137 

cold  metal  to  be  red-hot  simply  by  hammering.  *  *  * 
Likewise  inversely,  as  the  law  of  the  conservation  of 
force  must  require,  a  part  of  the  eternal  heat  of  the 
metal  can  be-rfiow  and  forever  transposed  into  the  living 
motion  of  our  soul."  This  whole  manner  of  investiga- 
tion and  proof  is  one  of  those*  numerous  unconscious 
logical  fallacies  which,  introduced  by  Hegel,  have  grad- 
ually attained  a  certain  title  by  possession.  From 
the  observation  of  a  process,  they  abstract  a  char- 
acteristic, as  general  as  possible, — as,  for  instance,  from 
the  observation  of  life  the  characteristic  of  motion  ;  then 
they  find  that  the  process  has  the  characteristic  in  com- 
mon with  still  other  processes — as,  for  instance,  the  self- 
motion  of  the  living  has  the  general  characteristic  of 
motion  in  common  with  the  objective  motion  of  the 
lifeless  ;  and  then  they  persuade  themselves  that  the 
process  which  they  try  to  explain  is  really  explained  by 
having  found  a  quality  of  this  process  as  comprehensive 
as  possible.  And  in  order  to  hide  the  falsity  of  the  con- 
clusion, they  also  give  to  the  general  idea,  which  they 
have  found  to  be  a  characteristic  of  that  process,  the 
same  name  which  the  special  process  has, — as,  for  in- 
stance, they  call  motion  life,  no  matter  whether  it  is  a 
motion  of  itself  or  a  being  moved,  no  matter  whether 
it  is  performed  from  within  or  in  consequence  of  an 
impulse  from  without ;  and  then  they  say  :  "  Behold, 
life  is  explained;  life  is  nothing  but  motion."  But  it 
can  be  readily  seen  that  life  is  also  motion,  and  has  there- 
fore this  characteristic  in  common  with  everything  which 
is  moved  ;  but  that  the  specific  of  that  motion  called  life 
— namely,  self-motion  in  consequence  of  an  impulse 
renewing  itself  from  within,  and,  as  Fechner  shows,  self- 


138  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

motion  in  a  rotatory  direction  of  the  molecules,  precisely 
the  same  thing  which  in  distinction  from  other  motions 
we  call  life, — is  not  explained,  but  simply  ignored. 

There  is  still  another  bold  hypothesis  which  we  have 
to  mention  —  namely,  that  the  organic  germs  were  once 
thrown  from  other  spheres  upon  the  earth  by  aerolites. 
Years  ago  this  idea  was  declared  by  Helmholtz  to  be 
scientifically  conceivable  ;  then  it  was  formally  asserted 
and  brought  into  general  notice  by  Sir  William  Thomp- 
son, in  his  opening  address  before  the  annual  assembly 
of  the  British  Association  at  Edinburgh,  in  1871,  but 
rejected  as  formally  and  materially  unscientific  by  Zoll- 
ner,  In  the  preface  to 'his  work,  "Nature  of  Comets," 
and  again  defended  by  Helmholtz  in  his  preface  to  the 
second  volume  of  a  translation  of  Thompson  and  Taif  s 
Theoretical  Physics.  However,  this  hypothesis  also  only 
defers  the  solution  of  the  question,  and,  supposing  its 
scientific  possibility,  leads  either  to  the  remoter  question, 
how  life  did  originate  in  those  other  spheres,  or  to  the 
metaphysical  assertion  of  the  eternity  of  life  and  of  the 
eternal  continuity  of  the  living  in  the  world,  and  shows 
therewith  very  clearly  the  impossibility  of  its  explana- 
tion. 

This  inexplicability  would  still  exist,  if  what  is  quite 
improbable  should  happen,  namely,  that  the  experimental 
attempts  at  artificially  producing  organic  life  should  be 
successful,  and  if  thus  the  question  as  to  the  genera ti<> 
ceqidvoca,  which  during  the  past  decades  so  much  alarmed 
the  minds  of  scientists  and  theologians,  should  be  exper- 
imentally solved  and  answered  in  the  affirmative.  For 
in  view  of  the  hopes  of  a  possible  explanation  of  life, 
which  is  expected  to  be  the  reward  for  the  success  of 


THE   NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.  139 

these  attempts,  Zollner  is  fully  right  in  saying:  "That 
the  scientists  to-day  set  such  an  extremely  high  value  on 
the  inductive  proof  of  the  yeneratio  cequivoca,  is  the  most 
significant  symptom  of  how  little  they  have  made  them- 
selves acquainted  with  the  first  principles  of  the  theory 
of  knowledge.  For,  suppose  they  should  really  succeed 
in  observing  the  origin  of  organic  germs  under  condi- 
tions entirely  free  from  objection  to  any  imaginable 
communication  with  the  atmosphere,  what  could  they 
answer  to  the  assertion  that  the  organic  germs,  in  refer- 
ence to  their  extension,  are  of  the  order  of  ether-atoms, 
and,  with  these,  press  through  the  intervals  of  the 
material  molecules  which  form  the  sides  of  our  appara- 
tus?" 

How  little  life  is  explained,  at  least  according  to  the 
present  state  of  our  knowledge,  also  follows  from  the 
insufficiency  of  all  attempts  at  defining  it.  The  latest  and 
most  thorough  attempt  at  such  a  definition  of  life,  with 
which  we  are  familiar,  is  that  made  by  Herbert  Spencer 
in  his  "First  Principles",  §  25,  and  in  his  "Principles  of 
Biology,"  Vol.  I,  Part  I,  Chap.  4  and  5.  Having  made 
thorough  investigations,  he  arrives  at  the  general  form- 
ula: "  Life  is  the  continuous  adjustment  of  internal  rela- 
tions to  external  relations."  To  this  definition  we  will 
not  make  the  objection  that  it  is  nothing  but  a  logical 
abstraction  from  the  common  quality  of  all  processes 
and  phenomena  of  life  ;  for  it  certainly  lies  in  the  nature 
of  a  definition  that  it  can  be  nothing  else  but  that. 
Nevertheless,  we  will  state  that  such  a  definition  of  life 
not  only  does  not  lead  us  any  nearer  to  the  comprehen- 
sion of  its  processes,  and  especially  of  the  richness  and 
the  organization  of  its  forms  and  functions,  but  that  it 


140  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

clearly  shows  us  how  little  the  origin  of  life  is  explained. 
For  this  very  definition  necessarily  and  obviously  leads 
us  to  the  questions  :  Whence  do  those  internal  relations 
originate,  whence  their  adjustment  to  external  rela- 
tions, and  whence  the  continuity  of  this  adjustment? 
The  answer  to  these  questions  this  definition  still  owes  us. 
Therefore,  not  only  self-consciousness  and  freedom, 
not  only  sensation  and  consciousness,  but  also  life  and 
the  organic,  remain  a  phenomenon  which  —  at  least, 
according  to  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  and 
reasoning — enters  into  the  realm  of  the  world  of  phenom- 
ena as  something  neio  that  can  not  be  explained  from  the 
foregoing,  although  it  presupposes  the  foregoing  as  the 
condition,  not  the  cause,  of  its  appearance  ;  and  no 
matter  whether  we  have  to  think  of  the  modality  of  its 
origin  as  a  sudden  or  as  a  gradual  one. 

§  4.  The  Elements  of  the  World,  the  Theory  of  Atoms,  and 
the  Mechanical  View  of  the  World. 

The  investigating  and  thinking  mind,  when  it  at- 
tempts to  explain  the  appearances  and  forms  of  that 
which  exists,  finds  itself  led  further  and  further  back, 
until  it  finally  arrives  at  the  last  elements  of  the  world 
and  of  matter.  Whether  we  take  the  problem  of  life  as 
solved  or  unsolved,  the  living  has  matter  and  its  subor- 
dination to  the  efficiency  of  all  its  chemical  and  mechan- 
ical powers  in  common  with  the  lifeless  ;  and  the  organic, 
in  its  first  beginnings,  stands  extraordinarily  near  to,  and 
is  grown  on  the  ground  of,  the  inorganic, — if  not  accord- 
ing to  the  category  of  cause  and  effect,  still  accord- 
ing to  that  of  condition  and  consequence,  of  basis  and 
structure.  Therefore  we  stand  at  last  before  the  ques- 


THE   NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.          141 

tion  of  the  final  elements  of  matter,  which,  indeed,  con- 
stitutes organic  as  well  as  inorganic  bodies. 

The  answer  to  this  question  is  attempted  by  the 
theory  of  atoms :  the  doctrine  which  teaches  that  the 
whole  material  world  is  composed  of  simple  particles 
which  are  no  farther  divisible,  and  from  whose  juxta- 
position the  chemical  elements — and,  in  respect  to  their 
other  forms  of  existence  and  combination,  the  whole 
world  of  bodies,  with  all  their  forms,  states,  and  changes, 
— are  composed. 

This  theory  has  not  only  the  practical  value  that  the 
physical  (and  especially  the  chemical)  sciences  can  make 
and  use  their  formulas  most  easily  under  the  supposition 
of  such  simple  primitive  elements  ;  but  it  also  has  the 
great  theoretical  merit  that  it  has  broken  down  the  old 
barriers  between  matter  and  force,  and  has  thus  promoted 
considerably  our  method  of  regarding  the  world  of  mate- 
rial substances.  Toward  this  result,  scientists  and  phi- 
losophers— and,  among  the  latter,  the  thinkers  and  inves- 
tigators of  both  views  of  the  world,  the  theistic  and  the 
pantheistic,  the  ideal  and  the  materialistic, — have  worked 
with  equal  merit,  and  have  equally  enjoyed  its  fruits, 
with  perhaps  the  single  exception  of  so  pure  a  materi- 
alist as  Ludwig  Biichner,  who,  it  seems,  does  not  like  to 
give  up  his  old  doctrine  of  force  and  matter  as  the  two 
inseparable,  equivalent,  and  equally  eternal  elements  of 
the  universe.  That  matter  itself,  even  when  looked  upon 
from  a  purely  physical  standpoint,  has  an  incorporeal 
principle  ;  that  the  whole  world  of  bodies,  as  such,  has 
but  a  phenomenal  character ;  that  not  force  and  matter" 
are  the  two  empirico-physical  principles  of  the  world, 
but  that  matter  itself  must  be  a  product  of  elementary 


THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

force  active  in  the  atoms  ;  these  doctrines  have  now 
become  pretty  nearly  common  property  of  natural  sci- 
ence and  philosophy.  Investigators  who  like  Wilhelm 
Wundt,  rise  from  natural  science  to  philosophy,  or  such 
as  take  their  starting-point  from  philosophy — whether 
they  be  theists,  like  Lotze,  I.  H.  Fichte,  Ulrici,  or  occupy 
the  ground  of  a  pessimistic  pantheism,  as  does  Eduard 
von  Hartmann,— all  share  this  view  and  its  fruits. 

But  in  spite  of  all  these  preferences  for  the  theory 
of  atoms,  we  should  not  forget  that  it  still  has  but  hypo- 
thetical value — that  it  is  but  an  idea  of  limits,  which 
indicates,  where  the  scientifically  perceptible  ceases,  and 
that  eveiy  attempt  at  moving  this  limit  still  farther  on 
must  either  fail  and  lead  into  unsolvable  contradictions, 
or,  if  successful,  only  leads  to  new  difficulties  and 
unsolved  problems. 

Already  within  that  realm  in  which  the  theory  of 
atoms  is  a  supplemental  hypothesis  directly  indispensa- 
ble at  present — i.  e.,  within  their  application  in  physical 
sciences — we  meet  suppositions  which  raise  great  doubts 
and  difficulties.  Such  a  scientific  difficulty  occurs  when  the 
atomism  of  the  natural  philosophers  supposes  a  double 
complexity  of  atoms,  material  atoms  and  atoms  of  ether: 
complexities  which  both  penetrate  one  another,  and  are 
supposed  to  follow  partly  totally  different,  partly  the 
same,  elementary  laws  of  force.  Material  atoms  are  subor- 
dinate to  the  law  of  gravitation,  while  atoms  of  ether 
are  not;  and  yet  both  act  legitimately  upon  one  another, 
— as,  for  instance,  when  heat  passes  into  motion  and 
motion  into  heat,  which  certainly  presupposes  a  law  of 
power  acting  in  common  for  both.  Another  difficulty 
lies  in  the  atomism  of  the  'chemists;  and  still  another 


THE    NATURO    PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.  143 

in  the  divergency  of  the  aims  at  which  the  physical  the- 
ory of  atoms  on  the  one  hand  and  the  chemical  theory, 
of  atoms  on  the  other  seem  to  point.  Chemistry  is 
inclined  to  explain  the  difference  of  its  numerous  ele- 
ments from  the  original  difference  of  the  atoms  ;  and 
yet  it  is  not  at  all  certain  that  the  elements  of  chemistry 
themselves  are  not  composed  of  still  more  simple  and 
less  numerous  primary  elements.  Many  indications 
seem  to  point  to  such  primary  elements  which  are  more 
simple  in  number  and  quality;  and  investigators  even 
mention  an  element  —  hydrogen — in  the  direction  of 
which  we  have  to  look  for  the  way  that  will  lead  us  to 
those  primitive  elements  of  matter.  The  divergency  of 
aims,  finally,  consists  in  the  fact  that  physical  atomism 
prevailingly  points  to  a  conformity  of  the  atoms  of 
bodies ;  chemical  atomism,  oh  the  contrary, — -at  least, 
according  to  its  present  state, — points  to  a  dissimilarity 
among  these. 

The  hypothetical  and  problematical  nature  of  the 
theory  of  atoms  strikes  us  still  more  clearly  when  we 
try  to  analyze  it  philosophically.  First,  we  meet  that 
antinomy  which  we  always  find  where  we  try  to  pass 
beyond  the  limits  of  our  empirical  knowledge  by  means 
of  conception.  For,  if  the  atoms  still  occupy  space, 
we  can  not  understand  why  they  should  not  be  fur- 
ther divisible,  and  if  they  do  not  occupy  space,  we 
can  not  understand  how  any  sum  of  that  which  does 
not  occupy  space,  can  finally  succeed  in  filling  space.  It 
is  true,  this  very  antinomy  has  led  to  the  overcoming  of 
that  dualism  of  force  and  matter  which  so  long  enchained 
science,  and  the  overcoming  of  which  we  greet  as  a  pro- 
gress of  our  theoretical  knowledge  of  nature.  We  no 


14:4:  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

longer  look  upon  the  atoms  as  material  elements,  but  as 
centres  of  force.  The  antinomy  has  the  further  merit 
that,  in  the  realm  of  the  knowledge  of  nature,  it  brings  to 
our  consciousness  the  great  advantage  of  a  concrete  per- 
ception and  reasoning  over  purely  logical  abstractions. 
For  Ulrici,  in  his  "God  and  Nature,"  is  right  in  calling 
our  attention  to  the  fact  that  we  must  think  about  the 
atoms,  not  in  an  abstractly  logical  and  an  abstractly 
mathematical  way,  but  concretely ;  that  we  have  to  con- 
sider them,  not  as  mere  quantities,  but  as  qualities  ;  and 
that  we  can  then  easily  arrive  at  the  perception  of  some- 
thing which  occupies  space,  and  which  therefore,  accord- 
ing to  abstract  conclusions  of  logic  and  mathematics, 
could  still  be  thought  of  as  divisible  in  abstracto,  but 
which,  even  as  a  consequence  of  its  quality,  of  its  con- 
crete natural  form,  is  no  longer  divisible  in  reality. 
Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  all  these  remarkable  attempts 
at  overcoming  the  difficulties  of  the  theory  of  atoms,  that 
antinomy  returns  as  often  as  we  undertake  to  make  that 
clearly  perceptible  which  we  have  at  last  gained  a  partial 
conception  of ;  and  thus  shows  us,  from  this  side  also, 
that  even  with  the  theory  of  atoms  we  have  arrived  at  the 
limit  where  not  only  our  observation,  but  also  the  pre- 
ciseness  and  certainty  of  our  conceptions,  ceases. 

By  the  atomic  theory,  we  do  not  gain  anything  for 
the  ultimate  explanation  of  the  world  and  its  contents, 
not  even  if  its  present  hypothetical  value  should  be 
changed  into  a  complete  demonstration.  For  the  whole 
theory  but  removes  the  question  as  to  the  origin  of 
things  from  their  sensible  appearance  to  the  elements  of 
that  appearance,  and  leaves  us  standing  just  as  helpless 
before  the  elements  as  before  the  appearances.  For 


THE    NATURO- PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS. 

whence  does  the  whole  richness  of  the  appearances  in 
the  world  come?  If  the  atoms  are  all  alike,  and  their 
laws  of  force  the  simplest  we  can  imagine,  then  their 
grouping  into  all  the  developments  and  formations  of 
which  wre  observe  such  an  infinite  and  regularly  arranged 
abundance,  is  not  less  unexplained  than  if  we  had  not 
gone  back  to  the  theory  of  atoms  at  all.  But  if  the 
atoms  and  their  laws  of  force  are  different,  the  difficulty 
is  not  simplified,  but  doubled.  For,  first,  the  theory 
then  owes  us  an  answer  to  the  questions  wherein  the 
difference  of  the  atoms  consists  and  whence  it  comes  ; 
and,  second,  the  question  we  have  to  consider  in  suppos- 
ing a  uniformity  of  the  atoms,  is  not  disposed  of  or 
answered — the  question,  namely,  as  to  the  causes  which 
bring  these  different  atoms  together  to  form  precisely 
those  complexities  of  atoms  which  we  observe  as  the 
world  of  phenomena. 

This  insufficiency  of  the  theory  of  atoms  in  explain- 
ing the  world  and  its  contents,  is  another  proof  to  us  that, 
however  great  the  practical  value  of  this  theory  may  be 
for  the  operations  of  physics  and  chemistry,  its  theoret- 
ical value  consists  essentially  in  the  fact  that  it  formu- 
lates more  accurately  the  perception  of  the  limits  of  our 
exact  knowledge.  Even  the  idea  of  Lotze,  that  the 
atoms  (in  themselves  different)  are  not  really  the  final 
elements  of  matter,  but  consist  of  still  more  simple  but 
likewise  different  elements,  seems  to  us  more  a  decora- 
tion than  an  extension  of  the  limits  at  which  our  percep- 
tion has  arrived;  we  stand  before  a  double  door,  but  find 
both  doors  locked.  We  agree  with  DuBois-Reymond, 
when  he  declares,  in  his  before-mentioned  lecture,  the 
impossibility  of  perceiving  the  last  elements  of  tho 
10 


THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

world,  matter  and  force,  to  be  the  other  limit  of 
our  knowledge  of  nature  which,  together  with  the  im- 
possibility of  the  explanation  of  the  origin  of  sensation 
and  consciousness,  remains  forever  fixed. 

Likewise,  the  peculiar  modification  which  G.  Th. 
Fechner  gives  to  the  theory  of  the  last  elements  of  the 
world,  cannot  escape  the  charge  of  leaving  the  problem 
of  the  world  scientifically  just  as  unsolved  as  before. 
Fechner  not  only  finds,  as  we  have  already  mentioned, 
the  difference  between  the  organic  and  the  inorganic  in 
the  difference  of  the  mutual  motions,  but  he  also  finds 
that  the  character  of  organic  motions  is  exactly  the  same 
as  that  which  the  bodies  of  the  universe  have  among 
themselves  in  their  motions.  Thus  he  distinguishes  the 
cosmorganic  motion,  which  is  performed  in  the  whole  of 
the  universe,  and  the  molecular-organic  motion,  which 
we  observe  in  the  single  organisms  of  the  earth  ;  he 
makes  God  the  personal,  self-conscious  soul  of  this  cos- 
mical  organism ;  and,  in  using  the  law  of  the  tendency 
to  stability,  with  which  he  completes  the  Darwinian  se- 
lection theory,  asserts  that  the  organic  in  the  whole  of 
the  universe,  as  well  as  in  the  narrow  sphere  of  single 
bodies  on  the  earth,  is  the  first  thing  from  which  the 
inorganic  was  separated  and  became  gradually  fixed. 
Thus,  in  his  opinion,  the  problem  which  up  to  the  pres- 
ent has  occupied  investigators, — namely,  how  did  the 
organic  originate  from  the  inorganic  ? — would  have  to 
be  reversed  to,  how  did  the  inorganic  originate  from  the 
organic  ? 

Preyer  would  also  reach  a  similar  result  with 
his  above-mentioned  theory  of  the  identity  of  life  and 
motion.  For  according  to  this  theory,  the  living  would 


THE   NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.  147 

be  as  old  and  common  as  motion,  and  the  organic  but 
the  dregs  of  life. 

We  may,  therefore,  say  that,  without  regard  to  the  fact 
that  neither  pantheism  nor  theism  will  ever  harmonize 
with  Fechner's  solution  of  this  contrast  which  gives  to 
God  exactly  the  same  position  in  the  world  as  the  soul 
has  in  the  body,  natural  science  will  certainly  treat  with 
great  reserve  a  cosmo-metaphysical  system  which  so 
fully  upsets  all  results  of  exact  investigations  into  the 
history  of  origin  and  development,  and  has  no  other 
proof  for  itself  than  the  identity,  or  at  least  the  simi- 
larity, of  the  abstract  formula  according  to  which  the 
molecular  motions  of  organisms  and  the  cosmical  motions 
are  performed.  Although  we  thus  have  to  deny  to  the 
proof  of  this  identity  or  similarity  the  weight  which 
Fechner  gives  to  it,  nevertheless  it  has  still  no  small 
merit,  since  it  throws  new  and  clearer  light  upon  the  old 
thought,  always  attractive  and  yet  so  difficult  to  present, 
—of  a  macrocosmus  and  a  microcosmus,  which  has  been 
often  enough  treated  with  so  much  natural  mysticism. 

Thus,  in  our  inquiry  into  the  development  of  things,  we 
have  successively  arrived  at  four  points,  each  of  which 
urged  us  to  make  the  confession  that  here  something  new 
came  into  existence,  which  can  not  be  explained  from  the 
preceding  conditions  of  its  being;  these  four  points  were: 
the  origin  of  self-conciousness,  the  origin  of  sensation 
and  consciousness,  the  origin  of  life,  and  finally  the  ele- 
ments of  the  universe.  Arrived  at  the  last  problem,  we 
see  the  confession  of  our  ignorance  increased  to  the  still 
more  comprehensive  confession  that  we  are  really  not 
able  fully  to  explain  anything  in  the  world.  We  are 
able  to  perceive  a  uniformity  of  law  in  the  states  and 


THE   THEORIES    OF   DARWIN. 

changes  of  things,  and  to  abstract  therefrom  common 
laws  of  nature  ;  we  can  observe  single  objects,  and  per- 
ceive their  states  and  changes  in  their  connection  with 
one  another  and  in  their  dependence  on  those  laws.  Bat 
we  are  not  able  to  explain  scientifically  either  the  origin 
of  these  laws  or  the  last  physical  causes  of  the  qualities 
of  things,  which  follow  these  laws. 

We  should  reach  the  same  result  if  we  had  not 
started  from  the  objective  world  of  the  existing,  as  we 
were  induced  to  do  by  our  subject,  but  from  theoretical 
investigations.  Here  also  we  should  immediately  find 
ourselves  in  a  world  of  relations  between  subject  and 
object,  of  a  regularly  arranged  abundance  of  subjective 
and  objective  qualities,  states  and  processes,  of  which 
the  objective  only  come  to  our  knowledge  through  the 
medium  of  the  subjective,  and  of  regularly  arranged 
laws  to  which  both  the  subjective  and  the  objective  are 
commonly  subordinate.  But  why  just  these  and  no 
other  qualities  of  the  subject  and  of  objects  exist,  why 
just  these  and  no  other  laws  reign,  why  just  this  and  no 
other  relation  takes  place  between  the  perceiving  sub- 
ject and  the  perceived  object,  would  remain  unanswered 
as  before. 

Amidst  a  generation  which  is  so  fond  of  reveling  in 
the  thought  of  an  extension  of  all  the  limits  of  our 
knowledge,  and  is  inclined  to  proclaim  as  true  that 
which  it  wishes  and  hopes,  investigators  are  not  wholly 
wanting  who  very  decidedly  express  their  consciousness 
of  these  limits  of  our  knowledge,  and  at  the  same  time 
combine  it  with  the  most  logical  scientific  reasoning  and 
investigation.  Even  when  in  detail  they  reach  these 
limits  from  the  most  varying  points  of  view,  and  draw 


THE    NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC    SUPPLEMENTS.          149 

them  in  different  directions,  they  all  agree  in  confirming 
the  principle  that  it  is  one  of  the  first  and  most  indis- 
pensable conditions  of  successful  investigation  always 
to  be  conscious  of  the  limits  of  its  perception.  Voices 
which  remind  mankind  of  these  limits,  are  perhaps  loss 
popular,  for  man  prefers  to  be  reminded  of  the  advances 
rather  than  of  the  limitations  of  his  knowledge  ;  but  they 
are  on  that  account  the  more  worthy  of  our  gratitude, 
for  they  keep  us  on  the  solid  ground  of  the  attainable 
from  which  alone  sure  progress  in  knowledge  is  possible. 
Among  such  philosophers  we  name  Ulrici,  and  especially 
Lotze  ;  among  scientists,  in  the  first  place,  two  pioneers 
in  their  departments — namely,  in  the  department  of  the 
mechanism  of  heat,  Robert  von  Mayer — compare  his 
"Bemerkungen  uber  das  mechanische  Aequivalent  der 
Warme"  ("Remarks  on  the  Mechanical  Equivalent  of 
Heat"),  and  "Ueber  nothwendige  Consequenzen  und 
InconsequenzenderWarmemechanik"  ("Necessary  Con- 
sequences and  Inconsequences  of  the  Mechanism  of 
Heat"),  Stuttgart,  Cotta; — and  in  the  realm  of  the  devel- 
opment of  organisms,  K.  E.  von  Baer — compare  his 
"  Reden  und  kleinere  Aufsatze"  ("Addresses  and  Es- 
says"), 2  vols.,  St.  Petersburg,  1864  and  1876.  In 
this  connection  we  have  already  mentioned  the  name  of 
DuBois-Reymond.  Otto  Kostlin  published  two  remark- 
able dissertations  in  this  direction — "  Ueber  die  Gren- 
zen  der  Naturwissenschaft "  ("Limits  of  Natural  Sci- 
ence"), Tubingen,  Fues,  2d  ed.,  1874,  and  "Ueber  natfir- 
liche  Entwicklung"  ("Natural  Development"),  ib., 
1875.  In  the  latter  he  especially  cautions  against 
hastily  confounding  the  laws  of  development  of  planets, 
development  of  the  organic  kingdom,  and  development 


150  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

of  the  individual  organisms.  Recently,  Wigand,  in  the 
second  volume  of  his  work  already  frequently  mentioned, 
attempts,  with  an  extreme  energy  which  does  too  little 
justice  to  the  representation  and  investigation  of  the  still 
unsolved  problems,  to  formulate  the  limits  of  the  know- 
able. 

A  contrary  extreme,  and  of  its  kind  a  still  more  one- 
sided corrective  of  this  too  great  stability,  we  have  in  those 
investigators  who,  by  reason  of  the  great  progress  which 
has  been  made  in  the  realm  of  the  theoretical  knowl- 
edge of  nature,  allow  themselves  to  be  drawn  on  to  the 
hope  of  still  explaining  all  states  and  processes  in  the  world 
—the  spiritual  and  the  ethic  processes  as  well  as  the  phys- 
ical— from  the  pure  mechanism  of  atoms  ;  and  who  see 
in  that  which  thus  far  has  been  mechanically  explained, 
the  only  and  the  infallible  way  of  explaining  all  that  is  still 
obscure.  They  call  this  view  the  mechanical  view  of  the 
world ;  and,  as  "monism,"  put  it  in  opposition  to  the 
"vitalistic,  teleological,  and  dualistic  view  of  the  world. " 
In  order  to  obtain  a  correct  view  of  this  standpoint, 
we  quote  from  Hackel's  "Natural  History  of  Cre- 
ation", Vol.  I,  page  23,  the  following  passage:  "By 
the  theory  of  descent  we  are  for  the  first  time  enabled 
to  conceive  of  the  unity  of  nature  in  such  a  manner  that 
a  mechanico-causal  explanation  of  even  the  most  intricate 
organic  phenomena,  for  example,  the  origin  and  struct- 
ure of  the  organs  of  sense,  is  no  more  difficult  (in  a  gen- 
eral way)  than  is  the  mechanical  explanation  of  any  phys- 
ical process  ;  as,  for  example,  earthquakes,  the  courses 
of  the  wind,  or  the  currents  of  -the  ocean.  We  thus 
arrive  at  the  extremely  important  conviction  that  <ill 
natural  bodies  which  are  known  to  us  are  equally 


THE    NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.          151 

mated,  that  the  distinction  which  has  been  made  between 
animate  and  inanimate  bodies  does  not  exist.  When  a 
stone  is  thrown  into  the  air,  and  falls  to  earth  according 
to  definite  laws,  or  when  in  a  solution  of  salt  a  crystal  is 
formed,  the  phenomenon  is  neither  more  nor  less  a 
mechanical  manifestation  of  life  than  the  growth  and 
flowering  of  plants,  than  the  propagation  of  animals  or 
the  activity  of  their  senses,  than  the  perception  or  the 
formation  of  thought  in  man."  Here  crystallization, 
organic  life,  sensation,  and  formation  of  thought,  are 
expressly  put  in  one  line  of  mechanism  with  the  falling 
of  a  stone. 

In  the  following  section  we  will  have  occasion  to  dis- 
cuss this  view  as  a  view  of  the  world  ;  but  we  believe 
that  the  presentation  of  this  idea,  and  the  exclusive 
vindication  of  it  as  a  complete  view  of  the  world,  needs 
just  here,  where  we  still  stand  on  the  ground  of  the  phi- 
losophy of  natural  perception,  some  critical  sifting. 

In  the  realm  of  material  nature,  mechanical  explana- 
tion and  general  explanation  is  directly  identical ;  i.  e. , 
a  process  of  nature  remains  obscure  so  long  and  so  far 
as  its  mechanism  is  not  yet  perceived,  and  in  the  same 
degree  as  its  mechanism  is  perceived,  the  process  also  is 
explained.  The  uniformity  of  law  in  the  occurrence  of 
events  according  to  the  causal  principle  in  the  realm  of 
material  nature,  can  be  approached  by  us  in  no  other 
form  than  in  that  of  mechanism,  provided  we  under- 
stand by  mechanism  an  activity  according  to  law  and 
which  can  be  mathematically  estimated  as  to  size  and 
number.  So  far,  therefore,  every  scientific  investigator 
in  the  knowledge  of  material  nature  takes  his  place  on 
the  standpoint  of  a  mechanical  view  of  the  world. 


THE   THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

But  here  we  have  gone  to  the  full  extent  to  which 
we  are  justified  in  taking  a  mechanical  view  of  the 
world,  and  have  fixed  its  limits  in  its  own  proper  realm 
—the  realm  of  the  scientific  perception  of  the  material 
world  ;  even  if  we  do  not  join  with  Wigand  in  resigning 
scientific  inquiry  in  that  direction,  and  express  the  ex- 
pectation that  these  limits  are  not  fixed  and  not  to  be 
designated  in  advance,  but  will  be  moved  farther  and 
farther,  and  that  not  only  in  regard  to  the  knowledge  of 
the  quantity  of  phenomena  (which  even  Wigand,  as  a 
scientific  investigator,  naturally  admits),  but  also  in  re- 
gard to  their  quality.  In  our  researches  hitherto  we 
have  often  met  such  limits.  We  have  found  that  in  the 
realm  of  the  material  world  such  important  phenomena 
and  processes  as  life  are  at  present  not  yet  fully  ex- 
plained. By  the  mechanical  view  of  the  world,  we  have 
been  led  back  to  the  last  elements  and  to  the  most  ele- 
mentary forces  of  matter,  but  have  been  convinced  that 
we  are  no  longer  able  to  find  them  with  scientific  cer- 
tainty, and  that  consequently  not  a  single  quality  of 
material  existence  is  really  explained  and  traced  back  to 
its  last  material  causes,  to  say  nothing  of  the  transcen- 
dental causes  which  are  entirely  inaccessible  to  our  exact 
scientific. knowledge. 

Now  there  is  another  realm  of  existence,  just  as  large 
as  and,  according  to  its  value,  still  larger  than,  that  of 
the  material  world,  which,  not  on  account  of  its  scien- 
tific inaccessibility,  but  in  conformity  with  its  own 
peculiar  nature,  entirely  withdraws  itself  from  the  me- 
chanical view.  It  is  the  realm  of  psychical  life;  and, 
still  more  decidedly  and  more  evidently,  the  realm  of 
mind.  As  far  as  our  observations  go,  the  law  of  caus- 


THE    NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.  153 

ality  reigns  here  also,  and  here  also  nothing  takes  place 
without  a  cause.  But  as  here  the  realm  in  which  the 
causal  law  reigns  is  no  longer  material  nature,  so  even 
the/<?/w.  in  which  it  is  active  is  no  longer  that  of  mechan- 
ism. For  we  certainly  cannot  understand  mechanical 
effect  to  be  anything  else  than  an  effect  of  something 
material  upon  something  material,  whose  uniformity  of 
law  can  be  exactly  estimated  mathematically  as  to  size 
and  number.  Now  if  the  application  of  mechanism  to 
the  psychical  and  spiritual  realm  does  not  express  any- 
thing except  the  certainly  quite  insidious  idea  that  here 
also  causality  reigns,  it  is  nothing  else  but  the  substitu- 
tion of  another  idea  for  the  word  mechanism  —  an  idea 
which  it  never  had  in  the  entire  use  of  language  up  to 
this  time,  and  by  the  substitution  of  which  the  proof 
for  a  mechanism  of  the  mind  is  not  given,  but  surrepti- 
tiously obtained  in  a  manner  similar  to  the  before-men- 
tioned attempt  of  Preyer,  surreptitiously  to  obtain  the 
proof  for  the  origin  of  life. 

But  if  the  mechanical  explanation  of  the  functions 
of  the  mind  really  means  tnat  they  also  consist  in  an 
effect  of  the  material  upon  something  material,  and  that 
this  effect  can  be  mathematically  estimated  as  to  size 
and  number,  it  is  an  assertion  which  has  first  to  be 
proven,  but  which  cannot  be  proven  and  cannot  be  al- 
lowed even  as  an  hypothesis,  as  a  problem  for  investiga- 
tion, because  it  contradicts  our  whole  experience.  And 
it  contradicts  not  only  the  conclusions  drawn  from  most 
natural  appearances,  which,  as  is  well  known,  are  de- 
ceitful and  even  tell  us  that  the  sun  goes  around  the 
earth,  but  it  contradicts  the  philosophical  analysis  just 
as  much  and  even  still  more  directly  and  decidedly  than 


154  THK   THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

the  direct  impression — as  became  clear  to  us  at  the  low- 
est point  of  contact  between  the  material  and  the 
psychical,  viz.,  at  sensation,  when  we  showed  the  impos- 
sibility of  scientifically  explaining  the  origin  of  sensat  ion. 
It  is  easy  to  see  what  facts  made  it  altogether  possi- 
ble to  produce  such  a  materialistic  psychology  and  to 
give  it  at  the  first  superficial  view  a  certain  appearance 
of  truth  ;  but  it  will  not  be  difficult  to  detect  its  want  of 
truth.  According  to  our  whole  experience,  the  human 
mind  is  bound  to  the  body  ;  its  proper  activity,  its  whole 
communication  with  the  material  and  immaterial  world 
outside  of  it,  even  its  whole  mutual  intercourse  with  the 
minds  of  fellow-beings,  is  performed  by  means  of  bodily 
functions  which,  as  such,  are  subordinate  to  mechan- 
ism. Therefore  "physiological  psychology-'  certainly 
belongs  to  the  most  interesting  of  the  branches  of  sci- 
ence which  at  present  enjoy  special  care,  and  works  in 
this  realm,  like  those  of  Wundt,  are  worthy  of  the  great- 
est attention.  Now  if  these  points  of  contact  once  exist 
between  the  material  and  the  psychical  and  spiritual 
processes,  so  that  material  functions  causally  influence 
psychical  and  spiritual  ones,  and  psychical  and  spiritual 
functions  similarly  influence  material  ones,  there  must 
also  exist  between  the  laws  of  material  processes  and 
those  of  psychical  and  spiritual  functions  a  relation 
which  makes  possible  such  a  mutual  effect,  and  we  must 
be  able  to  abstract  from  it  the  existence  of  a  common 
higher  law  of  which  on  the  one  side  the  material  laws, 
and  on  the  other  the  psychical  and  spiritual,  are  but  par- 
tial laws.  Precisely  here  lie  the  indications  which 
appear  to  favor  materialism  in  psychology.  But  it  is 
only  an  appearance.  For,  from  the  acknowledgment 


THE    NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.  155 

and  scientific  investigation  of  a  reciprocal  action,  to  an 
identification  of  the  two  factors  which  act  upon  one 
another,  is  still  an  infinite  step.  If  science  is  not  even 
able  to  identify  material  motion  and  sensation,  still  less 
can  it  identify  material  motion  and  the  spiritual  and 
ethic  activities.  When  this  is  done,  it  is  done  only  in 
consequence  of  the  same  confounding  of  condition  and 
cause  which  we  had  to  expose  on  the  occasion  of  the 
assertion  of  the  possibility  of  explaining  the  origin  of 
life  or  of  sensation,  and  of  consciousness  or  of  self-con- 
sciousness. But  we  here  also  willingly  admit  that  the 
realm  in  which  causality  reigns  in  the  form  of  mechanism, 
aims  at  being  the  support,  foundation,  and  instrument  of 
another  realm  where  causality  still  reigns,  but  mechan- 
ism ceases.  How  far  investigation  may  still  proceed  in  the 
direction  of  those  interesting  points  and  lines  where  both 
realms  touch  one  another  in  causal  reciprocal  action,  we 
do  not  know.  We  are  hardly  able  to  indicate  the  direc- 
tion in  which  the  investigation  must  proceed,  and  this 
direction  seems  to  be  assigned  to  it  by  the  idea  of  Auslos- 
ung.*  The  idea  of  Auslosung,  which  plays  such  an 

*  This  word,  which  is  of  recent  coinage  in  Germany,  has  been 
found  so  incapable  of  being  rendered  by  an  exact  English  equivalent, 
that  it  has  been  thought  best  to  retain  it  and  to  give  the  author's  own 
explanation  of  the  meaning  which  he  desired  it  to  express.  He  says, 
in  a  note  to  the  translator:  "  I  was  led  to  this  idea  [of  Auslosung]  in 
a  small  essay  of  Robert  von  Mayer  ("  Ueber  Auslosung,"  1876).  After- 
wards Mayer  personally  stated  to  me  that  he  heartily  approved  the 
emphasis  I  had  given  to  this  idea,  and  said  that  he  had  only  thought 
of  the  fact  that  psychical  processes,  like  the  action  of  the  will,  losen 
aus  (release)  physiological  processes,  like  the  action  of  the  muscles, 
and  that  I  had  carried  the  idea  farther,  in  saying  that  psychical  pro- 
cesses are  ausgelost  (released)  by  physiological  processes,  and  that  this 
is  a  very  important  step  farther  on  the  way  of  investigation.  Mayer 


156  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

important  role  in  physics,  seems  to  be  still  fruitful  for 
the  knowledge  of  psycho-physical  life  :  bodily  functions 
losen  aus  spiritual  ones,  spiritual  functions  bodily  ones. 
But  so  much  the  more  clearly  does  this  theory  show  the 
limits  of  mechanism  :  mechanism  reigns  in  the  world 
of  bodies  from  the  Auslb'sungen  and  to  the  Audosungen, 
with  which  the  mind  induces  the  body  to  activity,  and  the 
body  the  mind ;  beyond  these  limits  causality  still 
reigns,  but  no  longer  mechanism. 

Now  if  thus  the  mechanical  view  of  the  world  has 
within  its  own  most  proper  realm — the  realm  of  mate- 
rial phenomena — its  limits,  even  if  they  are  capable  of 
being  moved  farther  ;  arid  if  it  is  without  any  scientific 
acceptance  in  the  realm  of  soul  and  mind  :  its  usurpations 
reach  the  highest  possible  degree  when  it  pretends  to 

himself  thought  it  would  be  necessary  to  call  the  attention  to  this, 
when  he  further  developed  the  ideas  he  had  given  in  the  before-men- 
tioned essay  ;  his  intention  to  do  so  was  prevented  by  his  death. 

"  Auslosung  is  a  word  originated  by  modern  mechanical  science, 
and  means  :  (1.)  Slight  mechanical  operations  of  detaching  and  the 
like,  by  which  another  and  more  important  action,  whose  forces 
were  heretofore  restrained,  can  be  set  into  activity  :  e.  g.,  the  pressure 
which  sets  in  motion  a  machine,  previously  at  rest,  is  Auslosung  ;  the 
pressure  on  the  trigger  of  a  gun  is  Auslosung  ;  the  friction  of  a  match 
which  is  the  beginning  of  a  great  fire  is  Auslosung.  (2.)  This  idea  may 
now  be  applied  to  chemical  processes:  e.g.,  a  glass  of  sugar-water 
will  remain  sweet  unless  some  foreign  element  is  introduced  into  it, 
but  the  moment  it  receives  a  fermenting  substance  either  by  chance, 
from  the  air,  or  with  intention,  then  the  sugar  water  is  brought  into 
a  process  of  chemical  decomposition,  and  from  this  there  results 
Auslosung;  but  the  introduction  of  the  fermenting  agent  into  the 
sugar-water  is  Auslosung.  (3.)  Von  Mayer  applies  this  idea  to  psycho- 
physical  relations  of  life,  and  says:  when  the  will  acting  through  the 
agency  of  the  motor  nerves  sets  in  motion  the  muscles,  this  is  Aus- 
losung. " — [TRANS.] 


THE    NATURO  -  PHILOSOPHIC   SUPPLEMENTS.  157 

explain  the  last  causes  of  things.  For  from  its  very 
nature  it  follows  that  it  is  only  able  to  explain  the  recip- 
rocal action  of  material  things  among  themselves,  when 
these  things  in  their  qualities,  or  the  causes  of  their 
qualities  and  conditions,  are  already  present,  and  the 
laws  which  they  follow  are  already  active.  As  to  the 
origin  of  those  qualities  or  their  causes,  and  of  these 
laws,  this  view  leaves  us  entirely  in  the  dark. 


158  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 


CHAPTER  II. 

METAPHYSICAL    CONCLUSIONS    DRAWN    FROM    THE 
DARWINIAN    THEORIES. 

§  1.  Elimination  of  the  Idea  of  Design  in  the  World. — 

Monism. 

From  this  mechanical  view  of  the  world,  quite  a 
peculiar  conclusion  has  been  recently  drawn — not  by 
Darwin,  who  does  not  give  any  opinion  at  all  about  the 
mechanical  view  of  the  world,  as  such,  or  about  its  exten- 
sion and  influence,  nor,  indeed,  by  Darwinians,  not  even 
by  all  followers  of  a  mechanical  view  of  the  world,  but  on- 
ly by  a  part  of  them ;  namely,  by  those  who  have  in  a  high 
degree  attracted  to  themselves  the  attention  of  reading 
people.  This  conclusion  is  nothing  less  than  the  elimi- 
nation of  the  idea  of  design  in  nature.  This  phenom- 
enon demands  our  attention.  Heretofore,  the  proof  of 
plan,  design,  and  end  in  nature,  at  large  and  in  detail, 
was  looked  upon  as  the  most  beautiful  blossom  and  fruit 
of  a  thoughtful  contemplation  of  nature  ;  it  was  the 
great  and  beautiful  common  property,  in  the  enjoyment 
of  which  the  direct,  the  scientific,  and  the  religious  con- 
templation of  nature  peacefully  participated.  Now  this 
view  is  to  be  given  up  forever,  in  consequence  of  noth- 
ing else  than  Darwin's  selection  theory.  With  an  energy 
—we  may  say  with  a  passionateness  and  confidence  of 
victory — such  as  we  were  accustomed  to  see  only  in  the 
most  advanced  advocates  of  materialism,  Ludwig  Biich- 


METAPHYSICAL  CONCLUSIONS.         •  159 

ner,  D.  F.  Strauss,  Hackel,Oskar  Schmidt,  Helmholtz,  the 
editor  of  the  "Ausland"  and  some  of  his  associates,  and 
our  often-mentioned  "Anonymus," — in  a  common  attack, 
assail  every  idea  of  a  conformity  to  an  end  in  nature, 
every  idea  of  a  goal  toward  which  the  development  at 
large  and  individually  stri-ves;  in  a  word,  the  whole  cate- 
gory of  teleology  * 

In  order  to  be  just  in  our  judgment,  we  shall  have 
to  let  the  advocates  of  this  view  speak  for  themselves  ; — 
the  advocates  of  Dysteleology,  as  Hackel,  who  is  so 
extremely  productive  in  forming  new  exotic  words, 
calls  it ;  or  of  Aposkopiology,  as  Ebrard,  in  his  "  Apolo- 
getik"  (" Apologetics"),  correcting  the  etymology,  some- 

*  For  the  use  of  readers  who  do  not  understand  Greek,  we  may 
state  that  the  word  teleology  is  derived  from  the  Greek  word  telos, 
Gen.  teleos:  end,  purpose,  aim;  and  means  the  "doctrine  of  design  or 
a  conformity  to  the  end  in  view,"  or,  as  K.  E.  von  Baer  prefers  and 
wishes  to  have  introduced  into  scientific  language,  "  the  doctrine 
of  the  striving  toward  an  end  "  (Zielstrebigkeit).  It  seems  to  be  quite 
a  superficial  treatment  of  an  idea  on  whose  reception  or  rejection 
no  less  a  thing  than  an  entire  view  of  the  world  with  all  its  most 
important  and  deepest  questions  depends,  when  Dr.  G.  Seidlitz,  in  an 
essay  on  the  success  of  Darwinism  ("  Ausland,"  1874,  No.  37),  states 
incidentally  that  teleology  is  derived  from  the  Greek  riXeoq,  perfect. 
It  is  true  that  the  Greek  adjective  for  perfect  is  also  derived  from 
that  noun,  rl^oq,  which  has  the  same  root  as  the  German  word  Ziel, 
and  there  is  even  an  Ionic  form  for  that  adjective  which  is  -r^Aewr, 
but  the  Attic  form  is  rlAetos  ;  and  since  modern  languages,  when  a 
choice  is  allowed,  do  not  derive  their  Greek  foreign  words  from  the 
Ionic,  but  from  the  Attic  dialect,  that  word — were  it  really  derived 
from  that  adjective  and  did  it  express  "  doctrine  of  perfection" — 
would  have  to  be  teleiology,  or,  in  Latinized  form,  teliology.  As  far 
as  we  know,  the  word,  since  it  was  introduced  into  scientific  lan- 
guage, has  never  been  derived  from  any  other  root  than  from  rlXos, 
Gen.  r^Aeo^  end,  and  has  never  been  used  in  any  other  sense  than  to 
express  the  doctrine  of  a  purpose  and  end  in  the  world. 


160  THE    THKORIKS    or    DAKWIN. 

what  pedantically    calls  it;  or  of    Teleophoby,  as  it  is 
called  by  K.  E.  von  Baer,  in  humorous  irony. 

The  anonymous  author  of  the  book  called  "The 
Unconscious  from  the  Standpoint  of  Physiology  and 
Descent  Theory,"  asserts  that,  while  the  descent  theory 
but  puts  the  teleological  principle  in  question  by  with- 
drawing the  ground  for  a  positive  proof — an  assertion 
which  we  certainly  have  to  reject  most  decidedly  (com- 
pare Part  II,  Book  II,  Chap.  I,  §  2-§  (5)— the  selection 
theory  directly  rejects  it.  Natural  selection,  he  says, 
solves  the  seemingly  unsolvable  problem  of  explaining 
the  conformity  to  the  end  in  view,  as  result,  without 
taking  it  as  an  aiding  principle.  And  Helmholtz  says  : 
"Darwin's  theory  shows  how  conformity  to  the  end  in  the 
formation  of  organisms  can  also  originate  without  any 
intermingling  of  an  intelligence  by  the  blind  administra- 
tion of  a  law  of  nature." 

Hackel  really  revels  in  these  ideas.  He  says  (Nat, 
Hist,  of  Great.,  Vol.  I,  p.  19) :  "These  optimistic  views 
[of  the  much-talked  of  purposiveness  of  nature  or  of  the 
much-talked-of  beneficence  of  the  Creator]  have,  unfor- 
tunately, as  little  real  foundation  as  the  favorite  phrase, 
'  the  moral  order  of  the  universe,'  which  is  illustrated  in 
an  ironical  way  by  the  history  of  all  nations.  * 
If  we  contemplate  the  common  life  and  the  mutual  rela- 
tions between  plants  and  animals  (man  included),  we 
shall  find  everywhere,  and  at  all  times,  the  very  oppo- 
site of  that  kindly  and  peaceful  social  life  which  the 
goodness  of  the  Creator  ought  to  have  prepared  for  his 
creatures — we  shall  rather  find  everywhere  a  pitiless, 
most  embittered  Struggle  of  All  against  All.  Nowhere 
in  nature,  no  matter  where  we  turn  our  eyes,  does  that 


METAPHYSICAL   CONCLUSIONS.  161 

idyllic  peace,  celebrated  by  the  poets,  exist ;  we  find 
everywhere  a  struggle  and  a  striving  to  annihilate  neigh- 
bors and  competitors.  Passion  and  selfishness  —  con- 
scious or  unconscious — is  everywhere  the  motive  force 
of  life.  *  *  *  Man  in  this  respect  certainly  forms 
no  exception  to  the  rest  of  the  animal  world. "  And  on 
page  33  :  "In  the  usual  dualistic  or  teleological  (vital) 
conception  of  the  universe,  organic  nature  is  regarded 
as  the  purposely  executed  production  of  a  Creator  work- 
ing according  to  a  definite  plan.  Its  adherents  see  in 
every  individual  species  of  animal  and  plant  an  '  em- 
bodied creative  thought,'  the  material  expression  of  a 
definite  first  cause  (causa  finalis),  acting  for  a  set  pur- 
pose. They  must  necessarily  assume  supernatural  (not 
mechanical)  processes  of  the  origin  of  organisms.  *  * 
On  the  other  hand,  the  theory  of  development  carried 
out  by  Darwin,  must,  if  carried  out  logically,  lead  to  the 
monistic  or  mechanical  (causal)  conception  of  the  uni- 
verse. In  opposition  to  the  dualistic  or  teleological 
conception  of  nature,  our  theory  considers  organic  as 
well  as  inorganic  bodies  to  be  the  necessary  products  of 
natural  forces.  It  does  not  see  in  every  individual 
species  of  animal  and  plant  the  embodied  thought  of  a 
personal  Creator,  but  the  expression  for  the  time  being 
of  a  mechanical  process  of  development  of  matter,  the 
expression  of  a  necessarily  active  cause,  that  is,  of  a 
mechanical  cause  (causa  efficiens).  Where  teleological 
Dualism  seeks  the  arbitrary  thoughts  of  a  capricious 
Creator  in  miracles  of  creation,  causal  Monism  finds  in 
the  process  of  development  the  necessary  effects  of 
eternal  immutable  laws  of  nature."  Hackel's  "An  thro- 
pogeny  "  also  is  replete  with  attacks  upon  a  teleological 
11 


162  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

view  of  nature,  which  leave  nothing  wanting  in  distinct- 
ness and  coarseness.  On  page  111,  Vol.  I,  we  read:  "The 
rudimentary  organs  clearly  prove  that  the  mechanical,  or 
monistic  conception  of  the  nature  of  organisms  is  alone 
correct,  and  that  the  prevailing  teleological,  or  dualistic 
method  of  accounting  for  them  is  entirely  false.  The 
very  ancient  fable  of  the  all-wise  plan  according  to 
which  4  the  Creator's  hand  has  ordained  all  things  with 
wisdom  and  understanding,'  the  empty  phrase  about  the 
purposive  c  plan  of  structure '  of  organisms  is  in  this 
way  completely  disproved.  Stronger  arguments  can 
hardly  be  furnished  against  the  customary  teleology,  or 
Doctrine  of  Design,  than  the  fact  that  all  more  highly 
developed  organisms  possess  such  rudimentary  organs." 
(Compare  also  Vol.  II,  p.  439:  "The  rudimentary  organs 
are  among  the  most  overwhelming  proofs  against  the  pre- 
vailing teleological  ideas  of  creation.")  According  to 
his  opinion  (Vol.  I,  p.  245),  comparative  anatomy  may  no 
longer  look  for  a  ' '  pre-arranged  plan  of  construction  by 
the  Creator."  Besides,  he  calls  it  an  anthropocentric 
error  to  look  upon  man  as  a  preconceived  aim  of 
creation  and  a  true  final  purpose  of  terrestrial  life  ;  and 
on  page  IT,  of  Vol.  II,  he  supports  this  judgment  by 
comparing  the  relative  shortness  of  the  existence  of  man- 
kind with  the  length  of  the  preceding  geological  periods: 
4 '  Since  the  awakening  of  the  human  consciousness, 
human  vanity  and  human  arrogance  have  delighted  in 
regarding  Man  as  the  real  main-purpose  and  end  of  all 
earthly  life,  and  as  the  centre  of  terrestrial  Nature,  for 
whose  use  and  service  all  the  activities  of  the  rest  of 
creation  were  from  the  first  defined  or  predestined  by  a 
'  wise  providence.'  How  utterly  baseless  these  presump- 


METAPHYSICAL  CONCLUSIONS.  163 

tuous  anthropocentric  conceptions  are,  nothing  could 
evince  more  strikingly  than  a  comparison  of  the  dura- 
tion of  the  Anthropozoic  or  Quaternary  Epoch  with  that 
of  the  preceding  Epochs."  And  on  page  234,  Vol.  II: 
"  Hence  it  is  that,  in  accordance  with  the  received  teleo- 
logical  view,  it  has  been  customary  to  admire  the  so- 
called  <  wisdom  of  the  Creator '  and  the  4  purposive 
contrivances  of  His  Creation'  especially  in  this  matter. 
But  on  more  mature  consideration  it  will  be  observed 
that  the  Creator,  according  to  this  conception,  does  after 
all  but  play  the  part  of  an  ingenious  mechanic  or  of  a 
skillful  watchmaker  ;  just,  indeed,  as  all  these  cherished 
teleological  conceptions  of  the  Creator  and  His  Creation 
are  based  on  childish  anthropomorphism.  * 
But  it  is  exactly  on  this  point  that  the  history  of  evolu- 
tion proves  most  clearly  that  this  received  conception  is 
radically  false.  The  history  of  evolution  convinces  us 
that  the  highly  purposive  and  admirably  constituted 
sense  organs,  like  all  other  organs,  have  developed  with- 
out premeditated  aim. " 

Strauss,  in  his  "The  Old  Faith  and  the  New,"  gives 
to  this  idea  its  philosophic  and  universalistic  finish.  In 
§  67-§  70,  he  eliminates  not  only  the  idea  of  design  in 
individual  cases,  but  also  the  idea  of  a  design  in  the 
world  as  a  whole  ;  allows  us  to  speak  of  design  in  the 
world  only  in  a  subjective  sense,  so  far  as  we  understand 
it  to  be  what  we  think  we  perceive  as  the  common  final 
aim  of  the  concert  of  the  powers,  active  in  the  world  ; 
and  finds,  when  in  such  a  sense  it  is  spoken  of  as  design 
in  the  world,  that  the  universe  reaches  its  end  in  every 
instance.  Only  the  parts  develop  themselves,  driven  by 
the  mechanical  laws  of  causality,  and  after  having  lived 


164:  THE    THEORIES    OF  DARWIN. 

their  period  of  life,  sink  back  again  into  the  universe,  in 
order  to  make  place  for  new  developments  and  to 
prepare  them  in  their  turn. 

For  the  view  of  the  world  which  the  antagonists  of 
teleology  construct  out  of  this  "mechanical"  and  "causal" 
view,  they,  as  we  have  repeatedly  seen,  have  invented 
the  name  "  monism."  In  contrast  to  all  dualism  in  rea- 
soning about  the  relation  of  body  and  soul,  God  and 
universe,  time  and  eternity,  and  especially  in  contrast  to 
the  dualism  with  which  the  theistic  view  of  the  world  is 
said  to  be  loaded,  monism  claims  that  what  was  form- 
erly divided  into  God  and  universe,  force  and  matter, 
matter  and  spirit,  body  and  soul,  is  but  one ;  and  it  thus 
exhibits  a  reconciliation,  a  higher  unity,  of  materialism 
and  idealism,  of  pantheism  and  atheism,  which  unity  in 
the  scientific  and  the  practical  ethic  realm  has  no 
antagonist  to  fight  more  energetically,  and  none  which  it 
is  better  able  to  fight  successfully,  than  dualism,  which 
the  monistic  view  of  the  world,  by  a  queer  mistake  as 
to  the  theistic  position  of  God  in  nature,  especially  con- 
siders the  whole  theistic  view  of  the  world. 

The  scientific  antagonists  of  teleology  show  such  a 
scientific  intolerance  against  their  own  associates,  that 
one  of  the  latest  exhibitors  of  Darwinism,  Oskar  Schmidt, 
in  his  "Theory  of  Descent  and  Darwinism,"  bluntly 
classes  one  of  the  greatest  and  most  deserving  investiga- 
tors in  the  realm  of  comparative  anatomy  and  palaeontol- 
ogy, Richard  Owen,  of  London,  with  the  "  'Halves '  who, 
fearing  the  conclusions,  with  one  word  come  to  terms 
with  the  scientific  conscience."  And  why? — because 
Owen  still  sees  ends  in  nature,  and  by  his  inclination  to 
the  acceptance  of  a  descent,  does  not  allow  himself  to 


METAPHYSICAL   CONCLUSIONS.  165 

be  prevented  from  giving  adhesion  to  a  teleological  view 
of  the  world.  And  this  invention  of  monism  is  pro- 
claimed to  the  world  in  such  a  full  consciousness  of  its 
great  importance  in  the  history  of  culture,  that  Hackel 
closes  his  "Nat.  Hist,  of  Great."  with  the  following 
words:  "Future  centuries  will  celebrate  our  age, 
which  was  occupied  with  laying  the  foundations  of  the 
Doctrine  of  Descent,  as  the  hew  era  in  which  began  a 
period  of  human  development,  rich  in  blessings, — a 
period  which  was  characterized  by  the  victory  of  free  in- 
quiry over  the  despotism  of  authority,  and  by  the  power- 
ful ennobling  influence  of  the  Monistic  Philosophy." 
At  the  end  of  the  lecture,  next  to  the  last,  in  the  same 
Vol.  II,  page  332,  he  pays  the  following  compliment  to 
the  antagonists  of  monism:  "The  recognition  of  the 
theory  of  development  and  the  Monistic  Philosophy 
based  upon  it,  forms  the  best  criterion  for  the  degree  of 
man's  mental  development."  In  his  "  Generic  Morph- 
ology," and  in  the  first  edition  of  his  "Nat.  Hist,  of 
Creat.,"  he,  in  a  geological  scala,  which  closes  with  the 
human  period,  even  divides  the  whole  past,  present,  and 
future  history  of  mankind  into  two  halves  :  first  part, 
dualistic  period  of  culture  ;  second  part,  monistic  period 
of  culture.  Still,  we  will  not  omit  to  mention,  with 
credit,  that  this  anticipatory  historiography  has  discreetly 
disappeared  from  the  geological  scala  of  the  following 
editions  of  his  "  Natural  History  of  Creation." 

As  to  the  further  scientific  consequences  to  which  this 
anti-teleological  monism  leads,  the  advocates  of  it  are 
in  tolerable  accord ;  although  they  are  subject  to  the 
most  incomprehensible  illusions  regarding  the  practical 
consequences  of  it,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  above-quoted 


166  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

concluding  words  of  Hackers  ' '  Natural  History  of  Crea- 
tion." As  to  the  scientific  consequences,  they  express 
themselves  plainly  enough:  the  belief  in  a  living  Creator 
and  Lord  of  the  world  no  longer  find  any  place ; 
everything,  even  all  the  rich  treasures  of  human  life 
and  history,  become  a  result  of  blindly  acting  forces  ; 
the  history  of  the  world,  ethics,  and  all  spiritual  sci- 
ences, are  in  the  progress  of  perception  dissolved  into 
physiology,  and  physiology  into  chemistry,  physics  and 
mechanism.  In  his  "  Natural  History  of  Creation," 
Vol.  I,  page  170,  Hackel  frankly  calls  the  whole  history 
of  the  world  a  physico-chemical  process. 

Whoever  refers  to  a  view  of  another  person,  is  in 
duty  bound  to  enter  into  that  view,  if  possible  object- 
ively, even  if  he  does  not  agree  with  it.  The  author  of 
this  book  tries  to  comply  with  this  obligation  in  all  his 
representations,  but  must  confess  that  in  regard  to  the 
just  described  view  of  the  world,  he  does  not  succeed  in 
making  it  conceivable  to  himself  in  a  manner  to  be  just- 
ified even  from  a  relatively  scientific  standpoint ;  a  want 
for  which,  it  is  true,  we  have  beforehand  the  explana- 
tory cause  in  the  quotation  from  Hackel's  "  Natural 
History  of  Creation,"  Vol.  II,  p.  332,  given  above. 

Perhaps  it  appears  relatively  conceivable,  when  it  is 
asserted  that  the  observation  of  an  order,  a  connection, 
a  development,  a  plan,  in  the  world,  leads  to  the  percep- 
tion of  such  a  quality  of  the  laws,  primitive  elements, 
and  forces  of  the  world,  that  something  like  it  had  to 
result  from  them  ;  but  that  it  does  not  lead  to  the 
acknowledgment  of  a  personal  author  of  the  world.  We 
call  such  a  view  relatively  conceivable,  not  because  we 
agree  with  it — for  we  find  a  logic  which,  in  contemplat- 


METAPHYSICAL  CONCLUSIONS.  167 

ing  the  universe,  starts  from  an  intelligent  author  of  the 
world,  infinitely  less  surrounded  by  difficulties  than  one 
contrary  to  it  —  but  because  the  acknowledgment  or 
denial  of  a  living  God  is  in  the  last  instance  not  the  result 
of  any  scientific  investigation  or  logical  chain  of  reason- 
ing, but  the  moral  act  of  the  morally  and  religiously 
inclined  individual,  and  because,  if  the  individual  has 
once  refused  the  strongest  factor  of  faith  in  God,— 
namely,  his  self-testimony  in  the  conscience, — it  is  no 
longer  impossible  for  the  individual  to  ignore  his  other 
testimonies  as  such,  or  to  declare  them  deficient.  Now 
we  certainly  can  say  that  we  see  order  and  many  results 
in  the  world,  which  are  conformable  to  the  object  in 
view,  and  in  consequence  of  this  observation  must  admit 
that  no  imaginable  quality  of  primitive  beginnings,  ele- 
ments, and  forces  of  the  world  had  caused  this  result, 
but  that  this  result  must  have  already  been  in  the  plan. 
But  there  certainly  are  imaginable,  in  abstracto,  infinitely 
many  possibilities  of  other  elements  and  primitive  begin- 
nings of  the  world, — perhaps  of  some  whose  result 
would  have  been  but  an  eternal  chaos,  or  of  others 
whose  result  would  have  been  but  an  eternal  rigidness, 
or  of  still  others  whose  result  would  also  have  been  a 
certain  order  and  variety  of  phenomena  and  processes, 
but  less  beautiful  than  that  of  the  really  existing  world. 
Thus,  then,  this  world  now  exists  as  a  special  chance  of 
infinitely  many  chances  ;  and  who  knows  whether,  in 
the  course  of  thousands  of  millions  of  terrestrial  years 
in  the  struggle  for  existence,  it  did  not  obtain  its  exist- 
ence among  infinitely  many  possibilities  of  worlds 
through  a  natural  world  -  selection,  and  thus,  by  the 
result  of  its  existence,  fully  legitimate  its  conformity  to 


168  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

the  end  in  view  ?  With  this  deduction,  we  do  not  make, 
as  it  may  seem,  an  awkward  attempt  at  rendering  the 
whole  standpoint  ridiculous  by  a  wild  phantasy  ;  but 
we  quote  it  from  a  celebrated  and  otherwise  very  meri- 
torious book,  namely  the  "Geschichte  des  Material- 
ismus  "  ("  History  of  Materialism  "),  by  the  too  early  de- 
ceased Friedrich  Albert  Lange.  The  reader  will  find  it, 
in  the  second  part,  page  275,  simply  a  little  shorter  and, 
as  it  seems  to  us,  less  clear,  but  as  the  only  "correct 
teleology  "  which  Lange  professes.  This  whole  view, 
like  all  world-theories  and  cosmogonies  of  pantheism, 
naturalism,  or  atheism,  and  even  like  the  latest  of 
Eduard  von  Hartmann,  is  to  us  but  a  proof  that  the  rejec- 
tion of  the  reality  of  a  living  Creator  and  Lord  of  the 
world  requires  of  its  advocates  mysteries  and  mysticisms 
of  atheism  compared  to  which  the  greatest  difficulties 
of  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  are  but  the  merest 
trifles. 

Therefore,  if  that  first  and  second  step  in  the  rejec- 
tion of  the  highest  intelligence  and  omnipotence  as  the 
final  cause  of  the  world,  are  once  made,  it  is  easy  for  us 
to  comprehend  still  other  supports  which  this  view  of 
the  world  draws  to  itself.  However  large  the  number 
of  things  in  the  world  for  whose  existence  we  can  give 
a  reason,  or  of  which  we  can  show  that  that,  which  pre- 
ceded, aimed  at  their  appearance,  still  the  number  of 
those  to  which  we  can  not  ascribe  aim  and  design  is  just 
as  large.  There  are  even  phenomena  enough  which  in 
their  main  effects  appear  to  us  directly  irrational ;  as, 
for  instance,  those  which  operate  destructively, — all  the 
tortures  which  animals  inflict  on  one  another,  etc.  Be^ 
sides,  we  can  also  find  imperfections  in  the  degree  of  the 


METAPHYSICAL  CONCLUSIONS.  169 

conformity  to  the  end  in  view  in  all  those  phenomena 
which  appear  to  us  as  properly  planned  ;  for  instance, 
the  organic  appears  to  .us  higher  than  the  inorganic,  and 
yet  it  is  in  its  existence  not  only  dependent  on  the 
inorganic,  but  is  often  destroyed  prematurely  by  it.  Of 
course,  all  these  limits  and  barriers  of  our  teleological 
perception  are  abundantly  used  by  all  antagonists  of  a 
teleological  view  of  the  world  for  the  basis  of  their 
position.  Furthermore,  the  way  and  manner  in  which 
man  fixes  his  ends  and  reaches  them,  is  essentially  differ- 
ent from  the  way  and  manner  in  which  nature  acts. 
Man  seeks  to  attain  his  ends  with  less  expenditure  of 
power  and  means,  the  more  he  acts  conformably  to  the 
end  in  view  ;  while  nature,  it  often  enough  appears  to 
us,  when  we  have  reason  to  imagine  an  effect  of  its 
processes  also  as  the  probable  end  of  them,  reaches  this 
end  only  by  an  immense  squandering  of  means  —  for 
instance,  the  preservation  of  organic  species  simply  by 
the  production  of  thousands  of  germs  and  eggs,  most  of 
which  perish,  and  but  very  few  of  which  are  developed, 
and  still  less  are  transmitted.  This  is  a  difference  to 
which  Lange  points,  in  order  to  reject  a  theory  which 
recognizes  a  striving  toward  an  end  (Zielstrebigkeit) 
in  nature,  or  at  most  to  allow  it  a  little  place  as  the 
lowest  form  of  teleology,  and  to  reject  every  attempt  to 
regard  it  as  analogous  to  human  striving  toward  an  end, 
as  anthropomorphism.  Nature,  he  says,  acts,  as  if  a 
man,  in  order  to  shoot  a  hare,  should  in  a  large  field 
discharge  millions  of  guns  in  all  possible  directions  ;  as 
if  he,  in  order  to  get  into  a  locked  room,  should  buy 
ten  thousand  different  keys  and  try  them  all ;  as  if,  in 
order  to  have  a  house,  he  should  build  up  a  town  and 


170  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

leave  the  superfluous  houses  to  wind  and  weather. 
Nobody  should  call  such  actions  conformable  to  an  end 
in  view,  and  still  less  should  we  suppose  behind  this 
action  any  higher  wisdom,  hidden  reasons,  or  superior 
sagacity.  It  is  true,  Wigand  is  right  in  replying  to  this, 
that  when  we  observe  such  things  in  nature,  we  have  to 
draw  the  conclusion  that  the  very -end  supposed  by  the 
observing  man — in  this  case,  the  preservation  of  the 
species — is  not  the  only  end,  but  that  it  has  other  ends 
besides  ;  as,  for  instance,  richness  of  life,  inexhaustible 
abundance,  preservation  of  other  organisms,  etc.  Be- 
sides, this  is  but  a  single  side  of  the  comparison  between 
the  action,  of  man  and  that  of  nature  ;  and  from  this  side 
action  of  man,  conformable  to  an  end  in  view,  appears 
as  a  higher  form  of  teleology,  that  of  nature  as  a  lower. 
But  there  are  other  sides  of  comparison,  which  just  as 
clearly  strike  the  eye  ;  nature  builds  from  within  in  full 
sovereignty  of  its  process  over  matter  and  form.  Man 
approaches  his  materials  from  without ;  nature  works 
with  never-erring  certainty  (Hackel's  latest  theory,  that 
nature  falsifies  its  laws  and  processes,  can  surely  not  be 
meant  in  earnest ! )  ;  man  often  enough  with  error,  false 
calculation,  awkwardness,  failure  and  capricious  arbitra- 
riness. In  these  directions,  teleology  of  nature  is 
infinitely  superior  to  that  of  man. 

We  must  be  very  careful  in  using  anthropomorphism 
as  a  term  of  reproach.  It  may  be  used  as  a  reproach  in 
warning  against  careless  reasoning  and  hasty  compari- 
son, but  the  idea  of  anthropomorphism  is  so  extensible 
that  it  can  be  extended  over  all  human  reasoning  and 
conception.  Are  not  the  reasons  on  account  of  which 
the  so-called  anthropomorphism  is  to  be  rejected,  often 


METAPHYSICAL   CONCLUSIONS.  171 

enough  just  as  anthropomorphistic  as  the  ideas  which 
are  attacked  ?  For  instance,  when  the  idea  of  the  person- 
ality of  God  is  attacked  as  an  anthropomorphistic  one, 
are  not  the  reasons  with  which  it  is  assailed  exactly  as 
anthropomorphistic  as  the  conceptions  which  are  to  be 
assailed?  Do  we  not  derive  all  our  reasoning,  logic, 
our  views,  and  in  fact  everything,  at  first  from  our 
human  nature,  and  do  we  not  in  our  most  abstract  reason- 
ing always  operate  simply  with  the  laws,  as  they  inhere 
in  our  human  nature  ?  Is  there  even  a  single  scientific 
description  conceivable  without  its  being  full  of 
anthropomorphisms  ?  Even  the  works  of  Darwin  which, 
according  to  the  opinion  of  these  opponents  of  anthropo- 
morphism, destroy  anthropomorphism  and  teleology,  are 
the  most  striking  proof  in  favor  of  it.  The  discovery 
of  the  general  reign  of  the  law  of  causality  invalidates, 
as  they  say,  the  reign  of  the  category  of  teleology ;  for 
the  one  category  contradicts  the  other.  Suppose  it  were 
so  (we  will,  however,  immediately  see  that  the  con- 
trary is  true)  whence  do  we  know  that  the  category  of 
causality  has  the  preference  over  that  of  finality  or  tele- 
ology ?  The  one,  as  well  as  the  other,  is  anthropomor- 
phistic, and  is  an  undoubtedly  necessary  form  of  our 
human  reasoning.  We  believe  in  their  objective  validity, 
because  we  cannot  believe  that  the  sum  of  existences 
and  the  relations  between  the  perceiving  subject  and  the 
perceived  object  aim  at  deceiving  man  ;  we  do  not  want 
to  be  robbed  of  either  the  one  or  the  other  category  ; 
but  if  the  question  is  as  to  the  preference  of  the  one  cat- 
egory over  the  other  (which  we  contest),  who  knows 
whether  the  category  of  finality  has  not  more  reasons  for 
its  superiority  than  causality  ?  Compare,  in  reference 


17'2  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

to  tliis  whole  question,  also  the  clear  analyses  in  the 
second  volume  of  the  work  of  Wigand,  and  the  instruct- 
ive lecture  of  the  Duke  of  Argyll  upon  anthropomorph- 
ism in  theology. 

Nevertheless,  all  the  points  against  teleology  thus  far 
quoted  can  be  understood  by  us  as  attempts  at  rejecting 
the  necessity  of  acknowledging  a  teleologically  acting 
principle  of  the  world — or,  to  express  ourselves  more 
clearly,  of  a  living  God — after  having  once  rejected  the 
deepest  motive  for  this  acknowledgment,  namely  :  the 
self-testimony  of  God  in  the  human  conscience  and  mind. 
But  it  is  one  thing  to  declare  that  we  are  not  obliged  to 
accept  a  certain  conclusion,  and  quite  another  to  declare 
that  we  are  obliged  to  accept  directly  the  opposite  of 
such  a  conclusion.  It  is  one  thing  to  declare  that  the 
phenomena  in  the  world  do  not  yet  oblige  us  to  suppose 
an  author  with  a  preconceived  plan,  and  still  another  to 
declare  that  because  I  have  found  or  still  hope  to  find 
the  causal  connexion  of  phenomena  conformable  to  the 
end  in  view,  no  author  with  a  preconceived  plan  exists. 
This  last  assertion  is  one  which  the  author  of  this  work 
confesses  not  to  understand,  and  in  whose  conclusion  he 
cannot  agree.  Knowledge  of  the  origin  of  something 
certainly  does  not  exclude  the  question  wherefore  it 
exists,  and  does  not  even  take  its  place,  and  when  I  have 
answered  both  questions  satisfactorily,  then  I  may  and 
must  justly  ask  whether  both  that  for  which  something 
exists  and  that  by  which  something  exists,  is  intended 
or  not,  whether  that  which  in  the  language  of  causality 
I  call  cause  and  effect,  also  belongs  to  the  category  of 
finality,  according  to  which  that  very  cause  is  at  the 
same  time  called  means,  and  that  very  effect  also  design. 


METAPHYSICAL  CONCLUSIONS.  173 

The  one  way  of  viewing  postulates  the  other  as  its. 
necessary  completion  ;  and  the  teleological  point  of  view 
is  so  little  an  impediment  for  the  causal,  that  we  are 
much  more  fully  convinced  scientifically  of  the  correct- 
ness of  the  teleological  Avay  of  viewing,  when  first  the 
causal  chain  of  causes  and  effects  lies  plain  before  our 
perception  without  any  wanting  links. 

We  still  have  to  mention  two  monstrosities  which,  as 
it  seems  to  us,  necessarily  result  from  the  rejection  of 
teleology,  although  the  opponents  of  teleology  contest 
the  fact. 

The  one  is  the  reduction  to  chance  of  all  single  for- 
mations in  the  world.  It  is  true,  necessity  reigns  in 
laws  and  their  effect ;  but  if  the  degree  and  the  sum  of  all 
qualities  in  the  world  are  not  based  the  one  upon  the 
other,  if  especially  the  single  organizations  originate  by 
the  way  of  natural  selection,  every  coincidence  of  each 
single  causal  chain  in  the  world  with  any  other  causal 
chain  is  something  accidental  for  the  one  as  well  as  for 
the  other.  Now,  an  explanation  of  that  in  the  world 
which  is  conformable  to  the  end  in  view,  by  chance,  is  a 
scientifically  illogical  idea.  An  accidental  coincidence  of 
many  circumstances  can  in  a  single  case  produce  some- 
thing which  is  conformable  to  an  end  in  view;  but  the 
probability  that  the  formation  conformable  to  the  end  in 
view  is  again  nullified  by  the  next  throw  of  the  dice  of 
chance,  is  so  great,  and  with  every  following  throw  grows 
so  decidedly  in  geometrical  progression,  that  this  proba- 
bility after  a  few  terms  becomes  a  certainty,  and  we  can 
directly  demonstrate  mathematically  that  the  world 
without  a  teleological  plan  would  be  and  remain  a  chaos. 
As  we  have  seen,  even  Lange  finds  himself  obliged  to 


174  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

•admit  this  plan,  with  the  exception  that  he  makes  this 
plan  itself  chance — special  chance  among  infinitely  many 
possibilities. 

The  other  consequence  of  that  elimination  of  the 
idea  of  design  is  that  it  forbids  every  difference  between 
higher  and  lower,  and  changes  everything  into  an 
indifferent  and  equivalent  continual  stream  of  coming  and 
going.  For  the  whole  idea  of  higher  and  lower  belongs 
to  the  category  of  teleology.  If  the  new  which  origin- 
ates is  but  a  product  of  that  which  was  already  in  exist- 
ence, and  if  the  latter  does  not  aim  at  the  production  of 
the  new,  then  the  new  is  equivalent  to  the  preceding; 
and  it  is  but  an  illusion  of  man,  preconceiving  an  end, 
when  in  the  products  of  nature  he  discriminates  between 
higher  and  lower.  A  beginning  of  the  acknowledg- 
ment of  this  consequence  is  made,  when  Hackel,  in  his 
Anthropogeny,  so  violently  attacks  the  idea  that  man  is 
end  and  design  of  the  terrestrial  creation.  But  generally 
the  antagonists  of  teleology  are  guilty  of  the  inconse- 
quence which,  although  from  the  principles  of  their 
system  to  be  rejected,  is  indelibly  impressed  on  our 
thinking  mind  and  especially  on  our  moral  conscious- 
ness, that  they  still  discriminate  between  higher  and 
lower,  and  particularly  that  they  willingly  assign  to  the 
moral  disposition  and  demand,  and  to  the  morally 
planned  individual,  the  priority  among  existences.  This 
fact  is  pronounced  in  a  very  striking  way  in  the  conces- 
sions of  Strauss,  which  we  have  quoted  on  page  126, 
according  to  which  nature,  where  it  can  no  longer  go 
beyond  itself,  wishes  to  go  into  itself,  and  in  man  has 
wished  to  go  not  only  upwards  but  even  beyond  itself. 

Therefore,  not  only  theology,  but  also  philosophy, 


METAPHYSICAL  CONCLUSIONS.  175 

and  even  natural  science,  in  their  most  prominent  advo- 
cates, have  in  a  uniform  chorus  protested  against  this 
destruction  of  the  idea  of  design.  That  it  was  unani- 
mously done  on  the  part  of  theology,  is  quite  natural,  and 
needs  no  further  proofs.  When  we,  nevertheless,  men- 
tion expressly  a  single  essay  on  these  questions,  it  is 
done  on  account  of  the  fact  that  in  its  energetic  defense 
of  the  teleological  point  of  view  it  is  especially  effective 
by  frankly  and  impartially  admitting  the  strongest 
positions  of  the  opponent's  standpoint — a  thing  which 
rarely  happens  on  the  part  of  theologians.  It  is  the 
essay  of  Julius  Kostlin  "Ueber  die  Beweise  fur  das 
Dasein  Gottes"  ( "  Proofs  of  the  Existence  of  God"), 
in  the  "  Theologische  Studien  und  Kritiken,"  1875,  IV 
and  1876,  I ;  especially  1876, 1,  p.  42  ff.  On  the  part  of 
philosophy,  we  have  to  mention  Ulrici,  Fichte,  Huber  and 
Frohschammer,  who  have  rejected  the  attack  against 
teleology  with  inflexible  criticism.  Even  Friedrich  Vi- 
scher  in  the  sixth  part  of  his  "Kritische  Gange"  ("Critical 
Walks  "),  has  forcibly  maintained  the  right  of  teleology, 
especially  of  its  highest  revelation,  the  moral  order  of 
the  world — in  contrast  to  his  friend  D.  F.  Strauss,  whose 
"  The  Old  Faith  and  the  New  "he  criticises;  but  it  is 
true,  in  consequence  of  his  pantheism,  he  reaches  the 
wholly  imaginary  conclusion  of  supposing  a  moral 
order  of  the  world  without  a  regulator.  And,  to  be 
able  to  make  the  systematized  order  and  beauty  of 
nature  conceivable  to  himself  without  a  Creator,  to  be 
able  to  make  conceivable  to  himself  a  design  in 
nature,  an  ideal,  according  to  which  nature  works  as 
an  unconscious  artist,  he  gives  to  philosophy  the  cer- 
tainly unsolvable  problem  of  finding  the  idea  of  time- 


170  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

less  time,  to  which  the  "  afterward "  can  just  as  well 
be  a  "beforehand"  ;  he  prefers  to  do  this  rather  than  to 
find  the  equally  clear  and  deep  solution  of  that  teleological 
difficulty  in  the  simple  idea  of  a  Creator,  who,  as  such, 
also  stands  above  time.  One  of  the  most  remarkable 
philosophic  testimonies  for  the  right  of  teleology  is  the 
philosophic  system  of  Eduard  von  Hartmann  who, 
although  he  calls  his  absolute  the  unconscious,  ascribes 
to  it  an  unconscious  intelligence  and  an  unconscious  will, 
and  makes  the  observation  and  acknowledgment  of  designs 
and  ends,  which  he  sees  in  the  whole  realm  of  the  world 
of  phenomena,  an  essential  part  of  his  entire  system. 
All  attempts  of  this  kind,  as  those  of  Vischer  and  Hart- 
mann, fully  and  correctly  to  understand  the  language  of 
facts  on  the  one  side  and  to  reject  on  the  other  the 
necessary  conclusion  to  which  it  leads — namely,  the 
acknowledgment  of  a  creative  intelligence  above  the 
facts,  and  having  an  end  in  view — only  increase  in  like 
manner  as  the  above-quoted  cosmogonic  idea  of  Lange 
by  the  monstrosities  of  reasoning  to  which  they  lead, 
the  power  of  demonstration  for  that  which  they  under- 
take to  contest.  Natural  scientists,  finally,  even  Darwin- 
ians, have  not  only  in  casual  utterances  often  spoken  a 
weighty  word  in  favor  of  teleology — as,  for  instance, 
those  who,  like  Oswald  Heer,  Kolliker,  Baumgartner, 
believe  in  a  metamorphosis  of  germs,  but  also  men  who 
are  quite  favorable  to  the  idea  of  an  origin  of  the  species 
through  descent — as,  for  instance,  Richard  Owen,  at  the 
end  of  his  ' '  Comparative  Anatomy  of  the  Vertebrates, " 
separately  published  as  "  Derivative  Hypothesis  of  Life 
and  Species"  ;  Alexander  Braun,  in  his  lecture  "Ueber 
die  Bedeutung  der  Entwicklung  in  der  Naturgeschichte  " 


METAPHYSICAL   CONCLUSIONS.  177 

("On  the  Importance  of  Development  in  Nature"),  Ber- 
lin, 1872  ;  A.  W.  Volkmann  "  Ueber  die  Entwicklung  der 
Organismen"  ( "  On  the  Development  of  Organisms"), 
Halle,  1875;  Schaaffhausen,  in  his  opening  address  to  the 
Wiesbaden  Anthr.  Versammlung,  Braunschweig,  1874, 
and  others;  but  they  have  also  given  to  teleology  entire 
treatises.  Besides  a  more  popular  treatise  of  the  astron- 
omer Madler  in  "  Westermann's  Monatshefte,"  October, 
1872,  there  belong  to  them  the  frequently  mentioned 
work  of  Wigand,  and  especially  three  essays  of  great 
importance  from  the  pen  of  a  man  who  in  questions  of 
development  and  its  extent  has  among  all  contemporaries 
the  first  right  to  speak,  namely,  Karl  Ernst  von  Baer. 
They  are  the  essays  on  the  conformity  to  the  end  in  view 
in  general,  on  the  conformity  to  the  end  in  view  in 
organic  bodies,  and  on  Darwin's  doctrine,  published  to- 
gether with  two  other  essays  in  the  already  mentioned 
"Studien  aus  dem  Gebiete  der  Naturwissenschaften," 
(Reden  und  Kleinere  Auf^atze,  2ter  Theil),  Petersburg, 
1876.  Nay,  even  the  two  founders  of  Darwinism, 
Darwin  himself  and  A.  R.  Wallace,  as  we  shall  see  in 
defining  their  position  in  reference  to  religion,  express 
themselves  decidedly  teleologicaily  ;  this  is  especially  true 
of  Wallace,  and  likewise  of  their  active  and  able  second, 
Huxley.  Only  a  single  utterance  of  Darwin  in  a  later 
publication  seems  to  take  a  sceptical  position  in  regard 
to  teleology ;  compare  below  Part  Second,  Book  I, 
Chapt.  Ill,  §  1. 

Finally,  we  have  to  say  a  word  concerning  the  name 

which  the  anti-teleological  view  of  the  world  gives  to 

itself:  the  name  "monism"  The  view  of  the  world  which 

monism   gives   us,   seems  hardly  comprehensible  ;  and 

12 


178  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

just  as  little  does  the  name  which  it  gives  itself,  seem 
justifiable. 

If  this  name  is  to  indicate  only  a  maxim  of  investi- 
gation— the  directive  which  scientific  investigation  has 
to  take,  in  order  to  reach  more  general  points  of  view— 
we  could  declare  ourselves  in  full  accord  with  it.  All 
investigation  strives  after  a  unity  of  principle  ;  this 
impulse  is  a  scientific  leading  motive  of  our  nature. 
Besides  the  absolute  limits  of  our  knowledge,  there  are 
still  enough  relative  and  provisory  limits  to  it ;  and 
there  also  are  enough  low  points  of  view,  mistakes,  and 
imperfections  in  science,  to  justify  us  when  we  expressly 
form  and  establish  monism  as  a  maxim  of  scientific 
investigation.  All  those  theories  and  points  of  view 
need  such  a  spur  and  corrective,  which  are  hastily 
satisfied  with  a  dualistic  or  a  still  farther  expanded  limit 
of  our  knowledge.  Among  them  we  rank  in  theology 
the  antique  heathenish  dualism  which  separates  God  and 
the  world  in  such  a  way  that  God  is  but  the  architect 
of  the  eternal  matter,  existing  independently  of  God ; 
and  also  the  modern  deistic  dualism  which  considers 
only  the  elements,  principles,  and  beginning  of  the 
world,  as  dependent  on  God,  but  not  the  entire  course  of 
their  developments  as  a  whole  and  in  detail.  In  phil- 
osophy, taken  in  a  narrower  sense,  we  reckon  with  them 
the  one-sided  atomism  which  can  no  longer  find  the 
connecting  link  between  the  single  elements  of  the 
world,  or  the  one-sided  assertion  of  realism  or  idealism, 
since  at  this  time  all  views  of  the  world  which  win 
acceptance  from  the  present  generation  claim  the  praise 
of  showing  the  reconciliation  and  higher  unity  of  realism 
and  idealism.  In  anthropology,  there  belongs  to  them 


METAPHYSICAL   CONCLUSIONS.  179 

such  a  treatment  of  psychology  and  physiology,  that  the 
one  science  does  not  trouble  itself  about  the  other,  and 
the  investigation  does  not  seek  or  keep  in  *mind  that 
which  is  common  to  both,  or  that  which  is  higher  and 
superior  to  them;  and  in  all  natural  sciences,  every  mode 
of  investigation  belongs  to  them,  where  the  single 
science  retains  no  sympathy  with  all  other  sciences  and 
with  the  principles  of  all  scientific  investigation.  In 
regard  to  these  low  points  of  view,  mistakes,  or  imper- 
fections, monism  certainly  is  a  correct  and  necessary 
maxim  of  investigation  ;  but  this  maxim  ought  not  to 
lead  us  so  far  that  we — as  very  often  happens  from  the 
unity  or  the  possibility  of  grouping  several  forms  of 
existence  under  general  conceptions — make  an  identity, 
that  we  efface  the  differences  instead  of  explaining  them, 
and  then  think  the  effacement  is  an  explanation;  that 
we  set  forth  the  assumed  form  of  unity  as  if  one  we 
had  found,  and  in  this  manner  falsify  the  method  of 
knowing.  For  as  certainly  and  as  much  as  man  is  sub- 
ject to  the  dangers  of  error  and  falsification,  just  so 
certainly  and  so  little  is  nature  subject  to  falsification. 

But  if  the  name  "  monism  "  is  to  designate  a  certain 
mew  of  the  world,  it  is  for  such  a  designation  either  too 
comprehensive  and  quite  applicable  to  all  views  which 
have  a  right  to  the  name  of  view  of  the  world ;  or  it 
is  misleading,  and  not  applicable  to  any.  For  the  name, 
as  if  it  were  properly  called  henism,  either  expresses 
only  the  unity  of  the  principle  of  the  world,  and  desig- 
nates a  quality  which  is  the  characteristic  of  every  view 
of  the  world,  and  which  especially  belongs  to  theism  in 
a  clearer  and  more  perfect  way  than  to  any  other  stand- 
point ;  or  the  name  is  used  to  attest  that  the  world  alone 


180  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

exists,  and  that  monism  knows  of  but  one  existence, — 
namely,  that  of  the  world  ;  while  the  contrary  view  of 
the  world — that  of  theism,  which  in  a  manner  wholly 
incompetent,  and  historically  wholly  unjustified,  is  called 
dualism — supposes  two  existences,  God  and  the  world. 
But  then  this  name  does  not  correctly  represent  either 
itself^or  theism.  It  does  not  correctly  represent  itself : 
for  the  so-called  monism  does  not,  indeed,  suppose  that 
that  which  appears  in  the  world  is  the  really  existing, 
or  that  the  processes  which  come  into  appearance  have 
again  their  final  cause  only  in  the  appearance,  but  it 
seeks  the  final  causes  of  the  phenomena  in  laws  and 
principles  which  can  no  longer  be  observed  by  our 
senses,  and  of  those  it  again  seeks  the  common,  highest, 
and  very  last  principle,  the  perception  of  which  it  either, 
with  Hackel,  renounces  or  finds  it,  with  other  theories, 
now  in  atomism,  and  in  attraction  and  repulsion,  then  in 
the  law  of  causality.  Thus  it  has  not  only  a  single  ex- 
istence and  mode  of  existence,  but  it  does  exactly  the 
same  thing  that  theism  does :  it  seeks  the  final  princi- 
ples of  the  world.  And  it  does  not  correctly  represent 
theism:  for  theism  also  does  not  know  of  two  existences 
to  which  the  idea  of  existing  is  applicable  in  fully  the 
same  way — namely,  the  world  and  God — but  in  seeking 
a  cause  for  the  existence  of  the  world,  it  finds  it  in  God  ; 
the  world,  according  to  its  view,  only  exists  by  the  fact 
that  it  exists  in  and  through  God.  So  theism  in  this 
sense  also  contests  with  monism  for  the  right  of  the 
name. 

Therefore,  when  teleology  allows  the  opponent's 
view  of  the  world  to  appropriate  the  name  monism 
exclusively  to  itself,  it  can  do  this  only  in  the  same 


METAPHYSICAL   CONCLUSIONS.  181 

sense  as  that  in  which,  in  order  to  avoid  disputes,  we  are 
satisfied  with  many  irrational  names  which  have  forced 
themselves  upon  us ;  as,  for  instance,  we  can  perhaps 
call  the  clerical  party  in  Bavaria  the  patriotic,  because 
it  calls  itself  so,  or  as  we  accept  the  title  of  the  ultra- 
montane paper  "Germania,"  at  Berlin,  without  conced- 
ing to  the  bearers  of  those  names  the  care  of  patriotism 
and  of  the  interests  of  the  German  empire  in  a  higher 
degree  than  to  parties  and  papers  of  a  different  stand- 
point. In  fact,  this  linguistic  arbitrariness  does  not 
particularly  tend  to  clearness  of  conception  and  to  the 
avoidance  of  obscure  phrases. 


PART  II. 


THE  POSITION  OF  THE 

THEOBIES    IN    REFEKEISTCE    TO 
RELIGION  AISTD  MOEALITY. 


(183) 


BOOK   I. 

HISTORICAL   AND   CRITICAL. 


PLAN   OF   TREATMENT. 

In  discussing  the  conclusions  which  have  been  drawn 
by  Darwinism  in  reference  to  religion  and  morality,  it 
would  seem  appropriate  to  treat  of  the  two  realms 
together.  For  the  grouping  which  we  have  to  give  to 
the  different  conclusions  of  Darwinian  tendencies,  in 
their  position  in  reference  to  religion,  is  nearly  the  same 
which  they  also  receive  in  their  position  in  reference  to 
ethical  questions. 

But,  nevertheless,  we  prefer  to  separate  the  two 
'questions ;  not  only  because  in  fact  one  author  has  laid 
more  stress  upon  the  religious  realm,  another  more  upon 
the  ethical,  but  because  in  reality,  and  also  in  the  solu- 
tion which  we  shall  try  to  give  to  the  problems  presented 
by  them,  both  realms,  although  closely  interwoven,  and 
limited  by  one  another,  still  are  theoretically  to  be  treat- 
ed apart. 

In  order  not  to  exceed  too  much  the  limits  of  our 
task,  we  must  avoid  going  more  into  the  details  of  the 
relations  between  religion  and  morality  in  general,  than 
is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  solution  of  our  main 
problem.  This  restriction  we  can  easily  put  on  our- 
selves. For,  first,  every  one  who  reflects  at  all  on 
human  life  and  action,  and  on  his  own  religious  and 

(185) 


186  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

moral  conduct,  generally  has  a  very  correct,  instinctive, 
and  direct  conception  and  perception  as  to  the  realm  of 
the  religious  as  well  as  of  the  moral — as  to  their  mutual 
differences,  as  well  as  to  their  reciprocal  relations — even 
if  he  has  not  yet  tried  to  bring  this  conception  into  ideas 
and  formulas  ;  and,  secondly,  it  will  not  be  difficult  to 
present  a  short  formula  as  to  the  ideal  relation  between 
the  religious  and  the  moral,  sufficient  for  the  wants  of 
science  as  well  as  for  the  practical  needs  of  a  more 
detailed  investigation.  The  religious  is  the  relation  of 
our  personality  to  God  ;  the  moral,  the  relation  of  it  to 
the  world,  comprehensively  taken,  ourselves  included. 
We  purposely  call  it  a  relation  of  our  personality,  and 
not  merely  a  relation  of  man,  because  in  the  religious 
the  ethical  moment  of  self-determination  which  is 
included  in  the  idea  of  personality,  is  an  essential  factor; 
and  because  we  gladly  make  it  conspicuous,  partly  in 
opposition  to  the  one-sidedness  of  Schleiermacher's  feel- 
ing of  absolute  dependence,  partly  to  prevent  a  contrary 
misunderstanding  of  our  own  view,  as  if  we  found 
the  seat  of  religion  in  the  activity  of  knowledge.  For 
when,  in  our  representation  of  the  Darwinian  con- 
clusions and  in  our  own  investigation,  we  proceed  as 
objectively  as  possibh,  and  try  to  avoid  all  systematiza- 
tion  which  is  unfruitful  for  our  task,  in  discussing  the 
Darwinian  theories  in  reference  to  religion,  we  shall 
have  to  take  chiefly  into  consideration  their  relation  to 
religion  in  an  objective  sense,  and  chiefly  also  their  rela- 
tion to  the  contents  of  religion  ;  but  this  would  make  it 
appear  that  we  supposed  religion  in  a  subjective  sense, 
religiousness,  to  be  in  the  first  place  an  activity  and  a 
possession  of  knowledge.  Nothing  lies  farther  from  us 


PLAN    OF    TREATMENT.  187 

than  this  thought ;  although  religiousness  certainly  has 
and  asks  for  solid,  objectively  true,  and  really  possessed 
salvation,  and  however  little  we  would  overlook  the  word 
of  the  Lord  :  "  And  this  is  life  eternal,  that  they  might 
know  thee,  the  only  true  God,  and  Jesus  Christ,  whom 
thou  hast  sent."  (John  xvii,  3.) 

Those  who  wish  to  inform  themselves  in  regard  to 
the  relation  of  religion  and  morality,  will  find  the  nec- 
essary information  in  Martensen's  "Ethik"  ("Ethics  "), 
in  Otto  Pfleiderer's  monograph,  which  partly  assumes  a 
contrary  point  of  view,  and  in  a  thorough  essay  of 
Julius  Kostlin  (Theol.  Studien  und  Kritiken,  1870,  I), 
which  appeared  before  the  "  Ethics  "  of  Martensen. 

In  undertaking  now  to  represent  the  conclusions 
which  have  been  drawn  from  Darwinism,  we  treat  of  the 
religious  realm  as  the  higher,  a  realm  demanding  a  sound 
morality  prior  to  the  moral  realm  ;  and  we  begin  with 
those  conclusions  which  take  a  hostile  position  in  refer- 
ence to  religion,  in  order  to  proceed  from  them  to  the 
moderate  and  friendly  relations 


188  THE   THEORIES   OF   DAKWIN. 


A.     THE  DARWINIAN  THEORIES  AND 
RELIGION. 

CHAPTER   I. 

MORE  OR  LESS   NEGATIVE   POSITION   IN  REFERENCE 
TO  RELIGION. 

§  1.      Extreme  Negation.     L.   Buchner  and  Consistent 
Materialism. 

The  common  point  of  beginning  and  attack  of  all 
those  who  take  a  negative  position  against  religion, 
is  the  rejection  of  teleology.  The  most  advanced  of  all 
materialists,  Ludwig  Biichner,  in  his  self-criticism,  which 
he  gives  in  his  "Natur  und  Wissenschaft "  ("  Nature 
and  Science"),  on  page  465,  openly  declares,  and  quite 
correctly,  that  with  the  success  or  failure  of  the  attacks 
upon  teleology  materialism  itself  stands  or  falls. 

Now  while  many,  as  we  shall  immediately  see, 
although  opposed  to  a  teleological  view  of  the 
world,  still  are  inclined  to  give  a  more  or  less  lasting 
value  to  certain  psychical  processes  which  may  be 
called  by  the  name  religion,  Biichner,  on  the  contrary, 
makes  a  direct  attack  upon  everything  which  is  thus 
called.  He  does  not  render  it  difficult  for  us  to  review 
his  position.  For,  after  having  given  it  openly,  but 
still  with  certain  relative  modifications,  in  different 
publications  (especially  in  his  book  "  Force  and  Matter," 
which  appeared  in  1855  in  the  first  edition,  and  in  1872 
in  the  twelfth)  he  gives  it  in  cynical  nakedness  in  the 
lectures  with  which  he  travelled  through  America  and 


POSITION   IN   REFERENCE   TO  RELIGION  189 

Germany  in  1872-1 8 74,  and  the  contents  of  which  he 
has  made  public  in  his  pamphlet:  "Der  Gottesbegriff 
und  dessen  Bedeutung  in  der  Gegenwart "  ("  The  Idea  of 
God,  and  its  Importance  at  the  Present  Time"),  Leipzig, 
1874,  Theo.  Thomas.  As  is  said  in  the  preface,  the 
design  of  the  lecture  is  "to  give  a  renewed  impulse 
to  the  final  and  definitive  elimination  of  an  idea  which, 
according  to  the  opinion  of  the  author,  obstructs  our 
whole  spiritual,  social,  and  political  development, 
as  no  other  idea  does."  He  means  the  idea  of  God  ;  not 
merely  the  theistic  idea  of  a  personal  God,  but  the  idea 
of  God  in  general.  For  even  the  pantheistic  idea  of 
God,  which  he  had  formerly  treated  with  a  certain  polite 
reserve,  finds  in  his  eyes  even  less  favor  than  the 
theistic.  He  says  :  "If  the  absurdity  is  already  great 
enough  in  theism,  it  is  possibly  still  greater  in  panthe- 
ism, which  moreover  has  always  played  a  great  rdle  in 
philosophy;"  and,  "Christianity  has  but  injured  the 
spiritual  and  material  progress  of  mankind."  In 
agreement  with  Strauss,  he  sees  the  earliest  origin 
of  the  idea  of  God  only  in  ignorance  and  fear.  "  Every 
creating,  preserving,  or  reigning  principle  in  the  world 
is  done  away  with,  and  there  remains  as  highest  spirit- 
ual power  present  in  the  world  only  human  reason. 
Atheism  or  philosophic  monism  alone  leads  to  freedom, 
to  reason,  progress,  acknowledgment  of  true  humanity, 
—in  short  to  humanism." 

This  materialistic  opposition  to  everything  which  is 
called  religion,  is  certainly  independent  of  Darwinism, 
and  originated  before  its  time  ;  but  since  Biichner  him- 
self sees  in  Darwinism  but  a  grand  confirmation  of  his 
view  of  the  world,  and  believes  that  he  has  found  in  it 


190  THE   THEORIES   OF  DAK  WIN. 

that  principle  which,  with  urgent  necessity,  banishes  tel- 
eology from  the  contemplation  of  nature  —  teleology, 
with  the  defeat  or  victory  of  which  materialism  stands 
or  falls, — we  are  entitled  and  obliged  to  rank  even  this 
view  of  the  world  among  the  conclusions  which  in  ref- 
erence to  religion  have  been  drawn  from  the  theories  of 
Darwin.  And,  indeed,  it  is  a  most  extreme  conclusion, 
and  simply  puts  itself  in  the  category  of  negation  to  the 
contents  of  religion,  as  well  as  to  religion  in  a  subjective 
sense,  to  religious  and  pious  conduct.  It  can  be  clearly 
seen  how  firmly  a  view  of  the  world  which  makes  war 
against  religion  and  the  idea  of  God  its  special  life-task, 
is  connected  with  all  those  destructive  elements  which 
lie  in  human  nature,  and  especially  in  the  social  circum- 
stances of  the  present,  and  which  have  their  only  and 
final  ethical  limit  in  the  consciousness  of  God  which,  as 
a  power  never  wholly  to  be  effaced,  lies  in  the  depth  of 
the  soul  of  even  those  who  wander  farthest  from  a  moral 
and  spiritual  life. 

§  2.     Replacement  of  Religion  through  a  Religious  Wor- 
ship of  the  Universe.  Strauss,  Oskar  Schmidt,  Hackel. 

Strauss,  in  that  testament  of  his  scientific  life  and 
activity,  "The  Old  Faith  and  the  New,"  takes  a  some- 
what different  position  in  reference  to  religion.  Even 
for  him,  the  whole  idea  of  God  is  abolished  and  replaced 
by  the  idea  of  the  cosmos  ;  but  he  makes  this  cosmos 
the  object  of  religious  worship,  and  has  exactly  the 
same  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  in  regard  to  it, 
which,  according  to  Schleiermacher,  constitutes  the 
nature  of  religion.  When  Arthur  Schopenhauer  or 


POSITION   IN   REFERENCE   TO   RELIGION.  191 

Eduard  von  Hartmann  bring  forth  their  pessimistic 
accusations  against  the  universe,  his  religious  sensation 
reacts  against  it  in  the  same  manner  as  the  organism 
against  the  prick  of  a  needle.  This  pessimism,  he  says, 
acts  upon  reason  as  an  absurdity,  but  upon  sensation  as 
blasphemy.  "  We  demand  the  same  piety  for  our 
cosmos  that  the  devout  of  old  demanded  for  his  God. 
If  wounded,  our  feeling  for  the  cosmos  simply  reacts  in 
a  religious  manner."  While,  therefore,  Strauss,  to  the 
question,  "Are  we  still  Christians?"  gives  an  emphatic 
"No,"  he  answers  the  question,  "Have  we  still  a  relig- 
ion ?"  with  "  Yes  or  No,  according  to  the  spirit  of  the 
inquiry. " 

Among  men  of  science  who  wrote  about  Darwinism, 
Oskar  Schmidt,  in  his  before-quoted  publication,  "The 
Doctrine  of  Descent  and  Darwinism,"  seems  to  take 
exactly  the  same  position  in  reference  to  religion.  At 
least,  he  unreservedly  professes  monism,  rejects  all  tele- 
ological  conceptions  as  imperfections,  speaks  of  the 
caprice  of  a  personal  God,  and  sees  the  conception  that 
the  idea  of  God  is  immanent  in  human  nature  invali- 
dated by  the  fact  "  that  many  millions  in  the  most  culti- 
vated nations,  and  among  them  the  most  eminent  and 
lucid  thinkers,  have  not  the  consciousness  of  a  personal 
God  ;  those  millions  of  whom  the  heroic  Strauss  became 
the  spokesman." 

Hackel,  it  is  true,  mentions  Strauss  only  in  the  pre- 
face of  the  fourth  edition  of  his  "Natural  History  of 
Creation,"  but  here  he  greets  "  The  Old  Faith  and  the 
New "  as  the  confession  which  he  also  makes,  and  thus 
gives  us  an  express  right  to  place  him  in  this  class, 
although  he  calls  his  worship  of  the  universe  religion  ; 


192  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

it  is,  however,  a  classification  which  his  whole  position 
compelled  us  to  give  him.  It  is  true,  he  speaks  very 
warmly  of  his  own  religion,  which  is  founded  on  the 
clear  knowledge  of  nature  and  its  inexhaustible  abund- 
ance of  manifestations,  and  which,  as  "  simple  religion 
of  nature,"  will  in  the  future  act  upon  the  course  of  de- 
velopment of  mankind,  ennobling  and  perfecting  it  in  a 
far  higher  degree  than  the  various  ecclesiastic  religions 
of  the  different  nations,  "resting  on  a  blind  belief  in  the 
vague  secrets  and  mythical  revelations  of  a  sacerdotal 
caste."  (Nat.  Hist,  of  Cr.,  Vol.  II,  p.  369.)  He  also 
repeatedly  speaks  of  "manifestations  of  nature,"  and 
even  of  a  "divine  Spirit  which  is  everywhere  active 
in  nature."  In  that  respect  he  seems  to  take  in 
reference  to  religion,  without  regard  to  the  historical 
form  in  which  it  appeared  as  Christian  religion,  a  still 
more  friendly  and  less  problematic  position  than  Strauss. 
Moreover,  he  demands  for  every  individual  the  full 
right  of  forming  his  own  religion  ;  among  the  more 
highly  developed  species  of  men,  he  says,  every  inde- 
pendent and  highly  developed  individual,  every  original 
person,  has  his  own  religion,  his  own  God  ;  and  it  would 
certainly,  therefore,  not  be  arrogant  if  he  should  also 
claim  the  right  of  forming  his  own  conception  of  God, 
his  own  religion.  But  when  we  try  to  form  a  more- 
complete  idea  of  his  position  in  reference  to  religion,  we 
really  do  not  find  any  essential  difference  between  it  and 
that  of  Strauss.  According  to  repeated  utterances,  he 
can  not  imagine  the  personal  Creator  without  caprice 
and  arbitrariness;  again  and  again  he  advocates  monism 
with  great  warmth,  and  also  identifies,  in  express  words> 
God  and  the  universe,  God  and  nature.  "Correspond- 


POSITION    IN   REFERENCE   TO   RELIGION.  193 

ing  to  our  progressive  perception  of  nature  and  our  im- 
movable conviction  of  the  truth  of  the  evolution  theory, 
our  religion  can  be  only  a  religion  of  nature"  "  In  re- 
jecting the  dualistic  conception  of  nature  and  the  herewith 
connected  amphitheistic  conception  of  God,  *  *  *  we 
certainly  lose  the  hypothesis  of  a  personal  Creator  ;  but 
we  gain  in  its  place  the  undoubtedly  more  worthy  and 
more  perfect  conception  of  a  divine  Spirit  which  pene- 
trates and  fills  the  universe. "  Furthermore,  the  faith  in 
a  personal  Creator  is  called  a  low  dualistic  conception  of 
God,  which  corresponds  to  a  low  animal  stage  of 
development  of  the  human  organism.  The  more  highly 
developed  man  of  the  present,  he  says,  is  capable  of 
and  intended  for  an  infinitely  nobler  and  sublimer  mon- 
istic idea  of  God,  to  which  belongs  the  future,  and 
through  which  we  attain  a  more  sublime  conception  of 
the  unity  of  God  and  nature.  According  to  his  Anthro- 
pogeny,  the  belief  that  the  hand  of  a  Creator  has 
arranged  all  things  with  wisdom  and  intelligence  is 
an  ancient  story  and  an  empty  phrase. 

§   3.     Pious  denunciation    of  the   Knowability   of  God. 
Wilhelm  Bleek,  Albert  Lange,  Herbert  Spencer. 

A  more  friendly  position  in  reference  to  religion  is 
taken  by  those  who  hold,  not  directly  negative,  but  only 
decidedly  sceptical  views  of  the  existence  of  God  ;  who 
reduce  the  relative  unsearchableness  of  God,  which  every 
religious  standpoint  admits,  to  an  absolute  unknowabil- 
ity  ;  and  who  find  the  nature  of  religion  either  in  a  pious 
acknowledgment  of  this  unknowability,  or  in  a  poetical 
substitute  for  the  knowledge  of  God,  i.e.,  comprehend- 
ing the  unknowable  in  a  figure.  The  most  prominent 
13 


11M-  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

advocates  of  this  position  are,  on  the  side  of  exact 
investigation,  Wilhelm  Bleek  ;  and  on  that  of  philoso- 
phy, Albert  Lange  in  Germany  and  Herbert  Spencer  in 
England.  Since  all  three  use  the  Darwinian  thecries  for 
their  systems,  they  also  belong  to  the  ranks  of  our  his- 
tori co-critical  essay. 

Wilhelm  Bleek,  in  the  preface  to  his  "Ursprung  der 
Sprache  "  ("  Origin  of  Language  "),  rejects  all  claims  of  a 
positively  revealed  religion  to  an  objective  truth — not  in 
such  a  way  as  to  substitute  the  universe  in  place  of  God, 
but  so  that  he  remains  sceptical  in  reference  to  every 
attempt  at  forming  an  idea  of  God,  demands  a  pious  and 
modest  confession  of  this  non-understanding  by  man, 
and  sees  in  this  reverential  modesty  the  certainly  not 
very  significant  nature  of  his  religion.  In  the  preface 
he  says  that  all  worship  originates  in  reverence  for 
ancestors,  and  that  even  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement 
of  modern  theology  has  its  origin  there.  The  next  step 
after  reverence  for  ancestors  was  the  worship  of  nature. 
But  the  grand  turning-point  at  which  the  mythological 
mode  of  view  gives  way — in  which  mode  of  view  he 
also  reckons  Christianity — is  the  giving  up  of  the  idea  of 
the  necessity  of  an  atonement ;  for  this  whole  idea  is  but 
anthropomorphism.  It  is  when  man  has  recognized  the 
impossibility  of  a  being,  similar  to  man,  as  the  final 
cause  of  all  existences,  and  in  reverential  modesty  has 
admitted  his  ignorance  in  reference  to  the  nature  of  the 
origin  of  things,  that  he  learns  to  understand  how  nar- 
row a  view  he  has  of  God  when  he  thinks  that  he  under- 
stands him. 

On  the  side  of  philosophy,  Albert  Lange  and  Herbert 
Spencer  reach  similar  results.  Albert  Lange,  in  his 


POSITION   IN   REFERENCE   TO   RELIGION.  195 

"  History  of  Materialism,"  starting  especially  from 
premises  of  Kant,  reaches  the  conclusion  that  the  "thing 
per  se, "  the  ' '  intelligible  world, "  is  absolutely  hidden  to 
us.  What  we  perceive  is  but  the  world  of  appearances  ; 
and  the  fact  that  we  perceive  it,  and  perceive  it  as  we 
do,  is  originally  founded  in  the  human  organization. 
By  virtue  of  this  organization  we  are  bound, 
in  all  our  knowledge  of  the  world  of  appearances, 
to  the  law  of  causality.  Science  does  not  get  beyond 
this  causal  chain  of  finite  and  relative  causes  and 
effects;  to  the  "thing perse "  there  is  nowhere  to  be  found 
a  bridge,  not  even  as  Kant  supposes,  in  the  categoric 
imperative,  nor  in  ideas.  Inasmuch  as  science  does  not 
get  beygnd  this  chain,  it  is  materialistic  ;  inasmuch  as  it 
must  nevertheless  perceive  the  existence,  or  at  least  the 
possibility  of  the  existence,  of  a  "  thing  per  se,"  even  if 
it  does  "not  see  any  way  to  its  perception,  it  is  idealistic. 
But  man  also  has  ideal  impulses,  and  he  has  to  follow 
them  just  as  much  as  the  impulse  of  perception.  By 
virtue  of  these  ideal  impulses,  he  makes  in  imagination 
a  picture  of  the  "  thing  per  se  "  in  the  activity  of  philos- 
ophic speculation,  art,  and  religion.  Philosophic  specu- 
lation is  but  imaginative  conceptions.  It  has  always  a 
value  in  the  history  of  culture,  as  a  summing-up  of  the 
elements  of  culture  and  of  the  spiritual  impulses  and 
treasures  of  a  certain  time;  but  it  errs  as  soon  as  it  claims 
to  be  more  than  imaginative  conceptions — namely,  an 
adequate  representation  of  the  final  cause  of  all  things — 
for  it  lacks  the  necessary  basis  of  experience.  Art  does 
not  claim  this,  and  therefore  is  not  exposed  to  that  dan- 
ger of  deception.  Religion  satisfies  a  need  of  the  heart, 
to  have  a  home  of  the  spirit  in  the  "  thing  per  se"  ;  but 


196  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN 

since  the  "  thing  per  se"  is  not  accessible  for  us,  religion 
creates  in  mind  that  home,  in  order  to  rise  above  the 
common  reality  to  it.  Lange  finds  the  highest  realization 
of  a  perfect  satisfaction  of  that  impulse  in  the  philosophic 
poems  of  Schiller.  He  sees  the  quintessence  of  religion 
expressly  "  in  the  elevation  of  minds  above  the  real,  and 
and  in  the  creation  of  a  home  of  the  spirit.'1  Religion 
remains  untouched  in  its  full  vital  power,  as  long  as  it 
retains  that  as  its  quintessence  ;  but  it  is  exposed  to  all 
the  dangers  of  a  destructive  criticism  as  soon  as  it  seeks 
its  quintessence  in  something  else — for  instance,  in  cer- 
tain doctrines  of  God,  the  human  soul,  creation  of  the 
world,  etc. 

Herbert  Spencer  is  in  full  accord  with  Lange  in 
regard  to  the  theory  of  an  absolute  indiscernibleness  of 
the  final  cause  of  all  things  ;  but  he  reaches  this  result  in 
a  somewhat  different  way,  and  from  his  premises  infers 
a  different  modification  of  the  nature  of  religion.  In  his 
"First  Principles"  he  appears  to  be  a  true  scholar  of  the 
English  and  Scotch  schools  of  philosophy,  from  which  he 
takes  his  start  in  conscious  and  express  opposition  to  the 
German  modes  of  speculation,  and  begins  with  an  empiric 
comparison  of  all  actual  contrasts  existing  in  the  world 
and  in  human  life.  He  follows  the  axiom  that  a  parti- 
cle of  truth  lies  at  the  basis  of  every  error,  and  that  each 
contrast  becomes  a  contrast  only  by  the  fact  that  the  two 
poles  of  the  contrast  have  something  in  common.  Now, 
in  comparing  with  one  another  all  contrasts  between 
religion  and  science,  and  all  forms  of  religiousness  and 
irreligiousness,  from  fetishism  up  to  monotheism,  pan- 
theism, and  atheism,  all  imaginable  cosmogonies,  he 
finds,  as  the  last  truth  common  to  all,  and  therefore 


POSITION    IN    REFERENCE   TO    RELIGION.  197 

alone  absolutely  certain,  the  absolute  indiscemibleness  of 
the  final  cause  of  all  things.  On  page  44  he  says,  that 
religions  diametrically  opposed  in  their  overt  dogmas, 
are  yet  perfectly  at  one  in  the  tacit  conviction  that  there 
is  a  problem  to  be  solved,  that  the  existence  of  the  world 
with  all  it  contains  is  a  mystery  ever  pressing  for  inter- 
pretation; and  on  page  45,  that  the  omnipresence  of  some- 
thing which  passes  comprehension,  is  that  which  remains 
unquestionable.  And  on  page  46  he  concludes:  "If 
Religion  and  Science  are  to  be  reconciled,  the  basis  of 
reconciliation  must  be  this  deepest,  widest,  and  most 
certain  of  all  facts  — that  the  Power  which  the  Universe 
manifests  to  us  is  utterly  inscrutable."  The  acknowl- 
edgment of  this  fact  is  religiousness  ;  the  contrary  of  it 
is  irreligiousness  and  anthropomorphistic  arrogance,  even 
if  it  appears  in  the  name  of  religiousness.  "Volumes 
might  be  written  upon  the  impiety  of  the  pious"  (p.  110). 

A  comparison  of  the  two  philosophers  is  interesting. 

In  one  direction,  Lange  does  more  justice  to  the 
religious  need  than  Spencer  does.  While  he  sees  in 
religion  the  metaphorical  realization  of  the  needs  of  the 
heart,  of  a  "creation  of  a  home  of  the  spirit,"  he  gives 
to  the  heart  full  play  to  satisfy  its  need,  and  to  create 
and  arrange  for  itself  a  spiritual  home  entirely  according 
to  its  need.  He  especially  acknowledges  repeatedly  the 
need  of  the  heart  for  atonement,  and  vigorously  defends 
this  need  and  its  satisfaction  against  Liberal  Theologians 
(Reform theologen),  like  Heinrich  Lang;  he  also  stands, 
as  we  see,  in  satisfactory  contrast  to  Wilhelm  Bleek. 
Without  reserve,  he  admits  into  the  hymn-book  of  his 
religion  of  the  future  hymns  like  that  of  Gerhard : 
"  O  Haupt  voll  Blut  und  Wunden  "  ("  O  Sacred  Head, 


198  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

now  wounded  ").  To  be  sure,  all  the  concessions  he  makes 
to  religion  sink  again  to  the  value  of  a  beautiful  illusion, 
from  the  fact  that  for  him  they  are  but  metaphorical 
approaches  to  the  cause  of  all  things,  which  after  all 
still  remains  inaccessible.  But  nevertheless,  in  conse- 
quence of  that  idea  of  religion,  religious  life,  and  espe- 
cially also  religious  service,  has  infinitely  more  room  for 
rich  development  in  Lange  than  in  Spencer.  For, 
according  to  the  view  of  the  latter,  religiousness  consists 
in  nothing  else  but  the  perception  and  acknowledgment 
of  this  indiscernibleness  of  the  final  cause.  All  other 
things  which  may  be  still  connected  with  religious  life 
and  reasoning,  are  but.a  misty  veil.  The  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  indiscernibleness  of  the  final  cause  of  all 
things  alone  is  the  quintessence  of  religion.  But  such 
a  religiousness,  which  expressly  forbids  imagining  any 
quality  or  any  state  of  the  highest  being,  certainly  would 
be,  as  Prof.  Huxley  correctly  says  in  his  "  Lay  Sermons,1" 
for  the  most  part  of  the  silent  sort. 

While  thus  Lange's  conception  of  religion  is  superior 
to  that  of  Spencer  in  admitting  a  richer  development  of 
religious  life,  a  more  various  satisfaction  of  the  religious 
need,  in  another  direction  Spencer  is  superior.  He 
comes  considerably  nearer  to  a  correct  and  full  concep- 
tion of  God  than  Lange.  His  idea  of  the  final  cause 
of  all  things  does  not  lie  entirely  in  the  conception  that 
it  is  the  absolute  indiscernible  ;  but  Spencer  is  fully  in 
earnest  with  the  idea  that  this  indiscernible  is  the  real 
cause  of  the  world  and  of  all  single  existences  in  it.  He 
accordingly  forbids  giving  certain  attributes  to  the  abso- 
lute— not  because  it  would  be  doubtful  whether  it  has 
attributes  or  not,  but  because  it  stands  above  all  these 


POSITION    IN    REFERENCE   TO    RELIGION.  199 

imaginable  attributes  as  their  real  cause.  Therefore  he 
forbids,  for  instance,  attributing  personality,  intelligence, 
will,  to  the  highest  being — not  because  it  could  also  be 
impersonal,  and  in  want  of  intelligence  and  will,  but 
because  it  stands  above  all  these  attributes  as  their  high- 
est real  cause,  and  because  we  can  think  of  all  these 
attributes  only  in  human  analogy,  and  therefore,  when 
attributed  to  the  highest  being,  can  think  of  them  only 
in  rejectable  anthropomorphism.  He  says,  on  page  109: 
"  Those  who  espouse  this  position  [personality  of  God], 
make  the  erroneous  assumption  that  the  choice  is  between 
personality  and  something  lower  than  personality ; 
whereas  the  choice  is  rather  between  personality  and 
something  higher.  Is  it  not  just  possible  that  there  is  a 
mode  of  being  as  much  transcending  Intelligence  and 

o  o  o 

Will,  as  these  transcend  mechanical  motion  ?  It  is  true 
that  we  are  totally  unable  to  conceive  any  such  higher 
mode  of  being.  But  this  is  not  a  reason  for  questioning 
its  existence  ;  it  is  rather  the  reverse The  Ulti- 
mate Cause  cannot  in  any  respect  be  conceived  by  us 
because  it  is  in  every  respect  greater  than  can  be  con- 
ceived." 

Thus  we  find  in  Lange  a  fuller  and  richer  conception 
of  the  subject  of  religion  ;  but  this  conception  is  in  want 
of  one  thing — without  which  it  is  in  want  of  everything 
—namely,  of  nothing  less  than  of  the  objective  reality. 
Spencer's  religiousness  has  a  much  more  meagre  and 
less  varied  character  :  the  acknowledgment  and  venera- 
tion of  the  indiscernible  ;  but  he  nevertheless  gives  us 
with  this  content  and  object  a  real  object,  even  an  object 
of  veneration^  in  which  the  abundance  of  all  reality  is 
hidden,  with  the  only  conception  that  the  indiscernible 


200  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

does  not  let  us  look  into  its  cornucopia,  but  only  lets  us 
judge  of  the  abundance  of  its  contents  by  the  richness 
of  that  which  it  pours  over  us  in  the  world  of  the  rela- 
tively perceptible. 

It  will  not  be  difficult  to  show  the  points  at  which 
each  of  these  writers  would  have  been  able,  had  he  so 
wished,  to  lead  his  conception  of  religion,  the  one  to  a 
real,  the  other  to  a  full  content. 

Lange  finds  the  last  principle  of  perception  which  is 
accessible  to  us,  in  our  organization.  Now  from  our 
organization  originate  not  only  all  modes  of  the  percep- 
tion of  the  empirical  world,  but  just  as  well  all  our  ideal 
impulses,  especially  the  ethical.  Which  one  of  all  those 
dispositions,  impulses,  and  activities  has  the  precedence, 
mainly  depends  upon  the  value  which  man  places  upon 
them.  '  Now,  when  man  attributes  to  the  ideal  and 
ethical  a  higher  value  than  to  the  empirical,  when  in 
reflecting  about  himself  he  finds  that  even  in  the  normal 
individual  the  empirical,  sensual,  and  material  is 
subordinate  and  subject  to  the  ideal  and  especially 
to  the  ethical,  then  from  the  standpoint  of  Lange 
he  is  right,  and  obliged  to  estimate  the  truth  of  that 
ideal  and  ethical  as  higher  than  the  truth  of  the  empir- 
ical world,  and  to  look  at  the  whole  empirical  world 
only  as  being  in  the  service  of  that  ideal  world.  When, 
at  the  same  time,  we  observe  an  inner  harmony  in  our 
organization,  this  observation  gives  us  the  right  and  the 
duty  of  controlling  the  truth  of  our  empirical  perception 
by  the  truth  of  the  results  of  our  ideal  and  our  ethical 
activity,  and  the  latter  again  by  the  former.  For  if  we 
do  not  wish  to  suppose  that  the  human  organization  aims 
at  a  grand  deception  of  mankind,  we  have,  in  spite  of 


POSITION   IN    REFERENCE   TO   RELIGION.  201 

the  superiority  of  the  ideal  and  ethical  activities,  to 
establish  the  axiom  that  the  empirical  and  the  ideal  and 
ethical  cannot  remain  in  lasting  contradiction.  Besides, 
if  we  should  add  to  this  that  a  religion  like  Christianity 
offers  to  man  that  which  it  gives  to  him  on  the  ground 
of  historical  facts,  then  the  reports  of  these  facts  will 
certainly  be  subject  to  historical  criticism  just  as  surely 
as  all  historical  reports  ;  but  if  they  are  confirmed,  the 
ideal  and  ethical  convincing  power  which  lies  in  this  re- 
ligion, unites  for  us  with  the  whole  weight  of  the  con- 
vincing power  of  the  historical  and  empirical  facts, 
although  the  reproduction  and  systematization  of  its 
contents  is  still  deficient  and  capable  of  further  devel- 
opment. 

In  Spencer's  system,  there  are  two  points  by  which 
his  own  course  of  reasoning  is  able  to  bridge  over  the 
poverty  of  his  conception  of  religion.  The  first  point, 
given  on  pages  107-108  of  his  " First  Principles,"  and 
also  elsewhere  in  his  works,  is  the  acknowledgment  that 
the  final  cause  of  all  things  is  higher  than  all  that  we 
know,  and  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  really  can  be  the 
real  cause  of  everything,  even  the  real  cause  of  the  spirit- 
ual and  ethical.  Thus  he  forbids  us  to  think  of  qualities 
of  the  highest  being,  but  he  himself  thinks  of  them  ;  for 
this  conception  of  the  highest  being  as  an  impersonal  is 
certainly  something  else  and  something  much  more  val- 
uable than  the  mere  negation  of  personality.  The  other 
point  which  might  be  able  to  lead  him  out  of  the  vacu- 
um of  his  idea  of  God,  lies  in  the  method  of  his  own 
investigation.  When  he  seeks  the  truth  by  collecting 
what  is  common  in  all  the  contrasts,  he  also  must  seek 
and  find  something  common  between  the  highest  cause 


202  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

of  all  things  on  one  side  and  of  the  world  as  a  whole 
and  in  detail  on  the  other ;  and  this  something  will 
consist  of  the  necessity  of  the  highest  cause  of  all 
things  being  so  qualified  that  it  is  able  to  bring 
into  existence  the  world  as  a  whole  and  in  detail.  If 
such  ideas  are  also  rejected  as  anthropomorphisms,  then 
all  reasoning  and  investigating  is  anthropomorphistic  ; 
and  in  that  respect  we  refer  to  what  we  had  to  say  above, 
when  treating  of  teleology  (p.  170  ff.).  The  same  Duke 
of  Argyll  whom  we  there  had  occasion  to  quote,  in  an 
article  in  the  "  Contemporary  Review"  (May,  1871), 
upon  "  Variety  as  an  Aim  in  Nature,"  has  admirably 
shown  that  it  is  the  mind  of  man  from  which  we  may 
draw  conclusions  as  to  the  nature  of  the  Creator,  and 
that  the  picture  which  we  thus  get  of  him,  can  at  the 
same  time  be  seen  true  and  yet  dim,  at  the  same  time 
real  and  yet  from  a  distance  ;  for  the  human  mind  does 
not  feel  anything  so  much  as  its  own  limitations,  and 
therefore  can  easily  imagine  each  of  his  powers  and 
talents  as  being  present  in  the  highest  being  in  infinite 
perfection.  If  Spencer  had  made  this  comparison,  and 
drawn  the  conclusions  which  follow  from  it  for  the 
nature  of  the  final  cause  of  all  things,  the  indiscernible- 
ness  of  God  would  for  him  be  reduced  to  an  unsearcha- 
bleness,  the  unknowable  be  changed  into  an  unsearcha- 
ble, and  we  could  willingly  acknowledge  the  humble 
modesty  in  regard  to  the  infinity  of  the  deity,  which  his 
philosophy  requires,  as  a  factor  of  all  true  religiousness. 
But  we  have  to  present  to  him  as  an  expression,  not  only 
of  true  religiousness,  but  also  of  true  science,  that  pas- 
sage of  the  Psalms  :  "  He  that  planted  the  ear,  shall  he 


POSITION   IN    REFERENCE   TO   RELIGION.  203 

not  hear  ?     He  that  formed  the  eye,  shall  he  not  see  ? " 
(Psalm  xciv,  9.) 

§  4.     Spinoza  and  Hegel  in  the  Garb  of  Darwin:  Carneri. 
Eduard  von  Jfartmann. 

To  the  Austrian  philosopher  Carneri  in  his  "  Sittlich- 
keit  und  Darwinismus"  ("Morality  and  Darwinism"), 
three  books  of  Ethics,  Vienna,  Bramniiller,  1871,  we 
shall  have  to  give  a  place  of  his  own. 

Inasmuch  as  religion  and  the  beautiful  are  to  him  but 
a  preliminary  stage  of  truth  which  has  to  dissolve  itself 
into  philosophy — a  philosophy  which,  inclined  to  mon- 
ism, prefers  to  call  itself  pantheism — he  takes  a  position 
in  reference  to  religion  similar  to  that  toward  material- 
ism, namely  :  a  negative  position.  But  inasmuch  as  he 
still  grants  to  religion  in  a  subjective  sense,  to  "religion 
in  the  form  of  piety,"  a  lasting  position  and  truth  (reli- 
gion, he  says,  has  truth,  but  the  positive  God  of  religion 
has  no  reality,  page  114),  and  inasmuch  as  he  ascribes  to 
it  not  only  a  transitory  pedagogical  value  for  the  masses, 
which  are  not  yet  elevated  to  the  height  of  philosophic 
reasoning,  but  a  value  also  for  the  philosopher — namely, 
the  value  of  religiousness  and  of  piety — he  rather  be- 
longs to  the  second  and  third  of  the  before-mentioned 
groups. 

Carneri,  in  his  "  Three  Books  of  Ethics,"  gives  us  a 
whole  philosophic  encyclopedia.  In  thoughts  sometimes 
rich,  but  without  regularly  arranged  and  quiet  reason- 
ing, and  in  full  command  and  employment  of  modern 
terms  which  he  uses  sometimes  like  a  genius,  but  often 
superficially  and  unjustly,  he  develops  a  view  of  the 
world  which,  although  it  appears  in  an  independent  way 


204  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

in  all  its  fundamentals,  as  regards  its  contents  takes  its 
origin  from  Spinoza,  and  as  regards  form  and  dialectics 
from  Hegel,  but  sometimes,  it  is  true,  sinks  into  weak- 
nesses of  which  these  philosophers  would  hardly  have 
been  guilty.  So,  for  instance,  when  he  simply  identifies 
religious  faith  with  conjecture,  he  takes  a  superficial  view 
which  he  has  in  common  with  Hackel  who,  among  other 
things,  repeatedly  says  that  faith  begins  where  knowl- 
edge ceases.  Dialectical  motion  is  everything  to  him. 
In  pursuing  this  dialectical  motion,  he  gives  us  a  multi- 
tude of  outlooks  into  all  imaginable  realms  of  knowledge 
and  life,  but  he  always  follows  at  the  same  time  the 
formula  of  dialectical  motion,  and,  where  the  difficulties 
of  the  real  world  are  most  invincibly  opposed  to  this 
dialectics,  knows,  like  his  master,  with  almost  chivalric 
ease,  to  mingle  and  confound  abstract  formalistic  reason- 
ing and  thoughts  naturally  following  from  the  given 
thought.  Want  of  clearness  in  general  makes  the  read- 
ing of  this  otherwise  not  unimportant  book  very  difficult. 
On  a  Darwinian  foundation  in  his  conception  of  nature 
and  its  development,  he  puts  a  Hegelian  structure  into 
his  conception  of  human  spiritual  life,  but  finally  lets 
mankind,  although  it  is  the  highest  form  of  appearance 
in  this  development,  sink  back  into  death  and  destruc- 
tion. 

The  God  of  this  view  of  the  world  is  the  causal  law; 
the  conception  of  this  causal  law  is  the  worship  of  the 
philosopher — a  God,  of  course,  so  incapable  of  filling 
and  quieting  a  mind  longing  for  God  —  a  worship  so 
leathern  that  Carneri  himself  cannot  get  rid  of  the 
opinion  that,  with  such  religious  ideas  of  reform,  he  will 
finally  lose  the  last  reader  of  his  book.  The  aim  of  the 


POSITION   IN   REFERENCE   TO   RELIGION.  205 

development,  also,  does  not  promise  to  the  mind  any 
substitute  for  the  rigidness  of  God,  for  the  aim  of  the 
development  is  death — the  death  of  the  individual  as 
well  as  of  the  universe.  "  He  who  has  learned  to  get 
comfort  in  the  deepest  affliction  from  the  absolute  im- 
partiality of  the  causal  law,  is  on  so  good  terms  with 
death,  whose  inflexibility  he  comprehends,  that  without 
reluctance  he  gives  to  it  the  universe  into  the  bargain." 
(p.  353.) 

We  give  these  glimpses  into  the  dreary  waste  of  the 
very  latest  advocate  of  pessimism  which,  as  it  seems, 
has  fully  and  formally  become  the  fashion,  in  order  to 
show  what  monstrosities  are  demanded  from  thought, 
what  revolting  hardness  trom  feeling,  what  nonentities 
of  ethical  striving,  are  offered  as  valuable  wares,  if  man 
has  once  begun  to  break  the  bond  between  himself  and 
his  living  Creator  and  Master.  For  this  reason,  not 
only  the  anti-teleological  monists  meet  the  fate  of  Nihil- 
ism, whether  they  appear  in  the  plebeian  roughness  of 
Biichner  or  in  the  aristocratic  gentility  of  Strauss,  but 
also  such  a  brilliant  advocate  of  teleology  as  Eduard  von 
Hartmann  does  not  know  of  any  other  final  end  to  offer 
to  the  world  and  mankind  than  nothingness,  because  he 
did  not  wish  to  be  driven  from  his  perception  of  ends  in 
the  world  to  the  only  conclusion  to  which  it  leads — 
namely:  to  the  perception  of  an  absolute  intelligent  and 
ethical  personality  that  directs  these  ends.  He  pre- 
fers, rather,  to  suppose  an  unconsciously  seeing  substance 
of  the  world,  which,  after  having  once  in  the  dark  im- 
pulse of  its  unconscious  will,  made  the  mistake  of  crea- 
ting a  world,  leads  the  same  by  the  instinct  of  uncon- 
scious teleology  in  sad,  melancholy,  and  yet  relatively 


206  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

best  development,  until  it  is  ripe  to  sink  back  into  noth- 
ingness, and  thereby  to  bring  the  absolute  to  rest. 

Although  we  pity  the  individuals  who  came  under 
the  ban  of  such  a  pessimism,  we  nevertheless  can  be 
glad  of  the  fact  that  the  consequences  of  such  a  separa- 
tion from  God  are  at  least  exposed  so  clearly,  and 
return  from  wandering  through  such  barren  steppes 
with  renewed  thankfulness  to  our  Christian  view  of  the 
world,  with  its  divine  plan  and  aim. 

We  have,  next,  however  to  review  the  representatives 
of  theism  and  of  the  Christian  view  of  the  world — 
which  review  will  show  us  that  the  song  of  triumph 
which  monism  began  to  raise  before  its  expected  victory, 
came  very  near  disturbing  the  composure  of  persons 
here  and  there. 

§  5.     Re-echo  of  Negation  on  the  Side  of  the  Christian 
View  of  the  World. 

In  this  condition  of  affairs,  it  certainly  could  not 
happen  otherwise  than  that,  even  on  the  part  of  the  the- 
istic  and  positive  Christian  view  of  the  world,  some 
advocates  were  drawn  into  the  contest  who  thought 
themselves  obliged  to  see  two  irreconcilable  antagonists 
in  Darwinism  and  Christianity. 

Science  and  religion  had  both  been  so  much  accus- 
tomed to  see  the  origin  of  species,  and  especially  the 
appearance  of  man  on  the  stage  of  earth,  hidden  in 
impenetrable  and  unapproachable  secrecy,  that  every 
attempt  at  clearing  up  this  darkness  very  naturally 
appeared  to  both  as  an  attack  upon  the  creative  activity 
of  God.  The  mode  of  reasoning  to  which  mankind,  in 
its  scientific  as  well  as  in  its  religious  meditations,  had 


POSITION    IN    REFERENCE   TO   RELIGION.  207 

accustomed  itself  for  hundreds  of  years,  was  used  to 
exclude  from  the  idea  of  creation  the  conception  of  inter- 
vening agencies;  and  this  was  true  not  only  in  regard  to 
the  idea  of  the  first  creation  of  the  universe,  where  the 
idea  of  intervening  agencies  naturally  is  left  out,  but 
also  in  regard  to  the  idea  of  the  creation  of  single  beings. 
Moreover,  mankind  was  so  accustomed  to  see  a  con- 
trast between  origination  and  creation,  that  in  the  same 
degree  in  which  man  tried  or  was  able  to  perceive  the 
modalities  of  the  origin  of  species,  the  divine  causality, 
or  at  least  the  idea  of  creation,  seemed  to  disappear;  and 
for  the  word  of  the  Bible,  that  God  created  creatures 
each  after  its  kind,  a  place  could  no  longer  be  found. 

To  this  was  added  the  fact  that  not  only  all  material- 
ism took  possession  of  Darwinism  as  the  irresistible 
battering-ram  which,  as  they  said,  forever  demolishes 
the  whole  fortress  of  theism  and  buries  under  its  ruins 
all  those  who  take  refuge  in  this  decaying  castle,  but 
that  even  naturalists  let  themselves  be  carried  away 
without  opposition  by  this  anti-theistic  current,  and  even 
submitted  to  be  heralds  and  prophets  of  this  new  anti- 
theistic  wisdom  of  monism.  Let  the  reader  think  of 
Hackel's  " Natural  History  of  Creation"  and  "Anthro- 
pogeny,"  where  he  will  find  the  most  interesting  reports 
from  all  realms  of  exact  natural  science,  together  with  a 
wholly  unsolved  entanglement  of  descent,  selection,  and 
mechanical  view  of  the  world,  and  this  mode  of  contem- 
plation of  the  world,  with  eloquent  and  enthusiastic 
proclamation  of  monism  and  with  unconcealed  derision 
of  the  capricious  arbitrariness  of  a  personal  Creator,  all 
thrown  together  as  one  great  entire  system,  formed  at 
one  stroke. 


208  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

Is  it,  then,  to  be  wondered  at,  that  not  only  the  un- 
critical among  believers,  but  also  those  who  thoughtfully 
examined  the  movements  of  the  mind,  believed  in  the 
loudly-proclaimed  connection  of  Darwinism  with  the 
whole  anti-Christian  view  of  the  world,  and  therefore 
protested  immediately  against  everything  which  is  called 
Darwinism  ?  Can  we  reproach  theologians  for  not  im- 
mediately becoming  scientists  themselves,  in  order  to 
form  an  independent  judgment  in  the  question,  when 
even  the  most  eminent  scientists  declared  that  amalga- 
mation of  the  most  heterogenetic  as  an  inevitable  conse- 
quence of  Darwinism,  and  as  much  as  possible  diminished 
or  concealed  their  want  of  harmony  with  a  few  other 
investigators  who,  although  small  in  number,  yet  by 
their  weight  counterbalanced  dozens  of  names  of  the 
second  and  third  rank  ? 

Thus  we  could  read,  in  the  journals  of  specialists, 
in  pamphlets,  in  religious  and  political  journals,  even  in 
local  newspapers,  a  great  many  articles  which  were 
guilty  of  exactly  the  same  confounding  of  the  scientific 
and  the  religious,  and  again  of  the  scientific  and  the 
philosophic,  as  those  who  had  caused  this  confounding, 
and  who,  under  the  supposition  of  this  solidarity  of 
wholly  distinct  things,  attacked  and  contested  in  the 
interest  of  religion,  not  only  the  anti-religious  conclu- 
sions of  Darwinian  philosophers,  but  also  Darwinism  as 
a  merely  scientific  theory,  and  rendered  the  contrast  as 
strong  as  possible  by  adhering  to  that  above  censured, 
unmotived,  indefensible,  and  one-sided  conception  of 
creation. 

And  although  on  the  part  of  positive  Christian  theol- 
ogy there  was  a  gradually  increasing  number  of  voices 


POSITION   IN   REFERENCE   TO   RELIGION.  209 

of  those  who  in  the  idea  of  an  origin  of  species  through 
descent  do  not  yet  see  an  injury  to  the  theistic  and  Chris- 
tian conception  of  God  and  creation,  still  as  a  rule  this 
concession  was  made  only  to  the  idea  of  descent,  and 
not  to  that  of  selection  and  to  that  which  is  properly 
called  Darwinism.  As  a  rule,  in  most  of  the  theological 
works  which  treat  in  general  of  the  Darwinian  ques- 
tions, Darwinism  and  opposition  to  the  Christian  concep- 
tion of  God  and  creation  were  and  are  still  taken  as 
identical.  For  instance,  Ebrard,  in  the  first  part  of  his 
'"'  Apologetik  "  ("Apologetics"),  Giitersloh,  Bertelsmann, 
1874,  enumerates  among  the  systems  which  are  opposed 
to  Christianity,  in  the  same  line  with  the  doubtless  anti- 
theistic  and  anti-Christian  aposkoplology  or  negation 
of  the  idea  of  design,  also  the  mechanistic  system,  or 
the  negation  of  the  organic  vital  force,  and  the  Dar- 
winian theory  of  descent.  Besides,  in  reading  his 
1 4  Apologetics, "  we  had  earnestly  wished,  in  the  interest 
of  science  as  well  as  of  religion,  that  a  theologian  who 
writes  a  work  which  claims  to  be  scientific  and  to  advo- 
cate the  Christian  standpoint,  had  abstained  from  that 
coarse  and  disgusting  contempt  and  derision  of  adversa- 
ries which  we  meet  so  often  in  his  book,  and  which  only 
causes  friend  and  foe  to  take  a  position  contrary  to  that 
which  the  author  intended.  Triimpelmann  who,  in  an 
essay  upon  Darwinism,  monistic  philosophy,  and  Chris- 
tianity (Jahrbiicher  fur  protestantische  Theologie,  1876, 1) 
gives  a  similar  conception  of  the  relation  between 
Darwinism  and  religion,  but  defends  his  whole  position 
with  much  more  scientific  acuteness  and  depth,  has  also 
not  taken  the  tone  which  worthily  treats  an  opposite 
opinion  and  its  advocates. 
14 


210  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 


CHAPTER  II. 

REFORM  OF  RELIGION,  OR  AT  LEAST  OF  THE  SCIENCE 
OF  RELIGION,  THROUGH  DARWINISM. 

§1.  Heinrich  Lang,  Friedrich  Vischer^  G-ustav  Jdger. 

In  passing  on  to  those  who  in  Darwinism  do  not  see 
a  negation  but  a  reformation  of  religion,  or  at  least  of 
theology,  we  first  meet  Heinrich  Lang,  the  late  spiritual 
leader  of  the  ' '  Reform-theologie  "  in  Switzerland.  He 
treats  of  "  Die  Religion  im  Zeitalter  Darwins"  ("  Relig- 
ion in  the  Age  of  Darwin  ")  in  Holtzendorff  's  and  Onck- 
en's  "Deutsche  Zeit-und  Streitfragen,"  Jahrg.  II,  Heft 
31,  Berlin,  Lucleritz,  1873. 

With  a  very  correct  estimate  of  the  lasting  value  of 
religion  as  well  as  of  natural  science,  and  with  a  warm 
apology  for  the  religious  realm,  he  regulates  the  bound- 
aries of  each  by  asking  religion  not  to  hinder  modern 
knowledge  of  the  world  and  nature,  and  by  asking 
knowledge  of  nature  to  leave  the  realm  of  religion 
untouched  in  its  self-certainty. 

But  when  he,  evidently  still  dependent  on  the  old 
rationalistic  supernaturalistic  conception  of  miracle  and 
providence,  claims  to  find  that  as  the  result  of  modern 
knowledge  of  the  world  and  nature  a  special  providence 
is  no  longer  conceivable,  and  no  other  hearing  of  prayer 
is  possible  than  a  subjective  psychological  one;  that  the 
processes  in  the  world,  in  their  entire  final  causal  con- 
nection of  causes  and  effects,  nowhere  leave  a  place  for 


REFORM   OF   RELIGION   THROUGH   DARWINISM.       211 

the  freely  acting  hand  of  a  divine  Lord  of  the  world, 
and  that  even  a  moral  order  of  the  world  can  only  prove 
itself  so  far  as  guilt  and  punishment  stand  in  a  natural 
causal  connection  with  one  another:  then  his  religious- 
ness makes  concessions  to  the  modern  view  of  the  world 
which  it  is  not  at  all  obliged  to  make  or  justified  in 
making,  and  forces  upon  religion  a  reform  against  the 
necessity  and  usefulness  of  which  not  only  religious  feel- 
ing and  need,  but  also  deeper  and  more  consequent 
reflection  on  God  and  the  world,  just  as  strongly  strives. 
What  remains  to  him  as  an  independent  realm  for 
religion  is  nevertheless  worthy  of  recognition.  As 
faith  of  the  human  mind  in  a  transcendental  unity  which 
manifests  itself  in  the  manifold  and  sensible,  and  carries 
through  a  moral  order  of  the  world — although  one  which, 
by  the  before-mentioned  limitation  of  the  natural  con- 
nection of  guilt  and  punishment,  is  very  much  reduced — 
religion  gives  to  the  mind  warmth  and  worship  ;  as  con- 
fidence of  the  heart  in  an  infinite  possession  in  the 
anguish  of  the  finite,  it  creates  confidence  in  God,  grat- 
itude, devotion,  energy,  courage  of  life  ;  as  reverence 
for  a  holiness  which  stands  unimpeachable  above  the 
fluctuating  inclinations  of  our  will,  awakens  the  con- 
sciousness of  guilt,  and  abolishes  the  guilt,  it  remains 
the  basis  of  all  moral  action.  Lang  also  sharply  and 
correctly  points  out  the  insufficiency  of  Strauss's  ' '  The 
Old  Faith  and  the  New,"  as  well  as  the  conflict  between 
his  metaphysical  naturalism  which  only  leads  to  the 
struggle  for  existence,  and  his  demand  of  self-submission 
to  the  universe,  and  of  the  moral  and  spiritual  self- 
determination  of  man  as  of  a  being  which  goes  beyond 
nature.  Nevertheless  we  can  not  follow  Lang  in  his 


212  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

ways  of  reform.  First — his  conception  of  God  is  amaz- 
ingly meagre,  and  of  more  than  a  Spencerian  unap- 
proachableness  God  is  to  him,  according  to  his  "  Dog- 
matics," nothing  but  the  eternal,  in  itself  perfect  cause 
of  all  being,  exempted  from  all  changes  of  the  world's 
process.  When  he  gives  the  name  of  father  to  this  pri- 
meval cause,  as  he  does  in  his  sermons  and  elsewhere, 
without  being  able  to  admit  relation  of  mutual  love  of 
person  to  person,  he  only  makes  it  glaringly  evident  how 
little  his  abstract  metaphysics  can  satisfy  religious  need. 
Second — that  which  is  claimed  to  be  gained  by  this 
modern  view  of  the  world  (namely,  extension  of  the 
supremacy  of  religion  to  everything,  even  to  the  affairs 
of  daily  life),  is  not  at  all  new,  but  is  the  effect  of  long- 
existing  sound  religiousness,  and  is  the  essence  of  all 
sound  religious  doctrine  ;  and  we  therefore  can  not  see 
how  a  view  of  the  world,  which,  for  instance,  denies 
divine  providence,  and  limits  the  hearing  of  prayer  to 
its  psychological  effects,  shall  have  greater  force  to  leaven 
the  whole  daily  life  religiously,  than  our  Christian 
faith  in  the  Father  without  whose  will  no  sparrow  falls 
to  the  ground,  and  who  says  to  his  children  :  "  Call  upon 
me  in  the  day  of  trouble  :  I  will  deliver  thee,  and  thou 
shalt  glorify  me."  Third  —  exactly  that  which  Lang 
declares  a  purification  of  religion  (namely,  the  before- 
mentioned  elimination  of  divine  providence  and  of  all  that 
which  is  connected  therewith),  appears  to  us  not  at  all 
as  a  reform,  but  as  an  immense  impoverishment  and 
desolation  of  religion,  which  is  so  far  from  being  re- 
quired by  natural  science,  that  it  turns  out  to  be  but  a 
concession  to  the  most  superficial  metaphysicians  who, 
of  course,  have  become  very  popular. 


REFORM   OF   RELIGION   THROUGH   DARWINISM.       213 

Friedrich  Yischer  is  also  to  be  ranked  in  this  group. 
In  the  sixth  part  of  his  "Kritische  Gange  "  ("Critical 
Walks  "),  he  speaks  of  Strauss'  "  The  Old  Faith  and  the 
New,"  and  takes  his  determined  position  in  reference  to 
the  religious  question,  quite  essentially  differing  from 
Strauss.  In  regard  to  the  aversion  to  miracles,  he  stands 
on  the  same  ground  with  Strauss  and  Lang;  in  protest- 
ing against  Strauss1  elimination  of  the  idea  of  design, 
and  especially  in  demanding  a  moral  order  of  the  world, 
he  is  still  more  energetic  than  Lang.  He  particularly 
does  not,  like  Lang,  limit  the  moral  order  of  the  world 
to  the  simple  empiric  causal  connection  between  human 
action  and  its  consequences.  But  on  the  other  hand,  by 
his  opposition  to  the  idea  of  a  personality  of  God,  he 
again  deviates  more  than  Lang  from  the  true  meaning 
of  Christian  religiousness.  On  page  219  he  says:  "How, 
in  spite  of  the  infinite  crossings  of  human  action,  is 
inner  conformity  to  the  end  in  view  in  general  so  estab- 
lished through  that  which  we  call  chance,  or  rather  by 
means  of  these  crossings,  that  we  can  speak  of  a  moral 
order  of  the  world  ?  Men,  individuals  as  well  as  com- 
munities, follow  their  aims.  Hereby  there  always 
results  something  quite  different  from  that  which  they 
intended  and  wished.  Sublime  laws  govern  above  us, 
between  us,  full  of  mystery  in  the  midst  of  life  ;  one  of 
them  in  reference  to  guilt,  punishment  of  guilt,  is 
called  nemesis.  Faith  in  that  meaning  of  the  word, 
which  we  regard  as  a  low  one  [he  means  the  faith  which 
has  its  dogmas  beyond  which  the  man  of  the  most 
recent  culture  has  passed,  not  knowing  that  he  also 
carries  around  with  him  his  dogmas,  his  "  new  faith"]  is 
in  need  of  a  person  who  founds,  carries  out,  and  executes 


214  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

these  laws.  But  the  faith  of  the  monists  has  no  such 
need.  Why  not  ?  That  needs  more  sufficient  demon- 
stration." 

Certainly  it  needs  more  sufficient  demonstration. 
But  this  demonstration  will  never  be  possible,  so  long 
as  we  acknowledge  the  government  of  a  moral  order  of 
the  world.  For  this  leads  of  necessity  to  faith  in  a 
living  God,  and  this  faith  demands  from  our  conception 
less  pretensions  than  the  faith  in  a  kind  of  system  of 
spiritual  machinery  by  which  chance  and  the  wished-for 
are  woven  together,  without  this  system  proceeding 
from  a  highly  spiritual  and  ethical  intelligence.  It 
nevertheless  must  be  acknowledged  that  Vischer,  from 
the  standpoint  of  ethical  need,  vindicates  the  position 
and  truth  of  religion,  as  he  also  beautifully  and  cor- 
rectly defines  its  position  in  reference  to  morality,  in 
saying  that  morality  makes  the  demand,  religion  gives 
the  strength  to  meet  it. 

From  another  side,  Gustav  Jager  makes  a  compro- 
mise between  Darwinism  and  religion  in  his  five  lectums 
on  "Die  Darwinsche  Theorie  und  ihre  Stellung  zu 
Moral  und  Religion  "  ("The  Darwinian  Theory  and  its 
Position  in  Reference  to  Morality  and  Religion  "),  Stutt- 
gart, J.  Hoffmann,  1869. 

He  makes  still  more  valid  concessions  to  religion  and 
Christianity  than  Lang  and  Vischer ;  directly  opposes 
materialistic  monism;  leaves  to  faith  in  a  personal  God, 
in  the  divinity  of  Christ,  in  individual  immortality,  in 
the  answer  to  prayer  beyond  the  psychological  effect,  in 
miracles,  in  short,  to  the  full  contents  of  Christian 
religiousness,  their  weight  and  truth;  and  in  that  respect 
we  would  have  to  rank  him  in  the  following  group,  if  he 


REFORM    OF    RELIGION    THROUGH    DARWINISM.       215 

did  not  by  his  manner  of  proving  these  concessions 
exclude  himself  from  it,  and  rank  himself  in  that  group 
of  which  we  treat  in  the  present  section. 

According  to  his  opinion,  Darwinism  gives  to  re- 
ligion, if  not  new  contents  (although  these  contents  are 
entirely  subject  to  revision  according  to  Darwinism), 
still  a  wholly  new  foundation,  and,  indeed,  a  foundation 
of  subjective  religiousness,  as  well  as  of  the  objective 
contents  of  religion,  only  from  the  standpoint  of  its 
practical  usefulness  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  The 
faith  in  a  personal  God,  in  immortality,  in  redemp- 
tion by  the  God-Man  Jesus  Christ,  in  the  hearing  of 
prayer,  in  help  in  danger  even  to  the  extent  of  miracles, 
strengthens  man,  gives  to  him  a  superiority  to  those  who 
do  not  have  that  faith  and  who  do  not  have  the  habit  of 
prayer,  and  therefore  is  so  far  the  best  weapon  in  the 
struggle  for  existence;  and  herein  lies  the  truth  of  re- 
ligion, especially  of  the  Christian  religion,  as  the  most 
successful  weapon  in  the  struggle  for  existence  which 
takes  place  through  the  whole  creation,  from  the  lowest 
organisms  up  to  the  highest  spiritual  life  of  mankind. 

We  willingly  admit  that  Christianity  has  cer- 
tainly proved  itself  by  far  the  strongest  and  most  suc- 
cessful means  of  education  to  mankind,  and  that,  if  we 
must  once  express  this  experience  in  the  Darwinian 
mode  of  speaking,  we  can  express  it  as  above.  But 
with  the  attempt  to  make  the  truth  of  religipn  and  the 
truth  of  its  contents,  even  if  only  subjective,  dependent 
only  and  solely  upon  the  proof  of  its  usefulness,  nobody,1 
either  friend  or  foe,  will  be  satisfied.  The  adversaries 
of  religion  and  Christianity,  perhaps  with  the  exception 
of  Biichner,  will  admit  that  Christianity  has  for  some 


216  THE   THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

time  been  a  quite  useful  weapon  to  mankind  in  the 
struggle  for  existence  ;  but  they  will  say  that  they  are 
just  about  to  replace  it  by  a  still  more  useful  weapon;  and 
the  advocates  of  religion  and  Christianity  likewise  can 
not  agree  upon  a  mere  grounding  of  their  religion  upon 
need  which  puts  upon  them  every  day  the  possibility  of 
changing  it  for  something  still  more  useful.  Both 
friend  and  foe  will  join  in  the  conviction  that  objective 
truth  is  always  the  best  guarantee  for  subjective  success; 
and  thus  both  will  pass  beyond  the  purely  utilitarian 
apologetics  or  polemics  to  the  questions  as  to  the  objec- 
tive reality  of  the  contents  of  Christian  religiousness. 


PEACE    BETWEEN    RELIGION    AND    DARWINISM.        217 

CHAPTER  III. 

PEACE  BETWEEN  RELIGION  AND  DARWINISM. 

§1.    Darwin,  Wallace,  72.  Owen,  Asa  Gray,  Mivart,  Mc- 
Cosh,  Anderson,  K.  E.  v.  Baer,  Alex.  Braun,  Brau- 

bach,  etc. 

It  still  remains  for  us  to  take  a  glance  at  those  who 
think  religion  and  Darwinism,  and  Christianity  and  Dar- 
winism, hold  toward  one  another  reciprocally  amicable 
relations. 

In  the  first  place,  we  have  to  mention  Darwin  him- 
self. In  his  earliest  work,  u  Origin  of  Species,"  he 
repeatedly,  gives  this  opinion,  as  on  page  421:  u  I  see 
no  good  reason  why  the  views  given  in  this  volume 
should  shock  the  religious  feelings  of  any  one.  It  is 
satisfactory,  as  showing  how  transient  such  impressions 
are,  to  remember  that  the  greatest  discpvery  ever  made 
by  man,  namely,  tho  law  of  the  attraction  of  gravity, 
was  also  attacked  by  Leibnitz  '  as  subversive  of  natural, 
and  inferentially  of  revealed,  religion.'  A  celebrated 
author  and  divine  has  written  to  me  that  he  '  has  grad- 
ually learned  to  see  that  it  is  just  as  noble  a  conception 
of  the  Deity  to  believe  that  He  created  a  few  original 
forms  capable  of  self-development  into  other  and  needful 
forms,  as  to  believe  that  He  required  a  fresh  act  of  crea- 
tion to  supply  the  voids  caused  by  the  action  of  His 
laws."  On  page  428,  he  speaks  of  the  laws  which 
God  has  impressed  on  matter  ;  and  at  the  end  of  his 
work,  on  page  429,  he  says  :  "  There  is  grandeur  in  this 


218  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

View  of  life,  with  its  several  powers,  having  been  orig- 
inally breathed  by  the  Creator  into  a  few  forms  or  into 
one."  In  his  "  Descent  of  Man,"  he  also  protests  against 
the  reproach  that  his  views  are  irreligious,  and  says  : 
"  The  birth  both  of  the  species  and  of  the  individual  are 
equally  parts  of  that  grand  sequence  of  events  which 
our  minds  refuse  to  accept  as  the  result  of  blind  chance." 
In  treating  of  the  question  as  to  the  development  of  the 
moral  instincts,  he  says  :  "If  he  [man]  breaks  through 
the  fixed  habits  of  his  life,  he  will  assuredly  feel  dissatis- 
faction. He  must  likewise  avoid  the  reprobation  of  the 
one  God  or  gods  in  whom,  according  to  his  knowledge  or 
superstition,  he  may  believe."  And  furthermore  he 
remarks  :  "The  question  whether  there  exists  a  Creator 
and  Ruler  of  the  Universe,  has  been  answered  in  the 
affirmative  by  some  of  the  highest  intellects  that  have 
ever  existed." 

It  is  true,  all  these  expressions  about  religion  are 
very  general  ;  but  since  in  his  works  we  do  not  find  any 
utterance  contrary  to  them  and  hostile  to  religion,  we 
have  a  right  to  rank  the  celebrated  originator  of  the 
whole  agitation  among  those  naturalists  who  are  con- 
scious of  the  limits  of  the  realms  of  the  natural  and  the 
religious,  and  are  convinced  of  the  possibility  of  a 
harmony  between  the  two.  For  his  casual  utterances 
against  a  "creation"  of  single  species  always  combine 
with  the  word  creation  the  idea  of  that  direct  creation 
out  of  nothing,  without  intervening  agencies,  which  is 
entirely  correct  for  the  idea  of  the  first  origin  of  the 
universe,  but  which  for  the  origin  of  the  single  forma- 
tions within  the  universe  is  neither  asked  for  by  the 
religious  view  of  the  world,  nor  established  by  the  Holy 


PEACE   BETWEEN   RELIGION    AND   DARWINISM.        219 

Scriptures,  nor  by  a  cautiously  reasoning  theology, 
although  it  very  often  controls  the  conceptions  of  nat- 
uralists as  well  as  of  theologians.  Now,  while  Darwin 
rejects  the  idea  of  a  sudden  appearance  of  a  new  species 
out  of  nothing — or,  as  he  once  expressed  himself  in  his 
" Origin  of  Species,"  the  idea  "that  at  innumerable 
periods  in  the  earth's  history  certain  elemental  atoms 
have  been  commanded  suddenly  to  flash  into  living 
tissues," — and  he  is  no  doubt  right  in  rejecting  it, — still 
at  the  same  time  he  does  not  deny  the  dependence  of 
the  successive  origin  of  a  new  species  on  a  divine  author. 
But  in  calling  that  process  creation  and  this  one  not,  he 
gives  the  appearance  of  an  opposition  to  the  religious 
idea  of  creation — an  appearance  of  which  the  greater 
part  of  the  guilt  is  borne  by  those  theologians  who  define 
the  idea  of  the  creation,  even  of  a  single  form,  in  a 
manner  which  is  only  proper  for  the  idea  of  the  first 
origin  of  the  universe. 

It  is  true,  we  could  rank  Darwin  still  more  readily 
among  the  scientists  who  are  at  peace  with  all  the  claims 
of  religion,  did  he  not  in  his  "Descent  of  Man,"  when 
enumerating  the  "excellent  naturalists  and  philoso- 
phers "  who  with  him  reduce  the  pedigree  of  man  to 
lower  forms,  mention  names  of  men  who  in  their  works 
firmly  unite  Darwinism  and  monistic  naturalism  or  even 
materialism,  and  expressly  protest  against  a  separation 
of  their  nature-historical  results  and  their  philosophic 
points  of  view.  We  mean  Biichner  and  Hackel.  The 
latter's  "Natural  History  of  Creation,"  he  especially 
praises:  "If  this  work  had  appeared  before  my  essay 
had  been  Avritten,  I  should  probably  never  have  com- 
pleted it.  Almost  all  the  conclusions  at  which  I  have 


220  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

arrived  I  find  confirmed  by  this  naturalist,"  etc.  The 
entire  silence  in  regard  to  the  anti  -  Christian  results 
which  these  two  authors  derive  from  their  naturo-histori- 
cal  premises,  makes  Darwin's  own  position  in  reference 
to  religion  again  very  uncertain.  It  seems  that  Darwin 
in  his  theology  is  not  only  inclined  to  theism,  but,  fol- 
lowing the  traditions  of  his  countrymen  of  the  last 
century,  to  a  quite  cool  and  superficial  deism,  and  that 
he  permits  himself  to  be  too  much  impressed  by  the 
anti-teleological  deductions  of  many  of  his  followers, 
and  to  be  induced  to  separate  in  his  later  publications 
the  Creator  and  his  work  more  widely  than  he  has  done 
in  the  beginning.  For  while  in  his  "  Origin  of  the 
Species,"  and  in  his  "  Descent  of  Man"  he  nowhere 
contests  a  teleological  view  of  nature,  and  rejects  the  idea 
of  single  creations  only  under  the  erroneous  supposition 
that  the  idea  of  'the  creation  of  the  single  also  excludes 
the  action  of  intervening  agencies,  we  find,  on  the  other 
hand,  in  <u  The  Expression  of  the  Emotions  in  Man  and 
Animals  "  a  passage  which,  though  in  a  reserved  way, 
seems  to  give  just  as  much  support  to  the  adversaries  of 
teleology  as  to  its  advocates,  if,  indeed,  not  more.  He 
says  (page  338):  "  The  belief  that  blushing  was  specially 
designed  by  the  Creator  is  opposed  to  the  general  theory 
of  evolution,  which  is  now  so  largely  accepted  ;  but  it 
forms  no  part  of  my  duty  here  to  argue  on  the  general 
question.  Those  who  believe  in  design  will  find  it 
difficult  to  account  for  shyness  being  the  most  frequent 
and  efficient  of  all  the  causes  of  blushing,"  etc.  This 
inconsistency  in  his  utterances  has  its  origin  in  the  fact 
that  the  strength  of  this  naturalist  does  not  seem  to  lie 
in  logical  philosophic  thought. 


PEACE    BETWEEN    RELIGION   AND   DARWINISM.        221 

A.  R.  Wallace,  the  independent  and  contempor- 
aneous co -originator  of  the  Darwinian  theory,  still  more 
evidently  and  more  decidedly  expresses  himself  favor- 
ably as  to  the  position  of  this  theory  in  reference  to 
religion.  In  his  "Natural  Selection,"  he  says  on  page 
368:  "It  does  not  seem  an  improbable  conclusion  that 
all  force  may  be  will-force;  and  thus,  that  the  whole 
universe  is  not  merely  dependent  on,  but  actually  is,  the 
WILL  of  higher  intelligences  or  of  one  Supreme  Intelli- 
gence." 

He  pronounces  the  belief  that  God  created  the  new 
species  in  "continual  interference"  with  the  regular 
process  of  things,  a  lower  conception,  "  a  limitation  of 
the  Creator's  power"  (page  280),  hence  something 
which  he  makes  obj  ection  to  directly  in  the  interest  of 
religion.  Moreover,  he  sees,  especially  in  those  stages 
which  caused  the  physical  development  of  man,  and 
which  became  the  material  basis  of  his  spiritual  produc- 
tions, moments  of  development  which  cannot  be  ex- 
plained by  natural  selection  or  by  a  coincidence  of 
material  circumstances,  but  only  by  the  preformation 
of  the  body  after  a  certain  design  and  for  a  certain  pur- 
pose. 

Richard  Owen,  the  celebrated  anatomist  and  palaeon- 
tologist of  England,  who,  after  having  for  a  long  time 
resisted  the  Darwinian  theories,  lately  accepted  the  idea 
of  development  and  rejected  that  of  selection,  takes  a 
similar  position.  In  the  last  part  of  his  "Comparative 
Anatomy  of  Vertebrates,"  which  was  issued  separately 
-in  1863  under  the  title  "  Derivative  Hypothesis  of  Life 
and  Species,"  he  sees  in  the  causes  which  produced  the 
new  species  only  the  servants  of  a  predestinating  intelli- 


222  THE   THEORIES    OF   DARWIN. 

gent  will — for  instance,  the  horse  predestinated  and  pre- 
pared for  man  ;  and  on  page  90  of  vol.  V.  of  "Trans- 
actions of  the  Zoological  Society,"  he  says,  "that 
natural  evolution,  through  secondary  causes,  by  means  of 
slow  physical  and  organic  operations  through  long  ages, 
is  not  the  less  clearly  recognizable  as  the  act  of  all- 
adaptive  Mind,  because  we  have  abandoned  the  old 
error  of  supposing  it  the  result  of  a  primary,  direct  and 
sudden  act  of  creational  construction.  ....  The  suc- 
cession of  species  by  continuously  operating  law  is  not 
necessarily  a  'blind  operation.'  Such  law,  however 
designed  in  the  properties  and  successions  of  natural 
objects,  intimates,  nevertheless,  a  preconceived  progress. 
Organisms  may  be  evolved  in  orderly  succession,  stage 
after  stage,  towards  a  foreseen  goal,  and  the  broad 
features  of  the  course  may  still  show  the  unmistakable 
impress  of  Divine  volition." 

Professor  Huxley,  of  London,  the  zealous  and  oft- 
mentioned  advocate  of  the  descent  of  man  from  the  ape, 
says — what  is  so  energetically  contested  by  his  warmest 
friends  in  Germany,  by  Biichner,  Hackel,  O.  Schmidt, 
and  others — that  the  teleological  and  the  mechanical 
mode  of  viewing  nature  by  no  means  exclude  one 
another.  He  does  this,  of  course,  without  going  into 
any  details  of  the  religious  question. 

Asa  Gray,  an  eminent  and  highly  esteemed  Ameri- 
can botanist,  who  is  particularly  respected  by  Darwin, 
and  is  supported  also  by  Sir  Charles  Lyell  in  "  The 
Antiquity  of  Man,"  says  in  his  essay  on  "  Natural  Selec- 
tion not  Incompatible  with  Natural  Theology,  a  Free 
Examination  of  Darwin's  Treatise"  (London,  Triibner, 
1861),  on  page  29  :  "Agreeing  that  plants  and  animals 


PEACE    BETWEEN    RELIGION   AND   DARWINISM.        223 

were  produced  by  Omnipotent  fiat  does  not  exclude  the 
idea  of  natural  order  and  what  we  call  secondary  causes. 
The  record  of  the  fiat— '  Let  the  earth  bring  forth  grass,' 
etc.,  'the  living  creature,'  etc., — seems  even  to  imply 
them,  and  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  different 
species  were  produced  through  natural  agencies."  And 
on  page  38:  "  Darwin's  hypothesis  concerns  the  order 
and  not  the  cause,  the  how  and  not  the  why  of  the  phe- 
nomena, and  so  leaves  the  question  of  design  just  where 
it  was  before."  And  finally,  in  a  passage  which  is 
adopted  by  Sir  Charles  Lyell  (ib.  page  505) :  ' '  We  may 
imagine  that  events  and  operations  in  general  go  on  in 
virtue  simply  of  forces  communicated  at  the  first,  and 
without  any  subsequent  interference,  or  we  may  hold 
that  now  and  then,  and  only  now  and  then,  there  is  a 
direct  interposition  of  the  Deity  ;  or,  lastly,  we  may 
suppose  that  all  the  changes  are  carried  on  by  the 
immediate  orderly  and  constant,  however  infinitely 
diversified,  action  of  the  intelligent  efficient  Cause." 

Mivart,  an  English  Catholic,  most  decidedly  advo- 
cates a  reconcilability  of  Darwinian  views,  and  especially 
of  the  evolution  theory,  as  he  establishes  it  with  the 
full  contents  of  Christian  orthodoxy,  in  his  remarkable 
book  ;'On  the  Genesis  of  Species"  (London  and  New 
York,  Macmillan  &  Co.,  2d.  ed.  1871),  in  which  we  find 
a  great  many  independent  naturo-historical  investiga- 
tions. He  assigns  to  the  selection  theory  only  a  sub- 
ordinate position,  but  on  the  other  hand  accepts  an 
evolution,  and,  in  close  connection  with  R.  Owen, 
explains  it  from  inner  and  innate  impulses  of  develop- 
ment of  the  organisms,  which  act  now  more  slowly  and 
gradually,  now  more  by  impulses  ;  he  places  man  as  to 


THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

his  physical  part  entirely  among  the  effects  of  the  evo- 
lution principle,  although,  taking  into  consideration  some 
utterances  of  Wallace,  he  thinks  it  possible,  but  not 
probable,  that  the  creation  and  the  preceding  stage  of 
his  physical  nature  is  also  different  from  that  of  animals. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  in  fully  adopting  the  old  scho- 
lastic creationism,  he  supposes  a  special  creation  of  the 
soul,  a  separation  of  body  and  soul,  which  in  this  form 
is  very  contestable,  and  might  better  have  been  replaced 
by  a  separation  of  natural  and  rational  or  of  physico- 
psychical  and  pneumatical  parts  of  his  being.  With  such 
a  view  of  nature,  he  finds  the  fullest  harmony  between 
the  evolution  theory  and  religion,  reconciles  the  plausi- 
ble antagonism  of  creation  and  development  by  dividing 
the  idea  of  creation  into  a  primary  creation  (creation  of 
the  beginning  out  of  nothing)  and  into  a  secondary  cre- 
ation (creation  through  intervening  agencies,  although 
that  which  is  produced  through  them  is  still  a  creation  and 
a  work  of  the  Creator),  and  declares  his  conviction  that 
what  is  acting  according  to  law  in  nature  also  stands 
under  the  causation  and  government  of  God  like  the  first 
beginning  of  the  universe — a  postulate  of  our  primary 
views  without  which  the  whole  universe  and  our  exist- 
ence in  it  would  harden  into  a  cold  mechanism  without 
consolation  or  ideality. 

Finally,  at  the  assembly  of  the  Evangelical  Alliance 
in  New  York  (October,  1873),  there  were  heard  many 
voices  of  eminent  advocates  of  a  theistic  and  Christian 
view  of  the  world,  which  maintained  the  full  consistency 
of  an  evolution  theory  with  religion  and  Christianity. 
McCosh,  for  instance,  as  referee  in  the  philosophic 
section  as  to  the  relation  of  the  evolution  theory  and 


PEACE    BETWEEN    RELIGION   AND   DARWINISM.        225 

religion,  said*  :  "  I  am  not  sure  that  religion  is  entitled 
to  insist  that  every  species  of  insects  has  been  created  by 
a  special  fiat  of  God,  with  no  secondary  agent  employed." 
And  still  more  plainly  and  more  courageously,  President 
Anderson,  of  the  University  of  Rochester,  in  his  very  re- 
markable address,  speaks  about  the  unnecessary  and  un- 
worthy fear  of  many  Christian  men,  when  they  see  the 
appearance  of  hypotheses  with  which  science  operates. 
At  the  end  of  his  address,  he  says:  "The  evidence 
for  the  existence  of  a  personal  Creator  cannot  be  affect- 
ed by  any  considerations  drawn  from  the  mode,  relative 
rapidity,  or  the  nature  of  the  proximate  antecedents  and 
consequences  in  the  creative  process." 

From  German  sources,  we  can  note  fewer  utterances 
of  a  friendly  or  at  least  neutral  position  between  Dar- 
winism and  religion.  For  this  fact  there  are  many 
reasons.  One  may  be,  that  on  the  continent  in  general 
there  is  a  smaller  number  of  those  who,  without  being 
specialists  in  both  realms,  unite  active  religious  interest 
and  reasoning  with  a  thorough  study  of  those  naturo- 
historical  questions,  while  in  Great  Britain  physico-theo- 
logical  studies  have  been  for  generations  traditional  and 
the  object  of  interest  for  the  majority  of  educated  men. 
A  second  reason,  indeed,  is  that  some  of  the  warmest 
scientific  advocates  of  Darwinism  at  once  attacked  also 
theism  and  Christianity  ;  hence  with  all  those  who  did 
not  have  time  and  incitement  enough  to  study  the  ques- 
tions for  themselves,  they  necessarily  created  the  opinion 
that  Darwinism  really  attacks  even  the  fundamentals  of 

*Compare  "History,  Essays,  and  Orations  of  the  6th  General  Con- 
ference of  the  Evangelical  Alliance,"  New  York,  Harper  Bros.,  1874, 
p.  264-271. 
15 


!^t)  THE    THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

religion,  and  their  whole  tendency  had  but  a  repelling 
influence  even  on  scientists  of  deeper  spiritual  and  ethical 
disposition  and  need.  Finally,  in  Germany  as  well  as  on 
the  whole  continent,  the  number  of  those  who  do  not 
care  for  religious  questions  in  general,  and  who  there- 
fore interest  themselves  in  the  scientific  questions 
brought  up  by  Darwin,  but  do  not  trouble  themselves 
farther  for  their  position  in  reference  to  religion  and 
Christianity,  is  unfortunately  larger  than  in  Great 
Britain. 

Nevertheless,  such  friendly  voices  are  not  entirely 
wanting  in  our  country.  The  botanist  Alex.  Braun  says, 
in  his  beautiful  and  significant  lecture  on  the  importance 
of  development  in  natural  history,  p.  48  :  "  Some  said 
that  the  descent  theory  denies  creation,  and  it  is  true, 
the  Darwinians  themselves  caused  this  opinion  by  con- 
trasting creation  and  development  as  irreconcilable  ideas. 
But  this  contrast  does  not  actually  exist,  for  as  soon  as 
we  look  upon  creation  as  a  divine  effect,  not  merely 
belonging  to  the  past,  or  appearing  in  single  abrupt 
movements,  but  connected  and  universally  present  in 
time,  we  can  seek  and  find  it  nowhere  else  but  in  the 
natural  history  of  development  itself.  Theolo- 

gians themselves,  according  to  the  Mosaic  documents, 
acknowledge  a  history  of  creation ;  natural  history, 
looked  upon  from  its  inner  side,  is  nothing  else  but  the 
farther  carrying  out  of  the  history  of  creation." 

Even  K.  E.  von  Baer,  who  expressly  contests  the 
idea  of  selection,  thinks  it  only  scientifically  indefensible, 
but  not  anti-religious  ;  an  opinion  also  held  by  Wigand. 

A  similar  friendly  relation  between  Darwinism  and 
religion  is  advocated  by  Braubach,  in  his  publication, 


PEACE   BETWEEN    RELIGION    AND   DARWINISM.        227 

"  Religion,  Moral  und  Philosophic  der  Darwin'schen 
Artlehre  nach  ihrer  Natur  und  ihrem  Character  als 
kleine  Parallele  rnenschlich  -  geistiger  Entwicklung  " 
("Religion,  Morality,  and  Philosophy  of  the  Darwinian 
Doctrine  of  Species,  as  to  its  Nature  and  Character ;  a 
Small  Parallel  of  Human  Intellectual  Development"), 
Neuwied,  Hansen,  1869,  a  publication  to  which  we  pay 
special  attention,  since  Darwin,  in  his  "  Descent  of 
Man,1'  twice  paid  it  the  honor  of  a  quotation.  It  is  true, 
the  essay,  through  its  peculiar  dependence  on  an  original 
and  quite  arbitrarily  grouped  scheme,  gives  the  impres- 
sion of  something  very  singular,  and  is  not  very  agree- 
ably and  easily  read  ;  but  it  shows  such  an  energetic 
union  of  respect  for  science  and  its  work  and  results, 
with  adhesion  to  all  the  fundamentals  of  Christian  truth, 
that  it  has  to  be  mentioned  as  one  of  the  rare  voices 
which,  even  in  regard  to  the  realm  of  nature,  pronounce 
the  fullest  harmony  between  religion  and  science.  Brau- 
bach  finds  in  the  animal  kingdom  the  elements  of  all  the 
spiritual  life  of  mankind,  even  of  religion  and  morality  ; 
but  everything  is  still  wrapped  in  the  lowest  stage  of 
sensuality.  Nevertheless,  he  assigns  to  mankind,  by  its 
possession  of  the  idea  of  infinity,  something  absolutely 
new,  absolutely  superior  to  the  animal  world,  and  sees 
the  Darwinian  ideas,  even  in  the  religious  and  moral 
possession  of  mankind,  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  they 
develop  themselves  on  the  way  from  the  sensual  stage 
to  the  rational  exactly  according  to  the  principles  of 
Darwin — namely,  through  transmission  with  individual 
variability  in  the  struggle  for  existence,  through  selec- 
tion of  the  fittest.  With  special  earnestness,  he  pro- 
nounces the  indissoluble  unity  of  religion  and  morality, 


228  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

and  says  that  religion,  as  it  presents  itself  upon  Darwin- 
ian grounds,  is  a  moral  religion. 

We  find  here  and  there  in  periodicals  many  more 
voices  which  pronounce  the  conviction  that,  out  of  the 
present  contest  of  minds,  peace  between  religion  and 
science  will  result. 

JS.     THE  DARWINIAN  THEORIES  AND 
MORALITY. 

PRELIMINARY  VIEW. 

We  can  treat  much  more  briefly  of  this  portion  of 
our  task  than  of  the  position  of  the  Darwinians  in  refer- 
ence to  the  religious  question,  for  the  reason  that  the 
contrasts  in  the  ethical  realm  are  far  less  sharply  drawn 
than  in  the  religious  realm,  although  in  principle  they 
are  not  less  widely  apart.  For  while  there  are  a  great 
many  men  who  think  that  it  belongs  to  good  society  and 
to  the  indispensable  characteristics  of  high  modern  edu- 
cation to  show  either  cold  indifference  or  direct  hos- 
tility in  reference  to  religion  and  to  the  whole  religious 
question;  while  a  great  many  of  the  much-read  works 
of  belle  lettres  never  tire  of  teaching  the  reading  public 
that  the  religious  question  really  no  longer  exists  for  the 
educated  man,  on  the  other  hand,  nobody,  not  even  the 
extremest  atheist  and  enemy  of  religion,  wishes  to 
renounce  the  reputation  of  having  moral  principles. 
Thus  it  happens  that  the  positions  taken  by  the  Darwin- 
ians in  reference  to  the  ethical  question  are  less  varied 
than  those  taken  by  them  in  reference  to  the  religious 
question.  And  we  may  also  be  brief  for  another  reason, 


PRELIMINARY    VIEW.  229 

namely,  that  by  reviewing  the  position  of  the  Darwin- 
ians in  reference  to  the  religions  question,  we  have  essen- 
tially prepared  the  way  for  the  principal  questions  which 
will  have  to  be  treated. 

We  shall  group  the  utterances  upon  the  relation  of 
the  Darwinian  theories  to  morality  as  we  did  those  in 
regard  to  the  relation  of  Darwinism  to  religion  ;  and 
shall  first  let  the  advocates  of  an  irreconcilableness 
between  the  two  speak,  then  those  advocating  a  reform- 
ative influence  of  Darwinism  upon  morality,  and  finally 
those  striving  for  neutrality  and  peace  between  the  two. 
We  shall  have  no  occasion,  except  incidentally,  to  dis- 
criminate between  the  different  fundamental  principles 
and  parts  of  ethics,  but  shall  in  the  last  part  of  our 
work  treat  of  the  question  independently.  In  making 
subdivisions  for  them  here,  we  should  but  cause  infinite 
repetitions,  unnecessarily  complicate  our  review,  and 
render  it  more  difficult. 


230  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
ANTAGONISM  BETWEEN  DARWINISM  AND  MORALITY. 

§1.  Objections  to  Darwinism  from  an  Ethical  Standpoint. 

From  what  we  said  at  the  beginning  of  the  preced- 
ing preliminary  view,  it  is  evident  that  we  have  to  look 
for  the  advocates  of  an  irreconcilableness  between  moral- 
ity and  Darwinism,  not  in  the  camp  of  the  followers  of 
the  latter,  but  only  in  that  of  its  adversaries.  It  is  true, 
such  advocates  were  never  wanting.  In  pamphlets  and 
journals,  it  has  been  often  enough  said  that  Darwinism 
cuts  through  the  nerve  of  life,  not  only  of  religion,  but 
also  of  morality. 

It  was  demonstrated  that  in  making  man  a  mere  pro- 
duct of  nature,  and  degrading  him  to  a  being  that  is 
nothing  else  but  a  more  highly  developed  animal,  Dar- 
winism takes  from  human  personality  its  value,  from  the 
realms  of  morality  its  dignity,  and  from  its  demands 
their  autonomy.  In  making  the  struggle  for  existence 
the  principle  of  all  development  and,  by  extending  it  to 
the  development  and  social  relations  of  man,  at  the  same 
time  the  human  social  principle,  it  puts  in  place  of  self- 
denial  and  love  the  principle  of  egoism  and  boorishness 
and  the  right  of  the  stronger,  gives  full  course  to  the 
unchaining  of  all  animal  passions,  and  coquettes  with  all 
the  emotions  which,  flattering  the  animal  part  of  man, 


ANTAGONISM  BETWEEN  DARWINISM  AND  MORALITY.       231 

aim  at  the  subversion  of  all  that  exists  and  at  the 
destruction  of  the  ideal  acquisitions  of  mankind.  In 
tracing  everything  which  constitutes  the  higher  position 
and  dignity  of  man  back  to  his  own  work,  and  permit- 
ting it  to  be  worked  out  of  physical,  spiritual,  and 
ethical  brutishness,  in  slow  development  and  effort, 
closely  related  to  the  animal  kingdom,  it  fosters  and 
nourishes  haughtiness  in  an  intolerable  way.  And 
finally,  in  breaking  off  and  denying  the  dependence  of 
man  upon  God,  and  leading  to  mechanical  determinism, 
it  destroys  the  deepest  and  most  effective  motive  to 
moral  action — the  tracing  of  the  moral  law  to  the  author- 
ity of  the  divine  Law-giver,  and  the  consciousness  of  an 
individual  moral  responsibility. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  many  of  the  most  zealous 
Darwinians  gave  too  much  cause  for  such  a  conception 
and  representation  of  the  ethical  consequences  of  their 
system.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  they  applied  the  selec- 
tion principle,  with  its  most  radical  consequences,  to 
the  origin  and  development  of  mankind,  and  that  they 
elevated  the  same  to  the  ethical  and  social  principle  of 
mankind  and  did  not  permit  the  acceptance  of  any  new 
and  higher  agencies  in  mankind  except  those  already 
active  in  the  animal  and  the  organic  world,  and  that  they 
gladly  treated  this  selection  principle  also  in  the  social 
and  ethical  realm  as  a  struggle  for  existence,  it  was 
simply  an  entirely  logical  conclusion  that  the  advocates 
of  the  moral  nobility  of  mankind  reproached  such  a 
reproduced  Darwinism  with  degrading  the  moral  dignity 
of  man  and  with  replacing  love  by  egoism.  Besides,  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  they  declared  materialistic  monism, 
even  the  most  naked  atheism,  the  only  conclusion  of 


232  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

Darwinism,  and  extended  their  mechanistic  explanation 
of  the  world  to  a  determinism  in  the  highest  degree 
mechanistic,  and,  carried  to  its  utmost  limit,  to  a  denial 
of  human  freedom,  it  was  not  to  be  wondered  at  that 
those  who  recognize  in  theism  the  basis  of  all  life  worthy 
of  man,  and  in  the  freedom  of  man  one  of  the  most 
precious  pearls  in  the  crown  of  his  human  dignity  and 
of  his  creation  in  the  image  of  God,  complained  of  Dar- 
winism's taking  from  morality  its  strongest  motive  and 
from  moral  action  its  responsibility.  And,  finally,  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  those  who  thus  express  themselves 
in  their  works  showed  but  rarely,  or  not  at  all,  some  of 
the  noblest  fruits  of  moral  education,  such  as  respectful 
treatment  of  adversaries,  humbleness  and  tact,  they 
could  not  themselves  reasonably  complain  that  there  was 
ascribed  to  their  doctrine  an  influence  detrimental  to 
moral  education.  All  this  we  find  abundantly  confirmed 
in  the  publications  of  Buchner  and  Hackel,  and  in  many 
articles  of  the  "Ausland." 

But  the  question  is,  whether  those  Darwinians  who 
drew  these  conclusions  were  by  their  scientific  investiga- 
tions obliged  to  draw  them,  or  whether  they  did  not 
rather  reach  their  religious  and  ethical  view  of  the 
world  by  quite  other  ways,  and  whether  they  did  not  in 
a  wholly  arbitrary  and  irresponsible  manner  make  ex- 
tensive use  of  Darwinism  in  this  anti-religious  and  ethi- 
cally objectional  direction — a  fact  which  we  shall  try  to 
prove  in  the  last  part  of  our  investigation. 

Of  course  the  Darwinians  who  spoke  thus,  did  not 
intend  to  injure  the  moral  principle,  but  only  to  purify 
and  reform  it ;  and  therefore  we  shall  have  to  speak  of 
them  in  the  following  section. 


REFORM   OF   MORALITY   THROUGH   DARWINISM.         233 


CHAPTER    V. 

REFORM    OF   MORALITY    THROUGH   DARWINISM. 

§  1.     The  Materialists  and  Monists.      Darwin   and    the 
English  Utilitarians.     Gustau  Jager. 

Among  those  who  ascribe  to  Darwinism  a  morally 
reforming  influence,  we  have  to  mention  in  the  first 
place  the  materialists.  It  is  true  that  even  before  the 
appearance  of  Darwinism  they  established  their  own 
moral  principle  of  naturalistic  determinism  and  of  the 
education  of  man  only  by  science  and  enlightenment,  in 
opposition  to  a  morality  which  rests  on  the  principle  of 
the  eternal  value  of  the  individual,  of  full  moral  respon- 
sibility, of  the  holiness  of  the  moral  law,  and  of  a  divine 
author  of  it  ;  they  stigmatized  the  ethical  requirement 
of  aiming  at  the  eternal  welfare  of  the  soul  as  a  lower 
stage  of  morality  in  comparison  with  their  own,  which 
carries  in  itself  the  reward  of  virtue;  and  they  declared 
Christianity  and  humanity,  Christian  morality  and  the 
morality  of  humanity,  two  things  irreconcilably  opposed 
to  one  another.  But  in  having  taken  possession  of 
Darwinism  as  their  monopoly,  they  have  made  it  the 
basis  of  new  attacks  upon  the  present  moral  principle 
of  Christendom  ;  and  therefore  we  have  here  to  mention 
them  with  their  moral  system. 

Biichner,  in  his  lecture  on  "  Gottesbegriff  und  dessen 


234  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

Bedeutung  "  ("  The  Idea  of  God  and  its  Importance  "), 
replaces  the  moral  principle  (which  in  his  opinion  is 
nothing  innate  but  something  acquired)  by  education, 
learning,  freedom  and  well-being;  says  that  only  atheism 
or  philosophic  monism  leads  to  freedom,  reason,  pro- 
gress, acknowledgment  of  true  humanity — to  human- 
ism ;  that  this  humanism  seeks  the  motives  of  its 
morality  not  in  the  external  relations  to  an  extramun- 
dane  God,  but  in  itself  and  in  the  welfare  of  mankind  ; 
and  that  infidels  often,  even  as  a  rule,  have  excelled  by 
moral  conduct,  while  Christianity  has  originated  many 
more  crimes  than  it  has  hindered,  and  it  would  no 
longer  be  possible  to  establish  with  real  Christians  a 
vital  community  as  at  present  understood.  He  declares 
the  utterance  of  Madame  de  Stael,  that  "  to  comprehend 
everything  means  to  forgive  everything,"  the  truest 
word  ever  spoken  ;  and  concludes  his  lecture  with  the 
remarks  that  the  more  man  renounces  his  faith  and  con- 
fides in  his  own  power,  his  own  reason,  his  own  reflexion, 
the  happier  he  will  be  and  the  more  successful  in  his 
struggle  for  existence. 

Strauss  in  "  The  Old  Faith  and  the  New,"  a  publica- 
tion which  certainly  has  to  be  ranked  here,  for  the 
reason  that  in  it  he  founds  on  Darwinism  his  whole 
knowledge  of  the  world,  on  the  ground  of  which  he 
wishes  to  arrange  life,  appears  to  be  much  more  decent, 
and  in  the  practical  consequences  much  more  conserva- 
tive, than  Biichner;  but  essentially  stands  upon  quite 
the  same  ground.  Hackel,  Oskar  Schmidt,  and  (as  to 
his  linguistic  Darwinism)  W.  Bleek,  group  themselves 
around  Strauss,  partly  with,  partly  without  express 
reference  to  his  deductions. 


REFORM    OF   MORALITY   THROUGH    DARWINISM.          235 

Strauss  arrives  at  a  peculiar  inconsequence,  but 
one  well  worthy  of  notice,  when,  in  place  of  the 
struggle  for  existence  which,  according  to  the  con- 
clusions of  those  who  also  reduce  morality  to  Dar- 
winism, is  still  the  spiritus  rector  of  moral  develop- 
ment in  mankind,  and  yet  cannot  of  itself  possibly  lead 
to  the  morally  indispensable  requirements  and  virtues 
of  self-sacrifice  and  of  mere  subordination  under  the 
moral  idea,  he  suddenly  substitutes  a  going  of  man 
beyond  mere  nature,  and  herewith  a  moral  principle, 
which  can  never  be  deduced  from  Darwinism  alone,  and 
which  is  directly  opposed  to  monism  and  pankosmisrn, 
which  is  to  be  the  basis  of  his  ethics.  The  reader  may 
compare  the  manner  in  which  he  metaphysically 
supports  his  moral  principle  when  he  says:  "  As 
nature  cannot  go  higher,  she  would  go  inwards. 
Nature  felt  herself  already  in  the  animal,  but  she 
wished  to  know  herself  also.  ...  In  man,  nature  en- 
deavored not  merely  to  exalt,  but  to  transcend  herself. " 
Ulrici,  the  philosopher,  in  his  reply  to  Strauss,  has 
pointed  out  in  sharp  terms  this  inconsequence,  as  well 
as  the  other,  that  from  the  ground  of  a  blind  necessity 
which  does  not  know  anything  of  a  higher  and  a  lower, 
the  difference  of  higher  and  lower,  good  and  bad, 
rational  and  irrational,  cannot  at  all  be  maintained ;  and 
that  the  requirement  of  a  progress  cannot  at  all  be 
made,  and  its  idea  not  at  all  be  given.  In  this  very  per- 
ceptible inconsistency,  Strauss  calls  that  morality  which 
he  requires,  "  the  relation  of  man  to  the  idea  of  his  kind" 
To  realize  the  latter  in  himself,  is  the  summary  of  his 
duties  toward  himself;  actually  to  recognize  and  pro- 
mote the  equality  of  the  kind  in  all  the  others,  is  the 


236  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

summary  of  his  duties  towards  others.  He  opposes 
the  internal  satisfaction  which  originates  therein,  to  the 
"rough  "  idea  of  a  reward  of  virtue  and  piety,  coming 
from  ivitkout,  which,  in  order  to  connect  both,  is  in  need 
of  a  God.  And  he  again  reaches  that  inconsequence 
which  from  his  metaphysical  standpoint  is  entirely 
without  motive,  but  as  to  itself  only  worthy  to  be  recog- 
nized, when  in  another  formula  of  his  moral  imperative 
he  says:  "Ever  remember  that  thou  art  human,  not 
merely  a  natural  production" 

It  is  also  this  representation  and  realization  of  the 
idea  of  the  kind,  which  those  who  combine  with  their 
Darwinism  a  negation  of  theism  have  mostly  established 
before  the  appearance  of  the  work  of  Strauss  as  the 
highest  moral  principle,  and  to  which  they  are  also  led 
most  naturally  by  Darwin's  deduction  of  morality  from 
the  social  instincts.  Thus,  Wilhelm  Bleek,  in  the  preface 
to  his  uUrsprung  der  Sprache  "  ("Origin  of  Language"), 
says  (page  XIII):  "To  aim  at  the  inner  and  outer  har- 
mony of  his  genus  in  one  or  the  other  way,  and  to 
promote  the  correct  relations  of  the  different  parts  to 
one  another  in  their  reciprocal  connections  and  in  the 
greater  parts  of  the  whole  organism  (family,  commu- 
nity, nation),  are  the  highest  visible  designs  of  human 
existence,  which  must  by  themselves  incite  man  to  noble 
actions  and  to  virtuous  deeds.  In  the  performance  of 
this  task  lies  the  highest  happiness  which  seems  to  be 
given  to  our  species,  a  happiness  accessible  by  everyone 
in  his  own  way.  Neither  the  fruit  of  eternal  punish- 
ment nor  the  hope  of  an  individual  happiness,  is  really 
capable  as  a  truly  saving  idea  to  elevate  man  to  a  higher 
existence ;  even  if  we  take  no  account  of  the  fact  that 


REFORM   OF   MORALITY   THROUGH   DARWINISM.          237 

each  of  these  two  fundamental  dogmas  of  the  vulgar 
dogmatism  makes  but  refined  egoism  the  lever  of  its 
ethics." 

Hackel  alone,  in  his  "Natural  History  of  Creation," 
with  his  utterances  as  to  Christianity,  morality,  and  the 
history  of  the  world,  again  sinks  down  to  the  level  of 
the  coarseness  of  Biichner,  and  even  below  it.  On  page 
19,  vol.  I,  he  entirely  contests  the  reality  of  the  moral 
order  of  the  world,  and  continues:  "If  we  contemplate 
the  common  life,  and  the  mutual  relations  between  plants 
and  animals  (man  included),  we  shall  find  everywhere  and 
at  all  times,  the  very  opposite  of  that  kindly  and  peace- 
ful social  life  which  the  goodness  of  the  Creator  ought 
to  have  prepared  for  his  creatures  —  we  shall  rather  find 
everywhere  a  pitiless,  most  embittered  struggle  of  all 
against  all.  Nowhere  in  nature,  no  matter  where  we 
turn  our  eyes,  does  that  idyllic  peace,  celebrated  by  the 
poets,  exist;  we  find  everywhere  a  struggle  and  a  striving 
to  annihilate  neighbors  and  competitors.  Passion  and 
selfishness,  conscious  or  unconscious,  is  everywhere  the 
motive  force  of  life.  Man  in  this  respect  certainly 
forms  no  exception  to  the  rest  of  the  animal  world." 
On  page  237,  vol.  I,  he  professes  the  most  extreme 
naturalistic  determinism:  "The  will  of  the  animal,  as 
well  as  that  of  man,  is  never  free.  The  widely  spread 
dogma  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  is,  from  a  scientific 
point  of  view,  altogether  untenable."  And  on  page  170, 
vol.  I,  he  even  says:  "If,  as  we  maintain,  natural  selec- 
tion is  the  great  active  cause  which  has  produced  the 
whole  wonderful  variety  of  organic  life  on  the  earth,  all 
the  interesting  phenomena  of  human  life  must  also  be 
explicable  from  the  same  cause.  For  man  is  after  all 


238  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

only  a  most  highly-developed  vertebrate  animal,  and  all 
aspects  of  human  life  have  their  parallels,  or,  more  cor- 
rectly, their  lower  stages  of  development,  in  the  animal 
kingdom.  The  whole  history  of  nations,  or  what  is 
called  universal  history,  must  therefore  be  explicable  by 
means  of  natural  selection, — must  be  a  physico-chemical 
process,  depending  upon  the  interaction  of  adaptation  and 
inheritance  in  the  struggle  for  life.  And  this  is  actually 
the  case."  That  in  his  ethical  naturalism  he  sees  a  real 
reform  of  morality,  he  expressly  declares  on  the  page 
next  to  the  last  of  his  "Natural  History  of  Creation": 
."  Just  as  this  new  monistic  philosophy  first  opens  up  to 
us  a  true  understanding  of  the  real  universe,  so  its 
application  to  practical  human  life  must  open  up  a  new 
road  towards  moral  perfection"  (Vol.  II,  p.  367.) 

In  the  low  conception  of  morality  and  its  principle, 
Hackel  is  perhaps  seconded  only  by  Seidlitz  who  says 
in  his  "Die  Darwin'she  Theorie  "  ("Darwin's  Theory  "),p. 
198  :  "Rational  and  moral  life  consist  in  the  satisfaction 
of  all  physical  functions,  in  correct  proportion  and  rela- 
tion to  one  another.  Man  is  immoral  through  excessive 
satisfaction  of  one  function  and  through  neglect  of  the 
others. " 

As  in  the  religious  question,  so  in  the  ethical,  Carneri 
also  takes  a  peculiar  position.  In  reducing  all  the  phe- 
nomena of  existence,  together  with  the  whole  spiritual 
life  of  mankind,  to  a  close  development  of  nature 
according  to  the  causal  law,  in  expressly  grouping  also 
the  utterances  of  the  will  of  man  under  this  law  of  an 
absolute  necessity,  in  fully  adopting  Darwin's  doctrine 
as  the  wholly  satisfactory  key  for  the  comprehension  of 
the  entire  development  of  nature  up  to  the  history  of 


REFORM   OF   MORALITY   THROUGH    DARWINISM.          239 

mankind,  in  advocating  an  absolutely  monistic  determin- 
ism and  a  nearly  exclusive  dependence  of  the  efficacy 
of  moral  principles  on  the  theoretic  cultivation  of  the 
mind,  on  reasoning  and  education,  he,  as  before  men- 
tioned, stands  on  exactly  the  same  ground  with 
materialists  and  monists  among  %  whom  he  expressly 
ranks  himself;  in  the  inconsequence  with  which  he 
makes  concessions  to  the  power  of  the  idea  and  the 
ideal  over  man  —  concessions  which  could  never  be 
concluded  from  a  mere  immanent  process  of  nature  — 
he  is  closely  .related  to  Strauss.  But  it  is  peculiar  that, 
although  entirely  dependent  in  his  reasoning  on  that 
monistic  view  of  the  world,  and  that  Darwinian  view 
of  nature,  he  defines  his  ethical  developments  and  his 
reflections  on  the  organizations  of  human  life  in  a  relative 
independence,  which  again  separates  him  as  moralist 
from  these  before-mentioned  monists  and  materialists, 
and  rather  ranks  him,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chap.  1,  §  4, 
in  the  line  of  the  disciples  of  Spinoza  and  Hegel.  From 
this  it  can  also  be  explained,  how  it  could  happen  that  in 
criticisms  and  reviews  of  Darwinism  and  its  literature 
the  standpoint  which  he  takes  could  find  such  different 
and  diametrically  opposed  expositions.  While,  for 
instance,  the  "Beweis  des  Glaubens,"  in  the  March 
number  of  1873,  thinks  that  Carneri  wishes  to  seek  on 
Darwinian  ground  a  new  and  better  basis  for  morality 
than  we  -had  heretofore  ;  while  Hackel  in  the  preface  to 
the  third  edition  of  his  "Natural  History  of  Creation/' 
page  XXIX,  mentions  the  publication  of  Carneri  with 
the  greatest  praise,  earnestly  recommends  all  theologians 
and  philosophers  to  read  it,  and  greets  it  as  the  first  suc- 
cessful attempt  at  applying  fruitfully  the  monistic  view 


240  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

of  the  world,  as  established  by  Darwinism,  to  the  realm 
of  practical  philosophy  and  at  showing  that  the  immense 
progress  of  our  knowledge  of  the.  world  caused  by  the 
descent  theory  has  only  the  most  beneficial  effect  upon 
the  further  progressing  development  of  mankind  in 
practical  life; — a  criticism  in  the  "Ausland"  (8  April, 
1872,  No.  15),  calls  the  same  publication  "an  attempt  at 
harmonizing  Darwin's  hypothesis  with  the  current  views 
of  ethics,  and  at  showing  that  those  doctrines  cannot  be 
sustained  which  result  as  strictly  logical  conclusions 
from  Darwin's  theory,  and  which  are  opposed  to  the 
present  views  of  morality. " 

In  returning  from  this  digression  to  Darwinism  in  its 
purest  form,  to  Darwin  himself,  we  have  in  the  first 
place  to  resume  the  discussion  entered  upon  as  to  the 
way  and  manner  in  which,  according  to  Darwin,  self- 
determination  is  originated.  Love  and  sympathy,  moral 
feeling  (with  this  definition  he  seems  to  point  at  the  con- 
sciousness of  moral  freedom  of  will  and  of  responsibil- 
ity), and  conscience,  are  to  him  very  important  elements 
of  morality  ;  and  in  the  moral  disposition  of  man  he 
sees  the  greatest  of  all  differences  between  man  and 
animal.  He  also  willingly  acknowledges  the  powerful 
impulse  which  morality  has  from  religion,  when  he  says 
(-Descent  of  Man,"  Vol.  II,  page  3±T) :  "With  the 
more  civilized  races,  the  conviction  of  the  existence  of 
an  all-seeing  Deity  has  had  a  potent  influence  on  the 
advance  of  morality."  From  these  and  all  his  other 
deductions,  we  see  that  Darwin  in  no  way  intends  to 
modify  the  maxims  of  moral  action  ;  and  if  under  the 
expression  "  reform  of  morality,"  with  which  we  have 
headed  the  present  chapter,  we  should  understand  but 


REFORM   OF   MORALITY   THROUGH   DARWINISM.         241 

a  reform  of  moral  action  itself,  we  should  without  hesi- 
tation have  to  rank  Darwin  with  the  next  group,  and 
not  with  that  of  which  we  now  treat ;  just  as  in  our 
review  of  the  position  of  Darwinism  in  reference  to  the 
religious  question,  we  had  to  rank  him  with  those  who 
take  a  neutral  and  peaceful  position  in  reference  to 
religion. 

But  if  he  does  not  touch  upon  morality  in  the  max- 
ims, he  nevertheless  comes  forth  in  the  theory  of  moral 
action,  in  the  science  of  morality  with  reformatory 
claims, — namely,  with  the  fact  that  reduces  the  whole 
moral  life  to  those  agencies  which  are  already  active  in 
the  preceding  animalic  stage.  It  is  true,  he  makes,  as 
we  have  seen,  a  distinction  in  the  genetic  derivation  of 
morality.  He  wholly  reduces  love  and  sympathy  to 
social  instincts  which  man  has  in  common  with  the 
animal ;  and  he  lets  the  formal  motives  of  moral  action, 
sense  of  duty  and  conscience,  originate  through  the  high 
development  of  intelligence  and  other  spiritual  forces, 
and  to  be  increased  and  transmitted  by  custom  and 
inheritance,  if  those  are  present.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  development  of  intelligence  is  to  him  an  exclusive 
product  of  the  preceding  stage  on  which  it  was  devel- 
oped, and  thus,  in  his  opinion,  entire  morality,  notwith- 
standing that  double  derivation,  certainly  has  purely  and 
exclusively  the  natural  basis  as  its  origin.  If  that  is 
once  the  standpoint  to  which  man  sees  himself  led,  he 
has,  in  order  to  reason  logically,  but  a  double  choice. 
He  must  either  say  that  a  development  out  of  a  natural 
basis  can  possibly  be  consistent  with  the  appearance  of 
a  new  and  higher  principle,  or  must  give  up  the  auton- 
omy of  the  moral  law,  and  leave  the  moral  action  cf 
16 


THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

man,  even  in  his  'maxims,  to  the  unsteady  flowing  of 
development,  or  even  of  arbitrariness,  and  to  the  degree 
of  education  and  intelligence  of  subjectivity.  Neither 
the  one  nor  the  other  is  done  by  Darwin.  It  is  true,  on 
the  one  hand  he  shows  that  modesty,  so  often  exhibited 
by  him,  of  the  investigator  who  does  not  wish  to  express 
any  opinion  on  questions  regarding  which  he  has  not  yet 
attained  a  mature  judgment ;  but  on  the  other  hand  lie 
also  manifests  the  same  aversion  to  going  beyond  purely 
naturo-historical  speculations  which,  as  we  have  seen  in 
Part  I,  Book  II,  Chapter  I,  §  1,  hindered  him  from 
obtaining  a  clear  conception  of  the  importance  of  the 
question  as  to  the  origin  of  self-consciousness  and  of 
moral  self-determination,  and  the  same  want  of  sequence 
in  reasoning,  which,  as  we  have  found  in  Chap.  Ill,  pre- 
vented him  from  giving  an  affirmative  or  negative  de- 
cision in  such  an  important  question,  as  whether  a  divine 
end  is  to  be  observed  in  the  processes  of  the  world. 

In  this  naturalization  of  ethical  principles,  he  is 
closely  related  to  that  peculiar  moral-philosophic  ten- 
dency in  England,  which  long  before  Darwin's  appear- 
ance, took  its  origin  in  John  Stuart  Mill,  but  which  now, 
in  the  closest  connection  with  Darwin's  principles,  has 
its  main  advocate  in  Herbert  Spencer,  and  is  commonly 
called  the  utilitarian  tendency.  We  understand  by  this 
that  conception  of  the  moral  motive  which  allows  the 
moral  good,  however  it  may  be  ideally  separated  from 
the  useful  in  the  developed  condition  of  mankind  at  the 
present  time,  in  its  origin  to  be  developed  at  the  outset 
from  the  same  origin  as  the  useful, — namely,  from  the 
sensation  of  like  and  dislike  ;  a  theory  of  utility  which 
Sir  John  Lubbock  still  tried  to  complete  and  deepen  by 


REFORM   OF   MORALITY   THROUGH   DARWINISM.         243 

the  theory  of  an  inheritance  of  the  sensation  of  author- 
ity. Activities  which  originally  proved  to  be  only 
useful,  were  inherited  as  traditional  instinct  by  the 
offspring,  and  were  thus  freed  from  the  sensation  of  the 
useful,  and  acted  as  authority  ;  this  is  the  origin  of  duty, 
according  to  the  history  of  development.  Inasmuch  as 
this  philosophic  system  aims  at  taking  from  ethics  the 
absoluteness  of  its  demands,  and  at  drawing  down  these 
demands  into  the  activities  of  originating  and  develop- 
ing, it  is  also  to  be  treated  of  in  this  place. 

As  in  the  religious  question,  so  in  the  ethical,  Gustav 
Jager  also  stands  nearer  to  a  neutral  relation  between 
Darwinism  and  the  hitherto  valid  principles.  He  puts 
the  moral  principles  the  same  as  the  religious,  into  the 
balance  of  utility  to  man  in  his  struggle  for  existence, 
and  finds  it  thus  easy  and  to  be  taken  for  granted, 
that  the  principles  of  morality,  as  they  became  the 
common  property  of  mankind  as  influenced  by  Chris- 
tianity, really  prove  themselves  also  the  most  ser- 
viceable to  mankind.  Social  life  is  of  more  benefit  to 
man  than  hermit  life  ;  this  reflection  leads  him  to  the 
moral  principle  of  charity.  And  as,  according  to  Dar- 
winism, rising  development  shows  itself  in  an  increasing 
differentiation  and  more  richly  organized  physical  devel- 
opment, so  the  organization  of  society  according  to  the 
principle  of  the  division  of  work  is  that  form  of  social 
life  which  proves  itself  the  most  practical  to  man  ;  and 
this  reflection  leads  him  to  the  full  acknowledgment  of 
the  entire  ethical  organization  of  human  life  and  its 
tasks. 

But,  as  we  saw,  in  treating  of  the  religious  question, 
that  nobody,  neither  friend  nor  foe,  could  possibly  be 


244  THE   THEORIES  OF   DARWIN. 

satisfied  with  the  substitution  of  the  category  of  utility 
for  that  of  truth,  we  are  compelled  to  say,  in  reference 
to  the  ethical  question,  that  a  moral  principle  which,  on 
such  a  foundation,  has  its  basis  and  authority  only  in  its 
utility,  is  really  no  authority,  and  loses  its  value  with 
every  -individual  who  is  unwilling  to  acknowledge  its 
utility  and  thinks  another  ground  of  action  may  be  more 
useful  than  the  moral. 


PEACE   BETWEEN   DARWINISM   AND   MORALITY.        245 


CHAPTER    VI. 

NEUTRALITY    AND    PEACE    BETWEEN  DARWINISM 
AND    MORALITY. 

§  1.     Jl/ivarty  Alex.  Braun,  and  Others. 

Evidently  a  real  neutrality  between  the  Darwinian 
theories  of  development  and  the  hitherto  valid  and 
absolute  authority  of  the  moral  principle  is  possible 
only,  when  we  deny  that  the  ethical  demand  is  simply  a 
natural  process — although  we  may  perceive  its  origin 
within  the  limits  of  a  natural  process — and  when  we 
fail  to  identify  that  demand  with  this  process,  and  do 
not  deduce  it  from  the  latter  as  its  sufficient  ground  of 
explanation;  but  harmony  between  the  two  theories, 
in  spite  of  all  traces  of  Darwinism  in  the  scientific  parts 
of  anthropology,  is  possible  when  we  acknowledge  the 
moral  demand,  if  once  present  and  valid,  in  its  entire 
and,  so  to  speak,  its  metaphysical  independence  in  its 
full  value,  far  exceeding  all  natural  necessity. 

It  is  shown  by  Mivart  that  such  an  absolute  author- 
ity of  the  ethical  demands,  and  such  an  independence 
of  the  whole  science  of  morality,  may  be  brought  into 
accord  with  the  scientific  theories  of  development.  In 
his  book  on  "The  Genesis  of  Species,"  he  devotes  a 
whole  chapter  to  ethical  questions.  He  discriminates, 
in  the  moral  good,  between  the  formal  good  (good 
with  consciousness  and  will  of  the  good)  and  the 


246  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

material  good  (good  without  consciousness  and  design), 
ascribes  only  the  latter  to  the  animal  world  in  its  moral 
features,  and  the  former  exclusively  to  mankind,  and 
thus  takes  ground  quite  analogous  to  that  held  by  him 
on  the  religious  question,  where  he  includes  in  the 
theory  of  development  the  physical  part  of  man,  but 
excludes  the  intellectual  part,  with  the  single  qualifica- 
tion that  in  the  religious  question  he  unnecessarily 
renders  his  position  more  difficult  by  designating  this 
intellectual  or  spiritual  part  by  the  term  "soul." 

German  authorities,  who  see  in  Darwinism  only  a 
scientific  question  which  can  be  solved  by  means  of 
natural  investigation,  and  who  therefore,  think  the 
religious  and  ethical  questions  but  little  affected  by  it, 
have  expressed  themselves  in  regard  to  this  neutral  posi- 
tion toward  morality  still  more  rarely  than  as  to  its 
neutrality  toward  religion.  The  reason  for  this  is  pro- 
bably that  the  independence  of  moral  principles  and  the 
absoluteness  of  their  authority  entirely  result  from 
themselves,  as  soon  as  we  have  once  admitted  theism 
and  left  room  in  general  for  a  freedom  standing  above 
natural  causality — and  perhaps  it  is  due  to  the  further 
fact  that  the  realm  of  the  moral  is  more  palpably  urged 
as  a  reality  and  necessity  upon  even  the  most  indifferent 
mind  than  the  realm  of  religion. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  find  frequent  utterances  which 
indirectly  refer  to  the  ethical  realm — for  instance,  ex- 
pressions in  reference  to  the  ethical  importance  of  an 
animal  descent  of  man.  Alex.  Braun  says:  "Man  assents 
to  the  idea  of  being  appointed  lord  of  the  creatures, 
but  then  he  may  also  acknowledge  that  he  is  not  placed 
over  his  subjects  as  a  stranger,  but  originated  from  the 


PEACE    BETWEEN    DARWINISM    AND   MORALITY.        247 

beings  whose  lord  he  wishes  to  be.     It  is  not  an  un- 

o 

worthy  idea,  but  rather  an  elevating  one,  that  man 
constitutes  the  last  and  highest  member  in  the  ancient 
and  infinitely  rich  development  of  organic  nature  on  our 
planet,  being  connected  by  the  most  intimate  bonds  of 
relationship  with  the  other  members,  as  the  latter  are 
connected  among  themselves  with  one  another;  not  a 
pernicious  parasite  on  the  tree  of  natural  life,  but  the 
true  son  of  the  blissful  mother  Nature."  In  reducing 
descent,  which  he  accepts,  to  a  development  from  an 
inner  force,  and  in  ascribing  to  the  Darwinian  selection, 
with  its  struggle  for  existence,  the  value  only  of  a  regu- 
lator (he  adopts  this  term  of  Wallace  as  a  very  striking 
one),  Braun,  in  his  concluding  appeal  to  young  stud- 
ents, calls  especial  attention  to  the  ethical  importance 
of  a  development  proceeding  from  within,  saying: 
uLife  has  its  outer  and  its  inner  side  ;  all  its  works  and 
ways  must  follow  mechanical  laws,  but  its  tasks  and  aims 
belong  to  a  higher  realm.  We  are  permitted  to  take  a 
glance  into  this  realm  through  the  all-embracing  history 
of  the  development  of  nature,  which  leads  up  into  our 
own  inmost  being,  up  to  our  highest  end.  Truly  pro- 
gressive development  is  the  best  wish  for  every  youth," 
etc. 

Inasmuch  as  that  in  which  Alex.  Braun  finds  a  satis- 
faction for  the  fulfillment  of  the  ethical  tasks — namely,  a 
deeper  knowledge  of  man's  connection  with  lower  nature, 
and  the  pointing  to  the  proper  tasks  of  the  development 
of  mankind, — has  thus  far  been  the  substance  of  all 
sound  systems  of  morality,  A\TC  did  not  mention  these 
and  similar  utterances,  of  which  we  could  gather  many 
more  from  other  writers,  in  the  preceding  part  of  our 


248  THE   THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

work — i.  e.,  in  describing  those  who  ascribe  to  Darwin- 
ism a  reformatory  influence  upon  morality  ;  but  we  rank 
these  utterances  with  those  which  predict  from  the 
descent  theory  neither  injury  to  morality  nor  any  espe- 
cial enlightenment  regarding  it. 

We  have  now  reached  the  end  of  that  part  of  our 
work  which  considers  and  treats  of  the  views  of  others. 
To  our  regret,  we  have  been  compelled  to  restrict  our- 
selves, in  this  review,  to  the  countries  of  the  English 
and  German  tongues  ;  the  former  being  the  home  of 
Darwin,  the  latter  our  own.  We  should  have  preferred 
to  take  into  our  review  also  the  literature  of  France  and 
Belgium,  Holland  and  Italy  ;  but  we  feared  being  able 
to  give  only  an  incomplete  report.  Besides,  it  is  in 
Germany  and  Great  Britain — and  partly  also  in  North 
America,  related  to  both  in  language  and  origin — where 
the  Darwinian  agitation  has  taken  deepest  hold  of  the 
mind  ;  and,  in  restricting  our  report  to  these  countries, 
we  are  not  likely  to  have  omitted  any  view  essential  to 
the  consideration  of  the  present  question.  It  is  true 
that  in  the  other  countries  named  the  Darwinian  litera- 
ture is  also  rich,  and  we  are  well  aware  of  the  incom- 
pleteness of  our  report  in  that  respect.  But  we  believe 
that  we  have  not  omitted  any  essential  views  and  evi- 
dences, even  if  the  names  of  many  of  their  advocates 
have  not  been  mentioned. 

It  still  remains  to  us  to  investigate  independently  the 
position  of  the  Darwinian  theories,  with  their  philosophic 
supplements,  in  reference  to  religion  and  morality :  a  task 
for  which  we  hope  to  have  essentially  prepared  the  way 
through  the  preceding  representations  and  investigations. 


PRELIMINARY  VIEW.  249 


BOOK   II. 

ANALYTICAL. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEW. 

In  treating  the  religious  question,  we  proceed  from 
the  supposition  that  religion  is  concerned  not  only  in 
the  subjective  truth  of  religious  impulse  and  sensation, 
but  also  in  the  objective  truth  and  reality  of  its  faith, 
although  it  attains  these  in  a  different  way  from  natural 
science.  A  religion  which  should  have  the  authorization 
of  its  existence  only  in  psychology,  and  which  was  not 
allowed  to  ask  whether  the  object  of  its  faith  also  has 
objective  reality,  would  stand  on  a  weak  basis,  and  its 
end  would  only  be  a  question  of  time;  for  an  impulse 
which  can  only  be  psychologically  established,  and  to 
which  no  real  objective  necessity  could  correspond, 
must  sooner  or  later  either  be  proven  a  psychological 
error  or  be  eliminated  by  progressing  culture.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  we  find  a  reconcilableness  or  an  irrecon- 
cilableness  of  Darwin's  views  with  the  objective 
substance  of  religion,  the  possible  question  as  to  its 
reconcilableness  or  irreconcilableness  with  subjective 
religiousness  on  the  ground  of  those  results  wholly 
answers  itself.  In  no  way,  not  even  in  the  most  indirect, 
can  we  approve  that  method  of  book-keeping  by  which 
something  can  be  true  in  regard  to  religion  and  false  in 
regard  to  science,  or  vice-versa;  on  the  contrary,  we  see 


250  THE   THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

in  all  attempts  at  healing  in  such  a  way  the  rupture 
which  at  present  exists  in  the  minds  of  so  many,  only  a 
more  emphatic  avowal  of  that  rupture. 

In  treating  of  the  religious  question  as  it  affects  the 
position  of  Darwinism  in  reference  to  the  substance  and 
the  objective  truth  of  the  religious  faith,  without  going 
into  a  detailed  treatment  of  the  question  of  the  reconcil- 
ableness  of  a  purely  subjective  religiousness  with  the 
Darwinian  views,  it  will  be  of  advantage  to  speak  first 
of  the  position  of  the  Darwinian  theories  in  reference  to 
the  basis  of  all  true  and  sound  religion  and  religiousness 
—the  theistic  vieiv  of  the  ivorld.  In  doing  this,  we  shall 
discriminate  the  purely  scientific  theories  of  Darwin 
from  the  philosophic  supplements  and  conclusions 
which  have  been  given  to  and  drawn  from  them,  and 
shall  have  to  consider  each  of  them  separately  in  con- 
nection with  the  theistic  view  of  the  world.  If  thereby 
we  shall  discover  Darwinian  views  which  can  be  brought 
into  accord  with  a  theistic  view  of  the  world,  we  shall 
also,  in  order  to  close  our  investigation,  have  to  consider 
them  with  those  parts  of  the  theology  of  positive  Chris- 
tianity which  can  be  affected  by  the  Darwinian  questions. 

In  treating  the  question  of  the  relation  of  Darwinism 
to  morality,  our  investigation  can  be  somewhat  abridged, 
because  many  of  the  principal  questions  which  have  to  be 
considered  have  found  their  solution  in  what  has  been 
previously  said,  and  partly  also  because  they  will  present 
themselves  in  a  different  form. 

The  principal  division  in  our  discussion  we  shall  most 
appropriately  assign  to  ethics,  and  thus  treat  first  of  the 
position  of  Darwinism  in  reference  to  the  moral  princi- 
ples, and  then  treat  of  this  in  reference  to  the  concrete 


PRELIMINARY   VIEW.  251 

moral  life.  Where  the  question  as  to  the  position  of 
Darwinism  in  reference  to  morality  occurs,  we  shall  no 
longer  have  to  treat  of  it  separately  as  to  the  different 
aspects  of  its  problems — we  should  otherwise  get  lost  in 
too  many  repetitions ;  but  we  shall  only  have  to  separate 
an  ethical  naturalism  which  supports  itself  upon  Darwin- 
ian grounds,  from  pure  Darwinism,  and  to  treat  of  each 
in  turn  as  to  its  position  in  reference  to  morality. 


252  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 


A.    THE  DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND 
RELIGION. 

CHAPTER   I. 

THE  DARWINIAN  THEORIES  AND  THE  THEISTIC  VIEW 
OF  THE  WORLD. 

A.    THE  POSITION  OP  PURELY  SCIENTIFIC  DARWINISM  IN  REFER- 
ENCE TO  THEISM. 

§1.  Scientific  Investigation  and  Theism.     The  Idea  of 
Creation. 

At  the  very  beginning  of  our  investigation,  we  have 
to  state  that  the  absolute  freedom  of  scientific  investiga- 

o 

tion  lies  not  only  in  the  interest  of  natural  science,  but 
just  as  clearly  in  the  direct  interest  of  religion  ;  and  that 
every  attempt  at  limiting  the  freedom  of  scientific  inves- 
tigation in  a  pretended  religious  interest,  can  only  have 
its  cause  in  the  fullest  misapprehension  of  that  which  the 
religious  interest  requires.  For  the  religious  view  of  the 
world  consists  in  this :  that  it  sees  in  the  universe,  with 
all  its  inhabitants  and  processes,  the  work  of  an  almighty 
Creator  and  Ruler  of  the  world ;  and  therefore  it  cannot 
be  unimportant  to  it,  whether  we  also  have  a  knowledge 
of  this  work,  to  a  certain  extent,  whether  we  make  use 
of  the  means  which  lead  to  the  knowledge  of  the  world, 


THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  253 

and  whether  we  make  progress  in  the  knowledge,  or  not. 
The  religious  view  of  the  world  sees  in  every  correction 
and  enrichment  of  -our  scientific  knowledge  only  a  cor- 
rection and  enrichment  of  our  knowledge  of  the  way 
and  manner  of  the  divine  creation  and  action  ;  and  every 
such  correction  and  enrichment  acts  directly  as  an 
incitement  to  religiousness  —  although,  fortunately  for 
the  universal  destination  of  religion,  the  degree  of  our 
religiousness  is  not  dependent  upon  the  degree  of  our 
knowledge  of  nature.  Therefore,  the  religious  view  of 
the  world  does  not  throw  any  barriers  in  the  way  of 
scientific  investigation ;  it  does  not  prescribe  the  route 
by  which  the  latter  is  to  reach  its  aim,  and  it  does  not 
forbid  it  any  scientific  auxiliary  means,  nor,  indeed,  any 
scientific  auxiliary  hypothesis,  nor  does  it,  so  far  as  the 
communication  of  scientific  knowledge  is  concerned, 
inquire  after  the  religious  or  the  irreligious  standpoint  of 
those  who  offer  it  such  knowledge.  In  all  these  directions, 
it  knows  of  but  one  requirement :  that  of  exact  and  cor- 
rect presentation ;  in  a  word,  of  but  one  requirement  of 
truth.  Real,  well-founded,  and  certain  results  of  natural 
science  can  never  come  into  antagonism  with  religion ; 
for  precisely  the  same  thing  which  in  the  language 
of  natural  science  is  called  natural  causal  connection,  is 
in  that  of  religion  called  the  way  and  manner  of  divine 
action  and  government.  Where  man  has  adopted  any 
view,  the  proving  of  which,  according  to  its  nature, 
belongs  to  natural  science,  and  natural  science  should 
show  an  error  in  such  a  view,  he  must  simply  give  it 
up  and  surrender  the  erroneous  opinion,  that  such  a  view 
is  to  form  a  constituent  part  of  our  religious  perception. 
Just  as  decidedly,  on  the  other  hand,  religion  can  ask  of 


254  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

natural  science  that  it  should  not  use  speculative  views 
of  religious  character,  the  proving  of  which  belongs  to 
the  science  of  religion,  for  the  purpose  of  scientific  gen- 
eralizations, in  case  the  science  of  religion  should  prove 
that  such  views  are  antagonistic  to  the  nature  and  the 
principles  of  religion. 

Those  who,  on  religious  grounds,  look  with  suspicion 
upon  scientific  investigation,  are  frequently  influenced  by 
two  erroneous  notions,  closely  related  to  one  another,  with- 
out regard  to  the  well-grounded  aversion  to  the  atheistic 
beauty  with  which  so  many  scientific  works  are  adorned. 
One  of  these  errors  is  the  notion  that  any  object  is  remote 
from  divine  causality  in  the  degree  in  which  it  has  the 
cause  of  its  origin  in  the  natural  connection,  and  that  it 
would  be  easier  for  us  to  trace  the  origin  of  an  object 
to  the  authorship  of  God,  if  we  could  not  find  any  natu- 
ral cause  of  its  origin,  than  if  we  had  knowledge  of  such 
a  natural  cause.  The  other  error  is  the  notion  that  the 
idea  of  "creation"  excludes  the  idea  of  the  action  of 
secondary  causes. 

If  the  first  mentioned  opinion  were  correct,  those 
certainly  would  be  right  who  identify  the  progress  of 
sciences  with  the  progress  of  atheism  ;  and  ignorance 
would  then  be  the  most  effective  protection  of  piety. 
But  this  opinion  is  in  direct  conflict  with  all  sound 
religious  and  scientific  reasoning.  It  is  in  conflict 
with  sound  religious  reasoning  :  for  the  religious  view 
of  the  world  sees  in  nature  itself,  with  its  whole  associ- 
ation of  causes  and  effects,  a  work  of  God  ;  and  as 
certainly  as,  according  to  the  religious  view  of  nature,  a 
thousand  years  in  the  sight  of  God  are  but  as  yesterday 
when  it  is  past,  just  so  certainly  is  an  object  a  work  of 


THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  255 

God,  whether  its  origin  is  due  to  milliards  of  well-known 
secondary  causes,  which  all  together  are  works  of  God 
— as  well  with  reference  to  the  laws  which  they  obey  as 
to  the  materials  and  forces  in  which  these  laws  are  active 
— or  whether,  when  treating  the  question  as  to  the  im- 
mediate cause  of  its  existence,  we  see  ourselves  led  to  an 
agency  unknown  to  us.  And  that  opinion  is  also  in 
conflict  with  all  sound  scientific  reasoning  :  for  the  fact 
that  we  do  not  have  any  knowledge  of  the  immediate 
cause  of  a  phenomenon,  is  by  no  means  a  proof  that  this 
immediate  cause  is  the  direct  action  of  God  who  does 
not  use  any  secondary  causes  ;  the  phenomena  may  just 
as  well  have  still  more  material  or  immaterial  secondary 
causes,  unknown  to  us.  We  will  illustrate  the  error, 
referred  to,  by  an  example  which  will  also  reveal  its 
relationship  to  the  other  error  of  which  we  shall  have  to 
speak  immediately.  It  is  certainly  no  evidence  of  an 
especially  intensive  piety,  if  we  build  the  conviction  that 
God  is  the  Creator  of  man,  among  other  things,  on  the 
obscurity  in  which  for  us  the  origin  of  mankind  is 
wrapped.  For  from  this  obscurity  no  other  conclusion 
can  be  drawn  than  increased  proofs  of  the  limitation 
of  our  knowledge  ;  that  piety  which  traces  those  phe- 
nomena whose  natural  causes  we  know,  just  as  decidedly 
to  the  causality  of  God,  is  much  more — we  shall  not  say, 
intensive,  but  correctly  guided — than  that  piety  which 
traces  back  those  whose  natural  causes  are  hidden  to  us. 
And,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  also  no  evidence  of  especial 
religious  coolness  or  indifference,  when  we  pursue  with 
interest  and  the  desire  of  success  the  attempts  at  bring- 
ing light  into  the  history  of  the  origin  of  mankind.  He 
who  does  the  latter  can,  according  to  his  religious  or 


256  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

irreligious  standpoint,  just  as  easily  connect  his  interest 
with  the  hope  of  an  enrichment  of  his  knowledge  of  the 
ways  and  works  of  God,  as  with  the  hope  of  a  confirma- 
tion in  his  atheistic  view  of  the  world.  The  reverence 
with  which  we  stand  before  the  action  of  God  in  those 
works  whose  existence  is  in  a  higher  degree  a  mystery 
to  us  than  the  existence  of  others  (for  in  reality  every- 
thing is  a  mystery  to  us),  is  perhaps  a  little  differently 
modified  from  the  reverence  with  which  we  stand  before 
the  action  of  God  in  those  of  his  works  in  the  mode  of 
whose  origin  we  are  permitted  to  get  a  deeper  glance  ; 
but  each  is  reverence,  and  we  can  get  from  both  nutri- 
ment for  our  religious  nature. 

Those  who  favor  the  second  error — namely,  that  the 
idea  of  creation  excludes  the  idea  of  secondary  causes — 
overlook  the  facts  that  the  idea  of  the  creation  of  the 
universe  is  essentially  different  from  the  idea  of  the 
creation  of  the  single  elements  of  the  universe,  as,  for 
instance,  of  the  earth,  of  the  organisms,  of  man  ;  that 
the  idea  of  a  creation  without  secondary  causes  can  only 
be  applied  to  the  origin  of  the  universe  in  its  elements, 
forces,  and  laws,  and  that  the  first  origin  of  the  single 
elements  in  the  world — as  of  the  single  planets,  organ- 
isms, man  —  not  only  admits  the  action  of  secondary 
causes,  but  even  requires  and  presupposes  the  action  of 
conditions.  For  all  single  species  of  beings  which  have 
originated  within  the  already  existing  world,  have  alsa 
certain  elements,  even  the  whole  basis  and  condition  of 
their  existence,  in  common  with  that  which  was  already 
before  in  existence  ;  the  planet  has  its  elements  in  com- 
mon with  the  elements  of  other  planets,  the  organic  has 
the  same  material  substances  as  the  inorganic,  man  has- 


THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  257 

the  elements  and  the  organization  of  his  body  as  well  as 
a  great  part  of  his  psychical  activity  in  common  with 
animals.  Nothing  urges  us  to  suppose — and  the  analogy 
of  all  that  we  know  even  forbids  us  to  suppose — that 
with  the  appearance  of  a  new  species  of  beings,  the 
same  matter  and  the  same  quality  of  matter  which  the 
last  appearance  has  in  common  with  the  already  existing, 
has  each  time  been  called  anew  into  existence  out  of 
nothing.  Only  that  which  in  the  new  species  is  really 
new,  comes  into  existence  anew  with  its  first  appearance. 
But  we  do  not  even  know  whether  the  proximate  cause 
of  this  new  does  really  come  into  existence  for  the  first 
time,  or  whether  it  was  not  before  in  existence  in  a  real, 
perhaps  latent,  condition,  and  is  now  set  free  for  the  first 
time.  In  the  one  case  as  in  the  other,  we  shall  call  the 
new,  which  comes  into  existence,  a  new  creation.  And 
if  man  thinks  that  the  new  only  deserves  the  name  of 
creation,  when  it  occurs  suddenly  and  at  once,  where 
before  only  other  things  were  present,  like  a  deus  ex 
mackina,  certainly  such  an  opinion  is  only  a  childlike 
conception,  which  becomes  childish  as  soon  as  we  scien- 
tifically reason  about  the  process.  It  cannot  be  doubtful 
that  religious  minds  which  are  not  accustomed  to  scien- 
tific reasoning,  have  such  a  conception  ;  whether  theolo- 
gians also  favor  it,  we  do  not  know,  although  it  is  pos- 
sible. Certainly  those  scientists  who  intend  to  attack 
the  faith  in  a  living  Creator  and  Lord  of  the  world, 
take  it  as  the  wholly  natural,  even  as  the  only  possible, 
conception  of  a  Creator  and  his  creation  ;  and  of  course 
it  is  to  them  a  great  and  cheap  pleasure  to  become  victori- 
ous knights  in  such  a  puppet-show  view  of  the  conception 
of  creation.  But  the  source  whence  Christians  derive  their 
17 


258  THE   THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

religious  knowledge  tells  them  precisely  the  contrary. 
The  Holy  Scripture,  it  is  true,  sees  in  the  entire  universe 
a  work  of  God.  But  where  it  describes  the  creation  of 
the  single  elements  of  the  world,  it  describes  at  the 
same  time  their  creation  as  the  product  of  natural 
causes,  brought  about  by  natural  conditions.  The  reader 
may  see,  for  instance,  the  words:  "And  God  said,  Let 
the  earth  bring  forth  grass,  the  herb  yielding  seed,  etc. 
And  the  earth  brought  forth  grass  and  "herb,"  etc.  "And 
God  said,  Let  the  earth  bring  forth  the  living  creature. " 
Even  the  creation  of  man  is  thus  related:  "And  the 
Lord  God  formed  man  of  the  dust  of  the  ground.*" 
Certainly  the  forming  presupposes  a  matter  out  of 
which  man  is  formed.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  where 
the  Bible  speaks  of  single  beings  in  the  kingdoms  long 
before  created  and  perfected,  of  the  individual  man  who 
is  originated  by  generation  and  birth,  of  single  plants  and 
animals — in  general,  of  single  processes  and  phenomena 
in  the  world  long  before  perfected,  of  wind  and  waves, 
of  rain  and  flames,  which  altogether  have  their  natural 
causes  of  origin — it  speaks  of  them  all  precisely  in  the 
same  way  as  when  describing  their  first  creation  as  works 
of  God.  The  expressions  ' '  create,  make,  form,  cause  to 
appear,"  are  applied  to  the  single  individuals  of  the  king- 
doms long  before  created,  precisely  in  the  same  way  as 
they  are  to  the  first  origin  of  the  first  individuals  of 
these  kingdoms. 

Thus,  by  the  full  freedom  which  religious-  interest 
gives  to  scientific  investigation,  we  are  well  prepared  to 
treat  with  entire  impartiality  the  question  as  to  the  posi- 
tion of  each  of  the  Darwinian  theories  in  reference  to 
theism. 


THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  259 

2.    The  Descent  Theory  and  Theism. 

In  the  first  part  of  our  investigation,  we  found  that 
the  idea  of  the  origin  of  the  species,  especially  of  the 
higher  organized  species,  through  descent  from  the  next 
related  lower  ones,  has  a  high  degree  of  probability, 
although  it  is  still  not  proven  in  a  strictly  scientific 
sense,  and  although  especially  the  supposition  of  an 
often-separated  primitive  generation  of  single  types  is 
not  excluded  by  that  idea,  and  we  can  hardly  suppose 
that  the  main  types  of  the  animal  kingdom  are  devel- 
oped out  of  one  another.  Now  we  are  far  from  asking 
of  religion  to  decide  for  itself  in  favor  of  the  one  or  the 
other  mode  of  conception,  or  to  place  its  influence  in  the 
one  or  the  other  balance-scale  of  scientific  investigations. 
It  leaves  the  answering  of  these  questions  exclusively  to 
natural  science,  knowing  beforehand  that  it  will  be  able 
to  come  to  an  understanding  with  the  one  as  well  as  with 
the  other  result  of  its  investigations.  But  we  confess 
frankly  that  it  is  incomparably  easier  for  us  to  bring  the 
origin  of  the  higher  groups  of  organisms  in  accord  with 
a  theistic  and  teleological  view  of  the  world  through 
descent  than  the  origin  of  each  single  species  of  organ- 
isms through  a  primitive  generation ;  and  we  reach  this 
result  especially  by  the  attempt  at  teleologically  perceiv- 
ing the  palseontological  remains  of  organic  life  on  earth. 
Theism  and  teleology  see  in  the  origin  of  things  a  striv- 
ing towards  a  goal,  a  rising  from  the  lower  to  the  higher, 
a  development — it  is  true  a  development  really  taken  only 
in  the  ideal  sense  of  an  ideal  connection,  of  a  plan  ;  or, 
as  K.  E.  v.  Baer,  in  1834-,  in  his  lecture  on  the  most 
common  law  of  nature  in  all  development,  expresses 


260  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

himself,  of  a  progressive  victory  of  mind  over  matter. 
Such  a  plan  and  its  realization  we  can  much  more  easily 
conceive  when,  in  the  past  genera  which  geological  form- 
ations show  us,  a  genealogical  connection  takes  place 
between  the  preceding  species  and  the  now  living  species, 
than  when  each  species  perished  and  beside  or  after  it  the 
newly  appearing  species  always  originated  out  of  the 
inorganic  through  primitive  generation.  In  the  first 
case,  we  see  in  the  preceding  a  real  preparation  for  the 
following,  and  also  easily  perceive  the  apparent  waste  of. 
enormous  periods  of  time  for  the  successive  processes 
of  creation.  In  the  second  case,  the  coming  and  going 
of  genera  in  innumerable  thousands  of  years,  without 
any  exterior  connection,  becomes  an  incomprehensible 
problem,  and  the  striving  towards  an  end  according  to  a 
regular  plan,  which  we  observe  in  the  development  of 
the  organic  kingdoms  on  earth,  disappears  completely  in 
metaphysical  darkness. 

Precisely  because  so  many  advocates  of  a  theistic 
view  of  the  world  have  thought  that  for  the  sake  of  the 
theistic  idea  of  creation  they  were  obliged  to  suppose  a 
primitive  origin  of  all  the  organic  species,  and  because, 
nevertheless,  the  fact  is  patent  that  in  the  course  of  the 
pre-historic  thousands  of  years  myriads  of  species  came 
and  perished,  not  to  return  again,  they  became  liable  to 
the  reproach  on  the  part  of  the  adversaries  of  theism, 
that  the  Creator,  as  they  supposed  him,  makes  unsuccess- 
ful attempts,  which  he  has  to  throw  away,  as  the  potter 
a  defective  vessel,  until  he  finally  succeeds  in  making 
something  durable  and  useful ;  and  this  objection  was 
and  is  still  made,  not  only  to  these  superficial  theists  and 
their  unhappily-selected  and  indefensible  position,  but  to 


THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  261 

the  whole  view  of  the  world  of  theism  itself  and  to  the 
faith  in  God  and  the  Creator  in  general. 

For  all  these  reasons,  we  can  from  the  religious  point 
of  view  but  welcome  the  idea  of  a  descent  of  species. 
Philologists  have,  if  we  are  correctly  informed,  the 
canon  that  as  a  rule  the  more  difficult  text  is  the  more 
correct  one ;  but  we  doubt  whether  those  should  adopt 
this  canon  who  try  to  read  in  the  book  of  nature, 
whether  with  the  eye  of  science  or  with  that  of  religion 
—unless  the  faculty  of  reasoning  is  given  to  us  in  order 
to  conceal  the  truth. 

But,  we  have  also  to  look  for  a  manner  of  reconcil- 
ing theism  with  all  the  different  possibilities  under  which 
a  descent  is  at  all  reasonable  and  conceivable.  One  of 
these  possibilities  is  that  of  an  entirely  successive  devel- 
opment of  species  out  of  one  another  by  imperceptibly 
small  transitions ;  and  of  this  we  shall  soon  speak. 
Another  is  the  possibility  of  a  descent  by  leaps, 
through  a  metamorphosis  of  gerrns  or  a  heterogenetic 
generation.  The  real  causes  of  such  a  heterogenetic 
generation,  if  it  took  place  at  all,  have  not  yet  been 
found ;  therefore  we  have  to  treat  only  of  the  abstract 
possibilities  of  its  conceivableness.  There  are  two  such 
possibilities. 

The  birth  of  a  new  species  took  place  in  one  of  two 
ways :  Either  to  those  materials  and  forces  which  formed 
the  germ  of  the  new  species,  were  added  entirely  new 
metaphysical  agencies  which  did  not  exist  before,  and 
only  the  basis  and  the  frame  within  which  the  new 
appeared,  or  that  which  the  new  species  has  in  common 
with  the  old  mother-species  had  the  cause  of  its  existence 
in  the  preceding.  Likewise  even  the  original  productions 


262  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

of  man  are  always  composed  of  two  factors — of  the 
given  pre-suppositions  and  conditions,  and  of  the  new 
which  on  their  basis  and  within  their  frame  comes  into 
existence.  Otherwise  the  causes  of  the  new  which  was 
to  originate  already  lay  in  all  former  stages,  but  were 
still  latent  and  still  hindered  in  their  activity,  and  only 
at  the  time  of  the  birth  the  new  impulse  came  which  set 
them  free  for  their  activity.  This  new  impulse  may  very 
well  belong  to  the  causal  connection  of  the  universe,  and 
be  caused  by  something  analogous  to  natural  selection. 

In  the  first  case,  which  in  it?  application  to  the  origin 
of  man  is  adopted  by  A.  R.  Wallace  and  Karl  Snell,  the 
reconciliation  between  descent  and  theism  has  not  the' 
least  difficulty  ;  for  if  the  agency  which  in  the  new- 
appearing  species  produces  that  which  is  specifically  new 
in  it,  came  only  into  existence  with  the  first  formation  of 
the  germs  of  the  new  species  in  the  mother-species,  this 
new  certainly  cannot  have  its  origin  anywhere  else  than 
in  the  supermundane  prima  causa  in  the  Creator  and 
Lord  of  the  world. 

In  the  second  case  also,  theism  is  in  no  way  threat- 
ened. For  if  we  have  to  refer  the  cause  of  a  new 
phenomenon  in  the  world  so  far  back  as  even  to  the 
beginning  and  the  first  elements  of  all  things,  we  never- 
theless have  to  arrive  at  last  at  the  cause  of  all  causes  ; 
and  this  is  the  living  God,  the  Creator  and  Lord  of  the 
world.  Thus  the  new  form  of  existence  would  anyhow 
have  the  cause  of  its  existence  in  God  ;  and  the  value, 
the  importance,  and  the  substance  of  its  existence, 
would  only  commence  from  where  it  really  made  its 
appearance,  and  not  from  where  its  still  latent  causes 
existed.  As  little  as  we  attribute  to  the  just  fecundated 


DARWINIAN    THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  263 

egg  of  man  the  value  of  man,  although  we  know  that 
under  the  right  conditions  the  full  man  is  to  be  de- 
veloped out  of  it,  just  so  little  in  accordance  with  that 
view  would  the  differences  of  value  within  the  created 
world  be  dissolved  in  a  mass  of  atoms  or  potencies  of  a 
similar  value.  Neither  should  we  have  to  fear  that  from 
such  a  theory  cold  deism  would  be  substituted  for  our 
theism,  full  of  life.  For  as  certainly  as  theism  does  not 
exclude,  but  includes,  all  that  is  relative  truth  in  deism, 
so  certainly  the  supposition  that  the  Creator  had  laid  the 
latent  causes  of  all  following  creatures  in  the  first  germs 
of  the  created,  would  also  not  exclude  the  idea  of  a 
constant  and  omnipotent  presence  of  the  Creator  in  the 
world.  Undoubtedly  it  belongs  to  our  most  elementary 
conceptions  of  God,  that  we  have  to  conceive  his  lofty 
position  above  time,  not  as  an  abstract  distance  from 
finite  development,  but  as  an  absolute  domination 
over  it  ;  so  that  for  God  himself,  who  creates  time  and 
developments  in  time,  there  is  no  dependence  on  the 
temporal  succession  of  created  things,  and  it  is  quite  the 
same  to  him  whether  he  instantly  calls  a  creature  into 
existence,  or  whether  he  prepares  it  in  a  short  space  of 
time,  or  years,  or  in  millions  of  years.  In  this  idea  we 
also  find  the  only  possible  and  simple  solution  of  the 
before-mentioned  problem  of  a  timeless  time  which  Fr. 
Vischer  wishes  to  propose  to  philosophy. 

§  3.     The  Evolution  Theory  and  Theism. 

In  speaking  of  an  evolution  theory,  in  distinction 
from  the  descent  theory,  we  mean,  as  is  evident  from 
the  first  part  of  our  work,  that  way  and  mode  of  con- 


THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

strncting  the  doctrine  of  the  descent  of  species  which 
permit  this  descent  to  take  place,  not  by  the  leaps  of  a 
metamorphosis  of  germs,  but  by  transitions  so  imper- 
ceptably  small  that  the  difference  of  two  generations 
which  lie  in  the  same  line  of  descent,  is  never  greater 
than  those  differences  which  always  take  place  between 
parents  and  children  of  the  same  species — transitions 
so  gradual  that  only  the  continuation  of  these  individual 
changes  in  a  single  direction  produces  an  increase  and, 
finally  and  gradually,  the  new  species.  The  treatment 
of  the  question  as  to  what  position  this  evolution  theory 
takes  regarding  theism,  is  even  more  simple  than 
answering  the  question  as  to  the  position  of  the  descent 
idea  in  reference  to  theism. 

For  now  we  have  no  longer  to  discuss  the  different 
possibilities  of  a  development,  as  heretofore  we  have 
discussed  those  of  a  descent,  but  only  the  idea  of  a 
gradual  development  or  of  an  evolution  in  general.  Of 
such  possibilities,  it  is  true,  we  find  several.  In  the 
first  place,  we  can  look  for  the  inciting  principle  of  the 
development  of  species  either  in  the  interior  of  organ- 
isms, or  we  can  see  it  approaching  the  latter  from  with- 
out. The  only  scientific  system  which  has  made  any 
attempt  at  mentioning  and  elaborating  the  inciting 
principle  of  development  is  that  of  Darwin  ;  a  system 
that  chooses  the  second  of  the  alternatives  just  stated 
and  sees  the  essential  principle  that  makes  the  transmis- 
sion of  individuals  a  progress  beyond  one  species, 
approaching  the  individuals  from  without.  But  while 
we  shall  have  to  treat  of  this  specific  Darwinian  theory 
— the  selection  theory— still  more  in  detail  in  the  follow- 
ing section,  we  shall  also  there  have  to  point  out  every- 


THE   DARWINIAN    THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  265 

thing  that  theism  has  to  say  in  reference  to  a  principle 
of  development  which  approaches  the  organisms  from 
without.  Another  possible  explanation  of  the  origin  of 
species  through  developement  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact 
that  we  look  for  the  inciting  principle  of  development 
In  the  interior  of  organisms.  This  is  done,  so  far  as  we 
know,  by  all  those  scientists  who,  although  inclined  to 
an  evolution  theory,  are  adversaries  'of  the  selection 
theory  ;  but  none  of  them  claim  to  have  found  the 
inciting  agencies  of  development.  Thus,  as  in  the 
preceding  section,  we  are  again  referred  only  to  the 
wholly  abstract  possibility  of  conceiving  these  inciting 
agencies  either  as  coming  into  existence  anew  in  the 
organism  with  each  smallest  individual  modification 
which  leads  to  a  development  of  the  species,  or  as  being 
before  present  in  the  organisms,  but  still  latent,  and 
only  coming  into  activity  when  they  are  set  free.  But 
the  question  whether  theism  could  accept  the  one  or  the 
other  possibility  had  to  be  treated  of  in  the  preceding 
section,  and  was  there  answered  in  the  affirmative. 

Thus  it  only  remains  to  treat  in  general  of  the  ques- 
tion as  to  the  reconcilableness  of  the  idea  of  the  origin 
of  species  through  evolution,  through  gradual  develop- 
ment, in  general  with  a  theistic  view  of  the  world. 

In  the  first  place,  we  wish  to  render  evident  the  fact 
which  is  so  often  overlooked  by  the  friends  of  monism  and 
still  more  by  theistic  adversaries  of  the  idea  of  evolution, 
that  the  idea  of  a  development  of  species,  and  also  of  man, 
does  not  offer  to  theistic  reasoning  any  new  or  any  other 
difficulties  than  those  which  have  been  long  present,  and 
which  had  found  their  solution  in  the  religious  conscious- 
ness long  before  any  idea  of  evolution  disturbed  the 


266  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

mind.  It  is  true,  the  question  as  to  the  origin  of  man- 
kind is,  to  speak  in  the  language  of  natural  history,  a 
still  unsolved  problem  ;  and  the  supposition  of  its  grad- 
ual development  out  of  the  animal  kingdom  is  still  an 
hypothesis — one  of  all  those  attempts  at  solving  this 
problem  which  still  wait  for  confirmation  or  refutation. 
But  there  is  another  quite  analogous  question  whose 
position  has  long  ceased  to  be  a  mere  problem,  and  whose 
solution  is  no  longer  a  mere  hypothesis  ;  namely,  the 
question  as  to  the  origin  of  the  perfect  human  or  any 
other  organic  individual.  To  speak  again  in  the  language 
of  natural  history,  this  origin  is  no  longer  a  problem— 
that  is,  without  regard  to  the  obscurity  in  which  the 
existence  and  origin  of  every  creature,  as  to  its  last 
causes,  is  always  and  will  always  be  veiled  for  us.  We 
know  that  the  human,  and,  in  general,  every  organic 
individual,  becomes  that  which  it  is  through  development. 
It  begins  the  course  of  its  being  with  the  existence  of  a 
single  cell,  the  egg,  and  goes  through  all  stages  of  this 
development  by  wholly  gradual  and  imperceptible  trans- 
itions, so  that  the  precise  moment  cannot  exactly  be 
fixed  when  any  organ,  any  physical  or  psychical  function, 
comes  into  existence,  until  perfect  man  is  developed. 
Man  has  this  mode  of  coming  into  existence  in  common 
with  all  organized  beings,  down  to  the  lowest  organisms 
which  stand  above  the  value  and  rank  of  a  single  cell.  At 
this  place,  and  with  the  design  of  our  present  discussion 
in  view,  we  ought  not  to  render  the  importance  of  this 
fact  obscure  by  a  teleologieal  comparison  of  the  different 
eggs  and  germs  with  one  another.  If  we  look  upon  that 
which  is  to  come  out  of  the  germs,  and  which  certainly 
is  prepared  and  present  in  the  first  vital  functions  of  the 


THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  267 

germ,  although  we  are  not  able  to  observe,  prove,  and 
estimate  it  by  means  of  the  microscope  and  the  retort, 
then  of  course  the  difference  in  the  value  of  the  germs 
must  be  immense  ;  and  from  this  point  of  view  we  cer- 
tainly look  upon  the  germ  of  man  differently  than  upon 
the  germ  of  an  oyster.  But  here  the  question  is  not  as 
to  the  differences  of  value  of  organisms  :  no  scientist 
who  remains  within  the  limits  of  his  realm,  will  ever 
deny  them ;  but  we  treat  of  the  question  whether  such 
valuable  objects  come  into  existence  suddenly  or  gradu- 
ally—whether it  is  possible,  or  even  a  fact  which  repeats 
itself  before  our  eyes,  that  a  form  of  being  of  higher 
value  comes  forth  from  a  form  of  being  of  a  lower  value 
in  gradual  development.  And  here  it  is  an  undisputed 
fact  that  all  qualities  of  man,  the  physical  as  well  as  the 
spiritual,  come  into  existence  in  such  a  gradual  develop- 
ment that  not  in  a  single  one  of  them  can  be  fixed  any 
moment  of  which  it  may  be  said :  on  the  other  side  of 
this  moment  it  did  not  exist,  but  on  this  side  it  did  exist. 
All  differentiations  of  his  body,  from  the  first  differen- 
tiation of  the  egg-cell  into  a  complexity  of  cells  up  to 
the  last  formation  of  his  organs,  take  place  in  the  same 
gliding  development.  All  his  psychical  and  spiritual 
functions  and  forces  come  into  existence  in  this  form  of 
gradual  development.  Where,  in  the  development  of 
the  human  individual,  is  the  moment  in  which  conscious- 
ness, language,  self -consciousness,  memory,  will,  the 
perception  of  God,  moral  responsibility,  the  perception 
of  the  idea  and  the  ideal,  or  whatever  else  we  may  men- 
tion, came  into  existence  ?  Nowhere  ;  all  this,  and  all 
the  rest,  is  developed  in  a  gradual  process.  The  only 
marked  time  in  this  development  is  the  time  of  birth  : 


268  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

it  brings  a  great  change  into  physical  life,  and  is  perhaps 
the  beginning-epoch  of  the  spiritual  development  of  man. 
But  even  the  birth  is  not  absolutely  bound  to  a  certain 
time  ;  the  child  may  be  born  too  early,  by  weeks  or 
even  months,  and  its  development  nevertheless  takes 
place  ;  and  even  after  birth,  how  slowly  and  gradually 
spiritual  development  begins  and  continues  ! 

With  this  gradual  process  of  individual  development 
which  we  have  long  known,  we  have  never  found  any 
difficulty  in  bringing  two  things  into  harmony.  First, 
we  always  judged  the  value  of  the  single  qualities  of 
man  only  in  the  proportion  in  which  they  were  really 
present  and  came  into  existence,  and  in  such  a  way  that 
we  entirely  followed  the  flowing  development  of  the 
individual.  Therefore  we  looked  upon  the  suckling,  for 
instance,  not  at  all  as  a  morally  responsible  individual ; 
upon  the  child  of  two  years  as  more  responsible,  but  to 
a  far  less  degree  than  the  child  of  school-age,  and  the 
latter  again  to  a  less  degree  than  the  man  ;  and  thus  we 
have .  been  long  accustomed  to  reason,  when  looking 
upon  all  single  qualities  of  man.  Second,  we  did  not  find 
any  difficulty  in  bringing  into  perfect  harmony  the  idea 
of  a  gradual  process  of  individual  development  and  of 
the  dependence  of  the  latter  on  a  complex  totality  of 
natural  causes :  with  the  idea  of  the  absolute  dependence 
on  God,  the  Creator,  of  that  which  arose  through  devel- 
opment. Every  religiously  reasoning  man  has  always 
looked  upon  himself  as  the  child  of  his  parents,  grad- 
ually developed  under  the  activity  of  complex  natural 
causes,  as  well  as  the  creature  of  God,  that  owes  the 
existence  of  all  its  forces  and  parts  of  body  and  soul  to 
God.  Should  it  then,  be  so  difficult,  or  is  it  only  some- 


THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  269 

thing  new, .  to  bring  into  harmony,  when  looking  upon 
the  entire  species  and  genus,  that  which  we  were  long  ago 
able  to  bring  into  harmony  when  looking  upon  the  indi- 
vidual— it  being  presupposed  that  the  investigation  leads 
us  to  a  development  of  the  entire  species  and  genus 
similar  to  that  of  the  individual  development  ?  Or  have 
we  here  again  to  ask,  as  in  §  1 :  is  it  more  religious  to 
make  no  attempt  at  removing  the  veil  which  covers  the 
natural  process  of  the  origin  of  mankind,  than  to  make 
it?  It  is  true,  the  not  knowing  anything  can,  under 
certain  circumstances,  create  and  increase  the  sensation 
of  reverence  for  the  depth  of  divine  power  and  wisdom  ; 
but  a  perception  of  the  ways  of  God  is  also  certainly 
able  to  create  the  same.  On  that  account,  we  need  not 
at  .all  fear  that  by  such  an  attempt  and  its  eventual 
success  we  might  get  into  the  shallows  of  superficiality, 
to  which  nothing  seems  any  longer  to  be  hidden,  only 
because  it  has  no  presentiment  of  the  depths  which  are 
to  be  sounded.  There  will  always  remain  enough  of  the 
mysterious  and  the  uninvesti  gated,  and  each  new  step 
forward  will  only  lead  to  new  views,  to  new  secrets,  to 
new  wonders. 

But  does  not  a  development,  like  that  which  we 
here  for  the  moment  assume  hypothetically,  efface  and 
destroy  the  specific  value  of  man  and  mankind  from  still 
another  side  ?  Would  not  a  beginning  of  mankind  be 
really  lost,  in  case  that  theory  of  evolution  should  gain 
authority?  and  would  not  there  still  lie  between  that 
which  is  decidedly  called  animal  world  and  that  which 
is  decidedly  called  mankind  an  innumerable  series  of 
generations  of  beings  which  were  neither  animal  nor 
man  ?  We  do  not  believe  it.  What  makes  man 


270  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

we  can  exactly  point  out:  it  is  self-consciousness  and 
moral  self-determination.  Now,  in  case  development 
took  place  in  the  above  sense,  it  may  have  passed  ever  so 
gradually ;  the  epochs  of  preparation  between  that  which 
we  know  as  highest  animal  development  and  that  which 
constitutes  the  substance  of  man,  may  have  stretched 
over  ever  so  many  generations,  and,  if  the  friends  of 
evolution  desire  it,  we  say  over  ever  so  many  thousands 
of  generations;  yet  that  which  makes  man  man — self- 
consciousness  and  moral  self-determination  —  must  have 
always  come  into  actual  reality  in  individuals.  Those 
individuals  in  which  self-consciousness  came  into  exis- 
tence and  activity,  for  the  first  time,  and  with  it  the 
entire  possibility  of  the  world  of  ideas  —  the  conscious- 
ness of  moral  responsibility,  and  with  it  also  the  entire 
dignity  of  moral  self-determination — were  the  first  men. 
The  individuals  which  preceded  the  latter  may  have  been 
ever  so  interesting  and  promising  as  objects  of  observa- 
tion, if  we  imagine  ourselves  spectators  of  these  once 
supposed  processes ;  yet,  they  were  not  men. 

§  4.     The  Selection  Theory  and  Theism. 

The  last  scientific  theory  whose  position  in  reference 
to  theism  we  have  to  discuss,  is  the  selection  theory. 

We  have  found  but  little  reason  for  sympathizing 
with  this  theory.  But  since  we  believed  that  we  were 
obliged  to  suspect  it,  not  for  religious  but  for  scientific 
reasons,  so  the  completeness  of  our  investigation  requires 
us  to  assume  hypothetically  that  the  selection  principle 
really  manifests  itself  as  the  only  and  exclusive  principle 
of  the  origin  of  species,  and  to  ask  now  what  position  it 
would  in  such  a  case  take  in  reference  to  theism. 


THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  271 

The  only  answer  we  are  able  to  give  is  decidedly  fav- 
orable to  theism. 

It  is  true,  development  would  in  such  a  case  ap- 
proach the  organisms  merely  from  without.  For  the 
principle  lying  within  the  organisms,  which  would 
then  be  the  indispensable  condition  of  all  development, 
would  be  first  the  principle  in  itself,  wholly  without  plan 
or  end,  of  individual  variability;  second,  the  principle  of 
inheritance  which  for  itself  and  without  that  first  princi- 
ple is  indeed  no  principle  of  development,  but  the  con- 
trary. The  causes  from  which  the  single  individuals  vary 
in  such  or  such  a  way,  would  then  be  the  outer  conditions 
of  life  and  adaptation  to  them :  i.  e. ,  something  coming 
from  without.  And  the  causes  from  which  one  individual, 
varying  in  such  or  such  a  way,  is  preserved  in  the  strug- 
gle for  existence,  and  another,  varying  differently,  per- 
ishes, would  be  approaching  the  individuals  also  from 
without ;  hence  they  are  a  larger  or  smaller  useful 
variation  for  the  existence  of  the  individual. 

Now  if,  through  these  influencing  causes  of  develop- 
ment, approaching  the  most  simple  organisms  from 
without,  a  rising  line  of  higher  and  higher  organized 
beings  comes  finally  into  existence  (a  line  in  which  sen- 
sation and  consciousness,  finally  self-consciousness  and 
free-will,  appear)  we  again  reach  the  teleological  dilem- 
ma :  all  this  has  either  happened  by  chance,  or  it  has  not. 
No  man  who  claims  to  treat  this  question  earnestly  and 
in  a  manner  worthy  of  respect,  will  assert  that  it  hap- 
pened by  chance,  but  by  necessity.  But  with  this  word 
the  materialist  only  hides  or  avoids  the  necessity  of 
supposing  a  plan  and  end  in  place  of  chance,  as  we  have 
convinced  ourselves  in  Part  I,  Book  II,  Chap.  II,  §  1. 


272  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

The  only  exception  in  this  case  is,  that  the  bearer  and 
agent  of  this  plan  would  not  be  the  single  organism 
(as  is  easily  possible  when  we  accept  a  descent  theory 
which  is  more  independent  from  the  selection  theory), 
but  the  collection  of  all  forces  and  conditions,  acting 
upon  the  organism  from  without.  And  for  the  question, 
whence  this  plan  and  its  realization  comes,  we  had  again 
but  the  one  answer:  from  a  highest  intelligence  and 
omnipotence,  from  the  personal  God  of  theism.  The 
locus  of  creation  and  the  locus  of  providence  would  now, 
as  ever,  retain  their  value  in  the  theological  system,  with 
the  sole  exception  that  most  of  that  which  so  far  belong- 
ed to  the  locus  of  creation  would  now  belong,  in  a  higher 
degree  than  in  the  hitherto  naturo-historical  view,  to  the 
locus  of  providence  and  of  the  government  of  the  world. 
When  looked  upon  from  the  theocentric  point  of  view, 
the  new  forms  which  we  had  to  suppose  as  called  into- 
existence  only  by  selection,  would  remain  products  of 
divine  creation:  the  "God  said,  and  it  was  so,"  would 
retain  its  undiminished  importance ;  but  looked  upon 
from  the  cosmic  point  of  view,  they  would  present 
themselves  as  products  of  the  divine  providence  and 
government  of  the  world,  still  more  exclusively  than  in 
every  principal  of  explanation  which  finds  the  causes  of 
development  in  the  organisms  themselves  or  in  an  imma- 
terial cause  acting  upon  the  organisms  from  within.  The 
first  as  well  as  the  second  point  of  view  is  in  full  harmony 
with  the  religious  view  of  things. 

We  do  not  conceal  that  on  the  ground  of  all  other 
analogies  we  sympathize  more  with  those  who  look  for 
the  determining  influences  of  the  origin  of  new  species 
rather  within  than  without  nature,  and  who,  while  look- 


THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  273 

ing  at  that  which  the  higher  species  have  in  common 
with  the  lower,  do  not  forget  or  neglect  the  new,  the 
original,  which  they  possess.  But  we  are  indeed  neither 
obliged  nor  entitled,  in  the  name  of  religion,  to  take 
beforehand  in  the  realm  of  scientific  investigation  the 
side  of  the  one  or  the  other  direction  of  investigation, 
or  even  of  the  one  or  the  other  result  of  investigation, 
before  it  is  arrived  at.  Let  us  unreservedly  allow 
scientists  free  investigation  in  their  realm,  so  long  as 
they  do  not  meddle  with  ethical  or  religious  principles, 
and  quietly  await  their  results.  These  results,  when 
once  reached,  may  correspond  ever  so  closely  with  our 
present  view  and  our  speculative  expectations,  or  in 
both  relations  be  ever  so  surprising  and  new;  the  one 
case  as  well  as  the  other  has  already  happened:  at  any 
rate  they  will  not  affect  our  religious  principles,  but 
only  enrich  our  perception  of  the  way  and  manner  of 
divine  activity  in  the  world,  and  thereby  give  new  food 
and  refreshment  to  our  religious  life. 

A.    THE  DARWINISTIC  PHILOSOPHEMES  IN  THEIR  POSITION  RE- 
GARDING THEISM. 

* 

§  5.  The  Naturo-Philosophic  Supplements  of  Darwinism 
and  Theism. 

We  still  have  to  discuss  the  position  of  theism  in 
reference  to  the  philosophic  problems  to  which  a  Dar- 
winistic  view  of  nature  sees  itself  led,  and  in  the  first 
place  its  position  in  reference  to  the  naturo-philosophio 
theories  with  which  the  descent  idea  tries  to  complete 
itself. 

In  the  first  part  of  our  book,  we  have  found  that  not 
18 


THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

a  single  one  of  the  naturo-philosophic  problems  before 
which  the  descent  idea  places  us,  is  really  solved  : 
neither  the  origin  of  self-consciousness  and  of  moral 
self-determination,  nor  the  origin  of  consciousness  and 
of  sensation,  nor  the  origin  of  life;  and  even  the  theory 
of  atoms,  although  it  is  quite  important  and  indispen- 
sable for  the  natural  philosopher  and  chemist  according 
to  the  present  state  of  his  knowledge  and  investigation, 
has  not  yet  been  able  to  divest  itself  of  its  hypothetical 
character.  Religion  might,  therefore,  refuse  to  define 
its  position  in  reference  to  theories  which  are  still  of  a 
quite  problematic  and  hypothetical  nature.  But  by 
giving  such  a  refusal,  religion  would  not  act  in  its  own 
interest.  The  reproach  is  often  made  that  it  has  an 
open  or  hidden  aversion  to  the  freedom  of  scientific  in- 
vestigation— a  reproach  which,  it  is  true,  is  often  enough 
provoked  by  its  own  advocates  ;  often  the  assertion  is 
made  by  advocates  of  free  investigation,  that  free 
science  has  led,  or  can  lead  -at  any  moment,  to  results 
which  shake  or  even  destroy  theism  and  with  it  the 
objective  and  scientifically  established  truth  of  a 
religious  view  of  the  world.  The  consequence  of  this 
assertion  is  exactly,  as  before-mentioned,  that  minds 
whose  religious  possession  is  to  them  an  inviolable 
sanctuary,  and  who  lack  time  and  occasion,  inclination 
and  ability,  to  examine  scientifically  these  asserted 
results  of  science,  really  suspect  free  science  and  con- 
test the  right  of  its  existence.  Another  consequence  of 
this  state  of  war  between  religion  and  science  is  the  fact 
that  so  many  minds  in  both  camps  fall  into  a  servile 
dependence  upon  battle-cries  :  they  confound  freedom 
of  investigation  with  license;  science  with  apathy  or 


THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  275 

hostility  to  faith;  faith  with  lack  of  scientific  perception, 
blind  unreasoning  belief,  etc.  Such  a  state  of  affairs 
does  not,  indeed,  serve  the  interests  of  peace  and  truth; 
only  a  correct  treatment  of  philosophy  as  well  as  of  re- 
ligion can  lead  to  them. 

Such  a  way  of  peace  and  truth  from  the  side  of 
religion  and  its  scientific  treatment  is  entered  upon, 
when  religion  sets  itself  right,  not  only  with  all  real,  but 
also  with  all  conceivable,  possible  results  of  the  other 
sciences,  not  only  of  the  exact,  but  also  of  the  philo- 
sophic sciences.  If  it  finds,  in  such  an  investigation, 
that  such  conceivable  results  are  reconcilable  with  the 
theistic  view  of  the  world  which  is  the  basis  of  religion, 
it  has  already  shown  its  relationship  to  the  freedom  of 
investigation.  But  if  it  finds  anywhere  a  possible 
result  which  is  in  conflict  with  its  theistic  view  of  the 
world,  it  is  obliged  to  examine  the  mutual  grounds  of 
dissent,  as  to  the  degree  of  their  truth  and  their  power 
of  demonstration  ;  and  in  case  its  own  position  is  the 
stronger,  better  founded,  and  more  convincing,  to  prove 
this  fact.  It  it  does  this,  it  again  acts  according  to  the 
principle  of  free  investigation — with  the  single  differ- 
ence that  in  such  a  case  it  not  only  makes  this  allowance 
to  the  opponent,  but  also  uses  this  principle  for  itself  in 
its  own  realm  and  especially  in  the  border  land  between 
itself  and  its  opponent ;  but  at  the  same  time  it  shows 
in  this  case  (what,  indeed,  so  many  are  inclined  to  deny), 
that  religion  also  has  its  science,  and  that  theology 
itself  is  this  science,  and  has  the  same  rights  as  the 
sciences  which  are  built  up  in  the  realm  of  material 
things  or  of  abstract  reasoning. 

We  therefore  assume  hypothetically,  that  the  origin 


276  THE   THEORIES  OF   DARWIN. 

of  self-consciousness  and  of  moral  self-determination  is 
fully  explained  by  consciousness ;  the  origin  of  con- 
sciousness and  sensation  by  that  which  has  no  sensation ; 
the  origin  of  the  living  and  organic  by  the  lifeless  and 
inorganic ;  and  that  atomism  also  is  scientifically  estab- 
lished and  proven  :  how,  then,  would  such  a  theory  of 
the  world  and  theism  stand  in  respect  to  each  other?  By 
this  assumption,  we  think  we  should  simply  stand  again 
at  the  point,  the  basis  of  which  we  had  to  discuss  in  Part 
I,  Book  II,  Chap.  II,  §  1,  when  treating  of  teleology.  We 
should  always  see  something  new,  something  harmoni- 
ously arranged:  a  process  of  objects  of  value,  continually 
rising  higher  and  higher,  coming  forth  out  of  one  another 
in  direct  causal  connection ;  and  should  have  a  choice  of 
one  of  two  ways  of  explaining  this  process.  We  should 
either  have  to  be  satisfied  with  this  final  causal  connection, 
and  perceive  in  this  process  itself  its  highest  and  last 
cause,  in  doing  which  we  should  be  obliged  again  to 
deny  order  and  plan  in  this  process,  to  reject  the  cate- 
gory of  lower  and  higher  and  the  acknowledgment  of  a 
striving  towards  an  end  in  these  developments,  and  after 
having  climbed  to  that  Faust-height  of  investigation  and 
knowledge,  to  throw  ourselves  in  spiritual  suicide  back 
into  the  night  and  barbarism  of  chaos,  or  of  a  rigid 
mechanism  to  which  all  development,  all  life,  all  spirit- 
ual and  ethical  tasks,  are  but  appearance;  or  we  should 
have  to  treat  the  idea  of  development  seriously  and 
recognize  a  plan  and  a  striving  towards  an  end  in  this 
world-process,  and  should  then  find  ourselves  referred  to 
a  higher  intelligence  and  a  creative  will  as  the  highest  and 
last  cause  which  appoints  the  end  and  conditions  of  this 
process.  This  would  be  the  case  still  more,  as  we  actually 


THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  277 

see  that  at  present  the  single  beings  whicn  stand  on  a 
lower  stage  of  existence  no  longer  produce  beings  of  a 
higher  stage,  although,  according  to  that  theory  whose 
correctness  we  now  assume  hypothetically,  the  elements 
and  factors  for  the  production  of  those  higher  forms  of 
existence  are  fully  present  in  the  lower  ones.  Inorganic 
matter  no  longer  produces  organisms;  the  louver  species 
of  plants  or  animals  no  longer  develop  higher  ones ; 
the  animal  no  longer  becomes  man;  and  yet  there 
were  periods,  lying  widely  apart,  in  which,  according  to 
that  theory,  such  things  took  place.  What  else  set  free 
those  active  causes,  at  the  right  time  and  in  the  right 
place?  What  else  closed  again  at  the  precise  place  and 
moment  the  valves  of  the  proceeding  development,  and 
brought  to  rest  again  the  inciting  force  of  the  rising 
development?— what  else  but  the  highest  end-appointing 
intelligence  and  omnipotence? 

Even  the  inherent  qualities  of  the  elements,  and  the 
products  of  all  the  higher  forms  of  existence  which  in 
the  future  shall  arise  out  of  them,  the  whole  striving 
toward  an  end  of  the  processes  in  the  world,  would 
present  itself  to  us  much  more  vividly  than  now,  where 
we  are  still  in  the  dark  as  to  all  these  questions.  We 
should  see  in  atoms  the  real  inherent  qualities  of  all 
things  and  processes  which  are  to  be  developed  out  of 
them  ;  in  the  inorganic  the  real  inherent  qualities  for  the 
organic  and  living  ;  in  that  which  has  no  consciousness 
and  sensation  the  real  inherent  qualities  for  self-con- 
sciousness. Instead  of  being  now  obliged  to  recur  to 
the  ideal  and  metaphysical,  we  should  see  the  threads  of 
the  world's  plan  uncovered  before  us  in  empirical  reality; 
and  far  from  bearing  with  it  an  impoverishment  of  our 


278  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

consciousness  of  God,  all  this  would  bring  us  only  an 
immense  enrichment  of  its  contents ;  for  with  such  an 
enlargement  of  our  knowledge,  we  should  only  be  per- 
mitted to  take  glances  into  the  way  and  manner  of 
divine  creation  and  action — glances  of  a  depth  which 
at  present  we  are  far  from  being  permitted  to  take. 

Even  very  concrete  parts  of  a  theistic  view  of  the 
world,  as  they  present  themselves  to  us — e.g.,  in  the 
Holy  Scripture,  from  its  most  developed  points  of  view- 
would  now  find  only  richer  illustrations  than  heretofore. 
St.  Paul,  for  instance,  in  Rom.  viii,  speaks  of  the  earnest 
expectation  of  the  creature  that  waiteth  for  the  mani- 
festation of  the  sons  of  God.  As  to  the  present  state 
of  our  knowledge  of  nature,  those  who  adopt  this  view 
are  only  entitled  to 'see  in  the  sensation  of  pain  of  the 
animal  world  a  sensation  of  this  longing,  unconscious 
of  the  end ;  but  as  to  all  soulless  and  lifeless  beings  and 
elements  in  the  world,  they  can  see  in  these  words  of  a 
sighing  and^  longing  creation  only  a  strong  figurative 
expression  used  because  of  its  suitableness  to  denote 
suffering  of  the  animal  world,  as  well  as  of  men, — for 
the  destination  of  the  world  to  another  and  higher  exis- 
tence in  which  the  law  of  perishableness  and  suffering 
no  longer  governs.  On  the  other  hand,  if,  as  we  assume 
hypo'thetically,  all  higher  forms  of  existence  in  the  world 
could  be  explained  out  of  the  preceding  lower  ones,  and 
if  the  before-mentioned  theorem  of  a  sensation  of  atoms 
should  form  a  needed  and  correct  link  in  that  chain  of 
explanation,  those  words  of  sighing  and  longing  would 
have  to  be  literally  taken  in  a  still  more  comprehensive 
sense  than  now  and  in  their  directly  literal  meaning 


THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES    AND   THEISM.  279 

would  refer  not  only  to  the  animal  world  but  indeed  to 
everything  in  the  world. 

Therefore,  so  long  as  attempts  at  explaining  the 
different  forms  of  existence  in  the  world  wholly  from 
one  another  keep  within  their  own  limits,  and  do  not  of 
themselves  undermine  theism;  and  so  long  as  there  are 
men  who  on  the  one  hand  favor  such  a  mode  of  explan- 
ation and  on  the  other  hand  still  adhere  firmly  to  a  faith 
in  God,  whether  it  be  the  deeper  theism  or  the  more 
shallow  and  superficial  deism — so  long  religion  has  no 
reason  for  opposing  those  attempts  at  explanation.  And 
there  are  such  men  ;  we  need  only  to  mention  Huxley, 
whose  position  in  reference  to  religion  we  have  already 
discussed;  or  Oskar  Peschel,  who,  in  his  "Volker- 
kunde  "  ("  Ethnology  "),  says:  "  It  is  not  quite  clear  how 
pious  minds  can  be  disturbed  by  this  theory ;  for  crea- 
tion obtains  more  dignity  and  importance  if  it  has  in 
itself  the  power  of  renewal  and  development  of  the 
perfect."  Even  Herbert  Spencer,  with  his  idea  of  the 
imperceptibility  of  the  super-personal,  of  the  final  cause 
of  all  things,  is  still  a  living  proof  of  the  fact  that  man 
can  trace  the  mechanism  of  causality  back  to  its  last 
consequences  and,  as  Spencer  does,  even  derive  con- 
sciousness and  sensation  from  that  which  is  without  sen- 
sation, and  yet  not  necessarily  proceed  so  far  as  negation 
of  a  living  God,  even  if  he  persists  in  his  refusal  to  per- 
ceive in  general  the  ultimate  cause  of  things. 

To  meet  those  attempts,  religion  would  have  to  take 
only  two  precautionary  measures  on  two  closely  related 
points  ;  and  in  doing  this  it  would  indeed  make  use 
of  that  before-mentioned  right  to  defend  freedom  of 


280  THE   THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

investigation  both  in  its   own  realm  and   in  the  border- 
territory. 

One  precaution  would  consist  in  the  requirement  of 
the  acknowledgment  that  even  in  that  purely  immanent 
mode  of  explanation  the  idea  of  value  is  fixed,  but  that 
the  value  of  the  new  appears  only  when  the  new  itself 
really  comes  into  existence;  that  we  therefore  do  not 
call,  e.g.%  the  inorganic  living,  because  according  to  that 
mode  of  explanation  life  develops  itself  out  of  it;  and 
that  we  do  not  ascribe  to  the  animal  the  value  of  man, 
because  according  to  that  mode  of  explanation  it  also 
includes  the  causes  of  the  development  of  man.  Such  a 
discrimination  of  ideas  is  indeed  a  scientific  postulate,  as 
we  have  had  occasion  to  show  at  many  points  of  our 
investigation;  and  we  also  complied  with  this  require- 
ment long  ago  in  that  realm  of  knowledge  which  is 
related  to  these  questions  as  to  the  origin  of  things,  but 
is  more  accessible  and  open  to  us,  namely,  in  the  realm 
of  the  development  of  the  individual.  We  have  spoken 
of  this  at  length  in  §  3.  But  in  the  interest  of  religion 
also  we  have  to  request  that  the  differences  of  value  of 
things  be  retained,  even  when  man  thinks  he  is  able  to 
explain  their  origin  merely  out  of  one  another.  For 
without  this,  all  things  would  finally  merge  simply  into 
existences  of  like  value;  man  would  sland  in  no  other 
relation  to  God  than  would  any  other  creature,  irrational 
or  lifeless;  and  the  quintessence  of  religious  life — the 
relation  of  mutual  personal  love  between  God  and  man, 
the  certainty  of  being  a  child  of  God — would  be  illusory 
when  there  should  no  longer  be  a  difference  of  value 
between  man  and  animal,  animal  and  plant,  plant  and 
stone. 


THE    DARWINIAN   THEORIES    AND   THEISM.  281 

Many  a  reader  thinks,  perhaps,  that  with  this  pre- 
caution we  make  a  restriction  which  is  wholly  a  matter 
of  course,  and  that  nobody  would  think  of  denying 
these  differences  of  value.  Hackel,  in  his  "  Anthropo- 
geny,"  repeatedly  reproaches  man  with  the  ''arrogant 
anthropocentric  imagination  "  which  leads  him  to  look 
upon  himself  as  the  aim  of  earthly  life  and  the  centre 
of  earthly  nature  ;  this,  he  says,  is  nothing  but  vanity 
and  haughtiness.  Several  writers  in  the  "Ausland" 
faithfully  second  him  in  this  debasement  of  the  value  of 
man.  Its  editor  ("Ausland,"  1874,  No.  48,  p.  957),  for 
instance,  reproaches  Ludwig  Noire,  although  he  other- 
wise sympathizes  with  him,  that  in  his  book  "Die  Welt 
als  Entwieklung  des  Geistes  "  ("The  World  as  Devel- 
opment of  Mind"),  Leipzig,  Veit  &  Co.,  1874,  he  still 
takes  this  anthropocentric  standpoint  and  can  say:  "The 
anthropocentric  view  recognizes  in  man's  mind  the 
highest  bloom  of  matter,  which  has  attained  to  the 
possession  of  a  soul."  This,  Hackel  says,  'is  nothing 
else  but  the  former  conception,  not  yet  overcome,  that 
man  is  the  crown  of  creation.  This  pleasure  in  debas- 
ing the  value  of  man  is  also  a  characteristic  sign  of  the 
times.  K.  E.  von  Baer  is  right,  when,  in  his  "Studies" 
(page  463),  he  says:  "  In  our  days,  men  like  to  ridicule 
as  arrogant  the  looking  upon  man  as  the  end  of  the 
history  of  earth.  But  it  is  certainly  not  man's 
merit  that  he  has  the  most  highly  developed  organic 
form.  He  also  must  not  overlook  the  fact  that  with  this 
his  task  of  developing  more  and  more  his  spiritual 

gifts  has  only  begun Is  it  not  more  worthy  of 

man  to  think  highly  of    himself    and  his   destination, 
than,  fixing  his  attention  only  upon  the  low,  to  acknow- 


282  THE    THEORIES    OF   DARWIN. 

ledge  only  the  animalic  basis  in  himself?  I  am  sorry 
to  say  that  the  new  doctrine  is  very  much  tainted 
in  this  direction  of  striving  after  the  low.  I  should 
rather  prefer  to  be  haughty  than  base,  and  I  well 
recollect  the  expression  of  Kant,  '  Man  cannot  think 
highly  enough  of  man.'  By  this  expression  the  pro- 
found thinker  especially  meant  that  mankind  has  to  set 
itself  great  tasks.  But  the  modern  views  are  more  a 
palliation  of  all  animal  emotions  in  man." 

The  other  precautionary  measure  referred  to  would 
be,  that  the  realm  of  mind,  and  especially  the  ethical 
realm,  is  not  dissolved  into  a  natural  mechanism.  This 
precaution  is  also  connected  with  the  first  one,"  the 
latter  being  its  condition  ;  for  only  where  it  is  acknow- 
ledged that  causes,  so  long  as  they  are  still  latent,  do  not 
fall  under  the  same  category  of  value  as  their  effects,  when 
these  are  once  realized,  it  can  also  be  acknowledged  that 
the  realm  of  mind  and  morality,  although  it  has  grown 
out  of  the  ground  of  the  mechanism  of  nature,  can  still 
have  brought  something  new  and  higher  into  the  world. 
Besides,  this  precaution  is  also  a  postulate  of  anthropo- 
logio  science.  For  spiritual  and  ethical  facts  have  at 
least  the  same  truth  and  reality  as  the  material,  and  a 
still  higher  value,  and  can  therefore  not  permit  any 
injury  to  their  full  recognition.  But  religion  also  must 
require  this  acknowledgment.  For  if  the  specific 
activity  of  mind  in  man  is  endangered,  we  also  lose  his 
specific  value,  and  thus  get  into  the  before-mentioned 
dilemma ;  and  if  the  moral  responsibility  of  man  is  en- 
dangered, the  relation  of  man  to  God  loses  its  ethical 
character.  Of  the  consequences  in  reference  to  morality, 
we  shall  have  to  speak  hereafter. 


THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  283 

Moreover,  religion  does  not  require  this  acknowledg- 
ment without  a  rich  compensation.  For  if  that  naturo- 
philosophic  mode  of  explanation,  whose  correctness  we 
hypothetically  assume  in  this  present  section,  prove  to  be 
right,  and  if  the  higher  which  comes  anew  into  exist- 
ence in  the  world,  is  to  have  the  full  cause  of  its  origin 
in  the  preceding  lower,  such  an  admission,  in  accordance 
with  the  laws  of  logic,  by  which  causa  cequat  effectwn,  is 
only  possible  when  we  either  similarly,  as  above,  inval- 
idate all  difference  between  higher  and  lower,  all  differ- 
ence of  value  of  creatures,  and  contest  the  possibility 
that  that  which  appears  anew  can  also  follow  new  laws 
of  existence  and  activity  ;  or  when,  in  the  highest  cause 
of  all  final  causes  in  the  world,  we  see  the  full  abun- 
dance of  all  those  possibilities  present  as  real  cause, 
which  afterwards  appear  in  succession  in  the  world. 
This  highest  cause,  then,  lodges  in  material  things  the 
final  causes  of  all  which  is  to  come,  as  still  latent  causes? 
waiting  to  be  set  free  ;  and  such  a  highest  cause  as  the  full- 
ness of  all  that  which  is  successively  to  be  developed  in  the 
world,  is  offered  to  science  by  religion  itself  in  the  idea 
of  a  living  God.  We  say  expressly,  that  religion  offers 
this  idea  to  science,  and  not  that  science  creates  this 
idea  ;  for  the  acknowledgment  of  God,  as  we  have  before 
had  occasion  to  point  out,  is  in  the  last  instance  not  a 
result  of  science,  but  an  ethical  action  of  mind, — although 
from  this  acknowledgment  the  brightest  light  falls  upon 
science  and  the  whole  series  of  its  conclusions,  and 
although  science  owes  to  precisely  this  idea  of  God  the 
highest  points  of  view  to  which  it  sees  itself  led  and 
from  which  alone  it  is  able  to  survey  its  entire  realm. 


284:  *     THE    THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

§  6.  Elimination  of  the  Idea  of  Design  or  its  Acknowledg- 
ment and  Theism. 

In  the  whole  preceding  course  of  our  investigation 
as  to  the  position  of  religion  and  theism  regarding  the 
different  scientific  and  naturo-philosophic  theories,  theism 
could  quietly  keep  the  position  of  a  friendly  and  peace- 
ful spectator.  The  degrees  of  our  sympathy  with  the 
theories  which  have  successively  passed  before  our  eyes, 
were  on  scientific  grounds  very  unequal ;  but  on  religious 
grounds,  and  in  the  interest  of  a  theistic  view  of  the 
world,  we  found  ourselves  nowhere  induced  to  take 
sides  for  or  against  a  theory.  But  the  position  of  religion 
and  theism  becomes  quite  different  in  reference  to  the 
assertion  that  the  existence  of  ends  and  designs  in 
nature  is  refuted  by  the  evolution  theory  or  by  any  other 
hypothetical  or  real  results  of  science.  With  this  asser- 
tion, the  existence  of  a  living  and  personal  God,  of  a 
Creator  and  Lord  of  the  world,  is  denied  ;  and  every 
religion  which  claims  objective  truth  for  its  basis  is 
eliminated.  It  is  true,  man  cart  under  this  supposition 
still  speak  of  a  religion  in  the  sense  of  subjective  relig- 
iousness ;  but  the  life-nerve  is  also  cut  off  from  this  sub- 
jective religiousness.  We  have  repeatedly  had  occasion 
to  prove  this  in  our  historical  review,  and  also  in  the 
section  in  which  we  pointed  out  the  plan  of  our  own 
analysis. 

But  still,  where  we  have  had  to  represent  this  anti- 
teleological  view  of  the  world,  we  have  happily  convinced 
ourselves  of  the  fact  that  an  existence  of  ends  and  designs 
in  nature  is  not  only  reconcilable  with  the  conformity  to 
law  and  the  causal  mechanism  of  its  processes,  but  is 


THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEISM.  285 

B\so  postulated  by  scientific  contemplation  of  nature,  as 
soon  as  the  latter  observes  that  in  these  processes,  acting 
with  lawful  necessity,  something  in  general  is  attained, 
and,  moreover,  when  out  of  them  comes  forth  some- 
thing so  infinitely  rich  and  beautifully  arranged,  such  a 
rising  series  of  higher  and  higher  developments,  as  the 
world.  On  the  other  hand,  combatting  the  striving 
towards  an  end  in  nature  leads  to  such  scientific  mon- 
strosities, destroys  so  thoroughly  the  idea  of  God  and 
also  all  ideas  of  value  in  the  world,  even  all  spiritual  and 
ethical  acquisitions  of  mankind,  that  we  can  explain  the 
origin  of  such  a  doctrine  only  by  the  determined  purpose 
of  getting  rid,  at  any  cost,  of  the  dependence  on  a  living 
God :  again  a  proof  of  the  fact  that  faith,  or  want  of 
faith,  in  its  final  causes,  is  not  the  product  of  reflecting 
intelligence,  but  an  ethical  action  of  that  centre  of  human 
personality  from  which  the  spiritual  process  of  life  in 
the  individual  comes  forth — an  ethical  action  of  mind. 

Herewith  the  position  of  theism  in  reference  to  the 
elimination  of  the  idea  of  design  is  also  soon  character- 
ized :  it  is  the  position  of  irreconcilable  antagonism.  In 
rejecting  the  position  of  its  opponent,  theism  perceives 
that  it  is  in  harmony  not  only  with  every  correctly  under- 
stood religious  need,  but  equally  so  with  every  scientific 
interest — with  the  interest  of  a  correct  knowledge  of 
nature,  as  well  as  with  the  interest  of  those  sciences 
which  have  to  take  care  of  and  try  to  understand  the 
spiritual  and  ethical  endowments  of  mankind. 

If  we  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  position  of  theism 
in  reference  to  the  idea  of  design  in  general,  theism  on  its 
part  also  gives  an  equally  firm  support  to  that  intimate 
connection,  proven  by  natural  science,  between  causality 


286  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

and  striving  toward  an  end — between  aetiology  and  tele- 
ology, as  they  are  called  in  the  language  of  the  philo- 
sophical school.  While  a  contemplation  of  nature  per- 
ceives in  nature  a  mechanism  governed  by  laws  and 
necessities,  it  finds  results  reached  through  this  chain  of 
causality  in  which  it  must  acknowledge  ends  toward 
which  the  preceding  has  striven.  Now,  theism,  on  its 
part,  proceeds  from  the  highest  end-appointing  cause  of 
things  and  processes,  and  finds  that  the  reaching  of  these 
ends  postulates  a  mechanism  of  natural  conformity  to 
law.  In  order  to  prove  this,  we  certainly  must  take  a 
course  which  is  prohibited  by  many  as  anthropomorph- 
ism, *'.  £.,  we  must  try  to  study  the  connection  of  ends 
and  designs,  and  the  possibility  of  such  a  connection 
where  we  are  able  to  observe  in  general  not  only  the 
accomplishment  of  purposes,  but  also  the  forming  of 
purposes ;  and  the  only  realm  of  this  kind  which  we 
know  of,  is  the  realm  of  human  action.  He  who,  merely 
through  fear  of  anthropomorphism,  shrinks  from  this 
only  possible  comparison,  may  consider  that  for  those 
who  assume  a  highest  end-appointing  cause  (and  we,  too, 
proceed  from  this  standpoint)  man  also,  who  forms  his 
designs  and  strives  toward  his  ends,  is  a  product  of  that 
highest  end-appointing  cause  ;  and  that,  therefore,  in  the 
human  striving  toward  an  end,  a  certain  analogue  of 
the  divine  striving  toward  an  end  must  occur.  We 
are,  indeed,  not  obliged  on  this  account  to  identify  the 
two,  and  to  close  our  eyes  against  the  immense  differ- 
ences which  exist  between  them,  and  which,  wholly  of 
themselves,  intrude  upon  our  observation.  What  we 
mean  by  that  analogy  may  thus  be  stated. 

Man  forms  for  himself  designs  and  ends,  and  pursues 


THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES    AND   THEISM.  287 

and  reaches  them  by  using  the  objects  and  forces  of 
nature  as  means.  He  can  do  this  only  because  the 
forces  in  nature  act  from  necessity,  strictly  conformable 
to  law.  Because,  and  so  far  as  man  knows  the  action 
of  forces,  conformable  to  law,  and  the  inviolable  neces- 
sity of  the  connection  between  certain  causes  and  their 
effects,  he  can  select  and  make  use  of  such  causes  as 
means,  by  virtue  of  which  he  reaches  those  effects  as 
designs  intended  by  him.  If  he  could  not  depend  on 
this  conformity  to  law,  on  this  causal  connection  taking 
place  according  to  simple  necessities,  he  could  not  select, 
make,  and  use,  with  certainty,  any  tool,  from  the  club 
Avith  which  he  defends  himself  against  his  enemies  or 
cracks  the  shells  of  fruit,  up  to  the  finest  instruments  of 
optics  and  chemistry,  and  even  to  the  telegraph  and 
steam  engine.  The  conformity  to  law,  with  which  the 
forces  of  nature  act.  far  from  being  an  impediment  to 
his  appointing  and  reaching  his  ends  is  much  more  the 
indispensable  means  by  which  he  is  enabled  in  general 
to  reach  them.  Now,  if  we  thus  find,  in  the  only  action 
striving  towards  an  end  which  we  are  able  to  observe  to 
the  extent  of  the  appointing  of  ends  and  the  selection 
of  means — namely,  man's  end-appointing  action — such  a 
strong  dependence  of  finality  on  causality  that  the 
reaching  of  ends  is  not  possible  at  all  unless  the  means 
act  of  necessity  conformably  to  law,  then  we  are 
certainly  obliged  to  draw  the  conclusion  that  the  highest 
author  of  things  has  prepared  the  world  so,  that  the 
reaching  of  ends  requires  the  action  of  means,  and  that 
the  category  of  finality  and  the  category  of  causality 
are  mutually  prepared  for  each  other.  For,  according 
to  the  theistic  and  teleological  view  of  the  world,  the 


288  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

laws  of  nature,  acting  with  causality  and  necessity,  are 
certainly  not  laws  which  the  Creator  found  in  some  way, 
and  with  which  he  had  to  calculate  as  with  factors  given 
to  him  from  somewhere  else,  in  order  to  make  use  of 
them,  so  far  as  he  was  permitted,  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  his  designs— this  would  be  the  way  and  manner 
of  human  teleological  action,  and  transferring  it  to 
divine  action  would  be  an  anthropomorphism  which  we 
should  have  to  reject.  On  the  contrary,  these  laws 
themselves  are  the  work  of  the  teleological ly  acting 
Creator — he,  indeed,  will  have  given  to  them  such  a 
quality  that  with  them  he  is  able  to  reach  his  ends  as  a 
whole  and  in  detail.  The  inviolability  of  the  laws  of 
nature  also  results  from  this  idea.  For  means  which 
would  have  to  be  supplemented,  sometimes  set  aside, 
occasionally  replaced  by  others,  would  be  less  perfect 
than  such  means  as  by  virtue  of  their  quality  are  able 
with  certainty  to  serve  the  designs  which  are  to  be 
reached  by  them.  How  theism  can  reconcile  with  this 
view  the  indispensable  idea  of  divine  freedom,  we  shall 
have  occasion  to  show  in  Chap.  IT,  §  4. 

Among  the  writers  who  defend  teleology,  we 
can  mention  two  who,  starting  from  the  analogy  of 
human  teleological  action,  have  pointed  out  the  idea  that 
teleology  itself  requires  a  necessity,  conformable  to  law, 
in  the  activity  of  the  forces  of  nature.  One  of  the  two 
is  K.  E.  von  Baer,  in  his  oft-quoted  essays  on  striving 
towards  end;  and  the  other  is  the  Duke  of  Argyll.  At 
a  time  when  the  assault  against  teleology  had  just  begun, 
this  noble  author  perceived  the  whole  importance  and 
weight  of  these  attacks,  and  most  energetically  defended 
teleology.  The  expression  of  the  just-mentioned  ideas, 


THE   DARWINIAN   THEORIES   AND  THEISM.  289 

among  others,  forms  one  of  the  fundamentals  of  his 
work,  "The  Reign  of  Law"  (London,  Strahan  &  Co., 
first  edition  published  in  1866,  and  since  then  in  fre- 
quently repeated  editions);  a  work  which  is  well  fitted 
to  instruct  us,  in  the  most  interesting  manner,  regarding 
the  present  state  of  the  related  questions  as  they  are 
treated  of  in  Great  Britain. 

19 


290  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 


CHAPTER    H. 


THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES    AND    POSITIVE 
CHRISTIANITY. 

§  1.     The  Creation  of  the  World. 

Now  that  we  have  come  to  a  clear  understanding 
of  the  position  of  the  Darwinian  theories  in  reference 
to  the  basis  of  all  religion  and  of  all  living  religiousness, 
to  theism  in  general,  it  remains  to  be  seen  what  position 
those  of  the  theories  which  are  reconcilable  with  theism 
take  in  reference  to  the  positive  Christian  view  of  the 
world. 

We  naturally  omit  all  those  objects  and  parts  of 
Christian  dogmatics  which  have  no  points  of  contact, 
or  are  very  indirectly  connected  with  the  Darwinian 
ideas,  or  which — as,  e.g.,  their  position  in  reference  to 
the  idea  of  God  in  general — have  found  their  principal 
illustration  in  our  investigation  just  finished.  We  shall 
nevertheless  have  now  to  take  into  consideration  once 
more,  although  from  another  side,  some  objects  which 
we  have  discussed  in  treating  of  the  relation  of  the 
Darwinian  ideas  to  theism,  on  account  of  the  specific 
part  which  theism  has  in  Christianity.  This  is  especially 
the  case  with  those  Christian  facts  which  belong  to  the 
first  article  of  the  Apostolic  Creed,  and  immediately 
also  with  the  doctrine  of  the  creation  of  the  world. 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY. 

At  first  sight  it  seems  that  the  evolution  theory  and 
Christianity  are  in  no  other  place  more  sharply^opposed 
to  each  other  than  in  that  of  the  history  of  creation. 
Darwinism  claims  for  its  theory  immense  periods  of 
time;  and  geology  seems  to  furnish  them  according  to 
its  demand.  The  Holy  Scripture,  on  the  other  hand, 
teaches  a  creation  of  the  world  in  six  days. 

With  the  attempt  to  find  the  right  way  to  end  this 
conflict,  we  enter  upon  that  part  of  the  border-land 
between  theology  and  natural  science,  which,  among  all 
others,  is  most  contested,  and  which  has  offered  to  the 
most  luxuriant  fancy  the  widest  field  of  action  and  the 
one  most  profitably  taken  advantage  of. 

We  confess  at  the  outset  that  we  sympathize  with 
those  who  try  to  keep  the  peculiar  realms  of  religion 
and  natural  science  apart  in  such  a  way  that  a  collision 
between  the  two  is  impossible.  We  quietly  leave  the 
investigation  of  the  temporal  succession  in  creation — 
especially  the  investigation  of  all  that  belongs  in  the 
finite  causal  connection  of  natural  processes — to  natural 
science  ;  we  also  do  not  look  to  the  source  of  our  Chris- 
tian religion,  to  the  Holy  Scripture,  for  a  scientific  man- 
ual, least  of  all  for  the  communication  of  a  knowledge 
of  nature,  supernaturally  manifested  and  claiming  divine 
authority,  the  acquisition  of  which  is  especially  the  task 
of  scientific  labor.  But  we  bestow  just  as  decidedly 
upon  religion  the  specific  task  of  showing  man  the  way 
to  communion  with  God,  especially  the  way  of  salvation  ; 
a  task  in  which  it  can  as  little  permit  itself  to  be  hindered 
by  natural  science,  as  the  latter  in  the  pursuit  of  its 
peculiar  tasks  can  allow  an  objection  from  any  source. 
On  the  side  of  religion,  the  bond  of  unity  which  brings 


292  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

into  harmony  the  two  activities  of  the  human  mind — the 
religious  and  the  investigating — in  the  realm  of  nature, 
and,  in  general,  in  the  whole  realm  of  exact  science, 
consists  in  the  fact  that  in  all  which  exact  science  offers 
to  religion  as  the  Tesult  of  its  investigation,  the  latter 
perceives  and  shows  the  works  and  ways  of  God ;  and 
on  the  side  of  the  exact  sciences,  the  bond  consists  in  the 
fact  that  they  bring  within  the  reach  of  their  scientific, 
historical,  literary,  culture  -  historical,  and  exegetical 
investigations  all  that  which  in  the  religious  realm 
appears,  or  in  the  written  word  is  fixed,  as  historical 
fact.  Religion,  therefore,  concedes  to  exact  sciences  the 
full  right  of  examining  the  biblical  records  as  to  all  the 
relations  of  their  historical  and  literary  connections  ;  it 
even  makes  these  investigations  a  quite  essential  and,  at 
present,  very  much  favored  branch  of  its  own  science  of 
theology.  On  the  other  hand,  religion  reserves  just  as 
decidedly  to  itself  the  full  right  of  drawing  from  them, 
of  maintaining,  and  of  realizing,  the  whole  full  religious 
basis  and  significance  of  those  records. 

We  know  very  well  that  such  a  proposition  is  very 
simple  in  principle,  but  much  more  difficult  in  practice. 
For  the  quintessence  of  that  which  constitutes  the  basis 
of  the  Christian  religion — namely,  the  leading  back  of 
mankind  to  communion  with  God  by  means  of  salvation 
—is  not  only  a  philosopheme,  a  theoretical  or  mystic 
doctrine,  but  a  fact :  it  comes  into  the  world  as  a  series 
of  divine  facts  ;  it  is  interwoven  by  innumerable  threads 
into  creation  and  the  course  of  nature  and  history  ;  and, 
as  to  this  whole  aspect  of  its  appearance  in  the  world  of 
phenomena,  it  falls  under  the  cognition  of  the  exact 
sciences.  But  as  soon  as  any  given  fact  excites  the 


POSITIVE   CHRISTIANITY. 

interest  of  religion  as  well  as  that  of  exact  science,  col- 
lisions are  possible  from  both  sides.  Some  advocates  of 
religion,  through  mistaken  zeal  for  religious  interests, 
may  think  it  necessary  to  assert  and  to  represent  as 
indispensable  to  religion  facts  whose  cognition  as  to  real- 
ity belongs  only  to  exact  science  and  which  are  contested 
by  exact  science  ;  as,  e.  g.,  the  creation  of  the  world  in 
six  literal  days,  or  the  creation  of  the  single  elements 
of  the  world  without  the  action  of  secondary  causes. 
And  some  advocates  of  exact  science,  from  reasons  of  a 
superficial  analogy,  may  erroneously  think  it  necessary 
to  dispute  the  reality  of  facts,  otherwise  well  attested, 
but  wanting  analogy,  in  which  religion  has  a  central 
interest ;  as,  e.  g.,  the  reality  of  the  resurrection  of  Jesus 
Christ,  or  the  reality  of  his  miracles.  Or  they  may 
unjustifiably  try,  from  our  experiences  in  this  world,  to 
forbid  glances  which  religion  permits  us  to  throw  beyond 
the  present  course  of  the  world  ;  e.  g.,  the  eschatological 
hope  of  Christians  is  often  enough  contested,  or  as  the 
laws  of  nature  are  called  eternal  in  the  absolute  sense 
of  the  word,  although  natural  science  is  only  led  to  a 
recognition  of  the  duration  of  the  same,  which  is  con- 
gruent with  the  circumstances  and  duration  of  this 
present  course  of  the  world. 

We  are  perfectly  aware  of  all  these  possibilities  of  a 
collision,  and  of  all  the  difficulties  of  their  prevention 
and  reconciliation  ;  but  we  nevertheless  know  of  no 
other  way  for  their  avoidance  than  that  simple  principle 
of  agreement  which,  on  account  of  its  simplicity  and 
clearness,  seems  to  us  to  be  perfectly  able  to  maintain 
the  peace  between  the  two  parties  interested,  or  where 
it  is  disturbed,  to  restore  it. 


294  THE   THEORIES    OF   DARWIN      * 

Thus,  we  wholly  agree  that  in  the  question  of  crea- 
tion the  investigation  of  the  succession  and  of  all  modal- 
ities in  the  appearance  of  the  single  elements  of  the 
world,  is  entirely  left  to  natural  science,  and  that  the 
biblical  records  should  on  the  one  hand  be  investigated 
wholly,  and  even  to  their  remotest  consequences,  from  a 
literary,  historical,  and  exegetical  point  of  view,  and  on 
the  other  hand  be  tested  with  equal  fullness  and  com- 
pleteness as  to  their  religious  contents.  The  literary  and 
exegetical  examination  of  the  Mosaic  account  of  crea- 
tion will  reveal  that  its  conceptions  of  that  which  in  the 
creation  of  the  world  belongs  entirely  to  the  natural 
process,  do  not  go  beyond  that  which  otherwise  belongs 
to  the  sphere  of  knowledge  and  views  of  antiquity,  as 
well  as  of  immediate  perception  of  nature  in  general ; 
and  that  we  cannot  expect  any  scientific  explanation  from 
it,  because  man  really  came  last  on  the  stage  of  earth, 
and  is  therefore  not  able  to  say  anything,  founded  upon 
autopsy,  about  the  origin  of  all  the  other  creatures 
which  preceded  his  appearance.  Just  as-  little  could  the 
first  men  possess  and  deliver  to  their  offspring  a  remem- 
brance of  the  first  beginnings  of  their  own  existence. 
Moreover,  the  literary  and  exegetical  interpretation  of 
the  Bible  will  also  refer  to  other  passages  of  the  Holy 
Scripture  which  entirely  differ  from  the  succession  of 
creations,  as  they  are  related  in  Genesis  I  ;  so,  e.  </.,  be- 
sides Job  XXXVIH,  4-11,  the  second  account  of  creation 
in  Genesis  11,  4-25  :  again  a  proof  that  what  we  read  in 
the  Biblical  record  of  creation  about  the  succession  in 
the  appearance  of  creatures  is  not  binding  upon  us. 
Religion  can  have  nothing  to  say  against  these  results ; 
it  will  not  reject  the  information  of  man  as  to  the  succes- 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  295 

sion  and  the  modalities  in  the  appearance  of  the  single 
elements  of  the  world,  which  it  receives  from  natural 
science,  and  will  not  expect  it  by  means  of  a  special 
supernatural  manifestation  ;  it  will  willingly  accept  it 
from  natural  science,  and  simply  make  use  of  it  in  such 
a  way  that  in  nature  and  its  processes  it  also  perceives  a 
manifestation  of  God.  Now,  when  it  examines  the  differ- 
ent Biblical  accounts  of  creation  as  to  their  religious  sub- 
stance, it  will  find  in  them  such  a  pure  and  correct  idea 
of  divine  nature  and  divine  action — such  a  pure  concep- 
tion, equally  satisfying  to  mind  and  to  science,  of  the 
nature  of  man,  of  his  position  in  nature,  of  the  nature 
and  destination  of  the  two  sexes,  of  the  ethical  nature 
and  the  ethical  primitive  history  of  man, — it  will  espe- 
cially have  to  acknowledge  in  the  Biblical  account  of 
creation,  in  spite  of  all  points  of  collision  with  the 
cosmogonies  of  paganism,  such  an  elevation  above  them, 
such  an  exemption  from  all  theogony,  with  which  heatiien 
cosmogonies  are  always  mixed  up,  that  we  are  perfectly 
right  in  perceiving  in  these  records  the  full  and  unmis- 
takable elements  of  a  pure  and  genuine  stream  of  mani- 
festation, which  pours  into  mankind. 

So  far  we  find  ourselves  in  full  harmony  with  a  the- 
ology which,  in  the  manner  indicated,  reconciles  the 
religious  interest  with  the  historical  and  critical  interest. 
We  find  the  points  of  view  to  which  this  perception 
leads,  represented  with  special  clearness  and  attractive- 
ness in  Dillmann's  Revision  of  Knobel's  "Commentar 
zur  Genesis"  ("Commentary  on  Genesis"),  Leipzig, 
Hirzel,  1875. 

But  it  seems  to  us  that  a  readiness  to  be  just  to 
historical  criticism  and  impartial  exegesis  has  hindered 


296  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

theologians  occupying  this  standpoint  from  being  just 
also  to  the  religious  element,  in  its  full  meaning,  in  refer- 
ence to  a  very  important  part  of  the  Mosaic  account  of 
creation,  in  which  the  author  of  it  shows  quite  a  decided 
religious  interest.  We  mean  the  six  days  of  creation, 
together  with  the  seventh  day,  the  divine  Sabbath.  The- 
ologians became  too  quickly  satisfied  with  the  exegetical 
perception  of  these  seven  days,  as  creative,  earthly  days, 
of  twenty  -  four  hours  ;  and  this  hindered  them  from 
assigning  to  the  religious  meaning  the  full  importance 
which  these  days  have  in  that  record.  That  the  idea 
and  the  number  of  the  days  in  that  account  have  a  high 
religious  meaning  to  the  author,  is  clear  from  the  follow- 
ing :  The  account  in  Genesis  i,  1-24,  belongs  to  that 
series  of  parts  of  jhe  Pentateuch  which  we  call  the 
original,  and  which  has  the  Sinaitical  Law  as  the  centre 
of  its  belief.  The  division  of  the  days  into  weeks,  each 
having  six  working  days  and  one  day  of  rest,  which 
possibly  existed  before,  but  which  received  obligatory 
importance  to  Israel  first  by  the  Sinaitical  legislation,  so 
far  controls  that  account  of  the  creation  of  the  world 
that,  next  to  the  sublime  perception  of  the  dignity  and 
position  of  man,  it  forms  its  very  quintessence.  The 
account  makes  that  divine  week  of  creation,  with  its  six 
working  days  and  its  divine  day  of  rest,  the  divine  pro- 
totype and  model  for  the  human  division  of  time ;  and 
the  Decalogue  also,  in  the  conception  which  it  has  in 
Exodus  xx,  directly  bases  the  commandment  of  the 
Sabbath  on  the  divine  week  of  creation.  Now,  if  we  sup- 
pose that  the  author  took  these  days  as  earthly  days  of 
twenty-four  hours,  we  are  first  of  all  obliged  to  reject  as 
a  child-like  error  the  idea  on  which  from  religious  reasons 


POSITIVE   CHRISTIANITY.  297 

— not  from  reasons  of  a  mystical  idea  of  God,  but  from 
direct  practical  religious  reasons — he  puts  great  impor- 
tance ;  an  idea  with  which  he  establishes  an  institution 
of  human  life  which  has  been  preserved  through  many 
thousands  of  years  and  is  still  preserved  as  the  exceed- 
ingly blissful  basis  of  all  social  life.  For  that  the  crea- 
tion of  the  world,  from  the  beginning  of  things  up  to 
the  appearance  of  man,  demanded  more  than  six  times 
twenty-four  hours,  is  beyond  any  doubt.  Moreover,  we 
should  be  obliged  to  reject  the  arguments  of  such  a 
central  religious  custom  as  Sabbath-rest  in  a  record  in 
which  we  have  to  assign  an  absolute  and  lasting  religious 
value  to  all  other  religious  elements  of  it,  as  to  the  ideas 
of  the  unity,  omnipotence,  and  wisdom  of  God,  of  his 
creation  through  the  creative  word,  of  the  perfection  of 
his  works,  of  man  bearing  the  image  of  God.  We 
should  even  see  that  idea  of  God  which  presents  itself 
to  us  out  of  all  other  characteristics  of  that  record  in 
such  spotless  purity  and  sublime  magnitude,  sink  down 
to  a  decided  insignificance  through  the  identification  of 
the  divine  days  of  creation  with  our  earthly  days  of 
twenty -four  hours.  All  this  certainly  brings  near  to  us 
the  question:  do  .we  make  a  correct  exegesis,  do  we  cor- 
rectly read  that  record,  when  we  think  that  the  author, 
because  he  speaks  of  days,  must  necessarily  have  under- 
stood earthly  days,  such  as  we  know  now  ? 

We  readily  perceive  how  interpreters  have  arrived 
at  this  view.  The  divine  sections  of  creation  in  the 
Mosaic  account  show  themselves  too  decidedly  as  days  to 
make  possible  any  other  interpretation  then  to  take  them 
as  days.  Now  from  experience  we  do  not  know  of  any 
other  days  than  of  earthly  days  of  twenty-four  hours  ; 


298  THE   THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

and  therefore  the  conclusion  naturally  follows,  that  the 
author  also  took  the  divine  days  of  creation  as  such 
earthly  days  of  twenty-four  hours.  A  simple  reference 
of  the  same  to  periods,  so  that  we  should  again  think  of 
fixed  periods  of  the  earth  or  of  the  world,  would  espe- 
cially pervert  the  literal  sense — would  entirely  remove 
from  the  account  the  idea  of  "  day  "  which  is  so  essential 
to  the  author  of  the  record,  and  thereby  render  obscure 
the  archetype  of  the  divine  week  of  creation  for  the 
human  divisions  of  time ;  and  the  looked-for  harmony 
between  the  Biblical  days  and  the  geological  periods  of 
the  earth  would  by  no  means  be  established  by  such  an 
identification  of  the  days  of  creation  with  the  periods  of 
the  world  :  for  the  geological  or  even  the  cosmic  and 
astronomical  periods  are  nowhere  in  congruity  with  the 
Biblical  days  of  creation. 

But  the  question,  however,  is  :  are  there  not  evidences 
in  the  Biblical  account  itself  which  show  that  the  author 
did  not  take  these  days  as  creative  earthly  days  of  twen- 
ty-four hours  ?  We  have  to  answer  this  question  decid- 
edly in  the  affirmative. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  an  established  fact  that  these 
days  of  the  week  of  creation  were  also,  according  to  the 
meaning  of  the  author,  days  of  God.  Now  that  such 
days  of  God,  even  with  the  most  childish  and  simple 
worldly  knowledge  of  that  early  period  of  mankind,  so 
soon  as  such  a  pure  idea  of  God,  as  appears  from  the 
whole  account,  is  at  the  bottom  of  the  conception,  can  no 
longer  be  identical  with  the  days  of  the  creature,  is  to  be 
inferred  beforehand  with  the  greatest  probability  from 
the  purity  of  that  idea  of  God,  and  is  even  expressly 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  299 

confirmed  by  special  evidences  in  the  record  itself.     We 
have  to  mention  no  less  than  four  of  them. 

The  days  of  creation  present  themselves  as  days  of 
God,  which  as  such  differ  from  the  creative  days  of  earth 
by  the  fact  that  with  them  the  day  and  the  work  of  the 
day  are  absolutely  identical.  In  the  creative  days,  the 
clay  and  the  work  of  the  day  are  always  different  from 
one  another  ;  the  days  come  and  go  as  temporal  frames 
which  include  everything  that  happens  during  these 
days,  whether  we  know  it  or  not.  Now  we  may  turn 
our  attention  to  and  mention  ever  so  many  works  of  an 
earthly  day  :  there  always  happen  innumerable  other 
things  which  also  belong  within  the  frame  of  that  day 
and  which  are  only  not  observed  by  us.  It  is  quite 
another  thing  with  those  Biblical  days  of  creation  :  here 
the  day  begins  with  the  beginning  of  the  day's  work  ;  it 
exists  and  passes  on  single  and  alone  in  the  course  of  the 
work  of  the  day,  and  it  comes  to  an  end  when  the 
day's  work  is  completed,  and  the  work  of  the  following 
day  begins  :  it  comes  to  an  end  with  "  evening  and 


morning. " 


We  also  lay  some  stress,  though  not  very  much, 
upon  the  fact  that,  in  the  account,  that  which  makes  and 
regulates  the  earthly  day  is  created  not  before  the  fourth 
day  of  creation,  Genesis  i,  14  :  "And  God  said,  Let  there 
be  lights  in  the  firmament  of  the  heaven  to  divide  the 
day  from  the  night ;  and  let  them  be  for  signs  and  for 
seasons,  and  for  days  and  years."  We  admit  that 
if  we  were  obliged  for  other  reasons  to  suppose  that  the 
author  of  the  account  took  the  days  of  creation  as  com- 
mon earthly  days  of  twenty-four  hours,  we  must  and 
should  find  it  possible  that  the  author  had  been  able  to- 


300  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

% 

suppose  the  existence  .and  the  course  ot  such  earthly 
days  even  'before  the  creation  of  sun,  moon,  and  stars; 
for  he  certainly  could  not  yet  have  the  scientific  percep- 
tion that  the  sun  with  its  light  and  the  rotation  of  the 
earth  were  the  only  cause  of  an  earthly  day.  But  it  is 
easier  and  more  natural  for  us  to  bring  that  passage, 
Genesis  1,14,  into  accord  with  the  conception  that  the  days 
of  creation  are  divine  days  which,  as  such,  are-  different 
from  creative  days,  and  on  one  of  which  God  also 
created  that  which  originates  creative  days. 

Another  evidence  in  the  account  is  of  still  greater 
importance  for  our  conception  of  days.  These  days  of 
creation  in  the  Biblical  record  have  no  night.  The 
account  closes  the  work  of  each  day  with  the  words: 
"And  the  evening  and  the  morning  were  the  first  day," 
"  the  second  day,"  etc.  Now,  if  we  have  to  suppose 
that  the  author  took  these  days  as  common  earthly  days, 
it  would  be  quite  impossible  to  understand  why,  after 
having  mentioned  at  the  close  of  the  day's  work  that  it 
now  became  evening,  he  omits  the  long  night  of  twelve 
hours,  and,  although  not  having  said  anything  of  the 
night,  makes  the  morning  which  follows  the  latter,  the 
end  of  the  preceding  day;  and  why  he  does  not  say, 
"and  it  became  evening  "  and  "it  became  night,  the 
first  day,"  etc.  We  then  could  not  avoid  the  question: 
what,  according  to  the  conception  of  the  author,  did  God 
do  in  these  six  nights  of  his  week  of  creation  ?  But  if 
we  suppose  that  the  author  took  the  days  as  days  of 
God,  and  therefore,  in  his  conception  of  the  days  of 
creation,  elevated  the  same  above  the  common  earthly 
days  of  the  creature,  and  so  represented  them  to  himself 
as  he  alone,  through  his  idea  of  God,  thought  he  might 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  301 

venture  to  do,  then  that  mode  of  expression,  so  exceed- 
ingly strange  under  all  other  suppositions,  appears  very- 
simple  and  natural  to  us.  For  the  author  did  not  men- 
tion a  night,  because  these  days  simply  had  no  night; 
and  they  had  none,  because  as  days  of  God  they  could 
have  none — because  with  God  there  is  no  night;  because 
the  rest  of  God,  as  the  seventh  day  shows,  is  only  a  day 
of  rest  and  not  a  night  of  rest.  And  the  author  saw 
the  morning  immediately  following  the  evening  of  his 
divine  day  of  creation,  and  recognized  in  this  morning 
together  with  the  evening  immediately  preceding  it,  the 
close  of  the  day,  because  the  accomplishment  of  the  day  V 
work  (evening)  already  contained  in  itself  the  preparation 
of  the  following  day's  work,  or  &t  least  pointed  to  the 
coming  of  the  latter. 

Finally,  the  fact  that,  according  to  the  Biblical 
account,  the  seventh  day  still  has  no  end,  is  just  as 
decisive  for  us.  The  end  of  each  of  the  six  days  is. 
mentioned  by  the  solemn  repetition  of  the  words:  "And 
the  evening  and  the  morning  were  the  first  day,"  etc. ; 
but  it  is  not  mentioned  in  regard  to  the  seventh  day.  Now 
if,  according  to  the  meaning  of  the  author,  the  seventh 
day  had  also  had  its  end  like  any  of  the  six  preceding 
days,  he  would  at  the  seventh  and  last  day  have  had 
double  reason  for  mentioning  its  end;  and  the  omission 
of  that  concluding  word  would  indeed  be  inconceivable. 
When  Dillman  says:  "The  formula  '  and  (it  became)  the 
evening'  is  wanting,  because  the  account  is  here  at  an 
end,  and  is  no  longer  to  be  carried  over  to  another  day, 
and  because  for  that  reason  its  designation  as  seventh 
day  is  presupposed  in  v.  2,"  we  have  to  reply  that, 
under  the  supposition  of  the  days  of  creation  having 


302  THE    THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

been  common  earthly  days,  a  carrying  over  of  the 
account  to  further  days  was  certainly  to  be  expected, 
even  if  from  nothing  else  than  the  formula:  "And  the 
evening  and  the  morning  were  the  first  day,"  etc.  For 
then  the  human  weeks  could  have  followed  the  week  of 
God,  in  which  man,  following  the  divine  example, 
would  have  had  to  work  six  days  and  to  rest  one.  The 
same  commentator  says  (p.  24):  "The  author  could  not 
even  have  dared  make  a  statement  about  the  life-dura- 
tion of  the  first  men,  if  to  him  the  day  in  which  he  was 
created  had  been  an  indefinitely  long  period  of  time." 
But,  according  to  the  conception  of  the  Biblical  author 
supposed  by  us,  only  the  "  day  of  God,"  in  which  he 
was  created,  would  have  been  an  indefinitely  long  period 
of  time  (although  we  are  not  willing  to  identify  the 
days  of  God  with  certain  earthly  periods  of  time);  the 
earthly  days  and  the  earthly  years,  on  the  other  hand, 
would  have  their  existence  after  the  fourth  day  of  crea- 
tion, and  thus,  according  to  that  view,  we  could  estimate 
and  name  the  earthly  years  and  days  of  all  that  which 
happened  before  the  fourth  day  of  creation,  under  the 
condition  that  we  have,  or  believe  we  have,  the  means 
of  estimating  them.  When  Dillmann  continues:  "On 
the  contrary,  the  author  took  these  days  as  nothing  else 
than  days,"  we  wholly  agree  with  him;  but  add  to  it : 
"not  days  of  the  creature,  but  days  of  God." 

By  this  long  duration  of  the  seventh  day,  we  are 
obliged  to  draw  still  another  conclusion ;  namely,  that 
according  to  the  conception  of  the  author  the  six  pre- 
ceding days  also  must  have  far  exceeded  the  duration  of 
earthly  days.  This  leads  us  to  another  Biblical  analogy, 
whose  direct  power  of  demonstration  for  a  long  dura- 


POSITIVE   CHRISTIANITY.  303 

•tion  of  the  Biblical  days  of  creation  is,  it  is  true,  justly 
contested,  but  which,  as  soon  as  we  have  to  assume  for 
other  reasons  that  according  to  the  author  the  days  of 
creation  far  exceed  the  earthly  days  as  to  duration, 
becomes  a  strong  support  of  this  view.  For  it  is  cer- 
tainly not  unimportant  that  in  the  90th  Psalm,  the  psalm 
of  Moses,  the  mediator  of  the  Sinaitical  legislation,  to 
the  circle  of  ideas  of  which  that  account  of  the  creation 
so  entirely  belongs,  the  thought  is  expressed  which  is 
also  taken  up  in  the  second  letter  of  St.  Peter,  with  its 
developed  cosmological  conceptions  :  namely,  the 
thought  "that  one  day  ^with  the  Lord  as  a  thousand 
years,  and  a  thousand  years  as  one  day." 

With  that  exegesis  of  the  seventh  day  as  one  still 
remaining  up  to  the  present,  we  are  in  clear  accord  with 
the  more  developed  theology  of  the  New  Testament,  and 
with  the  interpretation  which  it  itself  gives  of  that 
divine  day  of  rest.  Jesus  himself,  in  St.  John,  v.  17, 
puts  aside  a  reproach  of  the  Pharisees  in  reference  to  a 
healing  on  the  Sabbath,  with  the  words  :  ' '  My  father 
worketh  hitherto,  and  I  work. "  This  answer  only  has  a 
meaning  in  the  sense :  my  father  worketh  hitherto, 
although,  since  the  accomplishment  of  the  days  of  crea- 
tion, he  enjoys  the  Sabbath-rest ;  and  thus  I  also  work 
on  the  Sabbath  as  on  a  work-day.  And  the  Letter  to  the 
Hebrews,  in  its  fourth  chapter,  looks  through  the  medium 
of  the  ninety-fifth  Psalm  back  to  this  Sabbath  of  crea- 
tion which,  as  a  day  of  rest  of  God,  exists  to-day,  and 
the  entering  into  which  is  given  and  promised  to  the 
people  of  God. 

By  this  whole  conception  of  the  Biblical  week  of 
creation,  which  appears  to  us  exegetically  much  more 


304  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

natural  and  unconstrained  than  any  other,  we  alone 
reach  that  conception  which  the  author  of  that  record 
intends  to  reach ;  namely,  a  conception  really  worthy  of 
God,  of  his  temporal  relation  to  the  world,  and  of  the 
relation  of  human  days  to  the  divine  days  of  creation  ; 
we  get  a  foundation  for  the  commandment  to  keep  the 
Sabbath,  the  idea  of  which  can  be  completed  without 
disturbing  the  idea  of  God.  The  relation  of  God  to  the 
whole  temporal  course  of  this  present  world,  from  its 
beginning  to  its  end,  for  the  religious  ftiode  of  contem- 
plation of  man  who,  as  the  image  of  God,  looks  to  the 
creative  activity  of  God  for  a  prototype  and  an  example 
for  his  own  activity,  can  be  comprised  in  one  single, 
great,  divine  week,  whose  first  six  days  last  to  the  com- 
pletion of  the  creation  of  man,  and  whose  seventh  day 
still  lasts  and  will  last  to  the  completion  of  the  course 
of  the  world — till  the  latter  itself,  and  mankind  with  it, 
can  enter  into  the  divine  rest. 

From  this  religious  interpretation,  which  we  have  to- 
ascribe  to  that  Biblical  idea  of  the  divine  week  of  crea- 
tion, it  by  no  means  follows  that  religion  has  to  demand 
of  natural  science  that  it  shall  reach  in  its  cosmogonic 
investigations  the  same  succession  in  the  appearance  of 
things  as  we  find  in  the  Biblical  account.  This  would  be 
nothing  else  but  an  actual  carrying  of  a  pretended  relig- 
ious interest  over  beyond  the  limits  of  a  realm  in  which 
the  deciding  vote  belongs  to  natural  science.  However 
incomplete  the  cosmogonic  knowledge  of  the  latter  may 
be,  it  nevertheless  is  at  present  established  clearly  enough 
to  reject  forever  such  a  demand.  Astronomy  convinces 
us  that  it  is  entirely  inconceivable  that  all  which  belongs 
to  the  work  of  the  fourth  Biblical  day  of  creation,  even 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  305 

the  whole  formation  of  stars  and  of  our  system  of 
planets,  succeeded  the  work  of  the  third  day,  the  form- 
ation of  earthly  continents  and  plants.  And  geology 
in  its  strata,  which  exhibit  petrifactions,  shows  us  that 
the  relative  Biblical  days'  works  in  reality  did  not  suc- 
ceed one  another  alternately  in  such  a  way  that  the  one 
began  where  the  other  ceased,  but  that  from  the  begin- 
ning of  organic  life  the  works  of  the  third  and  the  fifth 
days  from  the  carboniferous  period,  also  the  works  of  the 
third,  fifth,  and  sixth  days,  developed  themselves  per- 
fectly by  the  side  of  each  other.  It  would  be  an  excess 
of  refinement  to  identify  any  Biblical  day  of  creation 
with  any  period  or  any  complex  of  periods  in  the  devel- 
opment of  the  earth  or  of  the  world. 

On  the  other  hand,  for  a  Christianity  founded  upon 
the  Holy  Scripture,  it  is  still  not  entirely  without  interest 
to  compare  ike  results  of  natural  science  and  tke  extent 
and  succession  of  the  Biblical  days'  works  with  one  another. 
For  a  declaration  which  undertakes  to  trace  something 
which  has  so  deep  a  hold  on  human  life  as  the  Sabbath- 
rest,  back  to  the  prototype  of  directly  divine  action,  is 
certainly  worthy  of  attention.  Now  if  we  wish  to  make 
such  a  comparison,  we  can  only  do  it  in  exact  analogy 
with  the  way  and  manner  in  which  we  compare  the  predic- 
tions of  the  prophetical  word  with  their  fulfilment.  For 
in  so  far  as  the  declarations  of  that  Biblical  record  about 
the  circumstances  of  creation  have  religious  value  of 
which  we  are  to  take  notice,  they  as  declarations  con- 
cerning events  of  which  man  certainly  cannot  have  his- 
torical knowledge  of  his  own,  come  entirely  under  the 
point  of  view  of  the  prophetical  word ;  with  the  excep- 
tion that  they  do  not  contain  a  forward-looking  but  :i 
20 


306  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

backward-looking  prophecy.  This  is  one  of  the  most 
correct  and  fruitful  thoughts  which  Johann  Heinrich 
Kurz,  in  his  "  Bibel  und  Astronomic"  ("Bible  and 
Astronomy"),  Berlin,  Wohlgernuth,  1st  edition,  18-i2, 
has  expressed,  but  has  fantastically  misused,  in  that 
work,  in  general  so  prolific  of  indefensible  positions  ; 
a  fate  which,  as  is  well  known,  the  forward-looking 
prophecy  has  had  also  often  enough  to  undergo. 

In  the  same  manner  as  we  have  to  explain  the  for- 
ward-looking prophecy  from  two  factors — on  the  one 
hand,  from  the  circumstances  of  time,  the  knowledge, 
the  dispositions,  and  the  characters  of  prophets  ;  on  the 
other,  from  the  receptivity  of  their  mind  for  the  mind 
of  God  and  the  last  purposes  of  his  actions — we  also 
have  explained  that  record  of  creation  from  two  factors  : 
on  the  one  hand,  from  the  view  and  the  knowledge  of  its 
time,  and  on  the  other  from  the  receptivity  of  its  author 
for  a  pure  and  living  idea  of  God  and  of  the  religious 
relations  of  human  life.  And  we  shall  also  have  to  do 
likewise  when  interpreting  it.  For  the  interpretation  of 
the  forward-looking  prophecy,  we  have  behind  us  the 
experience  of  thousands  of  years,  from  which  the  fol- 
lowing principles  of  treatment  and  interpretation  have 
resulted.  As  long  as  such  a  prophetic  word  is  not  yet 
fulfilled,  so  long,  indeed,  its  meaning  is  and  remains  the 
object  of  Christian  faith  and  Christian  hope;  but  it  is  diffi- 
cult and  almost  impossible  to  distinguish  in  it,  what  is  last- 
ing substance,  and  what  is  transient  form.  Perhaps  many  a 
thing  is  looked  upon  as  substance,  which  in  the  fulfilment 
appears  to  be  only  an  image  and  form  ;  and  perhaps 
many  a  thing  as  form,  which  in  the  fulfilment  shows 
itself  as  a  more  concrete  reality  than  we  had  supposed. 


POSITIVE   CHRISTIANITY.  307 

And  it  would  even  be  psychologically  a  violent  assump- 
tion, if  we  should  presuppose  in  the  mind  of  the  prophet 
a  still  greater  knowledge  of  the  future  course  of  things, 
than  that  which  he  expresses  ;  or  if  we  should  separate 
him  in  his  worldly  knowledge,  and  even  in  the  form  of 
his  prophetic  utterances,  from  the  views  and  limits  of 
his  time.  But  by  far  the  most  fruitless  effort  of  all 
would  be  to  construct  beforehand  out  of  his  words  the 
particulars  of  the  historical  course  of  the  future. 
Attempts  of  this  kind  have  been  defeated  whenever  they 
have  been  made.  But  if  the  fulfilment  of  such  a  pro- 
phetic word  has  once  taken  place,  it  is  a  joy  and  a 
strengthening  of  faith  to  all  following  generations ,  and 
even  after  the  final  fulfilment  of  all  prophecy,  it  will  still 
be  a  joy  to  the  children  of  God  in  their  perfection,  to  com- 
pare prophecy  and  fulfilment  and  to  allow  the  prophecy 
to  be  illumined  by  the  light  of  fulfilment,  the  fulfilment 
by  that  of  prophecy. 

All  this  finds  its  full  application  to  the  Biblical  nar- 
rative of  creation.  That  which  in  the  forward-looking 
prophecy  is  the  historical  fulfilment,  is  in  the  backward- 
looking  the  scientific  investigation.  So  long  as  the 
latter  was  not  directed  at  all  to  the  prehistoric  history 
of  the  earth,  it  was  an  audacious  undertaking  to  separ- 
ate in  the  Biblical  six  days'  work  substance  and  form 
from  one  another;  it  was  and  is  still  an  unpsychological 
violence  to  suppose  in  the  human  author  of  the  nar- 
rative all  possible  knowledge  of  psychical  and  scien- 
tific secrets,  and  to  lift  him  above  the  child-like  views  of 
his  time  concerning  the  things  of  this  world.  But  it 
was  by  far  the  most  fruitless  undertaking  to  construct 
in  detail  from  his  words  a  picture  of  the  real  circum- 


308  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

stances  of  the  creation  and  development  of  the  world. 
Attempts  of  this  kind  have  been  often  made;  but  they 
have  produced  nothing  but  dreams.  And  certainly  the 
attempt  to  control  and  correct  natural  investigation  by 
means  of  such  dreams  would  be  like  trying  to  correct 
well-established  facts  of  history  by  the  prophecies  of  a 
still  earlier  period,  or  even  to  prove  them  false.  But 
from  the  time  when  natural  science,  as  it  is  at  present, 
began  to  pay  attention  to  the  prehistoric  history  of  the 
earth  and  even  of  the  universe,  such  a  comparison  has 
been  possible. 

It  tells  us,  it  is  true,  that  the  Biblical  days'  works  did 
not  follow  each  other  in  the  course  of  earthly  and  cos- 
mic developments  in  such  a  way,  that  the  one  began 
where  the  other  ceased,  but  that  they  passed  on  in  the 
long  lines  of  their  course,beside  one  another,  and  above 
one  another.  But  looking  upon  their  meridian  altitudes, 
they  nevertheless,  where  we  are  able  to  undertake 
certain  geological  comparisons,  follow  one  another 
exactly  in  the  same  order  in  which  the  days  follow  one 
another  in  that  Biblical  record.  The  meridian  altitude 
of  the  third  day  (for  here  the  certainty  of  geological 
knowledge  first  begins  for  us)  has  to  be  looked  for  where 
the  continents  are  formed  and  the  vegetable  life  prepon- 
derates on  earth  :  and  that  is  the  carboniferous  period. 
The  meridian  altitude  of  the  fourth  day  must  have  been 
reached  where  for  the  first  time  the  covering  of  vapor 
and  clouds  of  the  earthly  atmosphere  permanently 
parted,  and  sun,  moon,  and  stars  became  visible  :  and 
geology  finds  this  time  in  the  period  which  lies  between 
the  carboniferous  period  and  the  trias — in  the  Permian 
period,  as  it  is  called  in  England,  in  the  dyas  of  the 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  309 

fossiliferous  and  of  cupriferous  slate  and  Zechstein,  as 
we  call  it  in  Germany.  The  meridian  altitude  of  the 
fifth  day  has  to  be  looked  for  where  ocean  life,  with  its 
sauria  and  innumerable  animals,  gave  its  impress  to 
organic  life  on  earth,  and  the  air  was  filled  with  inhabi- 
tants :  geology  calls  such  a  time  the  secondary  period  of 
trias,  lura,  and  chalk.  That  ocean-life  preponderated 
in  this  period,  is  beyond  any  doubt  ;  while  in  general 
geology  gives  us  more  meagre  information  about  the 
inhabitants  of  the  air  than  of  the  animals  of  the  ocean 
and  land.  The  flying  sauria  of  lura  are  still  character- 
istic enough  to  leave  at  least  the  possibility  that  the 
winged  world,  which  in  value  still  stands  below  the 
mammalia,  assisted  in  giving  to  that  secondary  period 
its  proper  type.  Finally,  the  meridian  altitude  of  the 
sixth  day  cannot  be  anywhere  else  than  where  the  ani- 
mals of  the  land  became  the  most  characteristic  inhab- 
itants of  the  globe,  and  where  man  appeared  :  and  that 
is  the  tertiary  period  of  geology,  in  which  mammalia 
appeared  in  great  numbers  and  variety,  and  at  the  end 
of  which  we  find  the  first  traces  of  the  appearance  of 
man. 

We  nevertheless  do  not  assign  special  weight  to  the 
establishment  of  such  a  correspondence.  The  religious 
value  of  the  idea  of  a  divine  week  of  creation  is  ren- 
dered perfectly  certain  to  us,  if  we  only  find  that  it  is 
reconcilable  with  a  pure  idea  of  God.  That  would  not 
be  the  case,  if  we  had  to  look  upon  the  week  of  crea- 
tion as  an  earthly  week  ;  but  it  is  perfectly  so,  if  the 
divine  week  stretches  over  the  whole  temporality  of  the 
course  of  the  world.  Therewith  we  can  be  satisfied. 
For  we  have  neither  theological  nor  philosophical  nor 


310  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

scientific  evidences  enough  to  draw  from  these  Biblical 
utterances  any  metaphysical  conclusions  in  reference  to 
the  relations  of  God  to  the  temporal  development  of  the 
world.  We  should  not  dare  to  contest  directly  such 
metaphysical  relations :  for  the  human  week,  with  its 
clay  of  rest,  is  such  an  eminently  fortunate  and  blissful 
institution,  the  observance  of  this  command  is  accom- 
panied by  such  a  striking  prosperity  in  all  life-relations 
of  a  people,  its  non-observance  by  such  an  evident  curse, 
and,  moreover,  the  idea  of  man  bearing  the  image  of 
God  is  such  a  fruitful  idea,  satisfying  equally  spirit  and 
mind,  that  wre  have  to  remember  the  possibility  that  the 
institution  of  the  human  week,  with  its  day  of  rest,  is 
certainly  founded  on  the  real  relations  of  the  life-process 
of  that  creature  which  bears  the  image  of  God  to  the 
activity  of  its  divine  prototype  upon  the  earth.  But 
nevertheless,  we  just  as  little  dare  to  attempt  or  to  chal- 
lenge the  establishment  of  such  metaphysical  relations  : 
for  a  theosophistic  treatment  of  numbers  seems  to  us  no 
fruitful  field  for  the  promotion  of  religion — neither  for 
the  promotion  of  religious  knowledge  nor  for  that  of 
religious  life. 

Still,  however,  the  result  of  our  comparison  between 
Biblical  and  scientific  interpretation  seems  to  us  worth 
mentioning  for  a  special  reason.  It  is  true,  we  have 
found  a  succession  of  the  meridian  altitudes  of  the  Bib- 
lical days  in  the  same  order  in  which,  according  to  the 
Biblical  relation,  the  days'  works  followed  one  another  ; 
but  we  have  found  in  the  total  course  of  the  Biblical  days 
that  their  works  in  reality  passed  on  in  long  lines  con- 
temporaneously with  one  another.  Now,  since  that  first 
part  of  our  result — the  succession  of  meridian  altitudes 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  311 

—is  the  least  we  have  to  expect,  if  the  counting  of  the 
days  shall  at  all  have  an  objectively  real  ground  in  the 
world's  process,  on  the  other  hand,  the  second  part  of 
our  result — the  far-reaching  contemporary  existence  of 
the  different  Biblical  days — has  an  exact  analogy  with 
those  prophecies  whose  partial  or  entire  fulfilment  per- 
mits us  a  more  certain  judgment  of  the  character  of 
prophecy  and  a  more  certain  comparison  between  proph- 
ecy and  fulfilment.  Even  the  prophetic  world  knows  of 
a  divine  day,  which  in  the  prophecies  occupies  an  emi- 
nent and  central  position  :  it  is  the  day  of  the  Lord  as 
the  day  of  judgment  and  salvation.  This  day  of  the 
Lord  also  stands  before  the  eye  of  the  prophet,  cer- 
tainly not  as  a  common  earthly  day  of  twenty -four 
hours,  but  as  a  day  of  God  rising  above  earthly  days 
and  embracing  an  infinite  number  of  them,  although  it 
also  has  its  very  distinct  meaning  which  comes  into  the 
earthly  temporality.  But  in  the  historic  fulfilment, 
there  happen  along  with  it  a  thousand  things  which  do 
not  belong  to  it ;  for  two-thirds  of  mankind  that  day  did 
not  dawn  at  all ;  and  as  to  its  temporal  course,  it  had  its 
dawn  in  the  beginnings  of  mankind, — its  sunrise  took 
place  eighteen  hundred  years  ago,  and  its  meridian  alti- 
tude is  still  impending. 

Finally,  that  even  the  piety  of  those  who  composed 
the  Biblical  records,  and  of  all  those  who  see  in  them 
the  manifested  evidences  of  their  faith,  assigns  no  relig- 
ious weight  to  the  succession  of  the  days'  works,  becomes 
clear  from  the  before-mentioned  fact,  that  the  second 
account  of  creation,  which  makes  man  and  his  ethical 
primitive  history  its  centre,  relates  the  creation  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  earth  in  quite  a  different  order  from 


312  THE    THEORIES    OF    DARV/IN. 

the  first  one.  We  shall  treat  of  this  point  again,  and 
more  in  detail,  for  another  reason,  in  the  following 
section. 

We  still  have  to  treat  of  the  question  as  to  what 
position  the  Holy  Scripture   and  Biblical   Christianity 
take  regarding  a  development  in  general :    and  here  also 
we  have  only  to  say  that  they  are  very  favorable  to  such 
an  idea.     The  works  of  the  six  days  themselves  are  in 
their  succession  nothing  else  but  a  development,  a  per- 
manent differentiation  of  that  which  was  not  separated 
before,  a  continuous  unfolding  of  the  more  simple  into 
the  more  complex,  an  always  progressing  preparation  of 
the  globe  for  newer  and  higher  forms  of  existence,  until 
finally  man  appeared.     In  the  Biblical  account  of  crea- 
tion, the  idea  which  forms  the  basis  of  every  evolution 
theory,   (namely,    that  the  new   which  appears  has   its 
conditions    and    suppositions,    its    creative    secondary 
reasons,  in  the  preceding),  is  pronounced  with   special 
clearness.     When  it  says  :   "Let  the  Earth  bring  forth 
grass  and  herb,     .     .     .     and  the  earth  brought  forth," 
etc.  ;  "  And  God  said  :  Let  the  Avaters  bring  forth  abun- 
dantly the  moving  creature  that  hath  life,"  etc.  ;  "Let 
the  earth  bring  forth  the  living  creature  ;  and  it  was 
so;"  and   "God  made  the  beast  of    the   earth," — the 
creative  causality  also  is  mentioned  in  the  clearest  words 
by  the  side  of  and  under  the  causality  of  the  Creator,  by 
means  of  which  the  latter  had  made  creatures.     The 
friendly  relation  between  the  Biblical  account  and  the 
evolution  theory  even  goes  so  far  that  the  Holy  Scrip- 
ture, like  that  theory,  does  not  permit  animals  to  come 
forth   from   plants,   although   the   latter   represent   the 
lower,  the  former  the  higher,  and  that  plants  are  a  neces- 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  313 

sary  condition  for  animals,  but  that  even  according  to 
the  Bible  both  kingdoms  come  forth  from  the  inorganic 
of  the  earth.  When  treating  of  the  creation  of  plants, 
it  says,  "  Let  the  earth  bring  forth  grass,"  etc.  ;  and 
when  treating  of  that  of  animals,  it  says,  u  Let  the 
earth  bring  forth  the  living  creature."  At  last,  if 
science  should  once  succeed  in  perceiving  more  clearly 
than  now  the  origin  of  the  organic  from  the  inorganic, 
it  would  have  in  those  words  the  means  for  a  harmony 
with  the  Biblical  conception. 

Now,  just  as  evidently  as  the  Holy  Scripture  is  favor- 
able, in  general  and  as  a  whole,  to  the  idea  of  evolution, 
so  certainly  it  seems  to  reject  it  precisely  at  that  point 
where  the  whole  interest  of  our  question  lies  ;  namely, 
in  reference  to  the  origin  of  the  single  species.  For 
here,  when  treating  of  the  creation  of  plants  as  well  as  of 
animals,  it  is  said  in  most  distinct  words:  "after  his 
kind"  But  the  contradiction  is  only  apparent.  As  to 
the  way  and  manner  in  which  God  created  every  species, 
whether  he  used  secondary  causes  or  not,  nothing  else 
is  said  than  that  God  created  every  species,  that  the 
creatures  exist  in  distinctly  marked  species,  and  that 
these  species  are  not  chance,  but  lie  in  the  plan  of  God 
—that  they  are  his  work.  This  fact,  that  it  was  God 
who  wished  to  create  each  species  as  species,  and  in 
reality  created  it,  is  just  as  firmly  established,  if  the 
species  came  forth  from  one  another  and  were  developed 
in  gradual  transitions,  as  if  they  received  their  existence 
in  some  other  way.  As,  in  the  fifth  day's  work,  we  find 
simply  the  words  :  ' '  And  God  said,  Let  the  earth  bring 
forth  the  living  creature  :  and  it  was  so;"  and  "  God 
/made  the  beast  of  the  earth," — in  precisely  the  same  way 


314:  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

God  could  indeed  create  single  plants  and  animals  after 
their  kind,  in  such  a  way  that  one  should  come  forth 
from  another,  that  they  should  be  developed  from  one 
another. 

§  2.    The  Creation  of  Man. 

The  most  important  facts  which  we  have  to  mention, 
as  bearing  upon  the  position  of  the  Christian  doctrine  of 
the  creation  of  man  in  reference  to  the  evolution  theory, 
have  been  treated  of  in  Chapter  I,  A.  We  have  especially 
convinced  ourselves  of  the  fact,  that  the  new,  even  if  it 
has  its  secondary  causes,  and  comes  into  existence  in- 
gradual  development,  is  no  less  a  creation  of  God,  and 
has  no  less  the  full  value  of  the  new,  than  if  it  were 
created  instantaneously.  Likewise  man  also  stands  before 
us  untouched  in  the  full  newness  and  dignity  of  his 
being,  in  the  full  qualitative  and  not  simply  quantitative 
superiority  of  the  highest  gifts  of  his  mind,  and  espe- 
cially of  his  personality,  his  ego,  his  liberty, — in  one 
word,  in  his  full  image  of  God, — whether  we  have  to 
look  upon  him  as  created  in  gradual  development  or  as 
created  suddenly. 

There  are  two  circumstances  in  the  Biblical  account 
from  which  we  see  that,  although  it  is  naturally  silent  as 
to  the  descent  problem,  it  not  only  knows  and  acknowl- 
edges the  connection  of  man  with  the  lower  creatures  of 
the  earth,  but  also  expressly  directs  attention  to  it. 

One  of  these  circumstances  is  connecting  man's  crea- 
tion with  that  of  land-animals,  in  a  single  day's  work.  We 
do  not  lay  more  stress  on  this  union  than  that  of  the  Holy 
Scripture,  although  it  emphasizes  so  strongly  the  dignity 
of  man  in  his  likeness  to  God  and  in  his  having  entire 


POSITIVE   CHRISTIANITY.  315 

supremacy  over  the  whole  earth,  and  although  it  could 
have  found  therein  reasons  enough  for  assigning  a 
proper  day  to  the  creation  of  man,  to  which  the  whole 
preceding  creation  pointed,  and  whom  the  whole  crea- 
tion on  earth  should  serve,  yet  in  its  account  of  the 
creation  it  evidently  desires  man  to  be  looked  upon  in 
his  connection  as  a  creature  with  the  animal  world. 
Moreover,  we  should  not  overlook,  in  the  Biblical 
account,  that  the  benediction  which  God  gives  to  the 
animals  of  the  water  arid  the  air,  at  the  end  of  the  fifth 
day,  is  in  the  sixth  day  not  pronounced  over  the  land- 
animals — although  they  certainly  are  as  much  entitled 
to  it  as  fish  and  birds — but  over  man.  Of  course,  it  is 
presupposed  that  the  land-animals  naturally  partake  of 
the  benediction  of  man,  so  far  as  it  can  be  due  to  them; 
the  benediction,  namely,  of  fertility  and  of  increase. 
According  to  these  indications  and  to  the  Biblical 
conception,  man  stands  in  still  another  and  closer  con- 
nection with  the  animal  world  than  in  that  of  mere 
supremacy  over  it. 

The  second  circumstance  to  which  we  have  to  call 
attention,  is  the  declaration  (Genesis  n,  7),  that  God 
created  man  out  of  earth ;  or  rather,  as-  the  literal 
translation  says:  "And  the  Lord  God  formed  man  (of) 
dust  of  the  ground"  It  is  of  no  importance  whether 
the  accusative  "dust  of  the  ground"  is,  as  some  say,  a 
mere  appositive,  or,  as  others  explain  it,  the  accusative 
of  matter.  When  the  account  calls  man  dust  of  the 
ground,  or  a  being  formed  of  dust,  the  difference  is  in- 
finitely insignificant,  whether  the  earthly  matter  out  of 
which  God  formed  man  who  is  dust  of  the  earth,  was  an 
animal  organism  or  not ;  whether  man  was  formed 


316  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

directly  or  indirectly  out  of  the  earth,  and  whether  the 
forming  demanded  a  longer  or  a  shorter  time.  For  that 
it  did  demand  time,  and  that  it  was  not  an  instantaneous 
€reation,  is  implied  in  the  expression  u  to  form." 

We  call  attention  to  this  passage  for  still  another 
reason.  The  second  account  of  creation,  as  it  begins 
Genesis  n,  4,  and  goes  on  to  the  end  of  the  third  chap- 
ter, is  strikingly  different  from  the  first  account,  Genesis 
i-Genesis  11,  4.  It  has  its  origin  in  that  author  whose 
book  is  called  that  of  the  Jehovist,  or,  more  lately,  the 
judaico-prophetic  book;  and  who,  among  all  those  that 
have  contributed  stones  to  the  building  of  the  Penta- 
teuch, gives  the  deepest  insight  into  the  nature  of  sin 
and  grace,  and  into  the  divine  plan  of  salvation.  Now 
in  this  book,  from  the  religious  point  of  view  so  ex- 
tremely worthy  of  attention,  the  account  of  the  creation 
is  given  quite  differently.  Man  is  the  centre  of  the 
account ;  that  which  does  not  directly  refer  to  him  is 
entirely  omitted.  The  order  in  which  the  inhabitants  of 
the  earth  were  created,  is  not  only  not  divided  into  the 
six  day's  works  of  the  first  account,  and  in  verse  4  is 
not  only  directly  taken  as  the  work  of  a  single  day,  in 
the  expression  D1'3  (m  the  day,  in  which = when),  with- 
out especial  stress  being  put  upon  the  expression  "  one 
day,"  for  DV^has  become  a  particle;  but  this  order  is 
entirely  different  from  the  other.  In  the  second  account, 
the  succession  is  the  following  :  "first,  man;  then,  the 
paradise  into  which  man  is  placed;  next,  the  trees  (the 
question  at  what  time  the  rest  of  the  vegetable  world  was 
created  is  left  entirely  without  answer);  then,  the  deter- 
mination to  create  also  an  assistant  to  man;  next,  the 
creation  of  animals;  finally,  the  creation  of  the  woman  out 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  317 

of  a  rib  of  man.  Now,  although  it  is  wholly  beyond 
doubt  that  the  two  accounts  had  different  authors,  the 
question  will  nevertheless  arise,  how  it  was  possible  that 
those  who  inserted  these  two  accounts  in  the  Holy 
Scripture,  one  after  the  other,  could  so  harmlessly  put 
side  by  side  and  read  one  after  the  other  these  two 
accounts,  so  entirely  contradictory,  without  being 
obliged  to  think  that  the  truth  of  the  one  would  refute 
the  other.  They  certainly  must  have  had  in  some  way 
the  conviction  that  the  one  account  was  consistent  with 
the  other.  But  such  an  agreement  between  the  two 
accounts  is  only  possible  when  we  either  see  in  them 
only  ideal  truths,  or  when  one  of  the  two  shall  repre- 
sent the  actual  reality  of  the  circumstances  of  creation, 
and  the  other  rather  their  ideal  character.  In  case  we 
should  have  to  make  such  a  distinction,  it  cannot  be 
doubtful  which  of  the  two  accounts  has  more  of  the 
real,  and  which  more  of  the  ideal  character.  In  the 
first  account  nothing  is  related  which  does  not  give 
direct  points  of  connection  in  the  real  process,  as  we 
can  imagine  it.  In  the  second  account,  we  find  many 
points  which  hardly  permit  a  direct  literal  conception, 
even  on  the  part  of  the  first  readers  of  the  account  and 
of  the  editors  of  the  canon  of  the  Old  Testament :  for 
instance,  besides  the  different  order  in  which  the  first 
account  is  given,  the  creation  of  the  woman  out  of  the 
rib  of  man;  this  account,  when  ideally  taken,  is  so  inex- 
pressibly comprehensive,  pregnant,  and  deep  —  when 
taken  really,  so  perfectly  improbable.  It  will  be  like- 
wise difficult  to  believe  that  even  the  old  readers  of 
the  account — at  least  those  of  them  who  looked  deeper 
and  were  more  enlightened — took  with  extreme  literal- 


318  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

ness  the  expression,  that  God  breathed  into  the  nostrils 
of  man  who  is  dust  of  the  ground,  the  breath  of  life. 
The  third  chapter  has  still  other  features  from  which 
we  have  at  least  to  assume  that  the  author  did  not  at  all 
intend  to  give  importance  to  an  extremely  literal  con- 
€eption  of  it.  Now,  if  the  second  account  is  the  more 
ideal  one,  the  meaning  of  it  is:  that  man,  his  being,  his 
aim,  his  primitive  history,  is  made  the  centre  of  the 
entire  description,  and  around  him  all  the  rest  is 
grouped;  while  in  the  first  account  he  appears  to  be  more 
the  end  of  the  whole  creation — as  he  presents  himself 
to  natural  investigation  in  the  real  process  of  creation, 
as  the  last  member  in  the  chain,  not  as  the  centre  in  a 
circle  or  a  star.  Now  if  that  is  the  case,  if  the  second 
account  of  creation,  having  man  as  its  centre,  is  the 
more  ideal,  then  we  certainly  must  not  overlook  the  fact 
that  in  the  ideal  account  man  is  called  dust  of  the 
ground.  Then  the  nature  of  dust  also  belongs,  from 
the  ideal  point  of  view,  so  necessarily  to  the  nature  of 
man  that  the  question,  whether  the  connection  of  this 
man  who  is  dust  of  the  ground,  with  this  ground,  is 
brought  about  through  the  form  of  a  preceding  animal 
organism,  or  not,  is  no  longer  of  importance.  Therefore, 
if  we  oppose  the  animal  ancestry  of  man  for  the  general 
reasons  that  we  do  not  wish  to  descend  from  something 
lower,  that  lower  nevertheless  is  present  as  dust  of  the 
ground.  And  if  we  oppose  such  a  pedigree  on  account 
of  the  ugliness  and  wickedness  which  exist  in  the 
animal  world,  we  have  to  point  to  the  fact  that,  on  the 
one  hand,  mankind  also  has  stains  which  are  uglier  than 
those  which  disfigure  the  wildest  beast  of  prey,  and  that, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  animal  world  shows  features  which 


POSITIVE   CHRISTIANITY.  319 

are  so  noble  that  no  man  need  be  ashamed  of  them.  It 
is  certainly  a  right  feeling  to  which  Darwin,  in  his  "De- 
scent of  Man,"  gives  expression,  when  he  says  :  "  For 
my  own  part,  I  would  as  soon  be  descended  from  that 
heroic  little  monkey  who  braved  his  dreaded  enemy  in 
order  to  save  the  life  of  his  keeper,  or  from  that  old 
baboon  who,  descending  from  the  mountains,  carried 
away  in  triumph  his  young  comrade  from  a  crowd  of 
astonished  dogs,  as  from  a  savage  who  delights  to  tor- 
ture his  enemies,  offers  up  bloody  sacrifices,  practices 
infanticide  without  remorse,  treats  his  wives  like  slaves, 
knows  no  decency,  and  is  haunted  by  the  grossest  super- 
stitions." We  have  but  to  add: — if  only  the  coming 
forth  from  the  creative  hand  of  God,  the  creation  in  his 
own  image,  the  communion  with  Him  and  being  a  child 
of  His,  are  preserved.  And  that  all  this  can  be  preserved, 
even  when  adopting  descent  and  evolution,  we  have  seen 
from  repeated  considerations. 

But  we  have  to  draw  still  another  conclusion  from 
the  difference  between  the  two  accounts  of  creation.  If 
the  succession,  in  which  the  inhabitants  of  the  earth 
appear  in  the  first  account,  is  so  entirely  different  from 
that  in  the  second,  as  it  evidently  is,  we  have  neces- 
sarily either  to  give  up  the  historical  reality  of  the  one 
or  of  the  other  account,  or  of  both,  or  to  suppose  that 
the  creation  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  earth  took  place  in 
a  way  and  manner  which  makes  it  possible  to  perceive  a 
real  connection  of  the  succession  in  the  first  account,  as 
well  as  in  that  of  the  second,  with  the  real  processes  of 
creation.  Now  we  do  not  at  all  intend  to  argue  with 
those  who  choose  the  first  part  of  the  dilemma ;  we  our- 
selves join  with  them,  and  believe  that  salvation  does 


320  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

not  depend  upon  the  objective  reality  of  that  succession, 
nor  the  possession  of  salvation  on  the  faith  of  such 
reality.  But  we  leave  to  the  consideration  of  those  who, 
in  their  religious  convictions,  think  themselves  bound  to 
the  objective  reality  of  both  accounts,  the  following 
thoughts  :  If  not  only  ideal  depth,  but  also  a  connection 
with  the  empirical  and  historical  reality  of  the  process 
of  creation,  is  to  be  assigned  to  the  succession  of  the 
first  account  as  well  as  to  that  of  the  second,  it  is  only 
possible  by  assuming  a  descent  —  namely,  that  man, 
e.  g.,  may  be  called  in  one  sense  the  first  of  creatures, 
inasmuch  as  with  the  first  organism  that  was  already 
given  which  was  afterwards  developed  into  man,  and 
inasmuch  as  all  which  was  otherwise  created  and  devel- 
oped as  aspecial  species,  was  only  present  on  account  of 
that  aim  ;  and  that  man  in  another,  in  the  merely  em- 
pirico-historical  sense,  is  still  also  the  last  of  creatures. 
Thus,  then,  the  advocates  of  descent  would  find  them- 
selves in  the  unaccustomed  position,  equally  surprising 
to  friend  and  foe,  of  being  in  a  much  more  friendly 
relation  to  the  Biblical  belief  in  revealed  religion  than 
their  opponents.  We  should  see  the  apparent  discords 
not  only  between  Scripture  and  nature,  but  also  between 
account  and  account,  dissolved  into  harmony,  and  above 
the  double  relation  of  the  two  accounts  we  should  see 
the  morphological  ideas  of  Oken  and  Gothe,  the  ideas 
of  types  of  Cuvier,  Agassiz,  and  Owen,  the  laws  of  devel- 
opment of  K.  E.  von  Btier,  and  finally  the  ideas  of 
descent  of  Lamarck  and  Darwin,  reach  a  friendly  hand 
to  one  another.  And  even  the  old  joys  of  a  teleological 
view  of  nature,  adorned  indeed  with  queue  and  wig,  but 
at  present  rejected  with  too  much  disdain,  even  if  they 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  321 

are  called  ichthyo-teleological  and  insecto-teleological, 
would  attain  in  this  reconciliation  their  modest,  subordi- 
nate place.  'Moreover,  we  should  then  have  the  satis- 
faction of  seeing  again  that  a  religiousness  which  in  its 
own  realm  gives  absolutely  free  play  to  natural  investi- 
gation, and  does  not  find  it  beneath  its  dignity  to  learn 
from  natural  science,  can  on  that  account  retain  its  own 
autonomy  in  its  own  realm  much  more  uncontestedly  ; 
and  that,  as  it  seems  to  us  in  the  present  case,  it  can  go 
much  farther  in  the  use  which  it  makes  of  its  autonomy 
and  in  the  extension  of  the  revealed  character  of  its 
religious  records  to  physical  processes  and  circumstances, 
than  is  either  necessary  or  safe,  and  that  it  nevertheless 
is  rewarded  for  keeping  peace  with  natural  science  by 
more  rich,  more  living,  and  more  correct  glimpses  into 
the  harmony  between  the  word  of  God  and  the  work  of 
God,  than  would  be  the  case  with  a  religiousness  which, 
without  regard  to  natural  science,  weaves  its  cosmog- 
onies from  the  Holy  Scripture  alone. 

§  3.   The  Primitive  Condition  of  Man  :  Paradise,  the  Fall 
oj  Man,  and  Primitive  History. 

After  the  Holy  Scripture  has  narrated  the  creation  of 
man  in  two  accounts,  the  second  of  them  gives  us  a  con- 
tinuation in  the  well-known  account  of  Paradise  and  of 
the  fall  of  man,  with  its  consequences ;  and  the  further 
development  of  the  Biblical  doctrine,  as  well  as  of  Chris- 
tian theology,  has  also  taken  the  substance  and  quintes- 
sence of  these  narratives  into. its  representation  of  the 
Christian  truths  of  salvation. 

We  shall  not  throw  any  obstacles  in  the  way  of  bring- 
ing about  an  understanding  between  the  Darwinian  vie- .  , 
21 


322  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

and  the  Biblical  primitive  history,  by  acknowledging 
the  justice  of  the  view  that  Christian  piety  might  in 
some  way  contain  in  itself  the  demand  that  also  the  form 
in  which  the  facts  of  truth  in  Genesis  HI  are  given  to  us, 
has  historical  reality.  He  who  makes  this  demand  has 
only  his  own  short-sightedness  and  imprudence  to  blame, 
if  he  also  loses  the  substance  with  the  form,  the  figura- 
tive nature  of  which  can  be  shown  to  him  only  too  cer- 
tainly. We  acknowledge  it  as  a  real  providence  of  God, 
which  intends  faithfully  to  guard  believing  man  against 
a  senseless  and  slavish  adherence  to  the  letter,  and 
against  grounding  his  means  of  salvation  upon  insecure 
foundations,  that  at  the  grand  and  venerable  portal  of 
Holy  Scripture  two  accounts  stand  peacefully  beside  one 
another,  which,  if  we  penetrate  through  the  form  into 
their  substance,  complete  one  another  in  magnificent  and 
profound  harmony,  but  which,  if  we  look  upon  the  form 
as  their  substance,  so  diametrically  contradict  each  other 
that  we  cannot  do  anything  else  but  reject  the  one  or  the 
other,  or,  still  more  logically,  both.  We  think  that  this 
hint  is  strong  enough  to  be  understood,  and  bears,  like 
all  bowing  before  truth  and  its  power  of  conviction,  rich 
fruit  not  only  for  our  knowledge,  but  also  for  the  purity, 
certainty,  and  richness  of  our  religiousness.  We  shall 
not  lose  by  this  acknowledgment  the  character  of  reve- 
lation and  the  impression  of  the  truth  of  these  Biblical 
records,  but  shall  be  able  through  them,  and  through 
them  alone,  to  gain  and  perceive  it.  It  is  true,  the  first 
account,  and  still  more  the  second — the  account  of  the 
creation  and  of  the  primitive  history  of  man — has  in  its 
external  form  an  exceedingly  close  relationship  to  the 
poetical  myths  of  the  ancient  nations  of  the  Orient;  but 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  323 

its  difference  does  not  consist  essentially  in  the  form— 
although  this  too,  being  the  form  of  a  true  and  correct 
substance,  shows  differences  enough  from  these  heathen 
myths — but  consists  in  the  substance  itself.  These 
heathen  myths  certainly  contain  many  beautiful,  deep, 
and  true  factors,  but  always,  besides,  fundamental  ideas 
which  we  have  to  reject  as  half-true  or  wholly  erroneous: 
sometimes  a  dualistic  conception  of  God  and  the  world, 
sometimes  a  materialization  of  the  divine,  the  spiritual, 
and  the  ethical,  sometimes  fatalistic  and  sometimes 
magic  elements  in  great  number.  These  Biblical  repre- 
sentations, on  the  other  hand,  certainly  appear  to  us  still 
in  a  picturesque  form  which  is  analogous  to  that  form- 
ation of  myth;  for  it  really  seems  to  be  the  only  form 
in  which  the  mind  of  man,  in  his  first  epoch  of  life,  was 
able  to  perceive  and  represent  supernatural  and  ethical 
truth,  as  we  are  to-day  able  to  represent  the  highest 
relations  of  our  mind  to  the  .supernatural  and  the  ethical 
only  in  pictures  and  parables;  but  the  Biblical  represen- 
tations offer  us,  under  this  plastic  covering,  a  substance 
which,  in  view  of  the  most  extensive  criticism,  of  the 
deepest  speculation,  and  of  the  most  enlightened  and 
practically  .most  successful  piety,  is  still  established  as 
the  purest,  the  most  correct,  and  the  most  fruitful  repre- 
sentation of  the  nature  of  God,  and  of  the  ethical  nature 
and  the  ethical  history  of  man. 

Moreover,  we  shall  not  make  it  difficult  to  bring 
about  an  understanding  between  the  Darwinian  theories 
and  the  Biblical  doctrine,  by  supporting  the  other  view 
taught  by  the  Holy  Scripture — that  death  came  into  the 
animal  world  first  through  the  fall  of  man,  and  that  the 
fall  of  man  first  brought  the  character  of  perishableness 


324:  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

into  the  condition  of  the  earth  or  even  of  the  universe. 
There  are  essentially  three  Biblical  passages  to  which 
those  refer  who  think  that  they  find  such  a  view  in  the 
Holy  Scripture;  namely,  Romans  v,  12;  Romans  vm,  19- 
23,  and  Genesis  HI  ;  but  they  are  wrong.  That  the 
Apostle  Paul,  in  Romans  v,  12,  by  the  world,  into 
which  death  came  through  sin,  did  not  mean  the  uni- 
verse or  the  globe,  but  mankind,  is  plain  enough  from 
the  connection,  and  is  only  demanded  by  the  difference 
of  meaning  which  in  the  Greek,  as  well  as  in  the  Ger- 
man language,  the  word  "world"  has  according  to  its 
connection.  And  in  Romans  vm,  19-23,  where  he 
speaks  of  the  subjection  of  the  creature  to  vanity,  he 
does  not  mention  a  certain  time  in  which  it  happened, 
nor  an  historical  occasion,  as  the  fall  of  man,  which 
should  have  given  the  impulse  to  this  subjection;  but  he 
only  says,  in  general,  that  it  was  God  who  "hath  sub- 
jected the  creature  to  vanity,"  and  that  he  hath  "  sub- 
jected the  same  in  hope"  He  who  reads  this  passage 
without  prepossession,  can  be  led  to  no  other  idea  than 
to  this  :  that  God  has  subjected  the  creature  to  the  law 
of  vanitv  from  the  very  beginning  of  creation — not 
forever,  but  from  the  very  beginning — with  the  inten- 
tion that  he  shall  also  celebrate  his  transfiguration  and 
deliverance  from  the  yoke  of  perishableness,  together 
with  the  perfection  of  mankind,  and  with  the  manifesta- 
tion and  transfiguration  of  the  children  of  God.  And 
even  the  curse  of  the  ground  (Genesis  m,  17)  is  no 
cursing  of  the  universe,  or  of  the  globe  and  its  crea- 
tures, but  only  a  cursing  of  the  ground;  and  of  this  not 
on  its  own  account,  but  only  in  its  relation,  as  a  means 
of  subsistence,  to  man,  and  in  opposition  to  the  exemp- 


POSITIVE   CHRISTIANITY.  325 

tion  from  labor  which  his  life  hitherto  had,  and  to  the 
agreeableness  of  his  means  of  support  in  paradise. 

After  having  thus  rejected  these  two  perversions  of 
the  Biblical  doctrine,  there,  remains  to  us  as  an  estab- 
lished substance  of  the  latter,  and  as  an  essential  part  of 
Christian  dogmatics,  so  far  as  it  may  come  into  contact 
with  the  Darwinian  views,  at  least  the  following:  Man 
was  originally  created  by  God,  good  and  happy.  To 
his  goodness  there  also  belonged  the  possibility  of  hav- 
ing a  sinless  development,  as  he  ought  to  have  had;  and 
to  his  happiness  there  also  belonged  a  life  amid  surround- 
ings wholly  corresponding  to  him,  and  the  possibility  of 
obtaining  exemption  from  death  and  all  evils  by  way  of 
a  self-controlling  submission  to  God,  which  resists 
temptation.  We  purposely  express  ourselves  thus.  For 
the  Biblical  primitive  history  does  not  say  that  man  was 
created  with  exemption  from  the  law  of  death,  but  that 
the  latter  must  have  been  granted  to  him  as  a  reward  for 
his  submission  :  the  tree  of  life  stood  by  the  side  of  the 
tree  of  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  and  only  the  eat- 
ing of  the  fruit  of  the  tree  of  life,  by  avoiding  the  eating 
of  the  forbidden  fruit,  should  have  given  to  man  that 
immortality  which  he  forfeited  by  disobedience.  Man 
became  disobedient,  and,  in  consequence  of  it,  subject 
to  death;  the  harmony  between  man  and  his  surround- 
ings disappeared;  the  earth  became  to  him  a  place  of 
labor  and  of  death;  and  now  began  for  man  his  histori- 
cal development  as  a  web  of  guilt,  of  punishment,  and 
of  education  and  redeeming  mercy. 

Now,  in  the  presence  of  this  Biblical  view,  the  ques- 
tion comes  up  first  of  all:  is  a  view  according  to  which 
man  should  have  been  able  and  obliged  to  take  a  sinless 


326  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

development,  and,  in  case  he  had  taken  it,  should  have 
been  exempt  from  the  fate  of  death  and  of  the  ills  pre- 
ceding it,  and  endowed  with  immortality  as  to  body  and 
soul — is  such  a  view  in  any  way  reconcilable  with  the 
Darwinian  ideas  of  development,  according  to  which 
man  came  forth  from  the  series  of  lower  organisms,  sub- 
ject to  death  ? 

We  could  avoid  answering  this  question  by  a  deduc- 
tion similar  to  that  which  we  drew  in  Chap.  I,  §  3,  when 
treating  of  the  question  of  the  reconcilableness  of  the 
idea  of  evolution  with  theism,  but  of  which  we  likewise 
made  no  use.  We  could  show  that  in  this  question  no 
other  difficulties  present  themselves  to  the  religious 
consciousness,  than  such  as  existed  long  before  the 
appearance  of  the  Darwinian  theories  and  were  over- 
come by  pious  consciousness  and  religious  reasoning. 
For  a  difficulty  entirely  similar  to  that  which  here 
appears  to  us,  when  looking  upon  the  whole  human 
species  and  its  origin,  stood  before  us  heretofore,  when 
looking  upon  the  human  individual  and  his  origin. 
From  the  standpoint  of  Biblical  Christianity,  we  ascribe 
to  the  human  individual  an  immortality  of  the  soul  and 
a  coming  resurrection  of  the  body  ;  but  we  do  not  to 
the  human  embryo  at  the  beginning  of  its  development 
in  the  womb.  Now  we  know  that  the  development  of 
man  from  that  embryo  to  perfect  man  is  wholly  gradual ; 
that  we  cannot  observe  and  predicate  of  any  organ,  of 
any  quality,  of  any  activity  of  body,  soul,  or  mind, 
exactly  the  moment  when  it  comes  into  existence  ;  and 
that  therefore  we  cannot  give  the  moment  when  we 
could  assume  that  something  so  decidedly  great  and  now 
as  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  the  prospect  of  a 


POSITIVE   CHRISTIANITY.  327 

resurrection  of  the  body,  begins  for  the  human  individ- 
ual. Although  we  know  all  this,  nevertheless  in  all 
discussions  of  the  question  whether  we  have  to  hope  for 
an  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  resurrection  of  the 
body,  the  gradual  development  has  hardly  ever  been,  so 
far  as  we  know,  a  weight — in  any  case,  never  the  deci- 
sive weight — in  the  balance  against  the  supposition  of 
an  immortality.  If  we  can  look  upon  the  idea  of  an 
immortality  of  the  soul  and  of  a  resurrection  of  the 
body  as  reconcilable  with  the  fact,  that  the  human  individ- 
ual was  only  developed  gradually  out  of  something 
which  was  still  soulless  and  perishable,  we  also  have  to 
look  upon  the  other  fact  as  reconcilable  with  the  gradual 
development  of  the  whole  species  ;  namely,  that  man,  if 
he  should  have  developed  himself  without  sin,  would 
have  reached  an  immortality  of  body  and  soul.  But  we 
shall  not  enter  this  path  which  would  lead  us  around  the 
whole  question.  For  the  objection  might  be  made,  that 
the  scientific  and  philosophic  impossibility  of  assuming 
an  eternal  duration  of  an  individual  that  originated  in 
time,  has,  indeed,  always  been  pointed  out,  and  only  the 
assertion,  not  the  proof*  of  the  contrary  has  been  opposed 
to  it ;  but  that  Darwinism  puts  this  impossibility  into  new 
and  full  light.  Therefore,  if  we  wish  to  reach  a  certain 
basis  for  our  conviction,  nothing  else  remains  to  us  but 
to  enter  upon  that  question  wholly  and  exclusively  from 
Darwinian  premises. 

Now  these  premises,  indeed,  indicate  to  us  a  develop- 
ment of  things,  but  a  development  of  such  a  kind  that 
there  appears  to  us  something  new,  and  always  new  in  a 
rising  line.  The  rising  of  this  line  of  development  con- 
sists in  the  fact  that  the  spiritual  comes  forth  from  the 


328  THE   THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

natural  in  permanent  progress  and  in  alwnys  higher 
development :  that  mind  vanquishes  matter.  The  first 
new  thing  which  meets  us  in  the  development  of  the 
globe,  is  the  organic  and  life  ;  the  second,  sensation  and 
consciousness  ;  the  third,  self-consciousness  and  free-will. 
Now  let  us  once  suppose  imaginary  human  spectators  of 
every  first  appearance  of  these  phenomena.  Would  he 
who  thus  fa-r  had  only  known  inorganic  phenomena  and 
processes,  have  dared,  before  the  appearance  of  life,  to 
utter  the  proposition  :  matter  can  also  become  living  and 
live  ?  And  who  would  have  dared  to  suggest  the  further 
doctrine  :  matter  can  also  feel  and  get  a  consciousness 
of  things  ?  Finally,  who  would  have  dared  even  to  say  : 
matter  can  also  become  a  self-conscious  and  free  person- 
ality ?  To  every  person  who  would  have  pronounced 
such  dreams  of  the  future,  there  would  have  been 
opposed,  apparently  with  full  right,  the  inviolable 
mechanism  of  the  inorganic  world.  But  all  this  never- 
theless took  place.  If  something  material  can  be  led  so 
far  that  a  personality  lives  in  it,  that,  with  the  assist- 
ance of  this  material  basis,  is  able  to  perceive  the  ideas 
and  the  eternal,  that  can  act  in  accordance  with  aims 
and  designs  and  can  set  itself  the  highest  aims,  and 
that  may  even  enter  upon  a  loving  and  child-like  rela- 
tion to  the  highest  primitive  cause  of  all  things,  then  we 
are  no  longer  permitted  to  say  that  the  material,  of 
which  the  body  of  such  a  personality  consists,  could  not 
have  been  subjected  to  the  service  of  such  a  personality 
so  far,  that  the  latter  could  have  vanquished  the  elements 
of  the  destruction  of  life  in  an  eternal  process  of  spon- 
taneous renewal. 

It  is  true,  with  such  a  concession  alone  we  have  not 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY  329 

gained  anything  directly.  For  in  dbstracto  everything 
is  finally  conceivable  which  does  not  contradict  the 
logical  laws  of  reasoning  —  even  the  basilisk  and  the 
mountain  of  diamonds  in  stories  and  fairy  tales.  But 
such  an  abstract  conceivableness  has  not  the  least  value 
for  the  knowledge  of  the  real,  nor  even  for  the  knowledge 
of  the  really  possible.  For  in  the  world  of  being  and 
becoming,  everything  in  its  last  elements,  forces,  qual- 
ities, and  laws,  as  well  as  in  the  last  causes  of  its  devel- 
opment, is  something  so  absolutely  given,  that  only  after- 
ward are  we  able  to  analyze  that  which  is  present,  from 
our  observations,  or  to  follow  from  the  given  factors  that 
which  can  be,  or  which  under  other  conditions  would 
have  become  different,  and  that  we  are  not  able  to  syn- 
thetically construct  the  one  or  the  other  in  advance, 
independently  from  the  factors  of  reality.  If,  therefore, 
that  concession  shall  attain  a  scientific  value,  and  if  the 
conditional  sentence  :  Man  would  not  have  been  subject 
to  death  if  he  had  not  sinned,  is  to  become  an  admitted 
and  unassailable  part  of  Christian  theology,  we  have  to 
look  in  the  realm  of  phenomena,  and  in  the  course  of 
that  which  took  place,  for  facts  which  prove  that  man, 
if  he  had  not  committed  sin,  would  not  have  died,  and 
which  thus  change  that  merely  abstract  possibility  into 
a  real  one. 

Now  we  have  such  a  fact  in  the  resurrection  of  the 
Lord.  If  it  really  took  place,  then  it  is  the  last  earthly 
stage  in  the  course  of  the  Lord's  work  of  Redemption, 
and  then  it  permits  us  to  draw  conclusions  backwards  as 
to  what  would  have  become  of  man,  if  he  had  not  been 
in  need  of  this  redemption,  if  he  had  had  a  sinless  devel- 
opment instead  of  one  with  sin. 


330  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

We  know  very  well  that  in  mentioning  this  fact  we 
meet  not  only  the  opposition  of  those  who  contest  a  tele- 
ological,  theistic,  and  especially  a  Christian  view  of  the 
world,  but  also  the  natural  doubts  of  those  who  defend 
with  warm  interest  teleology  and  the  ethical  fundamen- 
tals and  productive  forces  of  Christianity,  but  who  think 
it  more  advisable  to  pass  over  the  whole  question  of  the 
resurrection  in  cautious  silence.  The  main  consideration 
which  hinders  them  from  believing  in  the  reality  of  the 
resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ,  is  not  the  want  of  historical 
attestation,  but  rather  the  absolute  want  of  any  attested 
analogy  in  the  other  events  which  have  taken  place  on 
the  earth.  What  we  commonly  see  and  witness  in  the 
dead,  is  without  exception  precisely  the  opposite  of  that 
which  is  related  about  the  further  fate  of  Jesus  crucified. 
Now  we  have  repeatedly  had  occasion  to  point  out  that 
the  want  of  analogy  cannot  at  all  be  a  proof  of  a  fact's 
not  having  taken  place,  supposing  it  otherwise  Avell  estab- 
lished. Especially  if  a  development  of  events  follows 
aims,  it  lies  in  the  nature  of  this  development  that  in  its 
course  in  all  the  places  where  we  really  and  actually  can 
speak  of  a  development,  of  a  process,  things  appear  and 
must  appear  which  were  not  present  before,  and  which, 
even  if  they  once  appeared,  nevertheless  need  not  neces- 
sarily be  repeated,  except  at  certain  times  which  corre- 
spond to  the  plan  of  development ;  namely,  when  "  their 
time  has  come."  All  these  are  events  which  are  wanting 

O 

in  analogy,  but  which  cannot  be  doubted  at  all  on  that 
account.  That  was  the  case  with  the  first  appearance  of 
organic  life,  also  with  the  first  appearance  of  beings  hav- 
ing sensation  and  consciousness  ;  moreover,  it  was  the 
case  with  the  first  appearance  of  each  of  the  thousands 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  331 

of  species  of  organic  beings  :  all  these  things,  at  the 
time  when  they  first  appeared,  lacked  every  analogy  in 
the  past,  and  were  perhaps  repeated  for  some  time  in 
primitive  generations,  perhaps  not ;  at  any  rate,  they 
have  all  ceased  to  have  analogies  within  the  memory  of 
man.  In  an  eminent  degree  does  the  first  appearance  of 
man  want  every  analogy  with  what  we  observe  else- 
where. We  never  see  men  appear  on  the  stage  of  the 
earth,  who  were  not  originated  by  men;  yet  this  event, 
so  contrary  to  all  analogy,  did  once  take  place,  and 
stands  without  parallel  and  analogy  in  the  midst  of  the 
series  of  events,  so  far  as  our  knowledge  can  reach. 

Thus  the  resurrection  of  the  Lord  must  also  neces- 
sarily want  analogy,  in  case  it  is  an  event  which  really 
marks  a  station  of  progress  in  the  development  of  earth- 
ly creatures  and  their  history,  and  in  case  also  its  nature 
and  its  importance  tend  not  to  bring  mankind,  or  at 
least  those  who  believe  in  him  who  has  been  raised, 
at  once  under  the  influence  of  its  physical  consequences, 
but  only  so  far  to  prepare  the  way  for  these  conse- 
quences in  intellectual  and  moral  life-forces.  And  pre- 
cisely such  an  event  is  the  resurrection  of  Jesus,  accord- 
ing to  the  announcement  of  the  Lord  as  to  himself  and  his 
work,  and  according  to  the  development  of  this  personal 
testimony  in  the  minds  of  his  first  disciples,  and  also 
according  to  Avhat  Jesus  actually  became  for  mankind, 
and  especially  for  Christianity.  According  to  this  testi- 
mony of  Jesus  and  his  apostles,  and  to  this  actual  ex- 
perience, Jesus  is  the  Redeemer,  whose  work  is  to  make 
amends  for  the  destruction  caused  by  sin,  and  thus  to 
originate  and  establish  a  new  creation  in  mankind 
which,  from  inner,  mental,  and  spiritual  beginnings, 


332  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

renews  mankind,  and  becomes  the  leaven  which,  in  long 
periods  of  labor,  leads  it  to  the  goal  of  perfection  ;  a 
perfection  in  which  the  whole  creation  shall  participate 
—with  which,  indeed,  mankind  is  inseparably  connected 
on  the  whole  natural  side  of  its  existence.  But  then  it 
also  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  resurrection  of  Jesus  to  be 
single  in  its  kind,  and  without  analogy,  until  that  time 
shall  have  come  in  the  development  of  mankind  when 
the  last  enemy,  death,  shall  be  forever  removed  and 
overcome. 

We  quite  fail  to  conceive  how  those  who  acknowl- 
edge design  in  the  world,  can  avoid  the  acknowledgment 
of  the  resurrection  of  Jesus — supposing  the  fact  to  be 
historically  established:  whereof  we  shall  have  to  speak 
hereafter.  It  is,  indeed,  quite  impossible  to  speak  of  a 
goal  of  mankind,  if  annihilation — annihilation  of  single 
personalities  as  well  as  of  mankind  as  a  whole— is  its 
certain  destiny.  Where  and  what  is  this  end  of  man- 
kind, if  the  last  generation  of  the  globe  is  to  perish 
with  the  destruction  of  this  globe,  or  languish  and  die 
oven  before  that  destruction,  and  if  nothing  will  be  left 
of  mankind  beyond  the  soulless  material  for  new  form- 
ations in  their  putrifying  corpses  and  desolate  homes 
and  works  of  art?  Where  and  what  is  this  goal,  if  all 
which  once  set  human  minds  and  hearts  in  motion,  and 
which  stimulated  the  intellectual  and  moral  work  of  the 
human  races,  simply  ceases  to  exist,  no  longer  finds  any- 
where even  a  place  of  remembrance,  and  nowhere  has  a 
fruit  to  exhibit,  except  perhaps  in  the  mind  of  a  God 
who  once  set  the  cruel  play  in  motion,  and  now  permits 
it  to  cease,  in  order  to  procure  for  himself  a  change  in 
the  entertainment  ?  A  mere  immortality  of  human 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  333 

souls,  without  resurrection  and  without  the  perfec- 
tion and  transfiguration  of  the  universe,  is  not  afforded 
us  by  this  goal,  which  we  certainly  need,  if  we  are  to 
think  at  all  of  a  goal  for  mankind.  For  if  all  departing 
souls  should  be  carried  into  another  world  whose  only 
relation  to  the  further  course  of  the  earthly  history  of 
mankind  was  in  the  fact,  that  the  dead  are  always 
gathered  in  it ;  into  another  world  whose  only  relation 
to  the  past  of  the  earthly  history  of  mankind  should  be 
in  the  fact,  that  it  is  divided  into  a  heaven  and  a  hell  for 
those  who  reach  it ;  if  in  this  world  everything  should 
move  on,  without  end,  in  eternal  coming  and  going  ;  and 
if  nothing  could  be  said  of  that  other  world  than  that 
everything  there  is  different  from  ours — even  that  we 
should  there  have  no  possible  points  of  contact  with  this 
world:  then  we  should  have  nothing  else  but  a  gloomy 
dualism  of  the  world  for  which  neither  our  intellectual, 
nor  our  psychical,  and  least  of  all  our  physical,  organi- 
zation is  in  any  way  prepared,  we  should  have  in  it  no 
satisfaction  of  our  noblest  instincts,  no  goal  to  which  we 
would  be  led  by  any  of  the  guides  who  show  us  the 
paths  which  we  have  to  follow  on  earth.  Only  a  resur- 
rection and  transfiguration  of  the  earth  and  the  universe, 
as  well  as  of  a  glorified  mankind,  show  us  such  a  goal. 
For  this  aim,  for  such  a  real  continuation  of  life  of  the 
single  personality,  and  of  all  mankind,  after  the  long 
work  of  moral  and  intellectual  development,  all  noble  and 
worthy  instincts  of  mankind  are  prepared  —  from  the 
instinct  of  self-preservation  up  to  the  instinct  of  self- 
sacrifice  for  ideal  purposes  and  the  instinct  of  moral 
perfection  and  community  with  God.  We  find  that  an 
all  the  rest  of  creation,  instincts  and  inherent  powers 


334  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

are  present  to  be  satisfied.  The  naturalistic  tendencies 
which  at  present  control  so  many  minds,  are  very  much 
inclined  to  found  their  whole  view  of  the  world  upon 
this  correlation  of  instinct,  function,  and  satisfaction. 
Should,  then,  the  highest  instincts  of  the  highest  crea- 
ture on  earth  alone  make  an  exception  ?  Have  they 
originated  from  illusions,  and  do  they  lead  to  illusions  ? 
We  cannot  refrain  from  quoting  a  word  which  Alb. 
Reville,  of  Rotterdam,  has  written  in  the  first  part  of 
the  October  issue  of  the  "  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes," 
1874,  on  the  occasion  of  a  criticism  of  E.  v.  Hartmann's 
''Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious";  though  it  was 
written  only  in  defence  of  theism  in  general.  We  quote 
from  a  report  of  E.  P.,  in  the  Augsburger  Allgem. 
Zeitung,  Oct.  27,  1874,  which  is  all  at  present  at  our 
command:  "  When  the  young  bird,  fluttering  its  wings 
on  the  edge  of  its  mother's  nest,  launches  forth  for  the 
first  time,  it  finds  the  air  which  carries  it,  while  a 
passage  is  opened  for  it.  Instinct  deceived  the  bird 
just  as  little  as  it  deceives  the  multitude  of  large  and 
small  beings  which  only  live  in  following  its  incitations. 
And  should  man  alone,  whom  spiritual  perfection 
attracts — man  whose  characteristic  instinct  it  is  to  raise 
himself  mentally  toward  the  real-ideal,  the  superiority 
of  which  he  cannot  sufficiently  describe,  should  man, 
who  obeys  his  nature,  dash  his  head  against  the  wall 
built  of  unhewn  stones  of  unconscious,  blind,  and  deaf 
force?  Nature,  indeed,  has  too  much  spirit — according 
to  Hartmann  himself — to  indulge  in  such  an  absurdity  ; 
and  the  philosophy  of  the  '  unconscious  Unconscious  ' 
will  never  permit  it."  It  is  true,  there  is  actually  pres- 
ent in  mankind,  and  in  it  alone,  such  a  discord  between 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  335 

instinct  and  satisfaction  :  man  has  in  himself  instincts 
which  are  opposed  to  sin  and  death,  and  nevertheless  sin 
and  death  exist.  But  the  redemption  through  Christ, 
and  especially  the  knowledge  of  his  resurrection,  an- 
nounces to  us  that  this  discord  is  removed. 

Therefore,  he  who  in  general  ackno  wledges  that  man- 
kind in  its  development  has  had  given  to  it  goals  which 
correspond  to  its  gifts  and  instincts,  has  every  reason  to 
look  about  and  see  whether,  in  the  course  of  human  his- 
tory, certain  things  have  happened  which  point  at  such 
aims — indications  which  prophetically  assure  mankind, 
that  it  advances  toward  a  spiritual  and  moral  perfection, 
and  toward  an  undiminished  participation  of  all  members 
of  mankind  in  this  perfection.  Such  an  assurance  is  offered 
us  in  the  resurrection  of  Jesus  ;  and  therefore,  all  who 
have  not  abandoned  a  teleological  view  of  the  world, 
have  reason  for  examining  it  with  reference  to  the  degree 
of  its  historical  truth.  This  degree  is  the  highest  which 
we  can  in  general  claim  of  any  historical  event. 

In  order  to  show  this  with  such  brevity  as  is  neces- 
sary in  the  present  book,  and  at  the  same  time  to  guard 
ourselves  against  every  danger  of  prejudice  in  the  inves- 
tigation, we  shall  for  this  occasion  assume  hypothetically 
that  all,  even  the  most  extreme,  assertions  of  Biblical 
criticism  as  to  the  authenticity  and  inauthenticity  of  the 
books  of  the  New  Testament,  and  as  to  the  difference  of 
their  component  parts  and  the  time  of  their  composi- 
tion, are  correct  and  proven  ;  and  see  what  then  remains 
established.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  an  acknowledged 
fact,  that  Peter  first,  then  the  eleven  apostles  at  different 
times,  and  between  these  more  than  five  hundred  "breth- 
ren" (i.  e.,  nearly  or  fully  all  who  had  preserved  their 


336  THE   THEORIES  OF    DARWIN. 

attachment  to  the  Lord  till  his  death),,  saw  the  appear- 
ances of  the  risen  one,  a  few  days  after  his  death  ;  and, 
indeed,  under  the  most  different  circumstances,  and 
under  mental  conditions  in  which  they  did  not  at  all  expect 
any  such  second  appearance.  We  have,  in  regard  to  this, 
the  most  authentic  written  evidence  of  the  apostle  Paul, 
in  the  fifteenth  chapter  of  his  first  letter  to  the  Corin- 
thians :  a  letter  whose  authenticity  no  criticism  has  dared 
to  doubt.  This  letter  was  written  in  the  spring  of  58  : 
and  Paul  himself  had  already  been  changed  from  a  per- 
secutor into  a  believer  in  Christ  in  the  year  36 — i.  e.,  one 
year  after  the  death  of  Jesus,  -which  took  place  in  35  ; 
he  went  to  Jerusalem  in  39,  and  here  everything  was 
related  to  him  by  Peter,  as  we  know  from  his  letter 
(likewise  not  contested)  to  the  Galatians.  Thus  the 
authentic  information  of  the  man,  who  in  58  collected  the 
historical  proofs  of  the  reality  of  the  resurrection  of 
Jesus  for  his  Corinthian  Christians,  goes  back  to  four 
years  after  the  death  of  Jesus,  and  to  the  personal  wit- 
nesses of  the  appearances  ;  as  in  that  letter  he  also  refers 
to  the  fact  that  "many  of  these  five  hundred  brethren 
are  still  living."  Moreover,  it  is  an  established  fact, 
that  the  first  written  evidences  of  the  evangelical  history 
from  which  our  canonical  gospels  subsequently  originated, 
likewise  contained  accounts  of  the  appearance  of  the 
risen  one.  Finally,  it  is  an  established  fact  that,  from 
the  very  beginning,  the  whole  meaning  of  evangelical 
preaching  turned  on  the  two  facts  of  the  death  and  of 
the  resurrection  of  Jesus,  as  on  the  two  cardinal  points 
of  all  preaching  of  salvation  ;  also  that  all  the  faith  of 
those  who  embraced  the  Gospel  was  founded  upon  these 
two  facts,  as  upon  the  historical  fundamentals  of  the  sal- 


POSITIVE   CHRISTIANITY.  337 

vation  which  comes  from  Jesus  ;  and  that  thus  Chris- 
tianity, with  all  its  effects,  which  have  unhinged  the  old 
world  and  diffused  streams  of  blessing  over  mankind, 
has  its  historical  basis  in  faith  in  the  death  of  Jesus  and 
his  resurrection.  This  is  our  historical  chain  of  proof. 
And  that  evidence  which  gives  certainty  to  its  most  im- 
portant link,  on  which  everything  depends — the  appear- 
ance of  the  risen  one — is  the  entire  failure  of  all  the 
attempts  at  explaining  that  appearance  from  a  seeming 
death,  from  an  intended  deception,  from  a  self-delusion, 
from  a  vision  and  an  ecstasy,  from  a  poetic  myth  ;  in 
short,  from  any  other  cause  than,  that  the  Lord  really 
appeared  to  his  disciples  as  the  man  who  was  dead,  but 
who  is  risen  and  lives.  We  cannot  follow  Keim  in  all 
his  methods  of  reconstructing  the  life  of  Jesus,  and  we 
believe  that  he  is  much  too  timid  regarding  the  conse- 
quences which  follow  from  an  objective,  real  appearance 
of  Jesus  after  his  death ;  but  we  acknowledge  it  as  a 
high  merit  of  his  christological  works,  that  although  he 
is  willing  to  use  criticism  to  the  utmost,  he  has  so  thor- 
oughly and  strikingly  shown  the  impossibility  of  explain- 
ing the  appearance  of  Jesus  after  his  death  differently  from 
the  real  manifestations  of  his  still  living  person.  It  is 
well  that  Strauss,  in  his  ltThe  Old  Faith  and  the  New," 
declares  the  history  of  the  resurrection  of  Jesus  a  his- 
torical humbug  ;  for  it  may  open  the  eyes  of  many,  if 
the  tendency,  of  which  Strauss  is  leader,  is  no  longer  able 
to  explain  Christianity — the  noblest,  purest,  and  most 
successful  religion  which  has  come  into  existence  in  the 
whole  history  of  mankind — otherwise  than  by  calling  it 
a  humbug.  With  him  who  is  pleased  with  this  manner 
of  explaining  the  most  perfect  blossom  and  fruit  rf 


338  THE    THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

the  tree  of  mankind,  we  certainly  can  find  no  common 
ground  of  mutual  understanding. 

We  have  been  led  to  all  these  discussions,  by  look- 
ing for  something  actual  which  should  be  able  to  throw 
its  light  back  upon  the  earliest  primitive  history  of  man- 
kind— a  history  which  can  no  longer  be  historically  in- 
vestigated. We  have  found  this  reality  in  the  resurrec- 
tion of  Jesus  ;  and  the  light  which  it  throws  upon  the 
primitive  history  of  man,  we  have  perceived  in  the  con- 
clusion to  which  it  leads  us :  that  man,  if  he  had  taken 
a  sinless  development,  would  also  have  been  exempt  from 
death. 

The  resurrection  of  Jesus  throws  its  light  upon  still 
another  side  of  the  Biblical  doctrine  of  the  primitive 
condition  of  man  ;  namely,  upon  that  which  is  the  relig- 
ious quintessence  of  the  Biblical  doctrine  of  Paradise. 
As  now  the  resurrection  of  the  Lord  is  the  beginning 
and  the  prophecy  of  a  new  creation  on  the  basis  of  the 
old,  and  as  we  now  hope,  with  St.  Paul,  that  this  begin- 
ning shall  manifest  its  comprehensive  cosmic  effects,  when 
the  Lord  shall  manifest  them  in  the  resurrection  of  the 
"  children  of  God  :  "  so,  in  case  of  a  sinless  development 
of  man,  the  beginning  of  this  new  and  glorified  stage 
of  creation  would  certainly  have  been  perceptible  at  the 
beginning  of  the  history  of  mankind  and  in  the  relation 
of  man  to  his  earthly  surroundings.  But  we  are  of 
course  not  permitted  to  make  or  to  pursue  such  a  sug- 
gestion at  present,  since  a  sinful  development  of  man- 
kind, with  its  consequences,  actually  took  place. 

We  have  no  reason  to  enter  into  the  discussion  of 
another  often  and  much  debated  question,  which  is  con- 
nected with  the  primitive  history  of  man  ;  namely, 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  339 

whether  mankind  is  descended  from  one  or  more  pairs  of 
men.  We  pass  it  by  ;  because  it  has  no  connection 
whatever  with  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  the  Dar- 
winian ideas,  and  since  it  is  not  yet  archaeologically 
and  scientifically  solvable.  There  are  Darwinians  who 
think  monogenetically,  and  others  who  think  polygeneti- 
cally;  and  there  is  still  a  third  class — and  they  speak 
most  correctly — who  acknowledge  that  they  know 
nothing  about  it.  Besides,  we  can  also  pass  by  this  ques- 
tion, for  the  reason  that  in  spite  of  the  important  place 
which  it  occupies  in  the  theological  system  of  St.  Paul, 
we  have  no  right  to  assign  to  it,  in  the  form  in  which 
we  put  it,  the  decisive  dogmatic  importance  which  it 
still  occupies  in  many  conceptions  of  Christian  theology. 
For  we  cannot  question  the  right  of  the  natural  sciences 
to  enter  into  the  discussion  of  this  question,  and  to  look 
for  a  solution  of  it.  As  soon  as  we  make  this  conces- 
sion, it  necessarily  and  naturally  follows  from  it,  that  we 
must  no  longer  make  the  substance  and  truth  of  our 
religious  possession,  even  in  a  subordinate  manner, 
dependent  on  the  results  of  exact  investigations:  for  our 
religious  possessions  have  too  deep  a  basis  of  truth,  to 
permit  us  to  ground  them  on  the  results  of  investiga- 
tions in  a  realm  so  dark  for  science  and  so  far  removed 
from  religious  interest.  As  to  this  question,  we  may 
hope  for  a  future  solution  in  the  monogenetic  sense:  we 
may  rejoice  over  the  fact  that,  according  to  the  present 
state  of  knowledge,  the  needle  of  the  scale  rather  in- 
clines in  favor  of  a  oneness  of  origin  of  mankind;  but 
we  must  also  be  prepared  to  accept  the  possibility  of  a 
contrary  result,  without  being  afraid  that  in  such  a  case 
we  should  have  to  abandon  at  once  that  religious  factor 


340  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

for  whose  sake  the  advocates  of  a  monogenetic  descent 
might  defend  their  view.  This  religious  (and,  we  may 
add,  quite  as  strong  ethic)  factor  consists  in  the  idea  of 
the  intimate  unity  and  brotherhood  of  mankind.  We 
must  absolutely  adhere  to  this  idea  ;  for  it  is  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  particularism  which,  quite  without  exception, 
governed  the  entire  old  world,  even  its  most  highly 
developed  nations,  and  which  was  only  penetrated  by 
some  beams  of  hope  and  prediction  in  the  prophecy  of 
Israel — one  of  the  most  beautiful  and  blissful  gifts  of 
Christianity  to  mankind.  This  idea  still  contains,  as 
ethical  motive,  one  of  the  strongest,  most  indispensable, 
and  most  promising  forces  in  the  world.  If  this  idea 
shall  be  a  real  and  lastingly  effective  one,  it  certainly 
must  also  have  its  real  basis  in  the  history  of  the  origin 
of  mankind.  But,  we  must  ask,  is  the  only  conceivable 
reality  of  this  basis  a  monogenetic  pedigree,  and  do  we 
lose  this  reality  if  science  should  once  find  that  mankind 
came  into  existence  not  only  in  one  single  pair,  but  in 
several  pairs,  even  in  different  places,  and  at  different 
times  ?  Even  in  such  a  case,  the  idea  of  the  unity  of 
mankind  would  only  lose  its  real  basis,  if  at  the  same 
time  we  were  permitted  to  think  also  anti-teleologically 
— if  we  were  permitted  to  suppose  that  that  which  came 
into  existence,  repeatedly,  and  in  diiferent  places,  had 
each  time  entirely  different  causes  without  a  common 
aim  and  a  common  plan.  If  we  think  ideologically,  we 
see  the  unity  of  mankind,  also  in  case  of  a  poly  genetic 
origin,  in  the  unity  of  the  metaphysical  and  teleological 
cause  which  called  mankind  into  existence  ;  and  to 
rational  beings,  endowed  with  mind,  as  men  arc,  the 
metaphysical  bond  is  certainly  stronger  than  the  physical. 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  341 

Precisely  the  Darwinian  ideas  of  the  origin  of  species 
through  descent  would  show  us  in  such  a  case  the  real 
bond  which  unites  mankind.  For  then  we  should  only 
have  to  go  back  from  the  different  points  on  the  stem- 
lines  of  the  prehistoric  generators  of  these  primitive 
men,  at  which  men  originated  otherwise  than  by  gener- 
ation, in  order  to  arrive  finally  at  a  common  root  of  all 
these  stem-lines:  the  members  of  mankind  would  even 
then  remain  consanguineous  among  one  another,  not 
only  in  an  ideal,  but  in  a  real  sense. 

Now  that  the  idea  of  the  unity  of  mankind  was  holy 
and  important  to  St.  Paul,  is  to  be  inferred  in  advance 
from  such  a  universal  mind.  And  when  in  Acts  xvn, 
26,  he  expresses  this  idea  before  the  Athenians,  so  proud 
of  their  autochthony,  with  the  words  that  "of  one  blood 
all  nations  of  men  dwell  on  all  the  face  of  the  earth  ";  or 
when;  in  Romans  v,  and  1  Corinthians  xv,  he  makes  use  of 
the  idea  in  order  to  explain  and  to  glorify  the  universal 
power  of  redemption  of  Christ  by  putting  Adam  and 
Christ  in  opposition  to  one  another,  as  the  first  and  the 
second  Adam,  so  that  he  sees  sin  and  death  coming  forth 
from  Adam,  grace  and  justice  and  life  from  Christ  and 
extending  over  mankind  ;  then  we  find  this  idea  quite 
convincing  and  natural,  and  adhere  firmly  to  the  quint- 
essence of  these  truths,  even  if  we  acknowledge  neither 
in  these  passages,  nor  in  Genesis  I  and  n,  the  intention 
of  God  to  give  us  a  supernatural  manifestation  of  the 
exterior  process  of  the  creation  of  man.  Paul  himself 
gives  us  a  hint  not  to  follow  slavishly  a  literal  interpre- 
tation, when  he  says,  in  Romans  v,  "as  by  one  man  sin 
entered  into  the  world  and  death  by  sin,"  and  calls  this 
man  Adam,  although  he  knows  that  according  to  the 


34:2  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

Biblical  relation,  Eve  was  the  one  who  was  first 
seduced,  and  although  he  expressly  points  out  and 
makes  use  of  this  priority  of  the  sin  of  Eve  in  another 
connection,  and  for  another  reason. 

Finally,  we  may  here  also  take  into  consideration  the 
contradictions  which  have  come  up  by  reason  of  more 
recent  investigations,  in  reference  to  the  prehistoric 
conditions  of*  man,  and  which,  especially  in  England, 
have  been  designated  as  the  contradiction  between  the 
elevation  theory  and  the  depravation  theory. 

In  general,  this  contradiction  is  looked  upon  as  if  a 
conception  of  the  primitive  history  of  man,  remaining 
conformable  to  the  Bible,  could  only  be  brought  into- 
harmony  with  a  depravation  theory,  and  not  with  an 
elevation  theory;  but  certainly  without  reason. 

The  Biblical  and  Christian  conception  of  the  primi- 
tive history  of  man  does  not  at  all  demand  the  concep- 
tion of  a  gradual  sinking  down  of  mankind  from  a 
supernatural  height — of  a  gradual  depravation  of  our 
species — which  many  representations  seem  to  assume. 
For,  according  to  it,  the  fall  of  man  had  already  taken 
place  with  the  first  pair  of  mankind;  they  were  driven 
from  Paradise,  to  long  hard  labor  and  development;  and 
Paradise  was  taken  from  earth.  Even  the  paradisaical 
condition,  with  its  short  duration,  was  deficient  in  all 
the  various  gifts  of  life  which  are  a  product  of  human 
inventive  faculty  and  skill,  and  which  can  leave  behind 
vestiges  and  remains.  But  what  the  Holy  Scripture 
relates  or  indicates  of  the  after-paradisaical  primitive 
history  of  man,  wholly  corresponds  to  the  idea  of  a  grad- 
ual development  out  of  the  more  simple  and  rough, 
which  is  demanded  by  the  evolution  theory  in  its  appli- 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  343 

cation  to  history.  That,  even  according  to  the  Biblical 
conception,  goodness  and  progress  in  outer  culture,  sin 
and  intellectual  stagnation,  are  not  identical,  we  see  from 
the  fact,  that  by  the  Holy  Scripture  the  most  successful 
inventions  of  man  are  not  assigned  to  the  more  pious 
Sethites,  but  to  the  Titian-like,  rebellious  Kainites.  Like- 
wise, the  evolution  theory  does  not  at  all  require  a  con- 
stant, general,  and  exclusive  progress  of  mankind  in  all 
its  members.  As  in  the  realm  of  irrational  organisms, 
so  in  the  history  of  mankind  ;  it  has  to  assume  the  most 
various  ramifications  with  progress,  stand-still,  and  retro- 
gradation.  It  is  true,  it  sees  in  the  nations  of  culture 
progress  in  an  upward  rising  line  ;  but  besides,  stand- 
still and  retrogradations  in  great  variety.  It  also  sees 
in  mankind  in  general  a  labor  of  upward  rising  develop- 
ment ;  but  it  also  sees  many  hindrances  of  development, 
and  many  shavings  which  the  work  throws  to  one  side. 
But  exactly  the  same  thing  was  also  seen  in  every  relig- 
ious or  profane  contemplation  of  history,  long  before 
the  evolution  theory  was  born. 

Therefore,  the  different  views  of  the  earliest  primitive 
history  of  man,  the  theory  of  depravation  and  that  of 
elevation,  do  not  stand  so  opposed  to  one  another — the 
former  representing  the  Biblical  and  religious,  the  latter 
the  anti-religious,  view  of  the  history — but  the  question 
as  to  the  primitive  history  is  not  yet  solved  in  that 
respect ;  the  depravation  theory,  as  well  as  the  elevation 
theory,  indicates  rather  the  directions  in  which  investiga- 
tion has  to  put  its  questions  to  the  archaeological  sources. 
Investigation,  on  the  other  hand,  has  free  scope  in  both 
directions  ;  and  the  primitive  history  of  man  shows  itself 
to  be  a  realm  in  which  religious  and  scientific  interest. 


344  THE   THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

opponents  and  advocates  of  the  descent  theory,  can 
peacefully  join  hands  for  common  labor.  Up  to  the 
present,  the  investigations  reach  results  which  seem  to 
fall  now  more  into  one,  now  more  into  the  other,  scale 
of  the  balance.  On  the  one  hand,  the  older  the  products 
of  human  skill  are,  the  more  simple  they  are  ;  on  the 
other  hand,  even  the  oldest  remains  show  man  in  full 
possession  of  that  which  distinguishes  him  from  the 
animal,  and  attests  a  spiritual  life.  The  reader  may 
think  of  the  before  mentioned  sketches  of  the  reindeer 
and  mammoth  (page  90).  If  we  finally  come  down  to 
historic  times,  and  to  the  present,  in  order  to  try  to  draw 
conclusions  from  the  comparisons  of  the  remotest  times 
of  which  we  have  historic  knowledge,  with  the  present, 
as  to  prehistoric  times,  we  likewise  find  on  the  one  side 
vestiges  of  the  lowest  barbarism  in  the  past  and  present ; 
but  on  the  other  side  we  find  that  the  oldest  written  mon- 
uments afford  a  glance  into  a  perfection  of  intellectual 
reflection  and  into  a  nobility  of  moral  and  religious  views 
which  permits  us  to  draw  the  highest  conclusions  as  to 
the  intellectual  worth  of  earliest  mankind.  The  very 
oldest  records  of  the  Holy  Scripture  give  evidence  of 
this  intellectual  height ;  and  even  the  royal  programmes 
of  Assyrian  monarchs,  which  the  wonderful  diligence 
and  ingenuity  of  recent  investigators  have  deciphered 
from  the  cuneiform  inscriptions,  not  only  relatively  cor- 
respond to  the  height  of  culture  which  we  find  in  the 
ruins  of  Assyrian  palaces,  but  even,  when  looked  upon 
absolutely  and  aside  from  the  morality  of  conquest  which 
they  indulge,  are  inspired  by  a  nobility  of  mind,  and 
permeated  by  a  religiousness,  which  no  potentate  of 
recent  times  would  need  to  be  ashamed  of.  They  have 


POSITIVE   CHRISTIANITY. 

been  made  accessible  to  the  public  by  the  work  of  Eber- 
hard  Schrader  :  "  Die  Keilinschriften  und  das  Alte  Tes- 
tament" (''Cuneiform  Inscriptions  and  the  Old  Testa- 
ment'1), Giessen.  1872. 

§  4.    Providence,  Hearing  of  Prayer,  and  Miracles. 

Before  we  enter  into  the  special  christological  realm, 
we  have  yet  to  glance  at  the  realm  of  the  more  common 
relations  between  God  and  the  creature,  as  they  have 
found,  in  faith  in  a  divine  providence,  in  hearing  of 
prayer,  and  in  divine  miracles,  their  reflection  in  Chris- 
tian consciousness. 

It  is  true,  we  had  to  discuss  the  chief  basis  of  an 
understanding  in  this  matter  when  treating  of  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Darwinian  theories  in  reference  to  theism  in 
general  ;  but  we  have  a  double  reason  for  entering  again 
into  the  consideration  of  the  concrete  form  which  this 
faith  has  obtained  in  Christianity. 

One  reason  is  the  fact,  that  faith  in  a  special  prov- 
idence of  God,  in  a  hearing  of  prayer,  and  in  a  connec- 
tion of  the  human  history  of  salvation  with  miracles, 
forms  a  very  essential  part  of  the  Christian  view  of  the 
world  and  of  Christian  religiousness.  All  Holy  Scrip- 
ture is  interwoven  with  assurances  of  a  providence  of 
God.  going  even  into  details  ;  with  the  most  distinct  and 
solemn  promises  of  the  hearing  of  our  prayers  ;  and 
with  the  most  emphatic  reference  to  the  miracles  which 
it  relates.  The  Lord  himself  not  only  found  all  these 
doctrines,  and  left  them  untouched,  but  he  developed 
them  in  the  most  pregnant  way,  and  brought  them  into 
the  most  intimate  connection  with  the  quintessence  and 
centre  of  his  doctrine.  According  to  his  teaching, 


346  THE    THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

4 '  a  sparrow  shall  not  fall  to  the  ground  without  the  will 
of  your  heavenly  Father ;  but  the  very  hairs  of  your 
head  are  all  numbered."  He  encourages  us  to  pray, 
with  the  words  :  "  Verily,  verily,  I  say  unto  you,  What- 
soever ye  shall  ask  the  Father  in  my  name,  he  will  give 
it  you  ; "  and  he  proves  himself  to  be  the  Redeemer, 
through  signs  and  wonders,  and  refers  to  the  greatest 
sign  which  was  to  be  manifested  in  him — the  sign  of  the 
resurrection. 

The  other  reason  for  entering  upon  the  discussion  of 
these  questions,  lies  in  the  incredible  thoughtlessness 
with  which  a  great  part  of  modern  educated  people, 
even  of  such  men  as  do  not  at  all  wish  to  abandon  faith 
in  a  living  God,  permit  themselves  to  be  governed  by 
the  leaders  of  religious  infidelity,  and  to  be  defiled  and 
robbed  of  everything,  which  belongs  to  the  nature  of 
a  living  God.  By  many,  it  is  considered  as  good  taste, 
and  as  an  indispensable  sign  of  deep  scientific  learning 
and  high  education,  and  it  forms  a  seldom  contested  part 
of  correspondence  in  newspapers,  which  have  for  their 
public  a  wide  circle  of  educated  people,  that  in  referring 
to  the  inviolableness  of  the  laws  of  nature  they  declare 
faith  in  a  special  providence  of  God  to  be  a  view  long 
ago  rejected,  and  which  is  only  consistent  with  half-civil- 
ized individuals  ;  that  they  look  down  with  a  compas- 
sionate and  self-conscious  smile  upon  the  egoistic  im- 
plicit faith  of  congregations  who  still  pray  for  good 
harvest-weather,  and  see  in  the  damage  done  by  a  hail- 
storm a  divine  affliction  ;  that  they  criticise  it  as  a  sad 
token  of  ecclesiastical  darkness,  when  even  church- 
authorities  order  such  prayers  in  case  of  wide-spread 
calamities;  that  they  fall  into  a  passion  over  the  narrow- 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  347 

ness  and  the  dulling  influence  of  pedagogues  who  see 
in  the  histories  which  they  relate  to  their  pupils  or  put 
into  their  hands  for  reading,  the  government  of  an 
ethical  order  of  the  world  which  goes  a  little  farther 
than  the  rule  that  he  who  deceives  injures  his  good 
name,  and  he  who  gets  intoxicated  injures  his  health; 
that  they  give  a  man  who  still  believes  in  the  resurrec- 
tion of  Jesus,  to  understand  that  he  has  not  yet  learned 
the  first  elements  of ,  the  theory  of  putrefaction  and 
perishableness.  That  the  adversaries  of  faith  in  a  God 
thus  express  themselves,  and  try  to  conquer  as  much 
ground  as  possible  for  their  frosty  doctrine,  is  certainly 
quite  natural;  but  that  even  advocates  of  theism  should 
permit  such  stuff  to  be  presented  to  them,  and  can  keep 
silent  in  regard  to  it — nay,  that  even  preachers  offer  it 
to  their  congregations  as  ordinary  Sabbath  edification, 
and  that  their  hearers  can  gratefully  accept  it — is 
certainly  a  suggestive  and  alarming  evidence  of  the 
rapidity  with  which,  in  many  men  who  still  do  not  wish 
consciously  and  certainly  to  be  thought  godless  (i.e.,  to 
be  separated  from  God),  their  connection  with  the 
source  of  light  and  life  is  decreasing,  and  of  how 
strongly  the  fear  that  they  may  be  looked  upon  as 
unscientific  and  imperfectly  educated,  overbalances  the 
fear  of  losing  the  living  God  and  Father,  and  therewith 
the  support  of  both  mind  and  life. 

Now,  that  this  faith  in  a  special  providence,  in  a 
hearing  of  prayer,  and  in  divine  miracles,  forms  an 
essential  part  of  Christian  religiousness,  we  do  not  need 
to  show  more  in  detail;  it  is  an  established  historical 
fact,  and  an  object  of  direct  Christian  knowledge.  On 
the  other  hand,  wo  have  still  to  say  a  word  concerning 


348  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

that  which,  on  the  part  of  those  just  described,  is  so 
strongly  contested;  namely,  about  the  scientific  worth 
of  such  a  faith,  and  also  about  its  reconcilableness  with 
the  Darwinian  theories. 

In  the  first  place,  as  to  the  faith  in  a  special  pro- 
vidence of  God,  and,  in  connection  with  it,  as  to  the 
possibility  of  a  hearing  of  human  prayer,  such  a  faith 
is  by  itself  the  inevitable  consequence  of  all  theism; 
nay,  it  is  precisely  identical  with  theism ;  it  is  that 
which  makes  theism  theism,  and  distinguishes  it  from 
mere  deism — i.e.,  from  an  idea  of  God,  which  merely 
makes  God  the  author  of  the  world,  and  lets  the  world, 
after  it  was  once  created,  go  its  own  way.  Now,  the 
theistic  idea  of  God,  which  sees  the  Creator  in  an  un- 
interrupted connection  with  his  creation,  is  in  itself  the 
more  scientific  one:  for  a  God  who,  although  the  author 
of  the  world,  would  not  know  how  to  find,  nor  intend 
to  find,  a  way  of  communication  with  his  creation, 
would  certainly  be  an  idea  theologically  inconceivable. 
We  should,  therefore,  still  have  to  adhere  to  the  idea  of 
a  special  providence  of  God,  even  if  in  our  discursive  rea- 
soning and  exact  investigation  of  the  processes  in  the 
world  we  should  not  find  a  single  guide  referring  us  to 
the  scientific  possibility  of  such  a  direct  and  uninterrupted 
dependence  of  the  world  on  its  author.  We  should 
then  have  simply  to  declare  a  conviction  of  the  pro- 
vidence of  God  to  be  a  postulate  of  our  reasoning, 
which  is  given  with  the  idea  of  God  itself ;  and  would 
just  as  little  call  this  conviction  unscientific  on  account 
of  the  fact,  that  we  are  not  able  to  show  the  modalities 
of  divine  providence,  as  in  reference  to  the  exact 
sciences  we  should  contest  the  character  of  their  scien- 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  349 

tific  value  on  account  of  the  fact,  that  they  are  no 
longer  able  to  give  us  an  answer  exactly  where  our 
questions  become  most  important  and  interesting. 

But  the  ways  in  which  we  are  able  to  realize  scien- 
tifically the  idea  of  a  divine  providence  are,  indeed, 
not  entirely  closed  for  us.  We  have  several  of  them  ; 
one  starts  from  the  idea  of  God,  others  from  the  empiric 
created  world. 

It  belongs  to  the  idea  of  God,  that  we  have  to  think 
of  the  sublimity  of  God  over  time  and  space,  of  his 
eternity  and  omnipresence,  in  such  a  way  that  God,  in 
his  being,  life,  and  activity,  does  not  stand  in  time  nor 
within  any  limits  or  differences  of  space,  but  absolutely 
above  time  and  above  all  limits  and  differences  of  space; 
that  he  is  present  in  his  world  everywhere  and  at  any 
time.  He  who  objects  to  this,  can  only  do  it  with 
weapons  to  which  we  have  to  oppose  the  objection  which 
the  adversaries  of  the  Christian  idea  of  God  so  often 
raise  against  it — namely,  the  objection  of  a  rejectable 
anthropomorphism.  In  contesting  the  possibility  of  the 
idea  of  an  uninterrupted  presence  of  a  personal  and 
living  God  in  the  entire  realm  of  the  universe,  the 
adversaries  seem  to  permit  themselves  to  be  daunted  by 
the  difficulty  which  is  offered  to  man  in  controlling  the 
realms  of  his  own  activity.  The  greater  such  a  realm, 
the  more  difficult  becomes  a  comprehensive  survey,  the 
more  the  human  influence  has  to  restrict  itself  to  the 
greater  and  more  common  and  to  neglect  the  little  and 
single.  The  more  removed  is  the  past  which  helps  to 
constitute  the  circumstances  of  the  present,  the  greater 
is  the  human  ignorance  and  oblivion;  the  more  removed 
is  the  future,  the  greater  is  the  human  incapability  of 


350  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

influencing  it  decisively.  Such  measures  ought  to  dis- 
appear, even  in  their  last  traces,  when  we  reflect  on  God 
and  divine  activity.  If  once  the  idea  is  established  for 
us  of  a  living  God,  who  is  always  present  in  the  world 
created  by  him,  and  in  whose  "  sight  a  thousand  years 
are  but  as  yesterday  when  it  is  past,  and  as  a  watch  in 
the  night,"  the  final  causal  chain  of  causes  and  effects 
may  be  ever  so  long,  and  stretching  over  this  course  of 
the  world  from  its  beginning  to  its  end;  the  single 
phenomena  may  be  woven  together .  of  ever  so  many 
thousands  and  thousands  of  millions  of  different  causal 
chains  :  we  nevertheless  see  above  them  all  the  regu- 
lating hand  of  God  from  whom  they  all  come,  and  who 
not  only  surveys  and  controls  their  texture  in  all  its 
threads,  but  who  himself  arranged,  wove,  and  made  it. 
Such  a  view  is  not  only  more  satisfactory  to  the  religious 
need  of  man,  but  it  also  seems  to  us  more  scientific, 
than  a  view  which  traces  everything  back  to  a  blind  and 
dead  cause,  or  even  to  no  ultimate  cause  at  all,  and 
thinks  it  has  entirely  removed  the  last  veil,  if  it  pro- 
nounces the  great  word  "causal  law." 

Now,  while  our  idea  of  God  thus  tells  us  that  God 
has  in  his  hand  all  causal  chains  in  the  world,  and  its 
million-threaded  web  in  constant  omni-surveying  pres- 
ence and  in  all-controlling  omnipotence,  our  reflection  on 
the  world  and  its  substance  and  course  also  leads  us 
from  the  a  posteriori  starting-point  of  analytical  investiga- 
tion precisely  to  the  same  result ;  it  even  leads  us  to  a  still 
more  concrete  conception  of  this  idea — namely,  to  the 
result,  that  not  only  the  causal  chains,  in  their  totality 
and  in  their  web,  but  also  all  single  links  of  these  chains, 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  351 

have  their  force  and  existence  only  by  virtue  of  a  tran- 
scendental, or  what  is  the  same,  of  a  metaphysical,  cause. 

For  if  we  analyze  the  single  phenomena  in  the  world, 
we  certainly  observe  in  the  activity  of  their  qualities  and 
forces  such  a  conformity  to  law,  that,  in  our  reflection 
on  these  phenomena,  we  can  go  from  one  phenomenon 
to  the  .necessity  of  another  as  its  cause  or  its  effect,  and 
thus  form  those  particular  causal  chains  and  causal  nets 
in  whose  arranged  representation  natural  science  consists. 
But  that  those  qualities  and  forces  exist  and  act  precisely 
thus,  and  not  otherwise,  and  why,  we  are  no  longer  able 
to  explain.  We  can  only  say  :  the  material  and  the 
apparent  is  no  longer  their  cause,  but  their  effect ;  there- 
fore, the  cause  of  that  which  comes  into  existence  lies 
beyond  the  phenomenon — i.  e.,  in  the  transcendental,  in 
the  metaphysical. 

This  becomes  evident  in  the  inorganic  world  and  in 
those  qualities  which  are  common  to  all  matter.  Such 
common  qualities  of  the  latter  are,  for  instance,  cohesion 
and  gravitation.  That  all  matter  has  the  quality  of 
cohesion,  we  can  only  say  because  we  observe  it ;  but 
that  it  must  be  so,  and  why,  we  are  not  able  to  say. 
This  becomes  still  more  evident  in  gravitation.  Grav- 
itation is  so  decidedly  an  action  in  space,  that  it  appears 
to  us,  together  with  cohesion,  as  precisely  the  bond 
which  binds  the  entire  material  world  together.  Each 

O 

single  material  atom  is  subject  to  its  force  ;  but  how  and 
why,  and  especially  how  and  why  matter  acts  upon  the 
matter  in  space,  physics  can  no  longer  tell  us,  but  refers 
us  to  a  metaphysical  cause. 

This  dependence  of  each  single  being,  and  of  all  its 
qualities  and  forces,  on  a  transcendental  and  metaphys- 


352  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIX. 

ical  cause  of  its  existence,  becomes  most  clear  to  us  in 
the  world  of  the  organic,  and  especially  in  the  tran>- 
mission  and  development  of  organisms.  That  individ- 
uals originate  new  individuals  of  their  species  ;  that  the 
fecundated  germs,  if  the  necessary  conditions  are  pres- 
ent, develop  themselves  out  of  the  first  germ  and  o. 
cell  in  continually  progressive  and  distinct  differentia- 
tions, each  after  its  kind,  into  the  full-grown  condition, 
so  that  individuals  endowed  with  a  soul  and  intellectual 
life  are  also  developed  out  of  such  beginnings  ; — these 
are  facts  which  are  continually  repeated  before  our  eyes, 
and  men  of  science  have  not  yet  reached  the  end  in 
pursuing  the  actual  in  these  processes  into  its  finest 
ramifications.  But  how  it  is  that  individuals  must  trans- 
mit themselves — that  the  seeds  and  eggs  must  have  this 
force  ot  germination  and  development — they  have  not 
yet  been  able  to  explain,  and  will  never  be  able  to  do  so. 
The  word  '-inheritance,"  which  is  to  solve  the  problem, 
is  only  a  name  for  the  fact  which -we  observe,  and  for 
the  regularity  of  its  repetition  ;.  but  for  this  fact  of 
inheritance  itself,  we  seek  in  vain  a  physical  explanation  : 
wo  are  referred  to  a  metaphysical  cause.  Thus,  not  only 
i\\v  first  origin  of  life  on  earth  is  an  enigma  to  us  (as  wo 
have  seen  in  Part  I,  Book  II,  Chapter  I,  §  3),  but  organic 
life  itself,  in  its  whole  existence  and  course,  is  a  process 
which,  at  every  step,  and  in  every  place  of  its  course, 
remains  to  us  in  its  last  causes  physically  unexplained, 
and  refers  us  to  metaphysical  causes. 

If  we  finally  see  in  all  these  inorganic  and  organic 
processes  a  striving  towards  ends — and  we  must  see  it, 
as  soon  as  we  in  general  observe  order,  the  category  of 
higher  and  lower,  and  the  appearance  of  the  higher  on 


POSITIVE   CHRISTIANITY.  353 

the  basis  of  the  lower — we  are,  with  all  our  teleological 
observations,  again  referred  to  the  metaphysical,  and 
still  more  decidedly  to  the  goal- setting  metaphysical ; 
and  a  metaphysical  which  sets  and  reaches  goals  is 
nothing  else  than  that  in  philosophic  language  which  in 
the  language  of  religion  we  call  a  living  Creator  and 
Iinf<  r  of  the  world  and  the  activity  of  his  providence. 
From  still  another  side,  the  knowledge  of  the  world, 
even  in  a  scientific  way.  leads  us  to  the  acknowledgment 
of  a  divine  providence  which  controls  with  absolute  free- 
dom every  process  in  every  place  and  in  every  moment 
of  the  world's  course.  We  see  continually,  in  the  midst 
of  nature,  and  in  its  causal  course  conformable  to  law, 
something  supernatural,  transcendental,  and  metaphys- 
ical, acting  decisively  upon  the  course  of  nature  ;  and 
that  is  the  free  activity  of  man.  Every  man  carries  in 
the  freedom  of  the  determinations  of  his  will  something 
transcendental  and  metaphysical  in  himself,  which  we 
can  call  natural  only  when  we  mean  by  nature  the  sum- 
mary of  all  that  which  exists,  but  which  we  have  to  call 
supernatural  when  we  mean  by  nature  the  summary  of 
that  which  belongs  to  the  world  of  phenomena  in  its 
traceable  causes  as  well  as  in  its  traceable  effects. 
The  scale  of  life  -  activities,  from  the  lowest  arbi- 
trary motions,  from  the  impulses  and  instincts  of  the 
animal  up  to  the  highest  moral  action  of  the  will  cf 
man,  shows  us  in  indistinct  transitions  nil  stages 
which  lead  from  the  natural  to  the  supernatural,  until, 
in  the  ethical  and  religious  motives  of  man,  we  arrive 
at  superphysical  (i.  e.,  supernatural)  motives  which 
daily  and  hourly  invade  the  natural,  and  in  this  invasion 
consciously  and  unconsciously  use  the  forces  of  nature 
23 


354  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

and  their  activity,  conformable  to  law,  and  in  spite  of 
their  metaphysical  and  transcendental  origin,  from  the 
moment  of  their  activity,  join  the  natural  causal  connec- 
tion of  the  world's  course.  This  observation  of  an  inva- 
sion of  the  physical  by  the  supernatural,  as  it  continually 
takes  place  in  the  free  action  of  man,  leads  us  in  a  triple 
way  to  the  acknowledgment  of  an  action  of  divine  prov- 
idence upon  the  course  of  the  world. 

In  the  first  place,  this  observation  shows  us,  in  a  very 
direct  way,  points  where  the  free  disposition  of  God  acts 
determinatingly  upon  the  course  of  things,  and  where 
this  action  becomes  accessible  to  our  observation.  These 
points  are  the  human  personalities,  in  so  far  and  inas- 
much as  they  permit  themselves  to  be  influenced  and 
determined  by  the  will  of  God  in  the  ethical  and  religious 
motives  of  their  action,  and,  when  these  motives  become 
actions,  determinately  act  upon  the  course  of  things. 

In  the  second  place,  this  observation  further  leads, 
by  way  of  two  conclusions,  to  the  acknowledgment  of  a 
divine  providence 

One  conclusion  is  the  following  :  If  there  exist  in  the 
world  free  and  intelligent  beings  which,  through  their 
free  determinations,  guided  by  reflection,  decisively  act 
upon  the  course  of  nature,  and  if  these  beings,  on 
account  of  these  very  qualities  of  freedom  and  intelli- 
gence, occupy  the  highest  stage  among  the  creatures 
which  we  know,  the  last  metaphysical  cause  of  their  exis- 
tence must  also  have  qualities  which  are  able  to  produce 
such  free  and  intelligent  beings — at  least  the  qualities  of 
freedom  and  intelligence  in  the  highest  degree.  And 
this  highest  metaphysical  cause  which  produces  free  and 
intelligent  personalities  in  the  world,  can  at  least  be  no 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  355 

more  dependent  upon  the  entire  world,  whose  author  it 
is,  than  those  personalities  are  dependent  upon  that 
realm  in  the  world  in  which  they  have  their  existence. 
We  call  such  a  metaphysical  cause,  to  which  we  have  to 
ascribe  freedom  and  intelligence  in  the  highest  degree, 
God ;  and  we  call  its  free  position  in  reference  to  the 
world,  the  government  of  the  world,  or  providence. 

The  other  conclusion  leads  us  to  the  acknowledgment 
of  a  connection  of  providence  with  conformability  to  law 
in  the  actions  of  all  forces  and  qualities  in  the  world.  It 
is  the  same  conclusion  to  which  we  had  to  refer  in  Chap. 
I,  §  6,  but  which  now,  as  we  draw  from  theism  the  con- 
clusion of  the  acknowledgment  of  a  special  divine 
providence,  falls  with  increased  weight  into  the  scale. 
It  is  the  following:  On  the  one  hand,  we  observe  in 
the  processes  of  the  world  a  striving  towards  ends ;  on 
the  other,  we  know  in  the  world  itself  only  one  single 
creature  which  acts  according  to  aims?  which  sets  itself 
its  ends  and  reaches  them  with  freely  chosen  means. 
This  one  creature  is  man.  Now  man  can,  as  we  pointed 
out  in  Chap.  I,  §  6,  choose  and  use  the  means  with  which 
he  wishes  to  reach  his  ends,  only  because  he  can  rely  on 
the  conformity  to  the  end  in  view  and  the  regularity  in 
the  effect  of  all  the  qualities  and  forces  of  things.  If 
he  could  not  rely  on  them,  he  certainly  could  set  him- 
self ends ;  but  the  reaching  of  them  he  would  have  to 
leave  to  the  play  of  chance.  Now  if  we  see,  on  the  one 
side,  that  the  only  creature  known  to  us  which  sets  itself 
ends  is  able  to  reach  these  ends  by  virtue  of  inviolable 
conformity  to  law  in  the  forces  and  effects  of  its  means, 
and  if  we  see,  on  the  other,  that  in  the  course  of  the 
world  ends  are  also  reached,  and  that  at  the  same  time 


356  THE   THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

all  secondary  causes  which  lead  to  these  ends  act  with  a 
necessity  conformable  to  law,  we  certainly  are  right  in 
drawing  the  conclusion  that  the  highest  metaphysical 
cause  of  all  things — we  now  say,  the  living  God — has 
so  prepared  the  whole  universe  that  his  free  but  regular 
and  systematic  goal-setting  and  end-reaching  action  upon 
the  course  of  all  things  rests,  as  a  whole  as  well  as  in  de- 
tail, directly  upon  the  conformity  to  law  of  all  forces  and 
their  effects. 

The  observation  of  a  free  action  of  the  human  per- 
sonality upon  the  course  of  things,  once  more  leads  us 
back  to  a  reflection  on  the  idea  of  God.  For  if  we  have 
reason  to  acknowledge  a  freedom  of  the  determinations 
of  human  will — and  the  consciousness  of  ethical  responsi- 
bility will  be  a  proof  of  this  freedom  which  cannot  be 
invalidated  by  any  contrary  reflection  —  the  question 
comes  up :  how  is  this  freedom  of  a  creature  reconcil- 
able with  the  idea  of  God?  Far  be  it  from  us  to  claim 
to  have  found  a  solution  of  these  last  and  most  impor- 
tant problems  of  the  human  mind.  For  all  meditations 
on  them  but  lead  to  antinomies  in  the  presence  of  which 
we  dare  not  claim  to  remove  all  difficulties  of  reflec- 
tion still  less  to  solve  the  difficulties  by  pursuing 
only  one  chain  of  reasoning  and  ignoring  the  other. 
The  way  of  science  leads  rather  to  mere  compromises, 
and  these  compromises  consist  in  the  fact,  that  on  every 
side  of  our  observations  or  arguments  we  look  for  and 
adhere  to  that  which  results  for  us  in  incontestable  fact 
or  indispensable  postulate,  and  that  we  adhere  to  all 
results  or  postulates  thus  found  even  when  we  are  no 
longer  able  to  trace  their  unity  and  harmony  back  to 
their  last  sources.  Now  if,  on  the  one  hand,  our  idea  of 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  357 

God  is  established  as  a  self-testimony  of  God  to  our  ethi- 
cal consciousness  and  as  a  result  of  our  teleological 
reasoning,  and  if,  on  the  other,  is  established  the  fact 
of  the  world  and  of  its  processes  going  on  conformably 
to  law,  and  likewise  the  fact  of  human  freedom  and  its 
actions  upon  the  course  of  things,  and  finally  the  fact  of 
the  admission  of  the  human  will  and  action  into  a  higher 
teleology  which  is  superior  to  human  will,  and  which,  in 
the  history  of  mankind,  of  individuals,  and  nations, 
reaches  its  higher  ends,  now  by  affirming,  now  by  deny- 
ing, human  will ;  then  we  have  simply  to  account  for  all 
these  facts  as  mere  facts,  and  the  scientific  attempt  at 
pursuing  them  into  their  inner  connection  is  nothing  else 
but  a  more  or  less  successful  compromise.  We  have  to 
be  satisfied  with  these  indications,  for  the  further  discus- 
sion of  them  would  lead  us  far  beyond  the  task  of  the 
present  publication.  We  shall  only  point  out  the  fact, 
that  precisely  the  knowledge  of  the  image  of  God  in 
man  shows  us  the  way  to  the  knowledge  of  how  it  is 
conceivable  that  God  can  create  personalities  through 
whose  freedom  of  will  he  relatively  limits  the  absolute- 
ness of  his  own  will. 

In  all  our  discussions  hitherto,  the  scientific  basis  of 
a  faith  in  the  possibility  of  an  answer  to  prayer  has  been 
evident.  All  reasons  for  a  divine  providence,  also  speak 
with  the  same  force  of  persuasion  for  the  hearing  of  our 
prayers,  as  soon  as  the  idea  of  being  a  child  of  God  has 
become  an  integral  part  of  otir  idea  of  God.  And  this 
idea — the  idea  of  God  as  the  father,  and  of  a  relation- 
ship of  love  between  the  divine  and  the  human  person- 
alities—  is  so  much  a  part  of  the  Christian  idea  of  God, 
that  it  belongs  to  its  very  essence.  Only  one  considera- 


358  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

tion  might  offer  scientific  difficulties  to  our  faith  in  the 
hearing  of  prayer :  namely,  if  God  hears  the  prayers  of 
his  children,  in  the  course  of  time  new  motives  for  his 
action  present  themselves  to  him  ;  now,  is  it  reconcilable 
with  the  idea  of  God,  that  God  makes  himself  in  any 
such  way  dependent  on  that  which  first  appeared  in  time, 
and  on  the  changing  moods  of  the  creature?  But  this 
difficulty  is  precisely  the  same  which  we  met,  when 
acknowledging  human  freedom  and  its  reconcilableness 
with  a  divine  providence  ;  and  we  have  tried  to  indicate 
above  the  path  which  leads  to  its  solution. 

It  is  the  principal  idea  which  penetrates  all  our 
reasoning  about  the  relation  of  God  and  the  world— 
namely,  the  idea  of  a  teleology  in  the  world — which  is  to 
lead  us  to  a  correct  conception  of  the  miracles  and  their 
reconcilableness  with  a  mechanism  of  nature  and  with 
the  Darwinistic  ideas  of  development.  In  the  much 
discussed  contest  about  the  problem  of  miracles,  clearer 
results  would  certainly  have  been  attained,  if  one  had 
questioned  more  closely  what  the  record  of  the  Christian 
religion  means  by  miracles,  and  what  position,  according 
to  it,  these  miracles  have  to  take  in  the  order  of  the 
world  and  in  the  divine  plan  of  salvation;  and  after 
having  satisfied  himself  as  to  this  position,  had  further 
asked  what  position  they  take  in  reference  to  our  exact 
science  and  our  theistic  view  of  the  world.  Instead  of 
doing  this,  we  have  often  enough  seen  friend  and  foe  of 
the  idea  of  miracles,  as  soon  as  the  question  was  even 
touched  upon,  at  once  set  to  work  with  the  insufficient 
conceptions  of  old  rationalism  and  supernatural] sm,  and 
thus  raising  objections  and  attempting  solutions  which 
could  satisfy  nobody.  Especially  every  inadequate  idea 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  ^    359 

which  was  put  forth  by  the  advocates  of  faith  in 
miracles,  was  gladly  accepted  by  its  adversaries  ;  for 
thereby  they  were  furnished  with  a  caricature  of  the 
idea  of  miracles,  the  tearing  to  pieces  of  which  was  an 
easy  and  agreeable  sport  to  them. 

The  very  ideas  of  the  natural  and  the  supernatural 
are  a  category  which  is  to  be  treated  with  caution. 
When  discussing  the  question  of  divine  providence,  we 
have  seen  that,  with  every  free  act  of  the  will  of  man 
springing  from  an  ethical  motive,  something  super- 
natural invades  the  natural,  so  that  in  every  normal 
human  life  we  always  see  supernatural  and  natural  by 
the  side  of  and  in  one  another. 

The  distinction  between  the  direct  and  the  indirect 
action  or  invasion  of  God  is  also  to  be  used  with  great 
caution  and  restriction.  For  where  we  are  no  longer 
able  to  find  secondary  causes,  who  can  assert  that  God  no 
longer  uses  any  ?  Where  the  realm  of  visible  causes 
ceases  and  that  of  the  invisible  begins,  who  can  exclude 
secondary  causes  ?  And  on  the  other  hand,  where  God 
acts  directly,  who  can  deny  the  concurrence  of  his  direct 
presence  and  his  direct  action,  or  reduce  the  value  o£ 
that  which  was  indirectly  produced  ? 

Moreover,  the  often-returning  conceptions  of  a 
breaking  of  the  laws  of  nature,  or  the  compromises 
which  were  made  between  a  breaking  and  a  non-break- 
ing of  the  laws  of  nature  by  assuming  a  "supernatural 
acceleration  of  the  process  of  nature,"  were  still  more 
misleading.  In  the  whole  world,  infinitely  many  higher 
and  lower  forces  act  according  to  laws  and  order.  In 
every  process,  a  part  of  the  forces  which  in  the  single 
case  surround  it,  become  active,  and  thereby  hinder 


360  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

another  part  from  its  activity.  But  the  laws  of  this 
other  part  of  forces  are  not  thereby  invalidated  or 
broken.  When  a  man  acts  with  moral  freedom,  from 
mere  moral  motives,  the  highest  of  the  conceivable 
forces  over  which  we  have  control  comes  into  direct 
action  upon  the  natural.  But  therewith  those  forces, 
with  their  laws,  which  would  have  been  active  if  another 
motive  had  determined  him,  are  not  yet  overcome,  but 
only  hindered  from  their  activity  in  exactly  the  same 
way  as  one  part  of  forces  can  be  active  and  another  not, 
where  mere  mechanical  actions  take  place.  Thus,  in 
miracles,  no  law  of  nature  is  overcome,  but  only  a  force 
which  otherwise  would  have  been  active  according  to  the 
law  of  its  activity,  is  for  the  time  hindered  from  action 
by  another  force  becoming  active.  Moreover,  through 
the  conscious  and  unconscious  connection-  of  the  idea  of 
irregularity  and  lack  of  plan  with  the  idea  of  miracles, 
not  only  the  idea  of  a  God  who  works  miracles,  but  also 
that  of  a  personal  Creator  and  Ruler  of  the  world,  in 
general,  has  come  into  discredit.  For  that  reason, 
Hackel,  for  instance,  when  he  attacks  the  Christian  idea 
of  creation,  never  fails  to  speak  of  the  ''capricious 
arbitrariness"  of  a  Creator;  and  Oskar  Schmidt  also 
speaks  of  the  "  caprice"  of  the  God  of  Christians. 

With  these  criticisms,  which  we  have  made  in  refer- 
ence to  the  treatment  of  the  question  of  miracles,  we 
certainly  have  undertaken  only  to  characterize  the 
superficial  skirmishing  which  took  place  between  the 
two  opposing  views  of  the  world,  but  not  the  labors 
of  more  recent  theological  science.  But  that  skir- 
mish has  made,  like  all  superficiality,  the  most  noise 
in  the  world;  and  since  the  adversaries,  of  the  faith  in 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  361 

miracles  endeavored  almost  exclusively  to  reflect  in  this 
manner,  and  almost  ignored  the  deeper  deductions 
of  theological  science,  they  succeeded  in  making  the 
idea  of  miracles  almost  the  most  dreaded  object  of  anti- 
pathy to  modern  education,  and  many  of  those  who  feel 
that  the  conceptions  of  traditional  dogmatics  are  in  need 
of  revision,  and  religion  and  science  of  a  reconciliation, 
endeavor  to  find  that  revision  and  reconciliation  especial- 
ly In  the  fact,  that  religion  gives  up  miracles.  On  the 
other  hand,  theology  as  science,  in  its  main  advocates, 
long  ago  gave  up  these  insufficient  and  misleading  cate- 
gories and  conceptions,  and  established  a  conception  of 
miracles  which  can  easily  be  received  into  the  science  of 
the  processes  of  nature,  as  well  as  into  our  reasoning 
about  God  and  the  divine.  The  first  who  adopted  this 
mode  of  treatment,  is  one  of  the  pioneers  of  more  recent 
positive  theology,  and  of  a  theology  still  uninfluenced 
by  science  —  Karl  Immanuel  Nitzsch.  It  is  certainly 
interesting  to  read  what  this  man,  as  early  as  1829,  said, 
in  the  first  edition  of  his  "System  der  Christlichen 
Lehre  "  ("System  of  Christian  Doctrine"),  and  also  in  the 
succeeding  edition  printed  without  alteration.  He  says, 
on  page  64:  "The  miracles  of  revelation  are,  in  spite  of 
all  objective  supernaturalness,  derived  from  their  central 
origin,  something  really  conformable  to  law  :  partly  in 
relation  to  the  higher  order  of  things  to  which  they 
belong  and  which  is  also  a  world,  a  nature  in  its  kind, 
and  acts  upon  the  lower  in  its  way;  partly  in  reference 
to  the  similarity  to  common  nature  which  they  retain  in 
any  way;  partly  on  account  of  their  teleological  perfec- 
tion; and  they  must  not  only  be  expected  as  the  homo- 
geneous phenomenon  from  the  inner  miracle  of  vedemp- 


362  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

tion,  from  the  standpoint  of  perfect  Christian  faith,  but 
also  by  virtue  of  the  union  between  spirit  and  nature, 
be  looked  upon  as  the  natural  in  its  kind"  In  these 
words  we  find  the  fruitful  germs  of  a  sound  dogmatic 
development  which  the  idea  of  miracles  has  found  on 
the  part  of  more  recent  theology. 

Let  us,  in  the  first  place,  try  to  keep  free  from  all 
preconceived,  correct  or  incorrect,  opinions,  and  ask  how 
the  miracles  appear  to  us,  when  they  present  themselves 
with  a  claim  to  acknowledgment  as  integral  parts  of  a 
divine  revelation  of  salvation,  namely,  in  the  religion  of 
redemption  and  its  record.  In  regard  to  their  name, 
they  appear  to  us  in  the  Holy  Scriptures  as  amazing 
bright  processes,  as  great  deeds  and  signs;  and  in  regard 
to  their  nature,  as  signs  which  are  destined  to  call  the 
attention  of  man  to  the  government  in  grace  and  in  judg- 
ment of  a  living  God,  to  the  salvation  of  redemption 
which  God  gives  to  man,  and  to  the  human  instruments 
which  he  uses  for  that  purpose.  Now,  in  a  view  of  the 
world  which,  like  the  Biblical,  so  decidedly  sees  a  revela- 
tion of  God  in  all  that  which  takes  place,  in  a  view  of  the 
world  to  which  everything  natural  has  also,  as  a  work  of 
God,  its  supernatural  cause,  and  everything  supernatural, 
at  present  or  in  the  future,  is  transposed  again  into  nature 
and  history,  not  only  all  those  above  rejected  conceptions 
of  miracles  lose  their  significance,  but  all  remaining  con- 
ceptions with  which  one  otherwise  tries  to  distinguish  the 
miracles  from  all  that  is  not  miraculous,  or  to  classify  the 
different  species  of  miracles,  also  diminish  in  importance, 
as  do  also  all  those  distinctions  of  direct  and  indirect 
actions  of  God— the  distinctions  of  relative  and  abso- 
lute, of  subjective  and  objective  miracles:  and  there 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  363 

remains  but  a  single  inviolable  kernel  and  central  point 
of  the  Biblical  conception  of  miracles,  and  that  is  the 
above  mentioned  teleological  character  of  miracles.  In- 
deed, we  are  not  willing  to  reject  all  these  logical  distinc- 
tions and  investigations  as  worthless :  they  have  helped 
to  render  clear  our  conceptions  and  ideas,  and  they  still 
help.  But  a  deeper  investigation  of  the  idea  of  miracles 
and  its  relation  to  a  scientific  knowledge  of  the  world 

O 

may  perhaps  finally  lead  our  more  developed  reflection 
back  to  the  fact  that  we  find  the  quintessence  and  the 
nature  of  miracles  only  where  the  pious  people  of  the 
Bible  found  it.  And  this  quintessence  of  miracles  con- 
sists precisely  in  their  teleological  nature,  and  not  at  all  in 
the  fact  that  they  cannot  be  explained  physically  :  it  con- 
sists in  the  fact  that  miracles  are  signs  through  which 
God  manifests  himself  and  his  government  over  man, 
and  actually  shows  the  latter  that  he  wishes  to  bring  him 
to  the  pursuit  of  perfection  by  the  way  of  redemption. 
Ritschl,  in  an  essay  which  appeared  in  the  "  Jahrbiicher 
fiir  Deutsche  Theologie,"  as  early  as  1861,  pointed  out 
this  decidedly  teleological  character  of  Biblical  miracles 
and  the  indifference  shown  by  pious  men  in  the  Bible  as 
to  the  question  whether  these  deeds  and  signs  can  be  ex- 
plained naturally  or  not. 

The  profit  which  we  derive  from  this  reverting  to  the 
Biblical  conception  of  the  idea  of  miracles  is  by  no  means 
small. 

In  the  first  place,  we  help  to  establish  the  full  recog- 
nition of  that  direct  religious  consciousness  and  sensation 
which  is  not  only  characteristic  of  the  pious  men  of  Scrip- 
ture, but  which  yet  characterizes  all  genuine  religiousness; 
and  this  consists  in  the  fact  that  the  religious  man  sees 


364  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

miracles  of  God  in  all  that  turns  his  attention  to  GocTs 
government, — in  the  sea  of  stars,  in  rock  and  bush,  in 
sunshine  and  storm,  in  flower  and  worm,  just  as  certainty 
as  in  the  guidance  of  his  own  life  and  in  the  facts  and  pro- 
cesses of  the  history  of  salvation  and  of  the  kingdom  of 
the  Lord.  In  this  idea  of  miracles,  the  essential  thing  is 
not  that  the  phenomena  and  processes  are  inconceivable 
to  him — although  certainty  in  all  that  comes  into  appear- 
ance there  is  still  an  incomprehensible  and  uncomprehend- 
ed  remainder.  For  a  form  of  nature,  e.  g.,  which  turns 
his  attention  to  a  creator,  is  of  course  a  miracle,  even  if 
he  is  able  to  look  upon  it  with  none  other  eye  than  that 
of  the  unlearned :  but  it  even  then  remains  a  miracle,— 
nay,  it  is  increased  to  a  still  greater  miracle,  if  he  has 
learned  to  Contemplate  and  investigate  it  with  all  the 
auxiliary  means  of  science.  A  hearing  of  his  prayers 
remains  a  miracle,  whether  or  not  he  is  able  to  perceive 
the  natural  connection  of  the  process  in  which  he  sees  his 
prayers  answered,  or  even  to  trace  it  back  to  the  remotest 
times  which  preceded  his  prayers.  The  events  and  facts 
of  the  history  of  salvation  remain  miracles  to  him, 
whether  the  history  of  nature  and  the  world  offers  to 
him  auxiliary  means  of  explaining  them  or  not.  The 
pious  man,  therefore,  does  not  find  the  essential  character- 
istic of  miracles  in  their  relative  inconceivableness,  but 
in  the  fact  that  they  refer  him  to  a  living  God  who  stands 
above  this  process,  whether  perceived  or  unperceived  in 
its  relative  causal  connection,  and  unites  it  with  the  course 
of  things  in  order  to  reach  his  ends  and  to  manifest  him- 
self to  man.  Now,  in  our  attempt  at  a  scientific  repro- 
duction of  the  idea  of  miracles,  if  we  return  to  that 
Biblical  conception,  we  see  no  longer  in  this  just  men- 


POSITIVE   CHRISTIANITY.  3G5 

tioned  religious  conception  of  miracles  a  pious  sophistry 
which  avoids  the  difficulty  of  the  idea,  or  a  child-like 
naivete  worthy  of  being  partly  envied  and  partly  pitied, 
which  does  not  at  all  see  the  difficulties  and  remains  on 
the  child-stage  of  Biblical  conceptions  ;  but  we  only  per- 
ceive in  it  a  confirmation  and  fulfilment  of  that  profound 
and  beneficent  word  of  our  Lord:  "Verily  I  say  unto 
you,  Whosoever  shall  not  receive  the  kingdom  of  God 
as  a  little  child,  he  shall  not  enter  therein."  Of  course, 
piety  as  well  as  science  makes  distinctions  among  miracles. 
The  former  separates  the  mere  products  and  processes  of 
nature  which,  through  what  is  explicable  as  well  as  what 
is  inexplicable  in  their  qualities  and  processes,  point  to  an 
almighty  and  all-wise  Creator,  and  thereby  become  mir- 
acles to  the  religious  view  of  the  world,  from  the  histor- 
ical events  which,  by  their  newness  and  uniqueness,  and 
by  their  pointing  toward  divine  ends,  manifest  God  and 
his  teleological  government  to  man,  and  calls  them  mir- 
acles in  a  still  more  specific  sense  than  science  does. 
And  among  historical  events,  piety  as  well  as  science 
assigns  the  name  miracle,  in  the  most  pregnant  sense,  to 
those  events  which  belong  to  the  history  of  salvation, 
and,  by  their  newness  and  uniqueness,  introduce  new 
stages  into  it,  render  legitimate  its  new  instruments,  or 
bring  new  features  of  redemption  to  our  knowledge. 
Our  religiousness  has  the  greatest  and  deepest  interest  in 
this  history  :  for  it  is  the  history  of  the  leading  back  of 
man  into  communion  with  God  by  the  way  of  redemp- 
tion ;  and  therefore  the  events  of  this  history  are  pre- 
cisely those  miracles  upon  which  our  deepest  religious 
interest  is  concentrated.  But  in  spite  of  all  these  dis- 
tinctions in  degree,  that  natural  relationship  and  that 


366  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

common  character  of  the  miraculous  between  the  mira- 
cles of  nature,  the  miracles  of  the  history  of  man,  and 
the  miracles  of  the  history  of  salvation,  remain  estab- 
lished ;  and  we  render  a  service  to  religious  conscious- 
ness, as  well  as  to  the  scientific  conception  of  the  idea 
of  miracles,  if  by  returning  to  the  Biblical  idea  of  mira- 
cles, as  we  propose,  we  make  a  more  comprehensive 
definition  of  miracles  possible. 

Another  advantage  which  we  derive  from  returning 
to  the  Biblical  idea  of  miracles  consists  in  the  fact  that 
it  preserves  us  from  the  magical  and  necromantic  in  our 
conceptions  of  miracles  ;  that  it  allows  us  a  grouping  of 
miracles  according  to  value,  which  corresponds  with  the 
idea  of  God  and  of  the  divine  government  as  well  as 
with  the  idea  of  miracles  itself ;  and  that  in  the  presence 
of  all 'single  relations  of  miracles  it  summons  us  to  crit- 
icise and  investigate  the  real  state  of  the  case.  For  the 
nature  of  miracles  does  not  consist  in  the  inconceivable 
— at  least  not  in  the  planless  and  arbitrary, — but  in  the 
fact  that  they  call  the  attention  of  man  to  God  and  his 
government ;  and  this  leads  to  the  reverse  of  all  that  is 
magical  and  necromantic,  because  the  magical  is 
unworthy  of  the  idea  of  God  and  contradicts  all  the 
other  self-testimony  of  God.  Now  if  the  nature  of 
miracles  consists  in  the  fact  that  they  call  my  attention 
to  God  and  his  government,  an  event  will  become  a 
miracle  to  me,  and  increase  its  value,  in  the  degree  in 
which  it  refers  me  to  God  and  his  government,  and 
especially  in  the  degree  in  which  it  refers  me  to  that 
government  of  God  which  is  the  most  important  to  me 
— namely,  to  the  action  of  God  in  me  and  mankind, 
•Nvith  which  he  is  bringing  about  his  ends  in  salvation  ; 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  367 

but  in  the  degree  in  which  an  event  loses  this  character, 
it  becomes  to  me  an  event  without  miraculous  or  relig- 
ious significance.  This  gives  a  quite  definite  grouping 
of  miracles  according  to  value,  from  those  which  belong 
to  the  central  manifestations  of  the  divine  plan  of  salva- 
tion and  way  of  redemption,  to  those  which  lie  in  the. 
extreme  periphery  of  religious  interest.  It  is  a  group- 
ing which  corresponds  with  the  idea  of  God  just  as  much 
as  with  the  idea  of  miracles ;  while  alFother  divisions  or 
groupings  of  miracles  according  to  value,  which  might 
take  their  principle  of  division  and  their  weight  from 
the  greater  or  smaller  conceivableness  of  the  causal  con- 
nection, from  the  greater  or  smaller  difference  of  a 
miraculous  event  from  all  other  events,  are  indifferent 
in  reference  to  the  idea  of  God,  and  change  the  centre 
of  gravity  in  the  idea  of  miracles.  Besides,  if  these 
miracles  are  to  be  real  signs  to  me  which  refer  me  to 
God,  his  government,  and  his  ways  of  salvation,  they 
must,  in  the  first  place,  in  order  to  secure  my  conviction, 
be  real  events  and  facts  and  not  mere  falsifications  and 
fictions  ;  and  this  point  leads  us  to  the  duty  and  right 
of  criticising  and  investigating  actual  circumstances. 
In  presence  of  all  Biblical  and  non-Biblical  miracles,  we 
have  the  full  right  and  the  full  duty  of  using  criticism  in 
reference  to  the  confirmation  of  actual  circumstances, 
and  where  the  latter  cannot  be  established  with  cer- 
tainty, the  question  is  in  order  whether  the  related  event 
is  really  of  such  a  character  as  to  legitimate  itself  as  a 
sign  of  God  and  his  government.  In  the  preceding 
section,  we  have  had  occasion  to  use  this  principle  in 
reference  to  the  investigation  of  that  event  which,  next 
to  the  coming  of  the  Redeemer,  offers  itself  to  us  as  the 


368  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

central  miracle  of  the  history  of  salvation  and  redemp- 
tion :  namely,  in  reference  to  the  history  of  the  resurrec- 
tion of  the  Lord. 

We  have  by  no  means  the  wish  to  avoid  difficulties 
which   meet   us,  when   trying   to   bring   miracles,  and 
especially  the  specific  and  pregnant  miracles  of  the  his- 
tory  of    salvation,    into   harmony   with    our    scientific 
knowledge  of  the  world  :  only  we  can  no  longer  admit 
that  these  difficulties  consist  in  the  inconceivableness  or 
in  the  supernaturalism  of  miracles.    For  to  the  religious 
view  of  the  world — which  traces  equally  the  explicable 
as  well  as  the  inexplicable  back  to  God,   which  even 
derives  the  natural  from  the  supernatural  causality  of 
God — neither  the  occasional  inexplicability  nor  the  sup- 
posed supernaturalness  of  an  event  can  be  that  which 
makes  the  event  a  miracle.     But  an 'event  in  the  history 
of  salvation  becomes  a  miracle  from  the  fact  that  some- 
thing extraordinary,  something  new,  happens  in  it,  which 
by  its  newness  and  its  extraordinary  character  presents 
itself  to  man  as  the  manifestation  of  certain  divine  ends 
in  salvation,  and  can  be  explained  at  first  sight,  but  only 
at  first  sight,  from  nothing  else  than  from  the  service 
which  it  renders  to  the  plan  of  redemption.     Whether 
afterwards  these  extraordinary  and  new  features  can  or 
cannot   be   perceived   in   their    natural   connection,    or 
explained  out  of  it,  does  not  at  all  change  anything  in 
the  miraculous  character  of  the  event,  as  soon  as  it  has 
once  had  the  before-mentioned  effect.    The  only  task  and 
the  only  difficulty  which  meets  us  in  the  question  of 
miracles,  is  to  show  that  such  extraordinary  and  new 
things  really  happen,  and  to  bring  the  reality  and  possi- 
bility of  such  new  things  into  our  perception  of  the 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  369 

causal  connection  of  the  course  of  the  world,  conform- 
able to  law.  But  it  ceases  to  be  a  difficulty,  so  soon  as  we 
acknowledge  a  teleology  in  the  course  of  the  world  and 
a  teleology  in  the  history  of  mankind,  and  especially  as 
soon  as  we  acknowledge  that  teleology  in  the  history  of 
mankind  which,  by  the  way  of  the  divine  means  of 
redemption,  leads  man  back  to  God.  Where  there  are  no 
ends,  nothing  can  happen  which  calls  the  attention  of  men 
to  these  ends  ;  nor,  indeed,  can  anything  new  happen ; 
for  nothing  prevails  in  more  absolute  sovereignty  to  all 
eternity  than  the  maxims  causa,  cequat  effectum  and  effectus 
cequat  causam.  But  where  ends  are  appointed  and  reached, 
something  new  also  happens  ;  and  every  new  thing  refers 
to  its  end.  For  each  step  leading  nearer  such  an  end  is 
something  new,  and  refers,  as  soon  as  we  compare  it  with 
preceding  steps,  to  the  end  towards  which  it  strives. 
All  ends  to  which  the  course  of  things  refers  us, 
are  to  the  religious  view  of  the  world  ends  which  are 
appointed  by  God  ;  all  means  which  serve  to  reach  the 
ends,  are  means  which  God  created  and  chose;  and  every 
phenomenon  and  every  event  which  manifests  this  teleo- 
logical  government  of  God  to  our  mind,  is  a  miracle  to 
us.  Now  this  whole  course  of  the  world  is  interwoven 
with  such  new  things,  in  events  which  manifest  to  us, 
now  more  clearly,  now  more  dimly,  the  striving  of  the 
course  of  the  world  towards  an  end,  because  the  latter 
is  really  striving  towards  an  end.  Even  prehistoric  times 
show  us  new  things  which,  from  a  scientific  and  histori- 
cal point  of  view,  we  have  to  place  in  the  line  of  the 
course  of  the  world;  and  from  a  religious  point  of  view, 
in  the  line  of  miracles.  The  first  appearance  of  organic 
life  on  earth  was  new,  and  indicated  new  ends;  the  first 
24 


370  THE    THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

appearance  of  each  single  species  of  animals  and  plants 
was  new;  new,  also,  and  indicating  the  highest  end  of 
creative  life,  was  the  first  appearance  of  man.  All 
these  things  we  call  miracles  of  creation  ;  and  we  espe- 
cially place  the  creative  miracle  of  the  appearance  of 
man  on  a  level  with  the  greatest  miracles  of  which  we 
have  knowledge,  and  use  the  name  miracle  for  all  before 
mentioned  newly  appearing  formations,  whether  or  not 
we  are  able  to  explain  those  originations  from  the 
preceding  connection  of  the  course  of  nature  and  its 
forces.  Now,  in  the  history  of  mankind,  where  the 
intellectual  and  ethical  motives  of  that  which  happens 
become  active,  where  also  the  greatest  ends  which  come 
up  for  consideration  are  spiritual  and  ethical  ends, 
where  man  himself  acts  freely  according  to  ends,  and 
where,  therefore,  human  and  divine  teleology  come 
alternately  into  play,  the  manifestation  of  a  striving 
toward  an  end,  in  which  religious  consciousness  imme- 
diately sees  also  ends  and  means  of  God,  is  repeated  in 
an  eminent  degree.  Every  event  which  brings  about  a 
progress  in  the  history  of  mankind  as  well  as  of  indi- 
viduals, is  as  to  this  side  something  new,  extraordinary, 
teleological:  i.e.,  a  miracle  to  the  religious  mode  of  con- 
templation; and  this  miracle  is  the  greater  as  is  more 
important  the  end  under  consideration,  and  the  greater* 
and  the  more  decisive  the  step  towards  this  end  which 
the  event  accomplishes.  Now,  if  we  recognize  the 
return  of  mankind  into  a  communion  with  God  as  the 
highest  goal  of  the  general  and  individual  history  of 
mankind,  and  if  we  find  in  the  latter  facts  which  lead  to 
this  goal,  then  these  facts  are  the  great  central  miracles 
of  history.  As  such,  the  facts  of  redemption  present 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  371 

themselves  with  all  that  for  which  it  once  prepared  the 
way;  and,  now  that  it  has  come,  leads  to  full  and 
complete  perfection — and  among  them  all,  the  coming, 
the  person,  and  the  history  of  Jesus  Christ,  stands  as 
central  fact  and  central  miracle  in  the  midst  of  all 
events  in  the  history  of  salvation,  and  forms  the  central 
point  of  all  religious  interest.  We  see  how  unjust  it  is 
when  one  urges,  as  an  objection  to  a  belief  in  miracles, 
that  it  assigns  to  God  arbitrary  and  capricious  actions. 
We  call  the  manifestations  of  divine  teleology  miracles. 
But  striving  towards  an  end  and  conformity  to  a  regular 
plan  is  not  arbitrariness  or  caprice,  but  the  contrary;  and 
the  greater  our  estimate  of  the  highest  cause  of  all  things, 
the  greater  will  appear  to  us  the  conformity  to  a  plan 
and  to  law  of  all  which  presents  itself  as  miracles  in  the 
course  of  events.  There  is  perhaps  one  objection 
which  is  about  as  equally  unjust  as  the  objection  of 
caprice;  and  that  is  the  objection  that  faith  in  miracles, 
in  teaching  a  belief  in  supernatural  things,  tends  to 
introduce  into  the  course  of  events  something  which  is 
against  nature.  But  since  miracles,  as  a  sign  of  divine 
teleology,  manifest  ends  for  which  nature  also  is  pre- 
pared, and  through  which  the  fallen  nature  of  man, 
fallen  by  sin,  is  again  restored;  and  since  to  the  religious 
view  of  the  world  all  natural  phenomena  and  processes 
expressly  rank  among  miracles,  the  faith  in  miracles 
teaches  the  contrary  of  an  opposition  to  nature.  It  is 
incontestible — and  will  become  still  clearer  and  more 
certain  to  us  through  all  farther  investigation  of  the 
subject — that  the  acknowledgment  of  the  idea  of  mira- 
cles as  a  necessary  and  a  justified  part  of  religiousness 


372  THE    THEORIES  OF    DARWIN. 

stands  and  falls  with  the  acknowledgment  of  a  teleo- 
logical  view  of  the  world. 

o 

We  certainly  do  not  indulge  in  the  foolish  hope  that 
with  the  deductions  of  this  section  we  should  be  able 
suddenly  to  win  over  any  of  the  decided  adversaries  of 
faith  in  providence  and  miracles.  For,  as  we  have  had 
occasion  to  remind  the  reader,  the  acknowledgment  or 
the  non-acknowledgment  of  God  and  his  living  govern- 
ment in  the  world  is  not  the  result  of  this  or  that 
reflection  and  chain  of  conclusions,  but  rather  an 
ethical  action  of  the  centre  of  human  personality  in 
which  God  discovers  himself  in  his  self-manifestation. 
Now,  if  this  centre,  in  the  freedom  of  its  decision,  has 
once  denied  the  acknowledgment  of  God  and  his 
government,  then  the  intellectual  actions  of  the  soul 
offer  themselves  to  this  atheistic  and  anti-theistic  stand- 
point, and  build  up. atheistic  systems  in  which  the  ideas 
of  providence  and  miracles  naturally  find  no  place. 
Thus  system  is  opposed  to  system,  although  the  one  is 
not  able  to  overcome  the  other.  For  the  last  and  deep- 
est power  of  conviction  lies,  neither  for  one  nor  the 
other  system,  in  its  chains  of  conclusions,  in  its  super- 
structure, but  in  its  foundation,  its  standpoint,  and  its 
principles;  and  the  choosing  of  one  or  the  other  stand- 
point, the  theistic  or  atheistic,  is  an  ethical  action  which 
precedes  methodical  reasoning — or  if  it  takes  place  at 
the  same  time  or  precedes  it,  has  still  deeper  motives 
than  those  of  more  or  less  clear  forms  of  mere  reason- 
ing. But  we  believe,  and  we  wish  and  hope  in  our 
modest  way  to  have  shown  by  our  present  investigation, 
that  the  standpoint  of  faith  also  has  its  logical  and 
justified  science,  and  that  it  is  able  to  appreciate  the 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  373 

world  of  the  real  more  universally  and  candidly,  and 
offers  to  logical  reasoning  fewer  and  less  important 
difficulties,  than  the  systems  of  atheism. 

We  have  now  discussed  all  the  essential  and  direct 
points  of  contacts  between  Christianity  and  the  theory 
of  evolution.  But  a  remaining  part,  still  more  closely 
related  to  the  centre  of  the  Christian  view  of  the  world, 
yet  offers  some  indirect  points  of  contact  which  demand 
treatment. 

§  5.     The  Redeemer  and  the  Redemption.     The  Kingdom 
of  God  and  the  Acceptance  of  Salvation. 

As  soon  as  it  is  once  an  established  fact  that  an  evo- 
lution theory  of  the  origin  of  man  as  a  merely  scientific 
theory  permits  all  the  valuable  qualities  of  man,  when 
they  have  once  come  into  existence,  to  show  themselves 
undiminished  in  their  entire  greatness  and  importance, 
and  must  so  permit  them,  then  the  whole  Christian  view 
of  the  world,  of  the  Redeemer,  his  person,  his  course  of 
redemption,  and  his  work,  remains  entirely  untouched  by 
all  these  scientific  theories  of  evolution.  Yet  the  Bibli- 
cal representation,  the  orthodox  perception,  and  the 
actual  history  of  the  Redeemer  and  his  work,  present 
us  with  some  evidences  which  are  rather  in  sympathy 
than  in  antipathy  with  these  scientific  theories.  First, 
the  long  preparation  for  his  birth,  which  began  immedi- 
ately after  the  fall  of  man  and  stretched  over  at  least 
four  thousand  years,  perhaps  over  a  much  longer  period, 
the  special  preparation  of  his  human  genealogy,  the 
selection,  separation,  and  guidance  of  the  ancestor  and 
of  the  people  of  Israel,  of  the  tribe,  the  family,  and 
finally  of  the  mother  of  Jesus  — all  these  arc  manifestly 


374  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

just  as  favorable  to  the  idea  of  evolution  as  they  would 
have  been  to  the  idea  of  a  sudden  creation  of  man  out  of 
nothing,  if  Christ,  the  second  Adam,  had  come  into  exis- 
tence by  a  sudden  creation.  Moreover,  the  Redeemer 
himself  was  wholly  subject  to  the  ordinary  laws  of  de- 
velopment of  the  human  individual,  and  was,  from  his 
annunciation  and  conception,  developed  entirely  like 
man  in  the  long  process  of  evolution  from  the  egg  and  its 
still  absolutely  indifferent  spiritual  worth  through  all  the 
imperceptible  stages  of  development  before  and  after  the 
birth  up  to  the  full  age  of  man.  Likewise  the  result  of 
his  course  of  salvation,  redemption,  and  entrance  into  the 
kingdom  of  God,  underwent  the  same  process  of  gradual 
development.  It  began  with  a  few  disciples,  and  was 
slowly  propagated;  it  has  to-day  reached  but  a  small  part 
of  mankind,  and  even  where  it  took  root,  it  sees  infinitely 
many  things  by  its  side  which  it  has  not  yet  been  able  to 
penetrate  with  its  leaven : — facts  which  have  much  more 
elective  affinity  with  the  scientific  ideas  of  development 
than  with  those  of  sudden  creations. 

Finally,  precisely  the  same  analogy  forces  itself  upon 
us  in  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  way  of  salvation. 
The  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  human  individual  is 
nothing  less  than  a  new  birth ;  its  aim  is  the  revival  of 
the  entire  man,  in  mind,  soul,  and  body.  In  most  men, 
this  work  takes  place  by  a  slow  process,  advancing  step 
by  step.  This  gradual  course  is  even  the  rule  in  Chris- 
tianized nations ;  although  a  decisive  change  of  mind 
often  enough,  though  by  no  means  always,  takes  place 
in  marked  epochs  of  the  inner  history  of  life.  And  in 
all  Christians — even  in  those  whose  conversion  takes 
place  by  a  sudden  awakening,  like  that  of  Paul — the 


POSITIVE    CHRISTIANITY.  375 

transformation  of  the  entire  man  into  the  similarity  of 
Christ,  and  the  full  restoration  of  the  image  of  God,  is 
certainly  a  process  of  development,  and  must  await  its 
completion  in  the  resurrection.  This  view  is  also  con- 
tirmed  by  the  Lord's  parable  of  the  seed,  growing  up 
imperceptibly. 

Every  believing  Christian  knows  these  facts, .  and 
judges  and  acts  according  to  them :  therefore,  when  in 
the  realm  of  nature,  which  God  certainly  submitted  to 
the  free  investigation  of  the  human  mind,  he  meets  simi- 
lar views,  what  right  has  he  to  protest  against  them  as 
being  hostile  to  religion  ? 

§  6.     Eschatology. 

In  our  discussion  of  the  preceding  questions,  we  have 
seen  that  an  entirely  neutral,  not  to  say  friendly,  relation- 
ship is  taking  place  between  religion  and  the  theories  of 
development,  which  will  continue  so  long  as  the  latter 
keep  within  the  limits  of  their  proper  realm,  the  percep- 
tion of  nature ;  and  that  a  hostile  relation  takes  place, 
and  anti-religious  attacks  are  to  be  guarded  against,  only 
when  a  disbelieving  system  of  metaphysics,  which  has 
grown  on  other  ground,  in  an  uncalled-for  way,  tries  to 
connect  itself  closely  with  the  theory  of  descent.  This 
is  in  an  eminent  degree  the  case  with  the  great  eschat- 
ological  hopes  of  Christianity.  The  evolution  theory  so 
exclusively  contents  itself  with  the  attempts  at  perceiv- 
ing the  causal  circumstances  of  organisms  in  the  present 
world,  that  it  does  not  at  all  wish  to,  and  cannot,  express 
itself  concerning  the  end  and  goal  of  the  world  and  the 
laws  and  circumstances  which  may  reign  in  a  future  ceon, 
and  that  it  gives  free  scope  to  every  perception  of  the 
ultimate  which  might  come  from  another  source. 


376-  THE    THEORIES    OF    DARWIN. 

On  the  other  hand,  Christian  eschatology  is  alone 
able  to  do  most  essential  service  to  the  evolution  theory, 
in  case  it  should  be  verified,  by  giving  an  answer  to 
questions  to  which  the  evolution  theory  tends  more 
decidedly  than  any  other  scientific  theory — namely,  to 
the  questions  as  to  the  end  of  the  world  and  mankind, 
with  such  distinctions  as  no  philosophy  which  treats  of 
the  doctrines  of  nature,  is  able  to  give,  although  natu- 
ral science  itself  demands  the  answer  to  these  questions 
the  more  peremptorily,  the  higher  the  points  of  view 
are  to  which  it  leads  us. 

The  world  shows  to  every  investigating  eye  a  devel- 
opment, whether  we  have  to  take  this  development  as 
descent  or  as  successive  new  creation  ;  and  therefore  we 
shall  take,  in  the  following  discussion,  the  idea  of  devel- 
opment in  this  broad  sense  which  comprises  all  conceiv- 
able attempts  at  explanation.  All  nature — its  most  compre- 
hensive cosmic  realms  as  well  as  the  realms  of  its  small- 
est organisms  —  together  with  the  corporeal,  psychical, 
and  spiritual  nature  of  man,  shows  a  harmony,  a  conform- 
ity to  the  end  in  view,  and  a  striving  toward  an  end  of 
its  development,  the  denial  of  which  will  certainly  not 
add  to  the  laurels  which  transmit  the  scientific  fame  of 
our  present  generation  to  posterity.  Now,  what  is  this 
end?  .The  answer  which  we  receive  from  those  who 
reject  Christian  eschatology,  may  be  given  by  two  scien- 
tific antipodes  :  by  Strauss  and  Eduard  von  Hartmann. 
Strauss  takes  sides  with  those  who  reject  all  striving 
toward  an  end  in  nature  ;  and  his  answer  to  the  question 
(which  still  asserts  itself  in  his  system  of  the  world),  is  : 
eternal  circular  motion  of  the  universe,  death  of  all 
individuals  and  of  all  complexes  of  individuals,  even  of 


POSITIVE   CHRISTIANITY.  377 

mankind.  Eduard  von  Hartmann,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  filled  by  the  knowledge  of  the  teleological,  but  he 
rejects  the  hope  of  Christians,  and  the  end  which  offers 
itself  to  him  in  the  place  of  the  rejected  end  of  Chris- 
tian hope,  is  destruction — destruction  of  all  individuals 
and  destruction  of  the  world.  In  view  of  such  ends,  is 
not  the  Christian's  hope  the  answer  which  not  only  satis- 
fies the  deepest  ethical  and  religious  need,  but  also  all 
heights  and  depths  of  the  most  faithful,  most  devoted, 
and  most  enlightened  investigation  of  nature? 

Finally,  we  have  still  another  eschatological  conclu- 
sion to  mention  and  reject ;  a  conclusion  which  is  drawn 
from  this  theory  by  the  advocates  of  the  evolution  the- 
ory. It  opens  the  perspective  into  a  future  development 
of  still  higher  beings  out  of  man.  In  abstracto,  we  can 
naturally  make  no  objection  to  the  possibility  of  such  a 
development,  as  soon  as  we  once  accept  the  evolution 
theory  ;  but  we  have  to  object  to  the  supposition  of  such 
a  process  in  infinitum.  For  such  a  process  would  cer- 
tainly be  interrupted  by  the  final  destruction  of  the 
globe  ;  and  in  case  the  mechanico-naturalistie  view  of 
the  world  should  be  right,  this  destruction  would  be  only 
the  more  cruel  as  would  be  more  highly  organized  the 
beings  which  should  find  their  destruction  in  this  inevi- 
table catastrophe.  Moreover,  as  we  have  repeatedly 
seen,  a  development  in  infinitum  suffers  from  a  self-con- 
tradiction :  for  development  involves  an  end,  and  this 
end  must  certainly  have  been  once  reached.  Now,  if  we 
have  reason  to  assume  that  this  end  has  been  reached  in 
the  development  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  globe,  by  the 
creature  being  in  the  image  of  God  and  his  child,  and 
that  it  is  also  reached  in  fallen  man  through  redemption 


378  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

and  its  perfection,  then  the  idea  of  development,  it  is 
true,  allows  and  postulates  a  relative  development  of 
mankind,  so  long  as  this  takes  place  within  the  limits 
of  the  now  valid  laws  of  the  universe, — a  development 
towards  the  perfection  of  this  likeness  to  God  and  filial 
relationship  ;  but  that  idea  of  development  has  no  longer 
an  influence  that  would  lead  to  the  production  of  new 
beings  which  should  be  more  than  man. 

With  the  foregoing,  we  believe  that  we  have  dis- 
cussed all  essential  points  of  the  relation  between  relig- 
ion and  Darwinism  ;  and  we  now  proceed  to  the  last  part 
of  our  investigation. 


DARWINISM   AND   MORAL  PRINCIPLES.  379 


B.     THE    DARWINIAN    THEORIES    AND 
MORALITY. 

CHAPTER  III. 
DARWINISM  AND  MORAL  PRINCIPLES. 

§1.    Darwinistic  Naturalism  and  Moral  Principles. 

If  we  consider  the  ethical  consequences  of  a  view  of 
the  world  which,  proceeding  from  Darwinism,  permits 
the  universe,  man  included,  to  be  taken  up  into  a  mech- 
anism of  atoms — a  mechanism  in  which  everything, 
even  the  ethical  action  of  man,  finds  its  sufficient  expla- 
nation— we  certainly  cannot  perceive  how  such  a  view  of 
the  world  is  a-ble  to  arrive  at  firm  moral  principles.  If 
man,  even  in  his  spiritual  life  and  moral  action,  is  a 
mere  product  of  nature,  originated  through  descent,  and 
if  his  whole  spiritual  life  is  fully  consumed  by  these 
merely  mechanical  factors,  then  all  moral  principles  are 
also  nothing  else  than  inherited  customs  founded  upon 
those  instincts  which  in  the  struggle  for  existence  have 
proven  to  be  the  most  beneficial  to  man.  Then  their 
influence  is  subject  to  continual  change,  always  corre- 
sponding to  the  existing  state  of  human  development. 
As  these  moral  instincts  have  displaced  the  former 
instincts  of  the  animal  predecessors  of  man  —  say,  e.  g., 
of  sharks,  of  marsupialia,  of  lemu rides — so  they  must 


380  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

also  expect  at  any  time  to  be  displaced  in  turn  by  new 
and  still  more  useful  instincts.  And  even  in  the  same 
period  of  the  development  of  mankind,  the  moral  or  im- 
moral principles  which  have  actual  authority  in  each 
nation  or  tribe,  have  their  full  right  of  existence  as  long 
as  they  are  not  displaced  by  still  more  advantageous 
instincts.  Moral  principles  in  which  infanticide,  prosti- 
tution, and  cannibalism  have  a  place,  are  inferior  to  the 
highest  form  of  Christian  morality  only  so  far  as  they 
do  not  hold  their  own  in  the  struggle  for  existence, 
when  nations  having  those  low  views  come  into  collision 
with  nations  of  higher  moral  culture  ;  but  in  themselves 
they  have  full  value  and  full  right,  so  long  as  they  attain 
the  end  of  all  instincts,  and  so  far  as  we  can  speak  of 
ends  at  all ;  in  such  naturalism,  apart  from  human  activ- 
ity, the  end  consists  only  in  the  preservation  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  the  species  in  the  struggle  for  existence. 

Under  these  suppositions,  moral  principles  not 
only  lose  their  objective  and  solid  consistency  in  the 
mass  of  mankind,  but  they  also  become  irrevocably 
subject  to  the  arbitrariness  of  the  single  individual.  An 
individual  who  either  has  not,  or  asserts  that  he  has  not, 
a  determined  moral  instinct,  or  who  allows  it  to  be 
smothered  by  some  other  instinct  which  in  a  normal 
individual  is  subordinate,  but  in  him  stronger,  is  fully 
justified  in  his  immoral  action  so  long  as  he  is  successful 
with  it.  Every  individual  is  entirely  his  own  master 
and  his  own  judge.  If  man  is  morally  good,  it  may  be 
the  consequence  of  an  especially  happy  individual  dis- 
position, or  of  an  especially  clear  perception,  or  of 
happy  circumstances  and  influences;  but  it  is  not  the 
consequence  of  a  free  subordination  under  the  authority 


DARWINISM   AND   MORAL   PRINCIPLES.  381 

of  a  moral  law;  for  there  is  neither  freedom  nor  an  ob- 
jective moral  authority.  The  single  man  is  but  the  pro- 
duct of  a  certain  sum  and  mixture  "of  powers  of  nature, 
acting  of  necessity,  which  may  with  him  turn  out  fortu- 
nately or  unfortunately.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  man  is 
morally  perverted,  society  may  defend  itself  against  his 
perversity;  wisdom  may  try  to  convince  him  of  the  bad 
consequences  of  his  perversity  for  himself  and  society; 
the  effect  of  his  perversity  may  make  him  sensible  of 
the  bad  consequences  of  his  actions  :  but  there  is  no 
other  objectively  valid  corrective  of  his  perversity.  If 
he  is  successful  in  his  immoral  action,  and  if  he  silences 
his  conscience,  this  voice  of  the  unobserved  higher 
instinct  in  favor  of  the  preferred  lower — which  unfortu- 
nately, as  is  well  known,  succeeds  oftenest  and  most 
easily  in  the  case  of  those  whose  perversity  has  become 
the  most  habitual,  and  in  whom  another  grouping  of 
instincts  would  be  most  desirable — then  the  whole  affair 
is  settled,  and  he  is  absolved.  Let  us  be  understood 
correctly.  We  do  not  say  that  all  advocates  of  mechani- 
cal or  monistic  ethics  draw  these  conclusions  in  reality; 
we  know  very  well  that  many  a  man  is  better  than  his 
system;  but  it  seems  to  us  inevitable  that  the  logical 
pursuit  of  that  naturalistic  principle  leads  to  this 
dissolution  of  all  solid  fundamentals  of  moral  principles, 
and  that  it  is  but  an  inconsequence,  certainly  worthy  of 
honor  and  of  notice,  if  all  the  advocates  of  naturalism 
do  not  profess  this  dissolution  of  all  moral  principles 
with  the  same  cynic  frankness  that  is  shown  by  many  of 
their  partisans. 

We  do  not  say  too  much,  when  we  charge  ethical 
naturalism  with  dissolution  of  all  moral  principles.    Let 


382  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

us  examine  them,  for  a  moment,  according  to  the  old 
but  still  fundamental  division  into  duty,  virtue,  and 
highest  good. 

According  to  the  principles  of  that  ethical  naturalism, 
there  can  be  no  duty  at,  all,  no  objective  moral  law, 
binding  absolutely  and  in  general.  The  motives  of 
action  are  either  the  strongest  and  most  durable  instincts, 
or,  in  case  of  high  culture,  conventional  agreement  of  that 
which  benefits  society.  In  the  one  as  well  as  in  the  other 
case,  when  the  duty  is  neglected,  the  appeal  is  not  made  to 
something  absolutely  objective  and  binding,  but  either 
to  the  highest  instinct  (and  to  this  every  individual  has 
the  right  to  answer  with  a  Quod  nego),  or  to  agreement 
and  custom;  and  as  to  this,  every  individual  has  the 
right  to  make  his  reformatory  or  revolutionary  attempt 
at  change — of  course  only  upon  the  condition  that  his 
attempt  is  successful,  and  that  it  stands  proof. 

Relatively  it  is  easiest  for  ethical  naturalism  to 
establish  a  principle  of  virtue,  inasmuch  as  we  have  to 
look  upon  virtue  as  the  principle  of  individual  perfec- 
tion, and  inasmuch  as  even  naturalism,  by  means  of  the 
indestructible  impulse  of  man  to  attain  moral  ideas,  can 
postulate  an  ideal  of  human  action.  But  on  closer 
examination  even  the  naturalistic  idea  of  virtue  vanishes 
under  our  hands.  Virtue,  as  individual  morality,  is 
constituted  of  the  factors  of  duty  and  of  the  highest 
good,  which  form  the  motives  of  virtuous  action.  Now 
a  system  of  morality  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  entirely 
wanting  in  an  objective  solid  principle  of  duty  as  the 
motive  of  action,  and  which  likewise,  as  we  shall  see 
immediately,  is  wanting  in  an  objectively  established 
highest  good  as  the  end  of  action,  cannot  possibly  pro- 


DARWINISM    AND   MORAL   PRINCIPLES.  383 

duce  any  other  idea  of  virtue  than  an  abstract  formal  one. 
In  ethical  naturalism,  even  this  form  is  subject  to  change. 
For,  according  to  this  system,  not  only  the  motive  and 
end  but  also  the  form  of  moral  action  depend  on  that 
which  in  every  circle  of  society  and  at  every  time 
proves  to  be  the  most  successful  form.  It  is  the  proof 
of  success  cr  failure  which  gives  this  form  a  certain 
traditional  authority  and  a  relative  solidity — but  only  a 
relative  one,  and  only  until  it  is  displaced  by  a  still  more 
successful  form. 

Thaf,  finally,  ethical  naturalism  is  also  wanting  in  an 
objective  end  of  moral  action,  in  the  idea  and  meaning 
of  the  highest  good,  is  indeed  not  denied  by  naturalism 
itself.  It  is  true  it  speaks  with  predilection  of  the  idea 
of  species,  which  man  is  to  represent  and  to  realize,  and 
in  that  respect  we  can  say  that  the  highest  good  of 
naturalistic  ethologists  is  the  species  or  the  idea  of 
species.*  But  the  idea  of  species  is  only  the  empty 
vessel  which  first  becomes  valuable  by  reason  of  its 
contents.  Now,  if  we  ask  ethical  naturalism  the  prop- 
erties with  which  that  idea  of  species  is  to  be  endowed, 
it  certainly  mentions  properties,  but  those  which  are 
too  rich;  namely,  it  mentions  the  idea  of  all  that  is  good 
in  human  life  and  the  forms  of  human  life,  in  concrete*, 
the  whole  sum  of  all  the  conditions  and  acquisitions  of 
the  culture  of  mankind,  art,  nature,  and  science  :  the 
comprehensive  idea  of  these  acquisitions,  the  enjoy- 
ment of  them,  the  work  at  them,  is  the  highest  good. 
Now,  since  no  human  individual  can  enjoy  them  all  and 
work  at  them  all  at  the  same  time,  every  individual,  as 

*  Compare  D.  F.  Strauss,  the  most  celebrated  moral  philosopher 
of  Monism,  in  §  74  of  his  "The  Old  Faith  and  the  New." 


384  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

to  disposition,  inclination,  and  circumstances,  has  to 
enjoy  a  part  of  them,  to  work  at  a  part  of  them,  and  to 
renounce  a  part  of  them.  And  since  each  single  one  of 
these  good  things,  however  valuable  to  the  individual, 
may  be  refused  to  or  taken  away  from  him,  he  has  again 
to  learn  to  be  satisfied  with  that  idea  of  species,  however 
little  it  is  able  to  offer  him,  when  separated  from  the  em- 
piric possessions  of  this  earthly  life.  Thus  with  natur- 
alism the  highest  good  is  either  mentioned  in  an  ab- 
straction which  does  not  offer  us  anything,  or  which,  if 
we  ask  the  meaning  of  that  abstraction,  is  instantly 
drawn  down  into  the  low  sphere  and  the  varied  multi- 
formity of  empirical  and  individual  life,  left  to  the 
chance  of  individual  taste,  and  confounded  with  that 
which  is  connected  with  the  highest  good  only  in  the 
second  line  and  in  a  derived  manner — namely,  with  the 
formations  and  actions  of  life  which  strive  at  and  serve 
the  realization  of  the  highest  good.  Ethical  naturalism 
is  not  able  to  produce  out  of  itself  an  objective  highest 
good  which  is  for  each  individual  alike  attractive,  rich, 
and  comprehensive. 

Moreover,  since  ethical  naturalism  proves  itself  insuf- 
ficient for  the  principles  of  any  and  all  morality,  it  is  but 
a  natural  conclusion  that  it  is  still  less  able  to  produce 
those  principles  which  are  characteristic  of  the  highest 
representation  of  human  morality  known  to  mankind, 
namely  :  Christian  morality.  Ethical  monism  has  no 
room  for  three  ethical  fundamental  views,  whose  full  pos- 
session morality  owes  "to  Christianity,  and  which  gives  to 
Christian  morality  its  highest  motive  power.  One  of 
these  is  a  deeper  conception  of  evil  as  a  sin,  as  a  positive 
rebellion  against  the  good ;  another  is  faith  in  a  future 


DARWINISM    AND   MORAL    PRINCIPLES.  385 

absolute  realization  of  the  highest  good  in  an  end  some- 
time to  be  reached  by  mankind  and  the  individual  and  by 
means  of  a  moral  order  of  the  world ;  and  the  third  is 
the  acknowledgment  of  the  full  worth  of  personality. 
Evil — to  which  of  course  no  objective  valid  moral  law, 
but  only  one  conventionally  established,  stands  opposed — 
is  to  ethical  naturalism  nothing  but  the  action  of  an  instinct 
which  in  this  given  case  is  not  beneficial  to  man  in  his 
struggle  for  existence  ;  the  category  of  good  and  evil  is 
entirely  replaced  by  the  category  of  the  useful  and  detri- 
mental. With  the  disappearance  of  the  idea  of  sin  as  a 
transgression  of  the  divine  law,  the  correlated  idea  of 
holiness  also  disappears  from  the  system  of  ethical 
naturalism.  Besides,  blessedness,  complete  harmony  of 
the  outer  and  inner  man  with  the  ideal  in  the  state 
of  mankind  as  well  as  of  every  individual,  complete 
realization  of  the  highest  good  for  the  whole  as  well  as 
for  the  single  through  the  means  of  moral  work  and  per- 
fection on  the  part  of  man  and  of  holy  and  loving  guid- 
ance and  endowment  on  the  part  of  God,  is  an  aim  which 
naturalism  is  not  able  to  acknowledge,  since,  according  to 
it,  mankind  and  individuals  continue  in  the  ever-flowing 
stream  of  earthly  incompletion  until  both  reach  their 
destiny  in  annihilation.  A  moral'order  of  the  world  is 
an  impossibility  to  it,  since  no  holy  and  loving  Ruler  and 
Governor  of  the  world,  but  only  a  blind  mechanism, 
causes  the  course  of  things.  Finally,  the  personality  of 
man  can  be  only  perceived  in  its  worth  and  in  its  full  im- 
portance, when,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  in  the  possession 
of  freedom,  of  full  moral  responsibility ;  and  when,  in 
the  second  place,  it  lives  beyond  the  span  of  its  short 
earthly  existence  and  may  hope  for  a  full  realization  of 
25 


386  THE   THEORIES    OF   DARWIN. 

all  its  ideals  of  virtue  and  the  highest  good  for  itself  as 
well  as  for  mankind.  Both  these  points  must  be  contest- 
ed by  monism  and  naturalism.  The  place  of  freedom  is 
taken  by  absolute  determinism;  even  man  is  only  a  natur- 
al product,  the  highest  which  naturalism  knows,  but  still 
no  more  than  a  product  of  nature ;  his  personality  and 
his  life,  bound  to  the  material  body,  cease  with  the  death 
of  this  body,  and  therefore  never  reach  the  ideal  of 
either  morality  or  blessedness.  All  ideals  are  and  must 
forever  remain  objective  illusions  which  came  forth  out 
of  the  power  of  the  corresponding  noble  impulse,  imag- 
inative objective  conceptions  of  the  moral  impulses. 

§  2.     Scientific  Darwinism  and  Moral  Principles. 

Whilst  Darwinistic  naturalism  surely  injures  the  moral 
principles,  the  Darwinistic  theories  are  friendly  to  them,  if 
they,  as  mere  scientific  theories,  restrain  themselves  with- 
in the  limits  of  natural  science.  But  in  no  other  point 
of  the  entire  realm  of  contact  between  the  natural  and 
intellectual  sciences  is  it  more  difficult  to  observe  the 
"ooundary-line  than  in  reflecting  upon  the  moral  self- 
determination  of  man ;  here  natural  science  is  always  in 
danger  of  going  beyond  its  limits. 

In  the  question  as  to  the  relation  of  the  evolution 
theories  to  religion,  the  boundary-line  can  everywhere  be 
easily  drawn  in  theory  and  easily  observed  in  practice. 
For  it  is  entirely  natural  for  man  to  look  upon  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  visible  world  on  the  one  hand,  with  a 
religious  mind,  as  works  and  actions  of  an  almighty 
Creator  and  Ruler  of  the  world,  on  the  other,  with  his  ob- 
serving and  reflecting  mind,  as  products  of  natural 
causes.  With  this  double  view,  man  by  no  means  feels 


DARWINISM    AND    MORAL   PRINCIPLES.  387 

himself  dragged  hither  and  thither  between  two  conflict- 
ing views ;  he  is  able  in  his  logical  contemplation  of  the 
world  scientifically  to  establish  and  arrange  each  for 
itself  and  both  in  their  harmony,  and  has  the  full  con- 
sciousness that  the  one,  like  the  other,  has  subjective  as 
well  as  objective  truth.  Or,  if  a  single  individual  does 
not  have  this  consciousness,  he  must  at  least  admit  that 
it  is  not  Darwinism  primarily  which  created  the  diffi- 
culty of  this  combined  view  of  the  world,  but  that  the 
latter  existed  for  man  in  the  past  as  well  as  in  the 
present. 

But  the  relation  of  the  Darwinian  theories  to  ethical 
problems  is  quite  a  different  thing.  Here,  in  the  first 
place,  it  is  not  the  same  process  which  is  to  be  explained 
as  well  in  regard  to  its  natural  conditions  as  to  its  moral 
cause.  It  is  true  that  this  double  view  deserves  atten- 
tion in  so  far  as  we  can  look  upon  every  action  which 
results  from  a  moral  determination  also  in  reference  to 
its  natural  side.  If  I  have  to  raise  my  arm  in  conse- 
quence of  a  moral  determination,  then  physiology  and 
mechanism  can  demonstrate  with  it  the  whole  theory  of 
the  motion  of  members.  But  this  is  not  the  question, 
when  we  treat  of  the  relation  between  the  natural  and 
the  ethical.  In  this  example,  the  moralist  examines  the 
motives  of  my  action,  the  scientist  describes  and  explains 
the  activity  of  the  nerves  and  muscles  of  my  arm,  and 
as  long  as  the  scientist  is  not  guilty  of  going  beyond  the 
boundary  to  which  he  is  tempted,  and  which  even  now 
we  are  endeavoring  to  make  clear,  as  long  as  he  does  not 
include  the  ethical  motives  in  his  physiological  attempts 
at  explanation,  the  one  keeps  himself  neutral  with  refer- 
ence to  the  other ;  each  of  them  knows  that  he  is  operat- 


388  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

ing  in  a  field  which  at  first  has  nothing  in  common  with 
that  of  the  other.  In  a  moral  action,  as  such,  the  ques- 
tion is  no  longer  as  to  a  process  which  is  to  be  explained 
as  well  in  regard  to  its  natural  conditions  as  to  its  ethical 
cause,  but  of  a  process  which  either  has  its  ethical  cause, 
and  then  in  its  ethical  value  no  natural  cause,  or  which 
even*  in  its  ethical  motives  belongs  to  the  causal  connec- 
tion of  empirical  nature  with  its  indestructible  chain  of 
natural  causes  and  natural  effects.  Now  at  this  point  the 
scientist,  as  such,  is  always  exposed  to  the  danger  of 
denying  the  first  part  of  our  dilemma  and  affirming  the 
second.  For,  in  moral  action,  something  which  is 
elevated  above  nature  and  its  causal  connection  always 
makes  its  way  into  this  causal  connection  of  nature,  and 
with  its  action  and  the  effects  of  this  action  wholly  enters 
into  this  connection  :  and  natural  science  which  has  to 
deal  particularly  with  this  causal  connection  of  nature 
and  with  it  alone,  is  on  that  account  nevertheless  always 
tempted  to  explain  everything  that  it  sees  coming  into 
this  connection,  in  all  its  causes  (even  in  those  which  no 
longer  belong  to  this  natural  causal  connection),  out  of  it. 
It  is  therefore  always  tempted  to  trace  even  ethical  action 
which,  with  its  deeds,  makes  its  way  and  enters  into  this 
causal  connection,  but  which  with  its  motives  stands 
above  it,  as  to  its  motives,  back  to  a  natural  causal  con- 
nection ;  and  thus  to  contest  the  independence  of  ethical 
motives  and  their  principles — which  independence  is  not 
dependent  on  nature,  but,  on  the  contrary,  frequently 
contradicts  it.  Ethics  must  adhere  to  the  fact  that  the 
ethical  determination  of  the  will  has  its  origin  not  in  a 
natural  condition,  but  in  the  ethical  centre  of  personality ; 
although  all  the  conditions  under  which  the  ethical  motive 


DARWINISM    AND   MORAL   PRINCIPLES.  389 

originates  and  acts,  belong  completely  to  the  causal  con- 
nection of  natural  life,  in  which  man  himself  stands  as 
to  the  whole  natural  part  of  his  being.  The  ethical 
realm  stands  above  the  natural  realm,  and  shows  its 
superiority  partly  by*  the  category  of  moral  demands 
whose  imperativeness  cannot  have  grown  out  of  the 
mechanical  necessity  of  the  natural  law,  because  it  often 
•enough  contradicts  the  latter  and  carries  out  its  demands 
in  opposition  to  it,  partly  by  the  consciousness  of  indi- 
vidual responsibility  which  cannot  be  got  rid  of  even  by 
him  who  mentally  establishes  a  system  of  determinism 
that  denies  responsibility,  partly  by  the  voice  of  the 
Injured  conscience  which  cannot  merely  be  the  dislike  of 
a  dissatisfied  higher  natural  impulse,  when  it  can  speak 
of  the  same  action  for  years,  even  for  an  entire  human, 
life,  and  even,  where  man  has  counterbalanced  that  once 
felt  dissatisfaction  of  the  higher  impulse,  by  an  oft-re- 
peated satisfaction  of  it.  In  Book  I,  Chapter  V,  §  1, 
we  tried  to  show  that  even  Darwin  seems  not  to  have 
entirely  avoided  this  danger  of  explaining  the  moral 
from  physical  causes  ;  while  at  the  same  time  we  acknowl- 
edge that  he  otherwise  esteems  the  realm  of  the  moral, 
and  that  he  even  finds  the  lofty  position  of  man  above 
the  animal  world  still  more  decidedly  expressed  in  his 
moral  than  in  his  intellectual  qualities. 

But  such  an  intrusion  of  the  physical  into  the  ethical 
is  by  no  means  a  necessary  consequence  of  scientific 
Darwinism — only  an  ever-present  temptation  of  it.  He 
who  once  admits  that  even  by  means  of  development 
something  new  can  originate,  that  even  under  the  full 
influence  of  the  evolution  theory  there  appeared  in  the 
series  of  creation  entirely  new  phenomena  with  the 


390  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

appearance  of  life  and  the  organic,  and  of  sensation  and 
consciousness,  and  still  more  with  the  appearance  of  self- 
consciousness  and  freedom,  which  phenomena  no  evolu- 
tion theory  is  able  to  explain  ;  and  he  who  takes  into 
consideration  the  weight  of  that  other  obvious  fact  that, 
in  the  origin  and  the  growth  of  each  single  man,  a  time 
in  which  he  acts  with  moral  responsibility  follows  in 
gradual  development  a  time  in  which  he  had  but  the 
value  and  the  life  of  a  cell, — such  an  one  can  explain  the 
whole  origin  of  mankind  according  to  the  evolution  the- 
ory, and  yet  see  something  absolutely  new  coming  forth 
with  the  appearance  of  moral  determination.  All  con- 
ditions of  the  moral  determinations  of  the  will  may  be 
and  are  naturally  conditioned,  as,  indeed,  in  this  world 
the  entire  spiritual  life  of  man  is  certainly  bound  to  the 
conditions  of  his  corporeal  life  ;  all  preliminary  stages 
of  moral  types  which  preceded  the  temporal  appearance 
of  moral  beings,  and  which  surround  us  still,  those 
stages  which  appear  in  the  animal  world,  may  have 
preceded  and  prepared  the  way  for  the  introduction  of 
morally  responsible  beings  into  the  world  :  the  moral 
determination  of  the  will  itself  nevertheless  remains 
something  new  and  independent — something  which  tran- 
scends nature. 

If  this  fact  is  once  admitted,  then  ethics  also  has  free 
play  to  establish  independently  and  render  valid  its 
principles.  And  then  we  have  no  longer  any  reason  to 
treat  of  the  relation  of  the  different  ethical  principles  to 
naturo-historical  Darwinism  ;  for  this  relation  is  that  of 
absolute  mutual  peace. 


DARWINISM   AND   MORAL   LIFE.  391 


CHAPTER   IV. 

DARWINISM  AND  MORAL  LIFE. 

§  1.     Darwinistic  Naturalism  and  Moral  Life. 

Precisely  the  same  relationship  between  Darwinism 
and  morality,  which  we  found  in  treating  of  moral  prin- 
ciples, presents  itself  when  we  ask  about  the  relationship 
of  Darwinistic  ideas  and  moral  life  in  its  concrete  reality. 
He  who  builds  a  system  of  monistic  naturalism  upon  his 
Darwinism,  if  he  is  logical,  and  not  better  than  his  sys- 
tem, comes  into  inevitable  collision  with  concrete  moral 
life ;  while  he  who  limits  his  Darwinism  to  the  realm  of 
natural  science,  remains  in  concrete  life  in  peace  with 
morality. 

That  Darwinistic  ethical  naturalism  also  comes  into 
conflict  with  concrete  moral  life,  becomes  evident  from 
the  joy  with  which  the  advocates  ot  subversion  and  ne- 
gation greet  the  new  principle  of  the  "struggle  for 
existence,"  and  make  it  the  principle  of  their  own 
actions  and  social  theories.  This  is  not  chance  sym- 
pathy, but  is  founded  upon  the  nature  of  ethical  natural- 
ism. Of  him  who  learns  to  look  upon  himself  only  as  a 
product  of  nature,  though  highly  ennobled,  we  cannot 
expect  any  other  principle  than  that  of  following  his 
nature :  not,  indeed,  the  ideal  nature  of  man  —  for  this  is 
an  abstraction  which  man  reaches  only  by  means  of  a  long 


392  THE    THEORIES    OF    DARWIN. 

process  of  reflection — but  his  own  empirical  nature,  as  he 
finds  it  present  in  himself;  for  this  is  indeed  that  natural 
product  as  which  man  has  to  consider  himself  according 
to  that  theory.  Where  this  leads  to, everybody  knows  who 
knows  human  nature.  If  these  consequences  are  not  to 
be  found  in  all  ethical  naturalists,  and  if  they  are  per- 
haps the  least  evident  in  the  system  and  life  of  the  very 
ones  who  otherwise  teach  naturalism  the  most  logically 
(Strauss,  for  example),  we  again  most  cheerfully  admit 
that  many  men  are  better  than  their  systems,  and  that  in 
making  objection  to  a  system,  even  an  ethical  system,  we 
in  the  first  place  do  not  say  anything  at  all  about  the  ad- 
vocates of  this  system  and  their  moral  value.  Often 
enough  some  noble  and  fruitful  truth  has  been  advocated 
by  men  who  are  personally  contemptible, and  often  enough 
some  dangerous  error  is  propagated  by  men  who  are  per- 
sonally very  amiable  and  moral,  although  the  damage 
which  such  an  error  carries  Avith  it,  must  become  evident  in 
their  lives,  on  closer  observation.  Besides,  we  must  not 
overlook  the  fact,  that  what  in  a  perverse  system  is  still 
relatively  true,  and  the  thing  which  gives  it  a  relative 
vitality,  is  borrowed  from  truth  and  from  the  correct 
system ;  and  that  all  those  who  oppose  the  present  fund- 
amentals of  morality, and  especially  of  Christian  morality, 
in  a  thousand  ways  live  upon  and  consume  the  possessions 
which  they  owe  to  the  same  influences  against  which  they 
contend. 

But  to  whatever  relative  height  the  moral  nobility  of 
single  advocates  of  ethical  naturalism  may  rise,  it  is  not 
able,  at  least  not  from  its  own  principles,  to  produce 
thoroughly  moral  and  truly  cultivated  characters ;  such 
are  only  produced  where  that  which  forms  the  character, 


DARWINISM   AND   MORAL   LIFE.  393 

flows  out  of  a  spring  of  life  whose  origin  is  above  nature 
and  its  series  of  causes. 

From  this  we  see  that  for  the  most  part  a  very  low 
idea  of  personality,  a  very  low  derivation  of  the  motives 
of  human  action,  is  found  in  the  works  of  Darwinistic 
moralists — as,  e.g.,  we  have  seen  in  the  works  of  Hackel 
that  to  him  the  idea  of  a  personality  of  God  is  insepar- 
ably connected  with  the  idea  of  capricious  arbitrariness, 
and  that  he  derives  all  actions  of  all  men  from  the  mo- 
tives of  egoism. 

But  we  also  see,  from  still  more  common  evidences, 
the  tact  that  some  of  the  very  highest  blossoms  and 
noblest  fruits  of  human  virtue,  as  they  ripen  on  the 
ground  of  Christian  morality,  are  not  even  acknowl- 
edged, much  less  required,  by  ethical  naturalism.  We 
think  particularly  of  the  virtues  of  love,  of  self-denial, 
and  of  humility.  Certainly,  we  do  not  deny  that  men 
who  are  inclined  toward  naturalism  can  and  do  possess 
love  to  a  certain  degree,  but  the  highest  exemplification 
of  love,  the  love  of  enemies  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the 
word — not  only  compassion  on  the  battle-field,  but  the 
full,  forgiving,  blessing  love  which  renders  good  for  evil, 
and  even  intercedes  for  a  personal  enemy,  although  he 
may  be  the  intentional  and  successful  destroyer  of  our 
whole  earthly  happiness  —  such  a  love  may  perhaps  be 
demanded  and  admired  by  a  naturalistic  moralist  under 
the  imposing  influence  of  the  presence  of  such  a  love 
and  in  unconscious  dependence  on  the  motives  of  Chris, 
tianity  which  surround  him  ;  but  he  will  never  be  able  to 
show  from  what  point  of  his  system  it  is  to  be  deduced. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  easy  to  show  him  more  than  one 
point  of  his  system  which,  far  from  requiring  such  love, 


394  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

stigmatizes  it  as  simple  foolishness.  Such  a  fruit  only 
ripens  under  the  care  of  him  who  gave  his  life  for  us 
while  we  still  were  enemies,  and  under  the  influence  of 
the  remission  of  our  sin  by  our  Heavenly  Father. 

Moreover,  an  ethical  naturalist  can  also  accomplish 
much  in  self-denial :  he  can  make  many  great  sacrifices, 
if  he  can  thereby  reach  a  desirable  end  that  cannot  be 
reached  without  acts  of  self-denial ;  he  can  show  great 
strength  and  patience  in  a  resigned  endurance  of  the  in- 
evitable ;  and  if  we  take  into  consideration  the  possibility 
of  its  being  logically  at  variance  with  his  system,  he  may 
perform  all  that  which  the  highest  morality  requires. 
But  a  renunciation  which  is  more  than  silent  resignation, 

o 

and  which  under  certain  circumstances  can  also  become  a 
joyful  renunciation  of  all  that  was  beloved  and  dear  to 
man  on  earth,  does  not  grow  out  of  the  soil  of  natural- 
ism, and  is  possible  only  there  where  man  carries  in 
himself  a  possession  which  would  render  him  still  more 
fortunate  and  happy  than  the  idea  of  species,  and  where 
he  knows  the  cross  of  Jesus,  and  understands  the  word 
of  the  Lord:  "  He  that  loveth  his  life  shall  lose  it ;  and 
he  that  loseth  his  life  for  my  sake,  shall  find  it."  Strauss 
is  a  striking  proof  that  naturalism  is  not  able  to  estimate 
the  tasks  of  self-denial  at  their  full  importance.  In  his 
uThe  Old  Faith  and  the  New,"  although  he  speaks  with 
great  earnestness  of  moral  demands,  yet  he  deeply  de- 
grades that  which  is  connected  with  a  Christian  renun- 
ciation of  self  and  the  world,  when  he  reproaches 
Christianity  with  "a  thorough  cult  of  poverty  and 
mendicity"  (!)  and,  regarding  its  demand  for  self-denial, 
he  denies  that  it  has  any  comprehension  of  the  tasks  of 


DARWINISM   AND   MORAL   LIFE.  395 

industry,  of  the  virtues  of  home  and  family  life,  of  pa- 
triotism and  civil  virtue. 

Finally,  we  may  make  a  similar  statement  in  regard 
to  humility.  There  certainly  are  ethical  naturalists 
also  who  are  modest.  But  when  the  prophets  of  ethical 
naturalism  again  and  again  announce  that  the  great  aim 
of  all  the  discoveries  of  the  evolution  theory  is  to 
show  us  how  far  mankind  has  fortunately  progressed; 
when  their  spirit  of  devotion  is  nourished  by  Gothe's 
Promethean  word:  "  Hast  thou  not  thyself  accom- 
plished all,  thou  holy  glowing  heart?" — and  even  when 
Hackel  prints  as  the  leading  motto  of  his  "Anthropo- 
geny  "  Gothe's  poem  "  Prometheus";  when  the  struggle 
of  selection  is  also  elevated  to  a  moral  principle,  and 
the  life-task  of  an  individual  is  limited  to  creating 
elbow-room  for  himself  :  then  humility,  indeed,  is  a  virtue 
which  a  naturalist  may  acquire,  not  through  his  natural- 
ism, but  in  spite  of  it;  and  the  great  naivete  with  which, 
in  books  of  that  tendency,  haughtiness  and  passion  for 
glory  are  treated  as  something  necessarily  understood, 
and  their  own  ego  is  glorified,  is  a  much  more  logical 
result.  ' '  We  are  proud  of  having  so  immensely  out- 
stripped our  lower  animal  ancestors,  and  derive  from  it 
the  consoling  assurance  that  in  future  also,  mankind, 
as  a  whole,  will  follow  the  glorious  career  of  progressive 
development,  and  attain  a  still  higher  degree  of  mental 
perfection."  (Hackel,  "  Hist,  of  Great")  This  is  the  theme 
which  is  repeated  in  many  variations  in  all  books  of 
similar  tendency.  In  the  same  book  already  referred  to, 
we  read:  "Each  free  and  highly  developed  individual, 
each  original  person,  has  his  own  religion,  his  own  God; 
so  it  is  certainly  not  arrogance  when  we  also  claim  the 


396  THE   THEORIES    OF'  DAKWIN. 

right  of  forming  our  own  idea  of  God."  Or,  "The 
recognition  of  the  theory  of  development  and  the 
monistic  philosophy  based  upon  it  forms  the  best  cri- 
terion for  the  degree  of  man's  mental  development."  L. 
Biichner,  in  his  collec.ion  of  essays,  "A us  Natur  und 
Welt"  ("From  Nature  and  the  World  "),  dedicates  a 
long  chapter  to  self-glorification,  and  finds  confirmed  in 
himself  the  word  of  the  poet,  "Great  destinies  are  al- 
ways preceded  by  spirit  messengers";  and  he,  still 
living,  prefaces  his  own  biography  in  the  latest  edition 
of  ""Kraft  und  Stoff"  ("Force  and  Matter"),  and  on  the 
first  page  of  the  same  publishes  the  testimonial  which 
he  received,  when  leaving  the  gymnasium:  "  The  bearer 
of  this  testimonial  excelled  in  the  thorough  study  of 
literature,  philosophy,  and  poetry,  and  as  regards  style 
in  his  productions  showed  an  excellent  talent."  In  view 
of  these  things,  we  certainly  do  no  injustice  to  this  ten- 
dency when  we  deny  to  it  the  conception  of  the  idea  and 
the  practice  of  humility. 

§  2.     Scientific  Darwinism  and  Moral  Life. 

It  is  evident  from  the  peace-relation  between  mere 
scientific  Darwinism  and  moral  principles,  that  naturo- 
historical  Darwinism  also  remains  in  peace  with  moral 
life.  We  therefore  have  no  longer  to  treat  of  any 
question  of  competency  in  the  realm  of  concrete  moral 
life,  but  only  to  mention  the  points  of  contact  in  which 
both  realms,  fully  acknowledging  their  mutual  inde- 
pendence, yet  in  an  inferior  way  exercise  some  beneficial 
influence  upon  each  other. 


DARWINISM   AND   MORAL   LIFE.  397 

Moral  life  influences  Darwinism  in  so  far  as,  by  its 
mere  existence,  it  cautions  the  advocate  of  the  scientific 
evolution  theory  against  effacing  the  differences  between 
the  moral  and  the  natural,  and  against  degrading  man  to 
the  level  of  animals  on  account  of  his  connection  with 
the  animal  world.  The  naturo-historical  idea  of  evolu- 
tion, in  case  it  should  turn  out  to  be  correct,  would 
exercise  an  influence  upon  moral  life  in  a  three-fold 
direction:  First,  it  would  add  to  all  the  motives  of  the 
humane  treatment  of  the  animal  world — which  certainly 
without  it  already  has  moral  demands — a  new  one,  and 
establish  them  all  more  firmly.  Man  would  then 
recognize  in  the  animal  world  which  surrounds  him 
branches  of  his  own  natural  pedigree,  and  exercise  his 
right  of  mastery  only  in  the  sense  which  Alex.  Braun 
expresses,  when  he  says  :  "Man  consents  to  the  idea  of 
being  appointed  master  of  animals  ;  but  then  he  must 
also  acknowledge  that  he  is  not  placed  over  his  subjects 
as  a  stranger,  but  proceeded  from  the  people  itself, 
whose  master  he  wishes  to  be."  A  second  service  w^hich 
the  idea  of  evolution  would  have  to  render  to  the  form- 
ing of  moral  life,  would  consist  in  the  fact  that  it  would 
favor  all  those  ethical  modes  of  contemplation  and  those 
maxims  which  regard  the  gradual  process  of  develop- 
ment and  the  growth  of  character  as  the  relative  power 
of  influences  and  conditions,  and  that  it  would  give 
them  hints  for  the  perception  of  moral  growth,  in  like 
manner  as,  in  the  before-mentioned  parable,  the  Lord 
illustrates  the  imperceptible  and  continual  growth  of 
the  kingdom  of  God  with  the  growth  of  a  plant.  A 
third  service  which  the  evolution  theory  might  be  able 


398  THE   THEORIES   OF    DARWIN. 

to  render  to  moral  life,  would  consist  in  the  fact  that  it 
would  give  to  the  motive  of  perfection  and  progress, 
which  is  always  and  everywhere  a  moral  lever,  a  new 
illustration  and  a  new  weight  by  pointing  at  the  progress 
which  development  has  to  show  in  the  life  of  nature. 


CONCLUSION.  399 


CONCLUSION. 

If  now,  having  reached  our  goal,  we  look  back  upon 
the  way  which  we  have  traversed,  we  find  a  justification 
of  the  regret  expressed  at  the  beginning,  that  a  scientific 
treatment  of  religion  and  morality  is  compelled  to  take 
a  position  in  regard  to  theories  which  are  not  yet  estab- 
lished. We  found  the  most  different  problems — scien- 
tific, nature-philosophical,  metaphysical,  religious  and 
ethical — inextricably  mixed,  and  were  obliged,  as  one  of 
our  first  tasks,  to  make  an  attempt  at  finding  the  clew 
and  at  examining  and  testing  each  single  problem,  to- 
gether with  attempts  at  its  solution,  separately,  although 
keeping  constantly  in  mind  its  connection  with  all  other 
problems  and  their  attempts  at  solution.  We  found  our- 
selves led  into  the  presence  of  a  series  of  the  most  inter- 
esting problems,  but  not  a  single  solution  finished.  That 
very  attempt  at  solution  which  brought  up  this  whole 
question,  and  which  was  repeatedly  announced  as  the 
infallible  key  to  the  solution  of  all  scientific  problems — 
the  selection  theory — we  found  a  decided  failure,  at  least 
in  the  direction  of  the  extension  and  importance  which 
was  given  to  this  theory.  And  yet  in  spite  of  the  hypo- 
thetical nature  of  all  attempts  at  solution,  we  see  inves- 
tigators in  all  the  realms  of  natural  science  strongly 
attracted  by  the  very  promising  character  of  these  prob- 
lems and  busily  engaged  in  making  attempts  at  solution  ; 


400  THE   THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

and  we  see  even  philosophy  strongly  attracted  by  its 
interest  in  these  works.  Such  a  diligent  work  can  cer- 
tainly not  be  without  gain  ;  but  wherein  will  this  gain 
consist  ?  Will  it,  as  its  antagonists  prophecy,  be  like 
that  which  in  former  times  alchemy  brought  to  science, 
which,  indeed,  enriched  chemistry  by  an  entire  series  of 
new  discoveries,  but  did  not  find  what  it  sought,  the  one 
fundamental  element  from  which  all  the  rest  are  derived, 
which  only  confirmed,  with  a  power  acknowledged  even 
to-day,  the  old  doctrine  of  the  elementary  difference  of 
the  elements  ?  Will  the  Darwinian  investigations  thus 
also  make  all  possible  discoveries  l>y  the  way,  but  in  place 
of  that  which  they  look  for,  in  place  of  a  comiron  ped- 
igree or  of  a  few  pedigrees  for  all  organisms,  finally  only 
give  additional  strength  to  the  permanence  of  species 
and  the  unapproachableness  of  the  secret  of  their  origin  ? 
Or  can  we  derive  from  the  reasons  which  the  investiga- 
tors urge  in  favor  of  the  idea  of  an  origin  of  species 
through  descent  and  evolution,  the  hope  that  that  mys- 
terious darkness  of  prehistoric  times  upon  which  the 
works  of  our  century  have  shed  so  much  light,  will  still 
be  illuminated  even  to  the  sources  from  which  organic 
species  came,  and  from  which  mankind  also  originated? 
We  must  leave  the  decision  of  these  questions  to  the 
future  and  to  scientists. 

But  we  have  to  note  one  gain,  which  is  so  great  that 
on  its  account  we  willingly  cease  our  regret  in  regard  to 
the  unfinished  condition  of  these  theories?  for  we  owe 
the  full  enjoyment  of  this  gain  to  that  very  unfinished 
condition.  It  is  the  gain  which  rel'-yi.on  and  morality 
get  from  these  investigations,  and  which  consists  in  the 
new  and  comprehensive  confirmation  of  the  conviction, 


CONCLUSION.  401 

Svhich,  indeed,  was  established  before,  that  religion  and 
morality  —  Christian  religion  and  Christian  morality— 
rest  on  foundations  which  can  no  longer  be  shaken  by 
any  result  of  exact  investigation. 

The  triumph  with  which  the  Darwinian  theories  were 
greeted  by  many  as  the  new  sun  before  whose  rising  all 
that  mankind  kad  thus  far  called  light  and  sun  turns 
pale,  and  the  antipathy  with  which,  on  that  very  account, 
many  to  whom  their  religious  and  ethical  acquisitions  are 
a  sacred  sanctuary,  turn  away  from  these  theories,  urged 
us  to  investigate  their  position  in  reference  to  religion 
and  morality.  Now,  if  these  theories  had  produced  a 
certain  undoubted  result,  we  should  unquestionably  have 
been  satisfied  with  the  examination  of  the  position  of 
religion  and  morality  in  reference  to  this  certain  result. 
But  since  not  a  single  result  of  these  investigations  is 
really  established,  we  have  found  ourselves  obliged  to 
give  our  investigation  a  much  greater  extension  and  to 
discuss  even  all  imaginable  possibilities.  The  beneficial 
result  of  this  comparison  was,  that  religion  and  morality 
not  only  remain  at  peace  with  all  imaginable  possibilities 
of  scientific  theories,  but  can  also,  in  the  realm  of  the 
philosophy  of  the  doctrines  of  nature,  be  passive  specta- 
tors of  all  investigations  and  attempts,  even  of  all 
possible  excursions  into  the  realm  of  fancy,  without 
being  obliged  to  interfere.  It  is  in  the  realm  of  mere 
metaphysics  that  we  first  perceive  an  antagonist  whose 
victory  would  indeed  be  fatal  to  the  religious  and  ethical 
acquisitions  of  mankind:  this  antagonist  is  called  elimi- 
nation from  nature  of  the  idea  of  design.  Fortunately, 
this  metaphysical  idea  is  in  such  striking  opposition  not 

only  to  the  whole  world  of  facts  but  also  to  all  logical 
26 


402  THE   THEORIES   OP  DARWIN. 

reasoning,  it  has  everywhere,  where  man  perceives  or- 
ganization and  a  difference  between  lower  and  higher, 
especially  in  the  contemplation  of  the  world,  of  this 
cosmos  of  wonderful  order  and  beauty,  so  decidedly  all 
philosophical  as  well  as  all  exact  sciences  as  its  adversa- 
ries, it  lays  its  hands  so  rudely  and  so  destructively  not 
only  upon  the  religious  and  ethical  acquisitions  but  also 
upon  all  ideal  remaining  acquisitions  of  mankind,  that 
religion  and  morality  know,  when  fighting  this  adver- 
sary, they  are  in  firm  accord  with  all  the  spiritual  inter- 
ests of  mankind. 

This,  in  its  most  essential  features,  is  the  pleasing 
result  of  our  critical  examination  ;  and  such  a  demonstra- 
tion of  the  immovably  solid  foundation,  secure  from  all 
the  change  of  opinions  and  all  the  progress  of  discoveries 
on  which  morality  and  religion  rest,  has  still  an  entire 
series  of  further  pleasing  consequences  in  its  train. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  a  living  and  actual  proof  of  the 
fact  that  religion  and  morality  give  to  all  sciences  the 
full  freedom  of  investigation,.  The  religious  and  ethi- 
cal interest  itself  not  only  gives,  but  even  requires,  this 
freedom  of  investigation.  It  requires  it  in  consequence 
of  that  impulse  of  truth  which  religion  has  in  common 
with  every  impulse  of  knowledge,  and  which  in  itself  is 
an  ethical  impulse.  In  consequence  of  this  impulse,  reli- 
gion must  found  its  possession  on  nothing  else  than 
subjective  and  objective  truth,  and  can  look  upon  all  the 
paths  which  lead  through  even  the  remotest  realm  of 
knowledge  to  the  establishment  of  truth,  only  with  sym- 
pathetic interest.  Precisely  those  who  see  in  religion 
more  than  a  mere  expression  of  emotion,  and  all  those 
who  require  that  their  religious  life  and  the  object  of 


CONCLUSION.  403 

their  religious  faith  shall  possess  truth,  subjective  and 
objective,  cannot  commit  any  greater  folly  than  treating 
search  for  truth  in  any  other  realm  with  suspicion,  or 
even  ignoring  it.  They  only  injure  that  which  they 
meant  to  defend,  by  rendering  the  purity  of  their  own 
religious  interest  suspected,  and  by  establishing  more 
firmly  the  breach  between  religious  life  and  faith  and  the 
other  acquisitions  of  culture  and  interests  of  their  time, 
of  which  neither  religion  nor  science,  but  only  a  mis- 
guided tendency  of  their  minds  and  hearts,  is  guilty. 
How  much  unfriendly  and  unjust  judgment  has  already 
found  utterance  by  means  of  the  pen  and  voice,  in  refer- 
ence to  honest  and  meritorious  workers,  on  the  part 
of  religious  zealots  who  fail  to  recognize  that  close  rela- 
tionship of  the  religious  with  the  scientific  impulse 
of  truth !  How  often  and  how  much  does  such  a  judg- 
ment gain  great  consideration  from  a  public  of  which 
but  a  few  are  able  to  form  an  independent  opinion  of  the 
men  and  works  which  are  thus  abused  before  their  eyes 
and  ears,  and  how  much  of  the  aversion  to  the  form  in 
which  the  religious  life  of  the  present  offers  itself,  on  the 
part  of  those  men  who  are  thus  suspected,  is  in  the  last 
instance  to  be  attributed  neither  to  the  irreligiousness 
of  these  men  nor  to  the  deficiency  of  the  present  form 
of  our  religious  life,  but  to  the  repelling  effect  of  that 
unjust  treatment ! 

Another  gain  of  our  discussion,  correlated  to  that 
just  mentioned,  consists  in  the  proof  that  religion  and 
morality  have  their  autonomous  principle  and  realm 
which  is  not  at  all  obliged  to  borrow  the  proof  of  its 
truth  from  the  present  condition  and  degree  of  our 
knowledge,  but  carries  it  in  itself,  although  it  stands  in 


THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

fruitful  reciprocal  action  with  all  the  other  realms  of 
knowledge  and  life.  Just  as  decidedly  as  we  had  to  cau- 
tion the  advocates  of  religion  against  keeping  themselves 
indifferent,  suspicious,  or  even  hostile,  regarding  the  ad- 
vances into  the  realm  of  secular  knowledge,  so  decidedly 
do  we  like  to  see  the  workers  in  the  realm  of  the  knowl- 
edge of  nature  cautioned  against  confusing  points  of 
view,  in  thinking  that  they  can  through  their  scientific 
knowledge  purify  and  reform  the  religious  and  ethical 
realms.  They  may  purify  and  reform  as  much  as  they 
please,  but  only  in  their  own  realm.  The  only  thing 
they  are  able  to  reform  is  our  knowledge  of  nature,  and 
in  our  religious  and  ethical  life  and  perception  only  that 
which  belongs  to  this  natural  part;  but  this  is  only  the 
outer  part  of  religious  and  ethical  life  :  the  source  of  our 
religion  and  morality  springs  from  quite  another  ground 
than  that  which  they  cultivate. 

A  third  gain  from  our  discussion  is  the  actual  proof 
of  the  harmony  between  faith  and  knowledge,  between  the 
religious  and  the  scientific  mews  of  the  world.  In  our 
investigation  we  had  no  occasion  for  psychological  or 
theoretical  investigations  as  to  faith  and  knowledge  and 
their  mutual  relation;  but  if  our  discussion  is  not  an  en- 
tire failure,  perhaps  the  actual  exposition  of  a  standpoint 
on  which  faith  and  knowledge  may  live  at  peace  with  one 
another,  which  is  not  bought  by  a  sacrifice  on  either  side, 
and  which  does  not  consist  in  a  compromise  of  the  two, 
but  which  has  its  reason  in  the  deepest  .and  most  active 
interest  of  the  one,  in  the  full  and  unconstrained  freedom 
of  the  other,  a  stronger  proof  for  the  intimate  relation- 
ship of  these  brothers,  between  whom  the  present 
generation  wishes  too  often  to  sow  discord,  than  if  we 


CONCLUSION.  4<  >.") 

had  undertaken  long  religio-philosophical  and  theoreti- 
cal investigations. 

Finally,  the  results  of  our  analysis  have  given  us  still 
another  gain:  they  have  led  us  beyond  Leasing" s  '"Nathan"' 
and  his  parable  of  the  u Three  Rings.1'  We  call  this  a 
gain,  without  the  least  intention  of  discrediting  by  it  the 
motives  of  tolerance  and  the  points  of  view  for  the  judg- 
ment of  the  character  and  religiousness  of  human 
individuals,  which  lay  in  that  parable,  or  suspecting 
the  motives  of  so  many  of  our  contemporaries  whose 
religio-philosophical  judgment  is  entirely  expressed  in 
that  parable.  We  saw  ourselves  compelled  to  make  a 
choice  either  of  accepting  or  of  rejecting  ends  in  the 
world,  and  found  that  the  world  resolves  itself  into  a 
senseless  game  at  dice,  and  that  the  phenomena  become 
more  unintelligible  the  more  important  they  are,  if  we 
ignore  or  even  reject  teleology.  The  acknowledgment 
of  the  latter  prevented  us  from  seeing  in  the  world  and 
its  events  merely  the  eternal  stream  of  planless  coming 
and  going ;  it  prevented  us  from  accepting  such  an  end- 
less stream  of  appearance  and  disappearance,  and  there- 
fore also  an  endless  stream  of  the  appearance  and 
disappearance  of  new  forms  of  religion  in  that  creature 
for  whose  appearance  we  see  all  other  creatures  are  only 
a  preparation,  and  are  even  obliged  to  look  upon  them  as 
a  preparation  in  accordance  with  no  other  theory  more 
than  that  of  evolution.  It  also  urged  us  to  inquire  as  to 
the  ends  and  designs  of  mankind,  and  we  found  this  end 
in  the  disposition  of  man  for  a  communion  with  God,  for 
the  state  of  bearing  his  image  and  of  being  his  child. 
Now  we  have  fully  to  acknowledge  that  Christianity,  like 
all  religions  which  claim  truth  and  universal  acceptance, 


406  THE  THEORIES  OF  DARWIN. 

is  to  be  analyzed  with  the  very  same  means  of  science  as 
all  phenomena  in  the  world  of  facts,  and  that  therefore  it 
is  especially  subject  to  all  investigations  of  religio-philo- 
sophical,  religio-historical,  and  historical  criticism,  to  its 
fullest  extent.  But  precisely  such  an  analysis  of  Chris- 
tianity leads  us  to  a  result  which  elevates  Christian  re- 
ligion high  above  all  other  forms.  It  also  confirms  by 
means  of  science  what,  indeed,  is  established  to  a  Chris- 
tian mind  as  certainty  from  his  own  direct  experience, that 
the  quintessence  of  that  which  Christianity  offers  us,  is 
truth  and  ^ives  full  satisfaction  to  soul  and  mind.  For  that 

r^ 

analysis  establishes,  in  the  first  place,  that  Christianity 
shows  us  the  idea  of  God  and  the  nature  and  destiny  of 
man  in  a  purity  such  as  no  other  religion  does,  and  in 
such  a  life-creating  power  that  it  is  able  to  satisfy  most 
completely  all  the  nobler  desires  and  impulses  of  soul 
and  mind,  and  to  overcome  most  successfully  all  ignoble 
ones.  Furthermore,  it  shows  us  that  these  gifts  of 
Christianity  offered  themselves,  and  still  offer  themselves, 
not  ou\y  in  philosophemes  and  doctrines,  in  parables  and 
myths,  in  postulates  and  prophecies,  but  what,  indeed, 
is  not  the  case  in  any  other  religion,  in  an  arranged 
course  of  deeds  and  facts  which,  in  everything  that  is 
necessary  and  essential  for  the  acquisition.of  that  idea  of 
God  and  for  the  realization  of  that  ideal  of  mankind, 
legitimate  themselves  to  criticism  as  historical  facts,  and 
which  legitimate  themselves  as  actions  of  divine  man- 
ifestation by  the  fact,  that  they  and  their  consequences 
also  are  really  able  to  fulfill  what  they  promise,  and  to 
bring  mankind  nearer  to  the  accomplishment  of  that 
goal  which  they  set  up  for  it.  Finally,  it  shows  us, 
when  it  reviews  and  compares  the  development  of  cul- 


CONCLUSION.  407 

hire  among  all  mankind,  that  the  Christian  nations  have 
really  borne  the  richest  blossom  and  fruit  which  has 
appeared  hitherto  on  the  tree  of  mankind,  and  that 
"Christianity,  for  the  life  of  nations,  has  not  only,  like 
other  religions,  powers  of  preservation,  but  also  powers 
of  renovation  and  renewal  which  other  religions  are 
wanting.  Even  all  the  errors  of  superstition  and  im- 
morality, of  intolerance  and  lust  of  power,  of  so  many 
of  its  advocates  and  confessors,  at  which  the  adversaries 
of  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  so  willingly  point, 
are  but  a  confirmation  of  its  value.  For  they  show  us 
how  divine  and  heavenly  the  gift  must  be,  if  even  such 
errors  were  not  able  to  smother  its  fruits.  If  we  do 
not  wish  to  suppose  that  mankind  has  foundations  and 
ends  which  up  to  the  present  it  is  not  yet  allowed  to 
know,  we  certainly  must  look  for  these  foundations  and 
ends  where  we  find  the  best  which  has  so  far  been  given 
to  mankind  and  which  has  been  accomplished  by  it. 

This  acknowledgment  of  Christianity  as  the  only 
true  and  only  really  universal  religion  leads  us  beyond 
another  sentiment  of  Lessing,  which  has  found  an  equally 
strong  or  perhaps  still  stronger  echo  in  the  mind.  We 
mean  the  expression  that,  if  he  had  to  choose,  he  would 
prefer  the  continual  search  for  truth  to  the  possession  of 
truth  itself.  We  emphatically  acknowledge  the  holy 
right  and  the  high  nobility  of  this  impulse  of  investiga- 
tion and  activity,  but  we  need  not  buy  its  acknowledg- 
ment and  satisfaction  at  the  price  of  being  obliged  to 
renounce  a  consciousness  01  the  hope  of  a  consciousness 
which  is  equally  indispensable  to  our  inner  happiness  as 
that  impulse  of  investigation,  and  which  first  gives  to  this 
impulse  its  overwhelming  power — namely,  the  conscious- 


408  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

ness  and  the  hope  of  really  possessing  the  truth.  For, 
in  fact,  \ve  are  not  required  to  make  this  choice.  There 
is  a  possession  of  truth  which  does  not  exclude,  but 
requires,  the  search  for  truth  :  that  is  the  possession  of 
truth  in  the  answer  to  the  questions  as  to  the  starting 
point  and  the  goal  of  our  life,  the  possession  of  truth  in 
the  fundamentals  of  our  religious  view  of  the  world.  It 
is  the  certainty  about  the  starting-point  and  goal  of  our 
life,  which  lastingly  and  effectively  invites  us  also  to  look 
for  and  perceive  all  the  ways  which,  in  theory  as  well  as 
in  practice,  lead  from  a  firm  starting-point  to  a  certain 
end,  and  only  the  possession  of  truth  in  the  fundamentals 
of  our  religious  view  of  the  world  gives  value  and  satis- 
faction to  investigation  in  a  world  which,  without  this 
possession,  contains  for  us  only  transitory  and  fleeting, 
and  therefore  only  unsatisfactory,  things,  but  which 
stands  before  us  as  the  work  and  the  theatre  of  revela- 
tion of  a  God  and  Father,  and  therefore  gives  to  investi- 
gation inexhaustible  joy  and  satisfaction  when  we  look 
upon  it  from  these  stand-points. 

In  like  manner  as,  at  the  outset  of  our  investigation, 
we  perceived  in  organic  species  creations  of  God,  and  in 
spite  of  this,  or  rather  on  account  of  it,  looked  upon 
the  attempts  at  exploring  their  origin  with  so  much 
deeper  interest,  we  also  see  ourselves,  in  the  still  more 
direct  religious  realm,  not  at  all  condemned  to  stagna- 
tion when  we  acknowledge  Christianity  as  absolute 
religion.  This  very  acknowledgment  alone  makes  a 
real  progress  possible  for  us.  For  every  progress,  in 
order  to  be  a  real  progress,  needs  a  firm  starting-point 
and  a  certain  goal;  hence  that  which  is  shown  and 
offered  to  mankind  in  Christianity.  From  this  starting- 


CONCLUSION.  409 

point  and  toward  this  end  there  are  tasks  enough  for 
religious  progress.  The  ever  more  definite  investigation 
of  the  facts  and  doctrines  of  Christianity,  the  improve- 
ment and  ever  more  complete  reproduction  of  the 
scientific  image  in  which  these  facts  and  doctrines  are 
reflected  in  the  mind  of  man,  the  progressing  adaptation 
of  ecclesiastical  life  in  divine  service  and  organization 
to  the  substance  and  the  need  of  Christian  religiousness, 
the  harmonizing  of  our  possession  of  faith  with  all 
other  elements  of  culture  of  each  period,  the  working 
up  of  that  which  is  given  to  us  in  Christianity  into  the 
spiritual  and  ethical  acquisition  of  a  single  personality 
and  its  ever  more  complete  representation  and  realiza- 
tion in  the  individual  and  the  common .  life,  the  pro- 
gressing penetration  of  generations  by  the  transfiguring 
light  of  religion  and  morality,  and  the  progressive  over- 
coming of  the  likewise  progressingly  developing  king- 
dom of  evil — in  short,  all  that  which  the  language  of 
religon  calls  the  growth  of  the  kingdom  of  God,  is  work 
and  progress  enough,  but  certainly  work  and  progress 
on  the  ground  of  a  certain  basis  as  the  starting-point 
given  to  us  by  God,  and  work  and  progress  toward  a 
certain  goal  set  for  us  by  God. 

It  is  only  from  this  basis  of  a  possession  of  truth  as 
it  is  offered  to  us  by  Christian  theism,  and  by  the  facts 
of  redemption  and  of  a  reconciliation  of  man  with  God, 
that  the  breach  between  faith  and  knowledge,  between 
religion  and  the  life  of  culture,  which  at  present  takes 
place  in  so  many  a  heart  and  mind,  can  be  healed  ;  and, 
far  from  seeking  to  cripple  or  hinder  those  who  stand 
on  this  basis,  it  alone  gives  to  their  theoretical  and 
practical  activity  its  joyous  strength  and  certain  end,  to 


110  THE    THEORIES   OF   DARWIN. 

their  sphere  of  knowledge  its  universal  breadth.  The 
Apostle  Paul,  at  the  end  of  1  Corinthians,  xv,  when  he 
takes  a  comprehensive  view  from  the  highest  points  of 
Christian  hope  to  which  he  found  himself  led  from 
those  fundamentals,  knows  of  no  fitter  words  to  conclude 
with  and  to  give  it  a  practical  application  than  these: 
"Wherefore,  my  beloved  brethren,  be  ye  steadfast,  un- 
moveable,  always  abounding  in  the  work  of  the  Lord, 
forasmuch  as  ye  know  that  your  labour  is  not  vain  in 
the  Lord." 


7410759 


3 1378  00741  0759 


BL263 

S34z 

1883 


!he  theories 


59673 
of  Darwin 


.sophy. 


.iBRARY 


